Iamblichi Chalcidensis

In Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum Fragmenta

Edited with Translation and
Commentary
by
John M. Dillon

LEIDEN
E. J. BRILL
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JOHN M. DILLON

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PREFACE

This is the amplification and revision of a doctoral dissertation, 'The Fragments of Iamblichus' *Commentary on the Timaeus*', presented at the University of California at Berkeley in 1969, and no doubt it will be seen to bear many traces of its origins. Being now three years older and proportionately, I hope, wiser in the history of Platonism, I think that it was a formidable task for a beginner to undertake. However, ignorance then lent strength to my purpose, and the thing was done. The present work has benefited, I think, from my increased knowledge, but would still, no doubt, have profited from further delay and reflection.

On the other hand, there is no question, at least among the growing body of students of Neoplatonism, that the fragments of Iamblichus' lost works urgently require collection and publication, and his reputation merits the modest rehabilitation that will result from this. I hope that this first instalment will do something to raise him from the status of a third-rate magician to that of, perhaps, a philosopher of the second rank.

There is still much to be done. I hope to follow this with another volume or volumes, comprising the fragments of his commentaries on Aristotle, of his *De Anima* and *Letters*, and of his other works. I trust that this intention will not go the way of many similar intentions expressed throughout the history of scholarship. Already, for instance, at least two men before myself declared their intention of collecting the fragments of Iamblichus—G. Mau, in his RE article on Iamblichus, and one Kintrup, as reported by Kroll in his appendix to Mau's article: "Über die Bedeutung des Iamblichos wird sich besser urteilen lassen, sobald eine kritische Fragmentsammlung vorliegt, die von Kintrup vorbereitet wird". I can trace no record of this collection, but unless Herr Kintrup was anticipating somewhat, some part of it may still be in existence somewhere, possibly in Münster, where Kroll seems to have been at the time. The First World War may have dealt a fatal blow to the plans of both these scholars.

Even as this work goes to press, a most valuable survey of Neoplatonism has appeared by Professor R. T. Wallis which, in Ch. 4, gives a better account of Porphyry and Iamblichus than has

hitherto appeared. Soon we will have the new Budé edition of Damascius' *Dubitationes et Solutiones* from Mlle. Galperine, to supersede Ruelle. Soon, also, a useful collection of, and commentary on, the fragments of the baffling Theodorus of Asine may be expected from Dr. W. Deuse. We can look forward in the next years to the completion of the Saffrey-Westerink edition of Proclus' *Platonic Theology*, to free us from Aemilius Portus, and to the completion of Henry and Schwyzer's Plotinus. As for the *Chaldaean Oracles*, they have at last received a proper format and useful commentary from É. Des Places.[1]

This survey of work in progress is intended simply to show the relatively primitive stage at which Neoplatonic studies still remain. There are a number of gaps yet to be filled. There is still, for instance, no collection of the fragments of Porphyry. Proclus' *Commentary on the Parmenides* could do with a modern critical edition. Some kind of lexicon of Neoplatonic Greek might follow the establishment of the basic texts. I only hope that the present work may serve as a small contribution to the clarification of Neoplatonic studies.

My thanks go to Professor Gerson Rabinowitz of Berkeley, who first suggested to me the need for such a collection of fragments, and who subsequently made many useful suggestions; to Professor Thomas G. Rosenmeyer, of the same university, who provided much helpful criticism and encouragement at every stage of the work; to Professor L. G. Westerink of SUNY at Buffalo, and to Father H. D. Saffrey, for being so kind as to look over portions of the work, and make invaluable comments and corrections. None of these benefactors, of course, can be held responsible for the remaining inadequacies. I am also most grateful to my friend Peter Garnsey of Berkeley for reading over the section of the introduction on Iamblichus' life from a historian's point of view, and giving much helpful advice. Last but not least, I gratefully acknowledge my debt to my wife for typing the whole of this work at least twice, patiently deciphering my afterthoughts and insertions, and sternly correcting stylistic lapses.

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[1] Des Places' edition, with its useful appendices containing the relevant works of Psellus, was only available to me in the latter stages of my work, which will explain certain rather awkward additions.

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE

LIFE AND WORKS

I. Life

Any biography of Iamblichus must begin with the complaint that we know virtually nothing about the subject.[1] We chiefly rely on a biography by Eunapius, in his *Lives of the Sophists*,[2] from which solid information can be extracted only with difficulty and in small amounts. Nevertheless by examining each passage of this meagre source with care, certain data of value can be amassed. Let us begin at the beginning:

πατρὶς δὲ ἦν αὐτῷ Χαλκίς· κατὰ τὴν <Συρίαν τὴν> Κοίλην προσαγορευομένην ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις.

Syria in the time of Iamblichus' birth (c. 245 A.D.) had behind it almost 300 years of peaceful prosperity under Roman rule.[3] The Romans, following on Pompey's conquest in 64 B.C., imposed initially a loose control over the collection of statelets which sprang from the collapse of the Seleucid Empire. The Roman governor in Antioch preserved peace and collected tribute, but there was a large measure of self-government for Greek cities, and numerous local potentates were allowed to maintain an autonomous existence. The client kings were absorbed into the imperial structure around the beginning of the 2nd Century A.D., when the period of Syria's greatest prosperity begins.

For our purpose it will be enough to consider the North of Syria and the valley of the Orontes. The Orontes valley, when properly drained and irrigated, is an extremely rich and fertile area, and during the Roman age it seems to have been intelligently cultivated. The cities of the Orontes valley, Emesa, Apamea, and Antioch, enjoyed a prosperous and intellectually lively existence during this period, culminating in the latter half of the 2nd Cent.

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[1] e.g. Mau in RE 'Iamblichos'; Zeller, *Phil. d. Gr.* III^2 p. 613, note 2.

[2] pp. 457-61, Boissonade. Most recent edd. W. C. Wright, L.C.L. (with Philostratus); G. Giangrande, Rome 1956.

[3] For detailed studies see E. S. Bouchier, *Syria as a Roman Province*, 1916; F. M. Heichelheim, 'Syria', in *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, ed. Tenney Frank, 1938; Franz Cumont, in *CAH* XI, ch. 15.

The accession to the Imperial throne of a native of Emesa, Varius Avitus Bassianus ('Elagabalus') in 218 A.D. was a curious accident, perhaps, but not really disproportionate to the distinction of this part of the Roman world. Antioch was one of the most brilliant cities in the empire, and Apamea had in the century before Iamblichus produced, among other men of letters, the distinguished philosopher Numenius.

Iamblichus was born, as Eunapius tells us, in Chalcis 'in Coele Syria'. This is a potentially ambiguous statement, as the name Coele Syria referred to different areas at different times, in each of which there is a town Chalcis. Originally it took in southern Syria, but when Septimius Severus divided up the Syrian command in 194 A.D., he termed the *northern* province Coele, the southern Phoenice. Eunapius, then, writing towards the end of the 4th Century, could mean by 'Coele' only one thing. Iamblichus' home town is therefore Chalcis ad Belum, modern Qinnesrin, a strategically important town to the east of the Orontes valley, on the road from Beroea (Aleppo) to Apamea, and from Antioch to the east. The *Limes* of Chalcis played an important part in Roman defensive strategy.[1] In 256 A.D., in Iamblichus' childhood, the Persian king Sapor broke through the Roman defenses here, τὸ λίμιτον Χαλκίδος, and pillaged the whole north of Syria, including Antioch (Malalas, *Chron.* 295-6). We do not know how Iamblichus' family weathered this onslaught. They may well, if they were pro-Roman, have retreated before it temporarily. The 3rd Century was a disturbed period in which to grow up, particularly in northern Syria.

Iamblichus was an honourable name in this region, first borne (to our knowledge) by our Iamblichus' remote ancestor (see below), the phylarch of Arethusa and Emesa (Cic. *ad fam.* 15, 1, 2), slain at the battle of Actium in Antony's fleet. His son of the same name was restored by Augustus to Emesa in 20 B.C. In the second half of the second century (c. 165 A.D.) flourished the novelist Iamblichus, also of Syrian extraction, author of 'Babyloniaca'.

Our philosopher ἦν καὶ κατὰ γένος μὲν ἐπιφανὴς καὶ τῶν ἁβρῶν καὶ εὐδαιμόνων.

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[1] See R. Mouterde and A. Poidebard, *Le Limes de Chalcis*, Delegation Generale de la France au Levant, Archaeologique et Historique, Tome XXXVIII 1945.

It is remarkable that this Semitic name,[1] should be clung to by a distinguished family when so many of the rest of the well-to-do known to us had long since taken Greek names.[2] There were in fact ancestors of which the family could be proud. We learn from Photius (*Bibl.* cod. 181) that Iamblichus traced his ancestry to Sampsigeramos and Monimos, 'ἄνδρας τὰ πρῶτα τῆς εἰδωλολατρούσης ἀσεβείας ἀπενεγκαμένους'. These are both distinguished names in the Syrian region. Sampsigeramos was the founder of the line of priest-kings of Emesa, (Str. XVI, 2, 10) active in the 60's of the 1st Century B.C. and later. He is the father of the first Iamblichus mentioned above. Sampsigeramos was not necessarily the first of his line, merely the first to assert independence from the collapsing Seleucids. His descendants continued to rule Emesa until the reign of Domitian, and even thereafter were dominant in the area (v. inscrr. in *Inscriptions Grecques et Latines de la Syrie* V 2212-2217; Malalas, *Chron.* 296).

Monimos is more difficult to identify, although it was a common Syrian name (= Arabic *Mon'eim*, e.g. IGLS V 2079, 2382, 2383). No suitable Monimoi come to view, however, in the royal line of Emesa. There was a *god* Monimos worshipped in Emesa, as we learn from Julian, (*Or.* IV 150 D), who declares that he has all his information from Iamblichus, but the truth lies, perhaps, in another direction. Stephanus of Byzantium records, under the rubric Χάλκις, 'τετάρτη, πόλις ἐν Συρία, κτισθεῖσα ὑπὸ Μονικοῦ τοῦ Ἄραβος'. Monikos is not a name which I find recorded elsewhere, and I am much tempted to emend this to Μονίμου. The alteration is small, and would provide Iamblichus with a very suitable ancestor, none other than the founder of his native city.

It has proved difficult to decide when Iamblichus was born, but the tendency has been, in the most recent discussions of the subject, to push his birth back much earlier than the traditional

[1] The original form of his name is Syriac or Aramaic, '*ya-mliku*'. The second element is plainly the root meaning 'king', or 'rule'. The first element is probably simply the third person singular prefix of the Indicative. The whole would then mean '(El) is king'.

[2] Porphyry, admittedly, had a Phoenician name, Malkhos, which Amelius 'translated' into Greek for him, probably playfully, when Porphyry came to Rome (VP 17). He must then have taken on the name 'Porphyrios', on the basis of its connexion with kingship. Among prominent Syrians, only the Palmyrenes seem to have clung to their Semitic names (cf. Barbieri, *L'Albo Senatorio da Settimo Severo a Carino*, p. 451.

date of c. 265-280. Suidas fixes his *floruit* in the reign of Constantine (306-337 A.D.) which, assuming a conventional *floruit*-age of 40, puts his birth at 265 A.D. at the earliest. Schmid-Stählin (*Gesch. d. Griech. Lit.* II: 2^6 (1924), p. 1052) place his birth at 280 'at the latest', while S. Impellizzeri, (*La Letteratura bizantina* (1965) p. 107) suggests a life of '*circa* 275-320'. (I owe these references to Alan Cameron's article, cited below.).

Important in this connexion are Bidez' article "Le Philosophe Iamblique et son École',[1] and a note by Alan Cameron 'The Date of Iamblichus' Birth'.[2] Bidez shows, first (p. 32), that Iamblichus must have died before 326, not 330 as was previously assumed. His pupil Sopater left for Constantinople only after Iamblichus' death, as we know from Eunapius, and was already in the confidence of Constantius shortly after the assassination of Crispus and Fausta (326/7).[3] Bidez then points out that Iamblichus' anonymous correspondent, author of the letters of Pseudo-Julian (which Bidez rescued from the reproach of spuriousness and put to work as evidence), writing about 320 A.D., implies that the Master is an old man. At least, at the end of Ep. 187 (Bidez-Cumont), he prays that Iamblichus may be conveyed ἐς τὸ ἀκρότατον τοῦ γήρως, which seems to imply that he has proceeded fairly far in that direction already. From this Bidez argues that Iamblichus can hardly have been born later than 250.

Cameron carries the argument further, by drawing on a piece of evidence that had long been looking people in the face unnoticed. Porphyry, in his *Life of Plotinus* (ch. 9), mentions a number of lady disciples of Plotinus, one of whom is Amphicleia, τὴν Ἀρίστωνος τοῦ Ἰαμβλίχου γεγονυῖαν γυναῖκα. Now, Cameron argues, Amphicleia must have been at least in her 'teens to have been a pupil of Plotinus, and he died in 270. Probably, he adds, 268 is to be taken as a terminal date, since in that year Porphyry left Plotinus' circle for Sicily, not to return for many years. He therefore fixes Amphicleia's birth at c. 250. I would qualify this slightly by suggesting that Amphicleia may have been a ward of Plotinus', such as he is known to have had entrusted to him (*loc. cit.*), and

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[1] *REG* 27 (1919), pp. 29-40.

[2] *Hermes* 96 (1968), pp. 374-6.

[3] Sozomen, *Hist.* I 5, 1. Lydus (*De Mens.* 65, 21 Wünsch) describes Sopater as taking part with the Emperor in the inaugural ceremonies of the foundation of Constantinople in 330, so he was well established by that time.

thus may have been no more than fourteen or so in 268 or 270.[1] Admittedly, she is not spoken of as a ward, but as a female admirer. On the other hand, the subject of wards is mentioned immediately after her, so that an association of ideas is possible. Amphicleia may have been a ward who took to philosophy. The reason for this haggling over single years will become apparent directly.

Cameron points, correctly in my view, to a special force for γεγονυῖαν. Porphyry might have said simply Ἀρίστωνος τοῦ Ἰαμβλίχου υἱοῦ γυναῖκα. As it stands, the meaning surely is 'who (subsequently) became the wife of Ariston, the son of Iamblichus', that is, at some time between the death of Plotinus and the writing of the *Life* (c. 300 A.D.).

The obvious doubt that springs to mind, which Cameron does not raise, is that this may be a quite different Iamblichus from our philosopher. I feel that he is justified in rejecting the doubt, though not, perhaps, in ignoring it. Iamblichus is a distinctively Syrian name, and the chances of a second person of this name being associated with Plotinus' circle (even if only through his son) are far outweighed by those of its being the same man as our philosopher. Therefore, the chronology must be adjusted until it fits in some minimal way.

Cameron proposes a date for Iamblichus' birth of c. 245 A.D., about the latest date which would provide him with a son whom Amphiclea could credibly marry. I suggest that if we postulate a date of, say, 242, for Iamblichus' birth, and grant him a son by the age of twenty, while supposing Amphiclea to be no more than fourteen, say, in 270, we can bring down the age between Ariston and Amphiclea to about six years. If we are to use this evidence, it seems to me that we are torn between making Ariston too young and Iamblichus too old, and the date which I propose seems a reasonable compromise.

Eunapius continues:

οὗτος Ἀνατολίῳ τῷ μετὰ Πορφύριον τὰ δεύτερα φερομένῳ συγγενόμενος, πολύ γε ἐπέδωκε καὶ εἰς ἄκρον φιλοσοφίας ἤλασεν· εἶτα μετ' Ἀνατόλιον Πορφυρίῳ προσθεὶς ἑαυτόν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ τι Πορφυρίου διήνεγκεν, πλὴν ὅσον κατὰ συνθήκην καὶ δύναμιν τοῦ λόγου.

[1] This theory is vitiated, of course, if Amphicleia be taken as a daughter of the lady Gemina, just previously mentioned, but I find this unlikely. Porphyry would surely have said τὰς ταύτης θυγατέρας in 9, 1-2, had he intended us to understand this.

Zeller (*loc. cit.*) assumes that he came to Rome, began studies under Anatolius, 'perhaps during Porphyry's stay in Sicily', and then continued under Porphyry on his return. This account, which has been challenged,[1] would be made more certain if we were to take τὰ δεύτερα φερομένῳ as meaning 'standing in for', rather than merely 'who ranks next after', as Wright, the editor of the Loeb edition, takes it. In the former case Anatolius would have been the acting head of Porphyry's school when Iamblichus arrived in Rome. However, I cannot find this phrase used in this manner elsewhere, and so assume that Eunapius merely means that he was second only to Porphyry in distinction.

Eunapius is, on his own confession, very ill-informed on the details of Porphyry's life, and it seems clear enough that this lack of information extends to events concerning Iamblichus.

It seems to me to be worth reopening the question, apparently closed for subsequent scholars by the authority of Zeller (who himself was following Gustav Wolff), as to the possible identity of Anatolius, the teacher of Iamblichus, Anatolius the recipient of the dedication of Porphyry's Ὁμηρικὰ Ζητήματα, and Anatolius the Aristotelian scholar and Bishop of Laodicea.

The arguments of Wolff [2] and Zeller [3] appear to be based chiefly on faulty chronology, but also betray an unwillingness to believe that a man who became a Christian Bishop could have entered into the relationships presupposed by these identifications.

Wolff merely says (*op. cit.* p. 18): 'Anatolius Alexandrinus est, Laodicenorum ab a. 270 usque ad a. 287 episcopus, etc.', giving no further argument. Zeller gives somewhat more explanation (*loc. cit.*): "Dagegen verbietet eben dieses Verhältnis (with Porphyry, and Iamblichus in the *Theol. Ar.*) schon aus chronologischen Gründen, ihn fur Eine Person mit dem Peripatetiker Anatolius zu halten, der seit 270 Bischof von Laodicea war, denn dieser muss in der Zeit, in welcher Iamblich den Anatolius zum Lehrer hatte, längst im bischoflichen Amt gestanden haben, wenn er damals überhaupt noch am Leben war".

It seems to me that in spite of the authority of Zeller there is

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[1] e.g. by Mau in his RE article, and H. I. Marrou, in *The Conflict between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century*, ed. A. Momigliano, 1963, p. 133 n. 1.

[2] Porphyrii, *Phil. ex Or.* p. 17f.

[3] *Phil. d. Gr.* III, 2 p. 612 n.l.

no chronological reason why the Bishop of Laodicea could not have been the teacher of Iamblichus. Iamblichus' birth-date has now, I feel, been satisfactorily pushed back to before 245, while it is plain from Eusebius' chronicle [1] that Anatolius cannot have succeeded Eusebius (not the author) as Bishop of Laodicea until at least 274 and probably later. Zeller's date of 270 for his assumption of the bishopric is the result of placing too much faith in Eusebius' garbled account in HE VII 32, 21.

Since Anatolius was ordained Bishop by Theotecnus of Caesarea in order to succeed him (Theotecnus) in the diocese (Eus. *loc. cit.*) it seems to me necessary that he must have lived some time in the city, in order to earn the confidence of Theotecnus. I suggest that Anatolius did in fact attend the Council at Antioch in 270 to condemn Paul of Samosata, as Eusebius tells us, but that it was at Caesarea, rather than at Laodicea, that he tarried. The devastation of Alexandria, and of the Broucheion in particular, in 270 would constitute a powerful motive for his settling down in the centre of learning which flourished in Caesarea, very much as the great Origen had done some fifty years before.

Caesarea in the 270s, then, seems to me a very possible place for a student of good family from Chalcis to come to study under an established Aristotelian philosopher, be he Christian or no. The fact of a teacher's Christianity, except in times of active persecution, was not a matter of vital interest to potential students. It did not deter non-Christians from frequenting Origen, and Origen was a much more aggressive Christian than Anatolius seems to have been.

I suggest, then, that we should not multiply Anatolii unnecessarily. Anatolius' ordination would constitute a good reason for Iamblichus to move on, perhaps with wife and child, to Rome, in search of Porphyry, whom Anatolius will have known at Athens in the '50's, if indeed he is the same Anatolius to whom Porphyry dedicated the *Homeric Investigations*, a work of his Athenian period.

Once again, the identification should not be dismissed without good cause. It is perfectly reasonable that Anatolius should have gravitated to Athens in his youth to study under Longinus, the greatest scholar of his day, even as Porphyry did.

We do not know when Porphyry returned from Sicily to Rome.

[1] *Eusebius* flor. 4th Year of Aurelian; *Anatolius* flor. 2nd Year of Probus. (Jerome's trans.)

Eusebius, writing some time after his death (c. 305 A.D.), describes him [1] as ὁ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἐν Σικελίᾳ καταστάς, which must denote at least a considerable stay. Bidez [2] takes this as referring only to the time of the publication of Porphyry's work *Against the Christians*. He refers to himself as having returned to Rome in *Vit. Plot.* 2, but precisely when we cannot tell.[3]

That he should have already returned by the early 280's, however, is a proposition with which few would disagree, although nothing that Eunapius says forces us to assume that Iamblichus studied with Porphyry at Rome, and not at Lilybaeum. Whichever is the case, the only direct evidence we have of their association is the dedication to Iamblichus of Porphyry's work Περὶ τοῦ Γνῶθι σαυτόν.[4]

What the relationship between the two may have been we cannot judge with certainty. In later life Iamblichus was repeatedly, and often sharply, critical, of his master's philosophical positions. We can see this in the *Timaeus* commentary, where, of 32 recorded fragments in which Porphyry is mentioned, 25 are critical, only 7 signifying agreement. The *De Mysteriis* is a point-by-point answer to and refutation of Porphyry's *Letter to Anebo*, and Iamblichus' references to Porphyry in the *De Anima* are often less than reverent.[5] No doubt Iamblichus' 'Περὶ ἀγαλμάτων' (now lost) had a good deal to say in confutation of the work of Porphyry of the same name.[6] However, we must not conclude from this that Iamblichus learned nothing from Porphyry, or that they parted on bad terms. This refutation of one's predecessors was a necessary part of staying afloat in the scholastic world, then as now, and Iamblichus was enough of an original mind to have many modifications and elaborations to introduce into Porphyry's

[1] HE VI 19, 2.

[2] *Vie de Porphyre*, p. 103 n. 1.

[3] See on this matter Alan Cameron, 'The Date of Porphyry's ΚΑΤΑ ΧΡΙΣΤΙΑΝΩΝ' CQ XVII, 1967, pp. 382-4.

[4] Unless we take Iamblichus' statement in the *De Anima*, p. 375, 24 Wachs: ὡς δ' ἐγώ τινων ἀκήκοα Πλατωνικῶν, οἷον Πορφυρίου καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν, as evidence of personal acquaintance. Unfortunately, however, ἀκούω + Gen. came to be used in peculiar ways in the later period, e.g. Julian, *Or.* 5 162C, speaks of 'hearing' Xenarchus, a philosopher of the time of Augustus, and Proclus, *In Tim.* III 25, 2 Diehl, tells us τοιαῦτα γὰρ ἤκουσα τοῦ Θεοδώρου φιλοσοφοῦντος, which he cannot possibly have done in the normal sense.

[5] e.g. Stob. I 365 Wachs.

[6] Of which Bidez has assembled the fragments, *Vie d. Porph.* App. p. 1.

relatively simple metaphysical scheme. Also, contact with Plotinus was a personal experience for Porphyry, which he could not pass on, and Iamblichus' tendency to theurgy, a tendency of Porphyry himself in his youth, was not something which contact with Porphyry was sufficient to suppress. When Porphyry finally wrote his *Letter to Anebo*, very much of a recantation of his own early beliefs, as evidenced in the *Philosophy from Oracles*, Iamblichus was ready to spring to the defence with well-forged arguments.

As we do not know when (or even where) Iamblichus studied under Porphyry, so we do not know when he left him, to return to Syria and found his own school. From the very fact that he returned to Syria, as opposed to staying on in Rome as successor to Porphyry (he was, after all, so far as we know, his most distinguished pupil), I conclude that Iamblichus left Porphyry sometime before the master's death (*circa* 305 A.D.) perhaps owing to an increasing divergence of their views about the role of philosophy, or θεωρία, vis-a-vis θεουργία. Such hypotheses, however, can hardly be insisted upon.

For Iamblichus' activity upon his return to Syria we are dependent upon Eunapius' account, which, with all its fantastic anecdotes, is claimed by its author to rest on an oral tradition descending to him from Iamblichus' senior pupil Aedesius, *via* his own revered master Chrysanthius. Certain stories, Eunapius tells us, he forebore to repeat, so as not to introduce elements of fantasy into a factual narrative—an admirable sentiment indeed![1]

This account is amplified and supplemented by Bidez in his article 'Le Philosophe Iamblique et Son École'.[2] Though Eunapius is not specific, it seems from other sources that it was to Apamea, or to Daphne, the suburb of Antioch, rather than to his native Chalcis, that Iamblichus returned to found his School.[3] If one accepts into evidence (as I feel one must) the Letters of Pseudo-Julian, one might gather that Iamblichus had, by the 320's been long established in Apamea, not far from Antioch, when this correspondent was writing to him. For instance, Letter 40 Hertlein (184 Bidez-Cumont), probably to be dated 326 A.D. (see Wright,

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[1] VS 460: σφαλερόν τι καὶ θεομισὲς πρᾶγμα ἡγούμενος εἰς συγγραφὴν στάσιμον καὶ πεπηγυῖαν ἐπεισάγειν ἀκοὴν διεφθαρμένην καὶ ῥέουσαν.

[2] Quoted above, p. 6, n. 1.

[3] Praechter, 'Richtungen u. Schulen', p. 108, assumes Chalcis and Mau, in RE, is, as about so much else, uncertain.

Loeb ed. p. 254 note), is given in charge to a royal hypaspist named Julian, son of Bacchylus, Ἀπαμεύς τὸ γένος, ᾧ διὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἐνεχείριζον, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἥξειν καί σε ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναι καθυπισχνεῖτο.

Now Apamea is some distance from Chalcis, so that it would be unlikely that this soldier would know Iamblichus if Chalcis was his place of residence. Further, why send an Apamean at all, and stress the Ἀπαμεύς, if Apamea were not the destination of the letter? Again, Libanius, in a letter,[1] describes Apamea as τὴν Ἰαμβλίχου τε ἐρωμένην καὶ Σωπάτρου μητέρα, while in a speech [2] he speaks of "the choir of philosophers of Apamea, of whom the chorus-leader (Iamblichus) resembled the gods."

Apamea, after all, was the native place, and presumably place of work, of the great Numenius in the 2nd Century, and recently [3] Plotinus' senior pupil Amelius had settled there, no doubt because of his own admiration for Numenius. Amelius was dead by the time Porphyry wrote his *Commentary on the Timaeus* [4] (perhaps by 290), but he had left his library and possessions to his adopted son, Hostilianus Hesychius (Porph. *Vit. Plot.* 3), who presumably continued to live in Apamea.

On the other hand, the evidence of Malalas, *Chronographia* XII, 312, 11-12 would indicate that in fact Iamblichus was established, with a school, at Daphne, near Antioch, in the reigns of Maxentius and Galerius (305-312).[5] "Ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς αὐτοῦ βασιλείας Ἰάμβλιχος ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐδίδασκεν οἰκῶν ἐν Δάφνῃ ἕως τῆς τελευτῆς αὐτοῦ.'

Malalas conflates Maxentius and Galerius ('μετὰ τὸ ἀποθέσθαι τὴν βασιλείαν Μαξιμιανὸν ἐβασίλευσε Μαξέντιος ὁ καὶ Γαλέριος ἔτη γ').

Are we then to take this as referring to the reigns of both rulers? This hardly matters, perhaps, but to whom does αὐτοῦ refer? I take it to refer most naturally to Iamblichus, who will thus have continued teaching in Daphne until his death. We cannot

[1] *Ep.* 1389 Forster.

[2] *Or.* 52,21 (ed. Forster). A passage in *Or.* 18 (The Funeral Oration for Julian), sect. 187, is even clearer. The Apameans are taking pride in Iamblichus and Sopater: τῶν δὲ ἐν μεσογείᾳ (sc. the Apameans) ξένου τε καὶ πολίτου, τοῦ μὲν (Iamblichus) ταύτην προκρίναντος ἐμφιλοσοφεῖν, τοῦ δὲ ἐκεῖνόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἀκολουθοῦντας ἐκείνῳ πανταχόθεν ἀσμένως δεξαμένου (Sopater).

[3] In 269, Porph. *Vit. Plot.* 3

[4] Procl. *In Tim.* II 300, 24ff.

[5] See on this A. Schenk von Stauffenberg, *Die römische Kaisergeschichte bei Malalas*, Stuttgart 1931, p. 407.

credit this notice with any greater accuracy than the rest of Malalas' work, but it is at least evidence of some sort, which must be given a certain weight.

It is not, perhaps, a great issue whether Iamblichus fixed his school at Daphne or at Apamea. The two places are not far apart, and we are quite free to suppose that he at least visited Apamea frequently, and perhaps had originally established himself there on his return from Rome. His prize pupil, Sopater, was after all an Apamean, and a prominent one, who would have accorded him lavish hospitality (cf. p. 12, n. 2 above).

If we find Iamblichus in 320 as an enormously revered figure, it is reasonable to suppose that he had been by then active for some time. I have suggested that he did not necessarily stay with Porphyry until the latter's death. He was already, if my postulates are correct, a man of mature years and views when he came into contact with Porphyry, and not a young and reverent disciple. It seems probable to me, indeed, that the *De Mysteriis* is a relatively early work, written as it is in answer to Porphyry's *Letter to Anebo*, which is considered to date from his period with Plotinus (263-8),[1] on the basis of its place in his development from *The Philosophy of Oracles* to, say the *De Abstinentia*. An answer, it seems to me, would be in order as soon as Iamblichus read the work. The device of replying under the guise of the pompous figure of Abammon, Anebo's superior in the priestly college, seems a sign of youthful intellectual exuberance, as does the tone and structure of the work itself. It is well argued, certainly, but it is not well arranged, and displays a much simpler theology and metaphysics than do the Commentaries, and, presumably, than the vast work on the Chaldaean Oracles. Although Chaldaean references can be discerned,[2] the main influence seems to me to be Gnostic-Hermetic. I suggest that Iamblichus wrote it not long after 280, and that it was the first public indication of his position in defence of theurgy. I do not see that this controversy would make contact with Porphyry impossible. It is a normal enough School controversy,

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[1] Cf. Sodano, *Porfirio: Lettera ad Anebo*, Naples, 1958, Intro. p. XXXIV-XXXVI.

[2] Cf. Des Places, *Iamblique, Les Mystères d'Egypte*, Budé ed. Intro. pp. 14ff.; F. W. Cremer, *Die Chaldäischen Orakel und Iamblich 'De Mysteriis'*, Beitr. zu Klass. Phil. Heft 26, 1969, gives a most useful and comprehensive survey of the Chaldaean elements in the *De Mysteriis*.

with much heat expended and many debating points scored, but no mortal enemies made.

On the other hand, it seems to me probable that Iamblichus returned to Syria in the 290's, anxious to start up on his own. What the content of instruction was, we can only conjecture. From Eunapius we learn only marvellous tales. Nevertheless, in spite of himself, he may be able to tell us something.

"He had a multitude of disciples, and those who desired learning flocked to him from all parts. And it is hard to decide who among them was the most distinguished, for Sopater the Syrian was of their number, a man who was most eloquent both in his speeches and in his writings; and Aedesius and Eustathius from Cappadocia; while from Greece came Theodorus and Euphrasius, men of superlative virtue, and a crowd of other men not inferior in their powers of oratory, so that it seemed marvellous that he should satisfy them all." [1]

Sopater met a violent death by getting mixed up in Imperial politics, and it was left to Aedesius to carry on the School after the master's death, in a period of repression, during which the School had to go underground. He moved the School to Pergamon, (VS 465), and was succeeded on his death by Eustathius. If Theodorus may be assumed to be the well-known Theodorus of Asine, he later founded a school of his own, and his followers, if not himself, are found in the 350's casting aspersions on Iamblichus' character.[2] Euphrasius cannot be traced further.

In addition to these, we may reckon as pupils Dexippus, the author of an extant Commentary on the Categories,[3] on the basis of the evidence of Simplicius.[4] (Indeed Dexippus' Commentary constitutes good evidence for the content of Iamblichus' own); and Hierius, master of Maximus of Ephesus (Ammon. *In Anal. Pr.* 31, 16).

What was the content of instruction at the School? I suggest, on the evidence of the elementary and pedagogic form of what we may term the Pythagorean Sequence (Συναγωγὴ τῶν Πυθαγορείων δογμάτων), ten volumes of introduction to Pythagoras and

[1] VS 458, Wright's trans.
[2] Julian *Ep. 12* Bidez. (To Priscus.)
[3] CAG. Vol. IV Pars II, ed. Busse.
[4] *In Categ.* p. 2, 25 CAG. 'Δέξιππος δὲ ὁ Ἰαμβλίχειος...'

his philosophy, of which we still have four [1] (and probably the content of a fifth in the *Theologumena Arithmeticae*), that Iamblichus led his pupils to the higher reaches of philosophy through Pythagoreanism. He may in this be following the method of his teacher Anatolius, and certainly the inspiration of Nicomachus of Gerasa, from whom, indeed, much of the material in these volumes seems to be taken.

Following upon this, it is plain that there was study and exegesis of the works of Plato and Aristotle, Aristotle serving as an introduction to Plato, particularly in Logic and Physics. We have evidence of Commentaries by Iamblichus on the *Categories*, on the *De Interpretatione*, on the *Prior Analytics*, and on the *De Anima*.[2] As for Plato, Iamblichus seems to have been the first to lay down a definite number and order of dialogues to be studied. We find in the *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy*,[3] ch. 26, a course of ten dialogues (Alcibiades I, Gorgias, Phaedo, Cratylus, Theaetetus, (Sophist, Statesman),[4] Phaedrus, Symposium, and Philebus), which led to the two crowning heights of Platonic philosophy, the Parmenides and the Timaeus, the former 'theological', the latter 'physical'.[5] Of these, we have fragments or evidence of commentaries by Iamblichus on the *Alcibiades*, *Phaedo*, *Sophist*, *Phaedrus*, *Philebus*, *Parmenides* and *Timaeus*, the most extensive being those on the *Timaeus*.

We may suppose, then, that formal exegesis played a significant part in the curriculum of the School. One must also take into account the reputation which Iamblichus acquired in later times, (mainly, I feel, because of the excesses of *epigoni* such as Maximus of Ephesus in 350's), for magical practices. He must have used the Chaldaean Oracles in lectures, if we may conclude this reasonably from his enormous Commentary on the Oracles,[6] and his interpretation of them in accordance with Plato is no doubt the source of Proclus' interpretation. There is only one story relayed by Eunapius in which Iamblichus is alleged to have performed a magical act.[7] During a visit (of the whole school?) to the hot

[1] See section on *Works*, infra.
[2] For evidence of these see infra, *Works*.
[3] ed. L. G. Westerink.
[4] These supplied by Westerink, but with virtual certainty.
[5] See on all this the Comm. to *In Tim.* Fr. 1.
[6] At least 28 Books, Damascius, *Dub. et Sol.* ch. 43, Vol. I p. 86, 5f. Ruelle.
[7] VS 459.

springs at Gadara, Iamblichus, in response to insistent requests, conjured up two spirits in the forms of boys, Eros and Anteros, from two adjacent springs. On another occasion,[1] however, he is recorded as dismissing with a laugh rumours that during prayer he was wont to rise ten cubits into the air, and that his body and clothing took on a golden hue. His attempts to suppress hagiographical tendencies, however, were, given the climate of the times, doomed to scant success.

Two other stories seem to contain helpful insights. One concerns the visit to the school of a rival philosopher, Alypius.

"Now Iamblichus was waiting to have questions put to him rather than to ask them, but Alypius, contrary to all expectation, postponed all questioning about philosophy and, giving himself up to making an effect with his audience, said to Iamblichus: 'Tell me, philosopher, is a rich man either unjust or the heir of the unjust, yes or no? For there is no middle course.'"

Iamblichus disliked the catch of the question and replied: "Nay, most admired of men, this is not our method, to discuss anyone who more than other men possesses external things, but rather only one who excels in the virtue that is peculiar and appropriate to a philosopher." [2]

In other words, 'No sophistical logic-chopping here', and also, it seems, no 'political' discussion. We have a glimpse of Iamblichus here, seated in the midst of his disciples, awaiting questions. Presumably in more formal discourses he propounded the questions, perhaps picking on an interlocutor, but probably answering them himself.

We may note that Iamblichus came to have a high opinion of Alypius, and after his death even wrote his biography. Readers of his *Life of Pythagoras* will be interested in Eunapius' evaluation of this work (460):

τὰ γεγραμμένα δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς συνθήκης ἐμελαίνετο, καὶ νέφος αὐτοῖς ἐπέτρεχε βαθύ οὔ τι δι' ἀσάφειαν τῶν γενομένων, ἀλλὰ διδασκαλικὸν εἶχε τὸν Ἀλυπίου λόγον μακρόν τινα, καὶ διαλέξεων οὐ προσῆν μνήμη λόγον ἐχουσῶν.

"The narrative was obscured by its style and it was hidden by a

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[1] Ibid. 458.

[2] Ibid. 460, Wright's trans. It is possible that Alypius was making a crafty allusion to Iamblichus' own position as scion of a wealthy family.

thick cloud, though not because of any lack of clearness in the subject matter, for his authority was a long discourse of Alypius'; moreover, there was no mention of discourses that maintained an argument." (Wright's trans.).

Eunapius expands on this at some length. It is useful testimony to Iamblichus' style and literary practices, which is borne out by his surviving works.[1]

There is one other incident reported that throws interesting light on the activity of the school (again, relayed by Aedesius, via Chrysanthius):[2]

"The Sun was travelling towards the limits of the Lion at the time when it rises along with the constellation called the Dog. It was the hour for sacrifice (θυσίας καιρὸς ἦν), and this had been made ready in *one of the suburban villas* (προάστεια) belonging to Iamblichus."

The story concerns a marvellous premonition which came to Iamblichus as he and his companions were walking back to the city after the rites had been duly performed, that a corpse had recently passed by that road. He then, with his most faithful disciples, turned aside to another road, while the more sceptical went on, including Aedesius. And, lo and behold, not long afterwards they met mourners coming back from a funeral.

The story itself must fall under suspicion, if only because it resembles a similar tale told of Socrates by Plutarch in the *De Gen. Socr.* 580. The circumstances, however, are interesting. We find Iamblichus celebrating the heliacal rising of Sirius, (when the Sun is entering Leo) an important feast in Syrian sun worship.

It was a moveable feast, occurring about July 23rd,[3] and the sacrifices probably took place at dawn. It is interesting to note Iamblichus' possession of not one, but several, προάστεια, and the

[1] And yet Iamblichus did not ignore the question of style. Syrianus (*In Hermog.* I 9, 11ff.) quotes him as follows, from his work Περὶ κρίσεως ἀρίστου λόγου (see *Works*): 'δεῖ γὰρ μήτε τὸ σύντομον εἶναι ἀσαφὲς μήτε τὸ σαφὲς ἰδιωτικόν καὶ τὸ μέν σεμνὸν μὴ εἶναι ἄγαν ἐξηλλαγμένον τὸ δὲ κοινόν μὴ εἶναι εὐκαταφρόνητον, ἔχειν δέ τινα ἐξαίρετον ὑπεροχήν· τὸ γὰρ παντελὲς τοῦτο καὶ συμπεπληρωμένον τοῖς ὅλοις κάλλεσι τῶν λόγων παρ' Ὁμήρῳ τε καὶ Πλάτωνι καὶ Δημοσθένει γνωριμόν ἐστιν ἰδεῖν.

[2] VP 458-9.

[3] It is mentioned by Aratus, *Phaen.* 149-54 cf. Hipparchus, *In Arat. et Eudox.* II, 1, 18.

Pythagorean abhorrence of death which is part of the point of the story.

From the remains of Iamblichus' correspondence preserved by Stobaeus, we can observe a further circle of acquaintances, or admirers, to whom discourses, mostly ethical, in epistolary form, might be addressed.

As we have seen, by Libanius' time Apamea had acquired fame as a haunt (at least) of Iamblichus, and even in the master's lifetime he is addressed by his unknown correspondent (the Pseudo-Julian), in terms of extravagant reverence. How much 'magic' actually went on under Iamblichus' own presidency is not known, but he does seem to have started a trend which had most mischievous results in later years, until the Athenian School recalled Platonism to some sort of sanity towards the end of the Fourth Century.

II. Works

Any attempt to arrange the works of Iamblichus in definite chronological order at the present stage of research is rash in the extreme, and the same may be said of any attempt to trace his philosophical development. Nevertheless, I propose to present a provisional schema for both, which may at least serve as a basis for argument. I shall distinguish three possible stages, in each of which I shall try to place the works which I consider proper to them.

A. *Pythagorean-Hermetic Period*

This will comprise the period of his philosophical development prior to his contact with Porphyry, c. 280 A.D. Iamblichus' chief influences here will have been Anatolius, Nicomachus of Gerasa, Neopythagorean and Hermetic tracts, and perhaps the Chaldaean Oracles, which last, however, he will not have systematically Platonised.

I would assign the *De Mysteriis* to the end of this period, about 280, perhaps while Iamblichus was already in contact with Porphyry.

B. *Porphyrian-Platonic Period*

This period might be dated c. 280-305 A.D., including within it perhaps the first decade of the school at Apamea (or Daphne).

Works:

1. *De Anima.*[1] I would place this earlier than the Commentaries, and probably than the 'Pythagorean Sequence', though after Porphyry's *De Anima*, which it supplements. Besides doxographical material it contains much interesting criticism of his immediate predecessors, Numenius, Plotinus, Amelius and Porphyry, together with statements of his own views.

2. Περὶ καθόδου ψυχῆς. Lydus (*De Mens.* IV p. 167, 23 Wünsch) quotes from *Book I* of this work, which seems to make it separate from the *De Anima.* I place it next to it, but without much confidence. It may be from a quite different period.

3. The *'Pythagorean Sequence'.* I suggest that this ten-volume collection, which I term for convenience 'The Pythagorean Sequence', was for use in the School as an introduction to philosophy. I have listed the editions of surviving individual works in the Bibliography, but I will comment on their content briefly here.[2]

Volume 1: Βίος Πυθαγορικός, or *The Life of Pythagoras* (Vita Pythagorica), which might also be translated 'Life according to Pythagorean Principles'. The composition of this has been well analysed by E. Rohde in two issues of *Rheinisches Museum.*[3] He believes it to be a compilation based on two sources, (1) Nicomachus of Gerasa's *Life of Pythagoras* (used, with acknowledgement, by Porphyry in *his* Life of Pythagoras), and (2) a Life of Pythagoras by Apollonius of Tyana. This latter seems more problematical, as we have no independent evidence to go on, but Apollonius is quoted in VP 254 in such a way as to give the impression that he is *the* other source. Certainly there are two strands being combined, and this splicing, together with numerous repetitions of whole paragraphs at various places in the work, make it a most curious production. However, it serves its pedagogical and edifying purpose well enough.

Volume 2: Λόγος Προτρεπτικὸς εἰς φιλοσοφίαν, or Exhortation to Philosophy (normally termed the *Protrepticus*). A series of extracts from previous philosophers, first Pythagorean, then

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[1] Frr. in Stobaeus. Trans. and comm. by Festugière, *Rev. d. H.T.* Vol. III App. 1.

[2] On the Pythagorean Sequence see: Syr. *In Met.* p. 160, 15 Kroll CAG, and H. Oppermann, in *Gnomon* 5, 1929, pp. 545-558.

[3] *Vol. 26* 1871 pp. 554ff.; *27*, 1872, pp. 23ff. Reprinted in his *Kleine Schriften*, Vol. 2, 102ff.

Plato and Aristotle, then a perhaps 5th cent. B.C. sophist known as the Anonymus Iamblichi, and finally an interesting section on the Pythagorean symbols and prohibitions, which from the style seems original to Iamblichus, but is perhaps from Nicomachus of Gerasa. All these passages are linked by bridge-passages by Iamblichus himself, who also writes the introduction.

Volume 3: Περὶ τῆς κοινῆς μαθηματικῆς ἐπιστήμης, or 'On the General Theory of Mathematics' (*De Communi Mathematica Scientia*). This again is very much an anthology of extracts, from Plato, Aristotle and neo-Pythagorean writings, on the philosophy of mathematics, all taken without acknowledgement of their sources, and strung together with bridge-passages by the author himself.[1]

Volume 4: Περὶ τῆς Νικομάχου Ἀριθμητικῆς Εἰσαγωγῆς or 'On Nicomachus' Introduction to Arithmetic'. (*In Nicomachi Arithmeticam Introductionem*). This is a commentary on, and paraphrase of, Nicomachus of Gerasa's (surviving) *Introduction to Arithmetic*. In spite of its nature, it is in fact the most original, of the series.

None of these works is of much interest for Iamblichus' philosophy, although all are useful linguistically. It seems incredible that Iamblichus should have intended to pass off all the unacknowledged quotations, particularly from Plato, as his own, so that his habitual condemnation by scholars as a plagiarist is surely beside the point. I suggest that he was simply performing a service to his pupils, and to any other interested parties, and that the suppression of attributions was simply in the interest of literary neatness.

Besides these four surviving volumes of the original ten (which included surveys of Physics (Book V), Ethics (VI), Music, Geometry and Astronomy) we also have handed down to us an anonymous work entitled Θεολογούμενα Ἀριθμητικῆς. We know from Iamblichus himself[2] that he intended to write such a work, as the seventh volume of his Pythagorean collection. The work as we have it seems to be a compilation by some later hand of material from three sources. (1) The *Theologumena Arithmeticae* of Nicomachus of Gerasa (summarised in a hostile manner by Photius, *Bibl.* cod. 187), (2) The treatise *On the Decad and the Numbers comprised*

[1] See on this work, and its sources, Ph. Merlan, *From Platonism to Neoplatonism*, p. 25.

[2] *In Nic.* p. 125, 15ff. Pistelli.

by it by Anatolius (presumably Iamblichus' teacher), which has survived,[1] and (3) an anonymous core of material. This is linguistically similar to what we have otherwise of Iamblichus, and may with probability be ascribed to him. It is often difficult however, to separate it with certainty from Nicomachus' contributions. It is also probable that Iamblichus quoted both Nicomachus and Anatolius himself, which would have given the compilator the stimulus to interpolate extracts from them.

4. *Aristotelian and Platonic Commentaries*. These will have been in all probability the fruits of Iamblichus' lecturing in his own School, and no doubt extended over a considerable period. I place them in our second period, however, as they do not seem to be so influenced by the Chaldaean Oracles as are works of the latest period. This is, however, a provisional judgement.

We have evidence for, and in many cases considerable fragments of, the following commentaries:

I. *Aristotle*

(Iamblichus was not the first to adopt Aristotle as in essential harmony with Plato and useful as an introduction to him, but he obviously followed this practice.)

1. *On the Categories*. Numerous fragments in Simplicius' *Commentary*, p. 2, 9ff., etc. Kalbfleisch CAG VIII. Iamblichus, he tells us, was the first to employ 'Archytas' in the exegesis of the *Categories*.
2. *On the De Interpretatione*. References in Stephanus, *In De Interpr.*, p. 21, 28ff. Hayduck CAG XVIII: 3.
3. *On the Prior Analytics*. References in Philoponus, *In An. Pr. I*, p. 26, 5 Wallies CAG XIII; Ammonius, *In Anal. Pr.* pp. 31, 15ff.; 40, 16.
4. *On the De Caelo*. Reference in Simplicius, *In De Caelo*, p. 1, 24.
5. *On the De Anima*. References in Philoponus, *In De An.* p. 533, 26 Hayduck CAG XV, and Simplicius, *In De An.* p. 6, 16; 89 33ff. There may be some doubt whether these references are in fact to Iamblichus' own *De Anima*, which Simplicius in fact quotes, p.

[1] Published by Heiberg, Annales Internationales d'Histoire Congres de Paris 1900. 5e Section: Histoire des Sciences, pp. 27ff. On the *Theol. Ar.* see Oppermann's useful review of De Falco's edition (above, p. 19, n. 2), which discussed the composition of the work.

240, 33ff. Hayd. The Philoponus reference, however, seems to point to a Commentary. I leave the question open.

6. *On the Metaphysics.* References in Syrianus, *In Metaph.* p. 46, 24 etc. Kroll. CAG VI: 1.

II. *Plato*

(I take Iamblichus' own order of the dialogues as set out in *Anon. Proleg.* ch. 26. (see Comm. *ad In Tim.* Fr. 1).

1. *Alcibiades I.* Fragments in Proclus, *In Alc.* and Olympiodorus, *In Alc.*

2. (*Gorgias*: No evidence in Olympiodorus, *Comm. in Gorg.* Perhaps no commentary on the *Gorgias* before Olympiodorus' own teacher, Ammonius, pupil of Proclus.) The assumption of Mettauer, *De Platonis Scholiorum Fontibus*, pp. 22-24, that those elements in the scholia on the *Gorgias* which do not stem from Olympiodorus' Commentary must derive from a commentary by Proclus, seems to me unfounded.

3. *Phaedo.* References in Olympiodorus, *In Phaed.* p. 57, 4; 60, 20, etc. Norvin.

4. (*Cratylus.* Possible reference in Proclus, *In Cratyl.* p. 56, 15. Pasquali. Not necessarily proof of a Commentary, however.)

5. (*Theaetetus.* No evidence.)

6. *Sophist.* Summary of Introduction to Iamblichus' Commentary preserved in scholia to the dialogue.

7. (*Statesman*: No evidence.)

8. *Phaedrus.* References in Hermeias, *In Phaedr.* p. 9, 10; 68, 26 etc. Couvreur. Also Proclus, *Theol. Plat.* IV 23, p. 215 Portus.

9. (*Symposium*: No evidence.)

10. *Philebus.* References in Damascius, *In Philebum.*

11. *Timaeus.* Numerous references in Proclus *In Timaeum*, and useful quotations in Simplicius *In Phys.*

12. *Parmenides.* Secure evidence in Syrianus, *In Metaph.* p. 38, 38. Damascius, in his *Dub. et Sol.*, is certainly using Iamblichus' Commentary in the latter part of the work, but probably not in the earlier portion. In a number of places it is unfortunately doubtful whether or not he is referring to the *Commentary.* Proclus, in his Parmenides-Commentary, normally covers his traces too well to allow of certainty of attribution, but reference to Iamblichus' *Comm.* is clear in *In Parm.* VI col. 1054, 37-1055, 25 Cousin [2],

from the marginal glosses preserved in Paris. gr. 1810 fol. 178v and Laur. Plut. 85, 8 fol. 190r., cf. Proclus, *Theol. Plat.* Intro. p. LXXXII f. Saffrey-Westerink.

C. Latest Period

This might be dated tentatively c. 305-325 A.D., although we must envisage the Commentaries as perhaps extending through most of this period. I would postulate this as the period of greatest Chaldaean influence.

Works:

1. Περὶ θεῶν. This seems to have formed the basis for the theories relayed by Julian, particularly in *Orations IV* and *V* (*To King Helios*, and *To the Mother of the Gods*), and by Sallustius, in the *De Diis et Mundo*, perhaps written at the request of Julian, Sallustius being a close friend of the emperor's. Some of the speculations in Book I and the identifications of the Olympian Gods in Book IV, of the *Timaeus* commentary will probably reflect accurately the positions taken in this work. There may well have been criticism of Porphyry's Περὶ θείων ὀνομάτων, which must have dealt with the same subjects.

We have one fragment of the περὶ θεῶν in Proclus, *Theol. Plat.* I 11, p. 52, 2-13 Saffrey-Westerink, and see note p. 52 n. 1. Also a reference in Damascius, *Dub. et Sol.* ch. 61, I p. 132, 13 Ruelle, where Iamblichus is reported as making a distinction in this work, as well as elsewhere, between εἶναι and ὑπάρχειν.

2. Περὶ ἀγαλμάτων. Photius describes (*Bibl.* Cod. 215) a refutation of this work by John Philoponus. The work seems to have comprised the correct construction of statues, and the prayers to be addressed to them. No doubt it was written with reference to the work of Porphyry of the same title (of which we have extracts preserved by Eusebius),[1] correcting Porphyry's identifications and instructions. Many of the quotations of Iamblichus in Lydus, *De Mensibus*, may be traced to this work, or to the Περὶ θεῶν.[2]

3. Περὶ τῆς ἐν Τιμαίῳ τοῦ Διὸς δημηγορίας. I have given reasons (see Comm. ad *In Tim.* Fr. 34) for regarding this as a separate work from the Timaeus-Commentary. The passage which

[1] Printed in Bidez, *Vie de Porphyre*, App. pp. 1-23.
[2] Cf. J. Geffcken in *Archiv f. Religionswissenschaft*, XIX, 1919 p. 309ff.

Proclus gives us [1] reveals a far more elaborate, Chaldaean-influenced, metaphysical scheme than that used by Iamblichus in the Commentary, and indeed Proclus uses this to refute Iamblichus' treatment of the Demiurge in the Commentary. It seems to show a considerable growth of Chaldaean influence, and I am thus inclined to place it late in Iamblichus' philosophical development.[2]

4. 'Η Χαλδαική Θεολογία. This work is quoted by Damascius, *Dub et Sol.* I 86, 5, where he refers to a *28th* Book, and 154, 13 Ruelle. There may well have been even more. It must have been the *magnum opus* of this last period, if my view of Iamblichus' development has any validity. It was doubtless this work which laid the foundation for the official Platonising of the Chaldaean Oracles, which we see in full flower in Proclus and Damascius. A full unravelling of the influence of Iamblichus on all these later developments must, however, await a separate investigation.

There are in all five allusions to this treatise: Damascius, *loc. cit.*; Marinus, *V. Procli* 26; Lydus, *De Mens.* IV 159, p. 175, 8; Psellus, ap. *B.C.H.* I 1877, p. 319.

The Emperor Julian (Ep. 12 Bidez) was looking for a copy of it.

5. Θεολογία Πλατωνική, mentioned by Proclus in his *Platonic Theology* Book III xi (p. 140, 20 Portus) and probably *In Parm.* 1067, 23-34. This must have been a considerable work, but this is the only explicit mention of it.

6. Περὶ ἀρετῶν, quoted by 'Olympiodorus' B. (p. 113, 21 Norvin) as the source for Iamblichus' doctrine of the seven grades of virtue.

7. *De Providentia et Fato*, quoted by Proclus, *De Prov.* ch. 5, 2-3 Boese.

8. Περὶ συμβόλων (of the Pythagoreans), quoted in the *Protrepticus* p. 112, 2. This can hardly have differed much from the extant treatise on that subject which ends the *Protrepticus*.

9. A μονόβιβλον is mentioned by Nemesius of Emesa (*De Nat. Hom.* 51) with the title: Ὅτι οὐκ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων εἰς ζῷα ἄλογα, οὐδὲ ἀπὸ ζῴων ἀλόγων εἰς ἀνθρώπους αἱ μετενσωματώσεις γίνονται,

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[1] *In Tim.* I 308, 18ff.

[2] Cf. also Olympiod. *In Alc.*, p. 2, 4-5, Westerink.

ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ ζῴων εἰς ζῷα, καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνθρώπων εἰς ἄνθρωπα, surely a self-explanatory title if ever there was one. I am moved to wonder if this may not be the same work as that mentioned by Damascius, *Dub. et Sol.* ch. 402, II 259, 13 Ruelle, with the title Περὶ ψυχῆς μεταναστάσεως, in which various grades of soul are being distinguished. This could of course also be a subdivision of Iamblichus' *De Anima.* The title quoted by Nemesius does sound more like a sub-title.

10. Περὶ κρίσεως ἀρίστου λόγου, possibly a purely rhetorical treatise, quoted by Syrianus, *In Hermogenem* I p. 9, 11 Rabe.

11. The Panegyric of Alypius quoted by Eunapius *V.S.* 460 (see above, p. 23).

12. *Letters.* Many fragments in Stobaeus. Also referred to by Olympiodorus, *In Phaed.* p. 204, 2, and *In Gorg.* p. 221, 27.

In all, we have fragments of sixteen letters, addressed to various recipients: Sopater, Dexippus, Macedonius, Anatolius, Poemenius, Agrippa, Dyscolius, Arete and Asphalius, as well as the uncertain references in Olympiodorus. The *Letter to Macedonius on Fate,* of which there are a number of fragments, is perhaps of most philosophical importance.

This survey of Iamblichus' work may serve to give some impression of his output, even if the sketch of his philosophical development is disputed. All of the lost works still await the collection of their fragments, a collection first promised by G. Mau in his RE article in 1914, but never, it seems, undertaken. This collection of the fragments of the Platonic Commentaries constitutes a first step.

CHAPTER TWO

PHILOSOPHY

For the purpose of the present work, I shall confine myself mainly to such of Iamblichus' philosophical views as are illustrated by the fragments of his Platonic Commentaries. A proper account of his philosophy as a whole must await a close analysis of Proclus' *Platonic Theology*, Damascius' *Dubitationes et Solutiones*, and Proclus' Commentary on the *Parmenides*, from which last that element which is Iamblichean will have to be carefully isolated on the basis of whatever can be learned from all other sources.[1]

Iamblichus' system of philosophy is essentially an elaboration of Plotinus's Platonism, though strongly influenced by Neopythagorean writings and the Chaldaean Oracles. Besides his teacher Anatolius, the writings of his fellow-countryman Nicomachus of Gerasa (c. 120-196[2] A.D.) influenced him greatly. We find him making much use of the writings of 'Archytas', for instance, in his *Commentary on the Categories* and in the *Protrepticus*, and of other Neopythagorean apocrypha. He believed, with Moderatus of Gades, that Plato was essentially a Pythagorean, and he pays great respect to Speusippus for the same reason.

Following on the new direction given to philosophy by Plotinus a sequence of scholastic elaborations of doctrine arose by a sort of natural process. Plotinus' successors, Amelius, Porphyry, Iamblichus and Theodorus, are normally dismissed as second-rate and unoriginal. In comparison with Plotinus, certainly they were, but to condemn them absolutely for this is to condemn in the same breath the vast majority of philosophers of all eras and schools who have carried on and elaborated the thought of one

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[1] In the Parmenides-Commentary Proclus has gone much further than in the Timaeus-Commentary towards the complete masking of his sources, which sophistic stylistics seemed to favour. Iamblichus' name is not once mentioned, and yet his influence seems paramount. Fortunately, in the *Timaeus Commentary*, sources are given adequate acknowledgement (though the sophistic taboo against verbatim quoting is observed), which makes that commentary the best preserved of all.

[2] See my note 'A Date for the Death of Nicomachus of Gerasa'. CR n.s. XVI 1969.

great master or another, ironing out inconsistencies in his thought and bringing out in a salutary way various tendencies latent therein. All the four philosophers mentioned above were great and noble men; I am only required to defend one of them. However, it will be necessary in the course of my notes on the Commentaries to touch repeatedly on the opinions of the other three, and in particular on those of Porphyry, so that something may usefully be said now of their habits and beliefs.

The remarkable method of philosophising favoured by Plotinus was not, so far as we can see, followed by his pupils, at least in their written works. They returned to the business of exegesis, commentaries on Plato and Aristotle, and essays on such ancient subjects as *The Soul*, *Freewill and Necessity* and *The Gods*, although fortified in their work by the insights gained from contact with the Master. As compared with Middle Platonism, the chief developments were the doctrine of the Transcendent One, distinct from and superior to *Nous*, the doctrine of the Hypostases, and the doctrine of Emanation. We say this on the basis of our knowledge, which is incomplete, but pending evidence to the contrary, we may accept it.[1] As regards the interpretation of Plato, a far greater freedom of symbolic interpretation is immediately apparent, together with a concern to make Plato agree, not just with Aristotle or Pythagoras, but with Homer, Hesiod, Orpheus and the Chaldaean Oracles. It becomes absolutely necessary that Plato be consistent both with all these inspired authorities, and also with himself. This last had always been a necessity for Platonists; but it becomes a much more strenuous problem now, when the *whole* of each dialogue becomes infused with higher significance, and especially when, on the authority of Iamblichus, a single, consistent σκοπός is established for each dialogue, to which even the introductory and apparently casual portions must conform.

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[1] The concept of the Supreme God in Albinus, *Didaskalikos* ch. X, and certain doctrines of Philo, Plutarch (e.g. the Myth of the *De Genio Socr.*) and Celsus (ap. Origen, *Contra Celsum* VII 45), as well as a doctrine of emanation which I discern in Nicomachus of Gerasa, must make us aware of the limitations of our knowledge. There are large gaps in our knowledge of the doctrine of Numenius; and the Chaldaean Oracles and the Hermetic Corpus were, after all, based on contemporary Platonism of some variety, as Lewy, *Chald. Or.* Ch. VI, and Festugière *Rév. d. H.T.* have argued. On these matters see also Dodds, 'The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic One.' CQ 22, 1928, pp. 129-142.

We see the Neoplatonist philosophers, then, working on the basis of a number of sacred, 'inspired' books. The Dialogues of Plato, the Theogony of Hesiod, the Iliad and Odyssey, the Orphic Poems, (probably) the Ἱερὸς Λόγος of Pythagoras, and the Chaldaean Oracles. Within the framework of the consensus of this corpus, one might manoeuvre at will, interpreting, reinterpreting, refining concepts, and refuting one's predecessors. The most damning accusation was that of being unPlatonic. Iamblichus accuses Porphyry of this intellectual crime on a number of occasions.[1] One might also fail to make correct symbolic interpretations,[2] and one might confuse concepts, or fail to discriminate them with sufficient finesse. Iamblichus himself is frequently refined further, though rarely contradicted flatly, by Syrianus and the Athenian School.[3]

In this process of dialectical in-fighting, Iamblichus is found in a curious position. On the one hand he frequently appears as a conservative, repudiating the 'barbarous' innovations of Porphyry [4] or the triadic or numerological fantasies of Amelius [5] (who was later to be followed, as against Iamblichus, by Theodorus of Asine). On the other hand, it is plain that Iamblichus devised in many ways a more elaborate theology and metaphysics than Porphyry, and in all important respects laid the foundations for the philosophy of the later Athenian School. One important ideological difference, at least vis a vis the *later* Porphyry, author of the *Letter to Anebo*, is Iamblichus' defence and intellectualisation of the practice of 'theurgy' (θεουργία) to supplement 'theology' (θεολογία). We find a defence of his views in his reply to the *Letter to Anebo*, the book *On the Mysteries of the Egyptians* (usually termed the *De Mysteriis*), a much-maligned work. Though it does not directly concern us in our study of the present commentary, I should point out the remarkable general similarity between Iamblichus' defence of theurgy in this work, and philosophical theories

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[1] e.g. *In Tim.* Fr. 16, "οὔτε Πλατωνικῶς οὔτε ἀληθῶς"; *ibid.* Fr. 70 ἀλλοτρίως τοῦ Πλάτωνος εἰσαγομένας; also *In Tim.* I 307, 4 the criticism of Porphyry is probably Iamblichean.

[2] Not preserving the ἀναλογία, *In Tim.* Fr. 21, cf. *ibid.* Fr. 19.

[3] e.g. Pr. *In Tim.* I 153, 28; 218, 13; 441, 15; for contradiction, I 153, 28, following Fr. 16, I 218, 11, following Fr. 27, I 230, 17, following Fr. 29 etc.

[4] e.g. *In Tim.* Fr. 16 'βαρβαρικὴ ἀλαζονεία'.

[5] e.g. *In Tim.* Fr. 39 (Amelius' triad of Demiurges); *ibid.* fr. 54 (numerological calculations); *ibid.* Fr. 71 (exegesis of *Tim.* 39 E).

of Karma, or the Way of Sacrifice, in Indian Philosophy.[1] The doctrine that *acts*, as well as philosophical theorising, are necessary for the freeing of the soul from the bonds of the cosmos, is an obviously magical conception, and as such normally not considered worthy of a philosopher. It is on the basis of Iamblichus' defence of, and practice of, a theology of Action, that he has so often been condemned. What is more worthy of attention, however, is the philosophical justification which he employs in defence of theurgy, and the importance which this has for the sacramental theology of the later Greek Christian Fathers.

That, however, is matter for another treatise. Our concern here is with Iamblichus' metaphysics as illustrated by the Platonic Commentaries, and in that connexion something must first be said about his theory of the One.

The One

Iamblichus, alone, so far as we know, of the Neoplatonist philosophers, postulated two Ones, or first principles. We find in Damascius, *Dub. et Sol.* 43 (I p. 86 Ruelle), the following notice:

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνο προβαλλώμεθα εἰς ἐπίσκεψιν, πότερον δύο εἰσὶν αἱ πρῶται ἀρχαὶ πρὸ τῆς νοητῆς πρώτης τριάδος, ἥ τε πάντη ἄρρητος καὶ ἡ ἀσύντακτος πρὸς τὴν τριάδα, καθάπερ ἠξίωσεν ὁ μέγας Ἰάμβλιχος ἐν τῷ κη^ω^ βιβλίῳ τῆς Χαλδαικῆς τελειοτάτης θεολογίας, ἢ ὡς οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν μετ' αὐτὸν ἐδοκίμασαν, μετὰ τὴν ἄρρητον αἰτίαν καὶ μίαν εἶναι τὴν πρωτην τριάδα τῶν νοητῶν· ἢ καὶ ταύτης ὑποβησόμεθα τῆς ὑποθέσεως, κατὰ δὲ τὸν Πορφύριον ἐροῦμεν τὴν μίαν τῶν πάντων ἀρχὴν εἶναι τὸν πατέρα τῆς νοητῆς τριάδος;

"After this let us bring up the following point for consideration, whether the first principles before the first noetic triad are two in number, the completely ineffable, and that which is unconnected to the triad, as is the view of the great Iamblichus in Book 28 of his excellent *Chaldaean Theology*, or, as the great majority of those after him preferred to believe, that the first triad of the noetic beings follows directly on the ineffable first principle; or shall we

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[1] See on this the most interesting study by J. F. Staal, *Advaita and Neoplatonism*, Univ. of Madras, 1961, esp. pp. 61-70.

descend from this hypothesis and say with Porphyry that the first principle of all things is the Father of the noetic triad?"[1]

The evidence presented here for Iamblichus' theory is not easy to interpret. Damascius tends to support Iamblichus' view himself, as against Porphyry. What is at issue is the necessity of a second first principle which will preside actively over the generation of everything else. The majority of later philosophers considered that only one principle was necessary. Porphyry indulged in greater economy, and considered the first element (πατήρ) in the noetic triad to be sufficient as a first principle.[2] Damascius thinks that such a principle of generation must be either the ἓν πάντα, or κοινότερόν τι, and that it is better to adopt Iamblichus' view.

He does not explicitly state that Iamblichus was the *only* one to postulate two first principles, but he fails to mention any other, as he well might have had there been such. What then, did Iamblichus envisage? The problem, I think, stems from the contradiction between an absolutely transcendent One, arrived at by negative contemplation, which can have no direct effect on anything, and a creative first principle, these to be identified respectively with the subjects of the First and Second Hypotheses of the *Parmenides*. In Plotinus these two aspects of the One are merged, with inevitable tensions; in Porphyry the active first principle, as we see, is made the head of the noetic triad; Iamblichus simply distinguishes two Ones, preserving the first as πάντῃ ἄρρητος, and postulating a second, presiding over, but not correlated to (ἀσύντακτος), the noetic triad. This would in effect be the ἓν πάντα, the subject (for some Neoplatonists) of the Second Hypostasis of the *Parmenides*.[3]

This seems relatively clear, but in cc. 50 and 51 (I, p. 101, 11ff., and p. 103, 6ff. Ruelle), Damascius reveals that Iamblichus

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[1] Or 'the Father of the noetic triad is the first principle of all things'?

[2] This is important evidence for a triad — πατήρ (ὄν) — ζωή (δύναμις) — νοῦς within the noetic realm already in Porphyry. See also Pr. *In Tim.* III 64, 84, where Porphyry's elaborate scheme of interpretation is dependent on this triad.

[3] See the first chapter of Book VI of Proclus' *Comm. In Parm.* and Proclus, *Theol. Plat.* Intro p. LXXXII, Saffrey-Westerink. For Plotinus the second hypothesis chiefly describes Nous, but he uses some of its formulations to describe the One in its positive aspect. See Dodds, 'The Parmenides of Plato, etc.'

postulated also a dyad, πέρας—ἄπειρον, between the second One and the noetic realm.

In section 50 he is discussing the correctness of postulating a Dyad as the second principle after the Monad, and he quotes various authorities to support this—Orpheus, the Chaldaean Oracles, Plato (*Philebus* 23C), and Philolaus. He then brings in Iamblichus:

δεῖν οὖν φησί τις ἴσως προυποτιθέναι τὰς αἰτίας καὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ δυαδικῆς φύσεως τῶν στοιχείων· εἶναι τοίνυν τὴν δυάδα τῶν ἀρχῶν προδιῃρημένην τῆς εἰρημένης δυάδος αἰτίαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πρὸ τῆς δυάδος ἕν, ὅπερ ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος τίθεται πρὸ ἀμφοῖν τοῦ ὄντος ἑνὸς αἰτίαν προυπάρχειν.

. . . (101, 21) τοιαῦτα γὰρ ἔλεγε καὶ ὁ τὴν Ἰαμβλίχου πρεσβεύων ἀρχὴν μέσην τιθεμένην τῶν τε δυεῖν καὶ τῆς ἀρρήτου παντελῶς.

"One may perhaps say that one must assume as preliminary the causal principles of both the One-Existent and the dyadic structure of the elements inherent in it; the dyad of first principles has, then, a distinct existence, prior to the dyad which had just been mentioned, even as there exists also the One before the Dyad, which Iamblichus postulates before both, to be the cause of the One-Existent."

"For such would be the argument of one who accepts the first principle proposed by Iamblichus, which is situated between the two (principles) and the totally ineffable (One)."

In ch. 51, still on the same subject, but concentrating now more on the One prior to the Dyad, Damascius writes as follows (I 103, 6ff. Ruelle):

καὶ γὰρ ἡ μία ἀρχὴ πρὸ τῶν δυεῖν, αὕτη μὲν οὖν τὸ ἁπλῶς ἕν, ὁ μέσον ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος τίθεται τῶν δύο ἀρχῶν καὶ τῆς παντάπασιν ἀπορρήτου ἐκείνης, αἱ δὲ δύο, πέρας φέρε καὶ ἄπειρον, ἢ καὶ εἰ βούλεταί τις, ἓν καὶ πολλά, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἓν τοῖς πολλοῖς, οὐ τὸ πρὸ ἀμφοῖν καὶ ἀναντίθετον."

"For indeed the one first principle is prior to the two; and this is the 'simply One', which Iamblichus postulates in between the two first principles and that absolutely ineffable (first principle). These two principles may be termed Limit and the Unlimited, or if one wishes, One and Many, the 'One' here to be taken as 'One'

as opposed to 'Many', not the One which is prior to both these and has nothing opposed to it."

It looks from this very much as if we must fit in two further principles, derived primarily from the πέρας and ἄπειρον of the *Philebus* (17Cff.), between the Second One and the noetic realm. On this scheme, the ἓν ὄν or ἀεὶ ὄν at the summit of the noetic realm, will be the μικτόν resulting from the concerted action of these two principles, the Second One serving as the mixing agent, while the First One sits in unspeakable splendour above all this.[1]

The Realm of the One in Iamblichus' metaphysics is now, I think, complete. In contrast with the simplicity of Plotinus' One,[2] we seem to have the following elaborate scheme—

The First One
(παντελῶς ἄρρητον)

The Second One
(ὁ ἁπλῶς ἕν, πρὸ τῆς δυάδος, ἀσύντακτος πρὸς τὴν (νοητὴν) τριάδα)

Limit (πέρας) — *The Unlimited* (τὸ ἄπειρον)

The One Existent
(τὸ ἓν ὄν)

On the other hand, I find it doubtful how far Iamblichus is responsible for the elaborate system of henads which make their appearance in Proclus (e.g. ETh. ppr. 113-165). Proclus' account of Iamblichus' interpretation of the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides* (cf. *In Parm.* Fr. 2 of this ed. and *Comm.*) would indicate that Iamblichus postulated henads in the realm of the One, with which he equated the gods. However, henads do not appear to play any part in his exegesis of the other dialogues, as preserved to us.[3]

One may see in all this a scholastic working-out of the implica-

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[1] The second One and the Dyad of πέρας and ἄπειρον appear in Fr. 7 of the Timaeus Commentary (Pr. *In Tim.* I 78, 6f.) 'ἐπεὶ γὰρ πάντα καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἑνός ἐστι καὶ ἐκ τῆς μετὰ τὸ ἓν δυάδος..' See Comm. *ad loc.* The above references to Iamblichus do not seem to be from his *Parmenides Commentary*, but rather from the *Chaldaean Theology* or the *Platonic Theology*. What scheme Iamblichus used in his exegesis of Hyp. I of the *Parmenides* we cannot be sure.

[2] Cf. A. H. Armstrong, *The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe* in the *Philosophy of Plotinus*, esp. chap. I & II.

[3] But on this question see App. C.

tions of the Plotinian scheme—the contradiction between what Armstrong (*loc. cit.*) calls the Negative and the Positive One, and the necessity for fitting in the Pythagorean-Platonic Unlimited Dyad at some point in the scheme of first principles in such a way as to be inferior to the One.

The Noetic Realm [1]

The Noetic Monad

With the noetic realm, we come more properly within the confines of the *Timaeus Commentary*. The first principle to be noted is the following (Fr. 54): 'πάσης τάξεως ἡ ἀμέθεκτος ἡγεῖται μονὰς πρὸ τῶν μετεχομένων'. ('Every order is presided over by the unparticipated monad, prior to the participated entities'). Once again, contradictions kept in solution in the more vital philosophy of Plotinus are brought into the open by the more scholastic minds of his successors. There is a necessity, on the one hand, for participation of the lower orders in the higher, that the process of πρόοδος—ἐπιστροφή may take place, and on the other for the higher orders to be essentially pure and unmixed in themselves. By employing the formula that the higher orders can give of themselves to the lower without themselves being affected, as the sun gives off its heat and light, Plotinus staved off the problem. More vigorous analysis, however, created the necessity for three aspects or 'moments' of each hypostasis which represented (a) the hypostasis in its purest form, as opposed to (b) the hypostasis as participated in by a lower level of being, and (c) the hypostasis as reflected *in* the lower level of being; the three levels were termed ἀμέθεκτος (unparticipated), μετεχόμενος (participated) and κατὰ μέθεξιν or ἐν σχέσει (in participation or relation). In the realm of Nous, Iamblichus postulates, as his 'ruling', unparticipated Monad, τὸ ἓν ὄν. This he also terms τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν, and identifies it with *Aeon* and the Paradigm.

In *In Tim.* Fr. 29, discussing the passage 'τί τὸ ὂν ἀεί' κ.τ.λ. (*Tim.* 27D), Iamblichus gives his view of τὸ ἀεὶ ὂν as κρεῖττον καὶ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος καὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν, positioned ἐπ' ἄκρῳ τῆς νοητῆς οὐσίας, and πρώτως μετέχον τοῦ ἑνός. For this entity he draws support from the second hypothesis of the *Parmenides* (142 B ff.), and from the *Sophist* (244 B ff.). It is important that there be some aspect of each realm that partakes πρώτως, primarily, of the prior

[1] I have chosen 'realm' as a technical term to designate the terms κόσμος, διάκοσμος or τάξις.

realm, in order to provide as smooth a transition as possible in the procession of Being. It is, indeed, a striving for the clarification of the steps in this invincibly mysterious πρόοδος that is the chief cause for the multiplication of entities in post-Plotinian Platonism. Iamblichus' view of this monad of the noetic world requires some elaboration. In Damascius' *Dub. et Sol.* we have a remarkable reference to his doctrine on its knowability, whether from his *Parmenides Commentary* or not is unclear to me. I have included it, tentatively, as *In Parm.* Fr. 2B, (*Dub. et Sol.* Ch. 70, I 151, 18ff., Ruelle):

ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν οὔτε δόξῃ οὔτε διανοίᾳ οὔτε νῷ τῷ ψυχικῷ οὔτε νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τῇ τοῦ νοῦ παντελεῖ περιωπῇ οὔτε τῷ ἄνθει τοῦ νοῦ αἱρετόν, οὔτε ἐπιβολῇ ὅλως οὔτε κατὰ ἐπέρεισιν ὡρισμένην οὔτε κατὰ περίληψιν οὔτε τινὰ τοιοῦτον τρόπον ἐκεῖνο γνωστόν, συγχωρητέον ταῦτα ἀξιοῦντι τῷ μεγάλῳ Ἰαμβλίχῳ.

This is disconcerting, particularly the denial that it is beyond the grasp even of the ἄνθος τοῦ νοῦ, which one would have thought to be precisely the faculty which could grasp it. That was what the Chaldaean Oracles declared, after all:

ἔστιν γάρ τι νοητόν, ὃ χρή σε νοεῖν νόου ἄνθει· (Fr. 1 des Places)

Iamblichus faced this objection (*ibid.* 154, 7ff.). He claimed that the Oracle meant that the νοητόν was before the mind as an object of striving (ἐφετόν), not of knowledge, and that it did not fill the mind with knowledge, but with being and with 'complete and intelligible perfection' (ὅλη καὶ νοητὴ τελειότης).

This determined denial of knowability to the *noeton* is the result of Iamblichus' firm distinction of the roles of the three elements of the noetic triad. Knowing could only really begin with *nous* proper (see below). A fragment of his *Phaedrus* Commentary throws light on his doctrine here.

In Phaedr. Fr. 5 identifies the 'helmsman' of *Phaedr.* 247C with the 'One' of the Soul. It is presumably this faculty, τὸ ἓν τῆς ψυχῆς, that is able to achieve an intuition of the *noetic monad*. Iamblichus does not actually state this, but says that it is by the one of the soul that we achieve unity with the Gods (τὸ γὰρ ἓν τῆς ψυχῆς ἑνοῦσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς πέφυκεν). If it can grasp the Gods, however, it should be able to deal with the *noeton*.

A good deal of Damascius' doctrine in *Dub. et Sol.* cc. 55-69 on

the ἓν ὄν probably derives from Iamblichus. He has a number of references to Iamblichus in this section, and ends (c. 69, p. 151, 5ff.) with an assertion 'κατὰ τὸν Ἰάμβλιχον τὰ σεμνότατα τῶν εἰρημένων ἀνατεθείκαμεν'.

It seems as if the One Existent or monad of the noetic realm is in fact identical with the lowest entity of the realm of the One, the μικτόν, also termed ἓν ὄν, and they are to be distinguished only for the purposes of exposition. In general, it is an Iamblichean principle that the monad or highest element in any realm is situated equally in the realm above that which it presides over.

The One Existent is prior to both oneness and existence, which it dispenses to the first noetic triad, to which we will turn in a moment. First, however, we may consider the One Existent as Aeon, or Eternity.

Aeon

As Aeon (Αἰών), τὸ ἓν ὄν serves as a measure (μέτρον) for the noetic realm (*In Tim.* Fr. 64) in the same way that Time (Χρόνος) is a measure for the psychic and material realms. We may suspect that the definition of Aeon owes much to the definition of Time in relation to the Soul, but in the system Time, is of course, the image of Aeon (see *In Tim.* Frr. 63 and 64). Dodds, in discussing prop. 53 of Proclus' *Elements of Theology*, makes the suggestion that there may have been another influence at work, besides abstract scholastic tidiness, in the hypostatisation of Aeon:

"A deified Αἰών (probably in origin a Hellenised form of the Persian God Zervan) has a prominent place not only in Gnostic and Hermetic speculation and in the magical papyri, but in the sacred book of later Neoplatonism, the *Oracula Chaldaica* (cf. *In Tim.* III 14.3); and Proclus accordingly calls αἰών 'an intelligible god' (*ibid.* III 13.23)."

Dodds goes on to admit the likelihood that 'the immediate source of much of what Proclus has to say (at the beginning of Book IV) about Time and Eternity is Iamblichus', particularly in view of Fr. 64. The honour accorded to Aeon (and Time) would certainly seem to support the suggestion that some such influence is at work. The Egyptian concept of *Maat*, as the timeless condition in which the gods live, also comes to mind as a possible influence.

The Paradigm

Whatever about Aeon, the Paradigm is a purely Platonic entity, although subject to varying interpretations throughout later Platonism. With the Paradigm, in Iamblichus' metaphysics, is bound up the question of the identity of the Demiurge, a problem which was much debated in later Platonism.[1] In *In Tim.* Fr. 35, in the exegesis of *Tim.* 28Cff., he defines the Paradigm as αὐτὸ τὸ ὅπερ ὄν, only τὸ ἕν being above it. The Paradigm, then, is the highest element in the noetic world, seen in another light. This habit of referring to the same principle in different ways to suit different contexts (or, in a commentary, different lemmata) is a feature of Neoplatonic exegesis which can prove bewildering.

The Noetic Triad

This entity is also the first element in the 'noetic triad'. Even in Plotinus [2] we find mention of ὄν, ζωή, and νοῦς in conjunction, but they are not formalised into three hypostases (or *moments* of an hypostasis). Already in Porphyry, however, it seems that they were so formalised.[3] In Iamblichus, we see the three moments clearly distinguished in *In Tim.* Fr. 65 (on *Tim.* 38A) where χρόνος is said to derive different qualities from ὄν, ζωή and νοῦς respectively, and also in *In Alc.* Fr. 8, where an interesting doctrine of the extent of the influences of these three moments is propounded.

The prompting for this distinction, to the scholastic mind, comes from a much-quoted passage of the *Sophist*, 248E, where the Eleatic Stranger says 'τί δὲ πρὸς Διός; ὡς ἀληθῶς κίνησιν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ φρόνησιν ἦ ῥαδίως πεισθησόμεθα τῷ παντελῶς ὄντι μὴ παρεῖναι, μηδὲ ζῆν αὐτὸ μηδὲ φρονεῖν, ἀλλὰ σεμνὸν καὶ ἅγιον, νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον, ἀκίνητον ἑστὸς εἶναι;

How can one have Absolute Being without Life and Mind? And how, therefore, can one have Mind without Absolute Being and Life? It is not improbable, indeed, that a stimulus to the hypostatisation of ζωή came from the Gnostic and Hermetic systems, where it appears as a divine Principle,[4] but, as we see, a source could be found in Plato.

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[1] See my article 'Plotinus III 9, 1 and Later Views of the Intelligible World', *TAPA* 100, 1970.

[2] I 6, 7; V 4, 2 fin.; V. 6, 6.

[3] Cf. Procl. *In Tim*: III 64, 8ff., a most remarkable passage. See my Comm. ad *In Tim.* Fr. 70.

[4] See Dodds ET p. 253.

In Damascius' *Commentary on the Philebus*, sect. 105 p. 51 Westerink (*Comm. In Phileb.* Fr. 4) we find the statement that Iamblichus located in the καθαρὸς νοῦς, the first element of the noetic triad, the *monads* of the Forms, by which he meant τὸ ἑκάστου (εἴδους) ἀδιάκριτον, not the Forms themselves, which would reside properly in the third element, *Nous* proper. See my Comm. *ad loc.*

It also appears from *In Phileb.* Fr. 7 that Iamblichus held that the three aspects of the Good, as described in *Philebus* 64A-65A, Beauty, Symmetry and Truth, manifested themselves in, or 'adorned', the πατρικός νοῦς.

What distinction Iamblichus made between the monad of the noetic world, and the first element of the noetic triad, is not always clear, to me at any rate. He did, however, distinguish them.

This triad, in this form, is all that I will concern myself with, as it seems to be the metaphysical scheme on which the Platonic Commentaries are based. Other, more elaborate, Chaldaean-influenced schemes must await for their elucidation further study of the sources.[1] It does seem as though Iamblichus recognised three triads in the intelligible (noetic) world, as well as an *intellectual* hebdomad, but only in the passage mentioned above (n. 1) does this distinction become clear.

The Demiurge

Encompassing all this triad (or these triads) is the Demiurge. This was a distinctive theory of Iamblichus, in which he looks back to Plotinus. Amelius postulated three demiurges, and Porphyry wishes to make the Demiurge the hypercosmic soul, with Nous as the Paradigm.[2] In *In Tim.* Fr. 34, however, we find the following statement by Iamblichus:

'τὴν ὄντως οὐσίαν καὶ τῶν γιγνομένων ἀρχὴν καὶ τὰ νοητὰ τοῦ κόσμου παραδείγματα, ὅν γε καλοῦμεν νοητὸν κόσμον, καὶ ὅσας αἰτίας προυπάρχειν τιθέμεθα τῶν ἐν τῇ φύσει πάντων, ταῦτα πάντα ὁ νῦν ζητούμενος θεὸς δημιουργὸς ἐν ἑνὶ συλλαβὼν ὑφ' ἑαυτὸν ἔχει.'

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[1] It seems to me, for instance, that in the passage which Proclus quotes from Iamblichus' essay 'On the Speech of Zeus' (*In Tim.* I 308, 18ff.) we do in fact have a comprehensive description, replete with Iamblichean epithets, of ὄν, ζωή and νοῦς as a triad of 'Fathers' in the Intellectual Hebdomad. See my Comm. ad *In Tim.* Fr. 34, and Appendix A.

[2] For all this see my article 'Plot. Enn. III, 9.1', TAPA 100.

Proclus takes this as meaning that Iamblichus calls the whole intelligible realm the Demiurge (πάντα τὸν νοητὸν κόσμον ἀποκαλεῖ δημιουργόν, I 307, 17f.), but the quotation before us does not seem to warrant such a judgement. Iamblichus declares that the Demiurge 'gathers into one and holds in subjection to himself' the intelligible realm. From Iamblichus' point of view, it was necessary that the creator of the material world should have under his control all the forces of the intelligible world. Νοῦς by itself, on this scheme, can only create the Intelligence of intelligent beings. It must be left to ζωή to create Life, and τὸ ὄν to be responsible for mere Being. This idea, that the higher on the scale of being an hypostasis or entity is, the lower down on the scale is its extension, is first formulated clearly by Proclus, in E.T. Prop. 57 [1], but it can be traced back to Syrianus, *In Metaph.* 59, 17 (see Dodds, E.T. p. 230-1). In speaking of the relation of The One to Being, he says:

τὸ γὰρ ἓν ὕπερ τὸ [μὴ] ὂν καὶ σὺν τῷ ὄντι καὶ ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ ὄντος, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῆς στερήσεως·

"For the One is both higher than Being and co-ordinate with it and extends beyond it, as for instance to Matter and Negativity". (The μή is to be deleted with Kroll, as absurd. ἐπὶ τάδε, of course, has the signification 'on this side', 'in our direction.')

In *Comm. In Alc.* Fr. 8 (*ap.* Ol. *In Alc.* 110) we can see Iamblichus' version of this theory, applied within the hypostasis of Nous. He held that the higher principles do not extend *further* than the lower down the scale of Being, for all the principles extend to the ultimate depths, but the influence of the higher principles is 'more piercing' (δριμυτέρα). See my comm. *ad loc.*[2]

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[1] πᾶν αἴτιον καὶ πρὸ τοῦ αἰτιατοῦ ἐνεργεῖ καὶ μετ' αὐτὸ πλειόνων ἐστὶν ὑποστατικόν.

[2] One sees a curious prefiguring of this theory in the 3rd Cent., with Origen. In Περὶ ἀρχῶν I, 3(esp. Fr. 9 Koetschau) dealing with the Holy Spirit, he lays it down that the persons of the Trinity are arranged in such a way that the creative power of the highest (the Father) extends furthest, giving existence to every being, while the Son extends only to rational beings, and the Holy Spirit only *to the Saints*—this last category especially makes me feel that Origen is here adapting to his own use a philosophical doctrine which he picked up in Alexandria in his youth. The three persons of the Trinity are behaving strangely like Being, Life and Mind, with the reservation that the Holy Spirit might seem a better candidate for *Zoe*'s position than the Son. Not so, however, as Origen is presenting the Holy Spirit as the most strictly intellectual element of the Trinity, while the Son is a more general creative principle, *Logos* and *Sophia*.

We learn from Damascius *Dub. et Sol.* ch. 278 (II 149, 25f. = *In Parm.* Fr. 6A) that Iamblichus situated τὰ γένη τοῦ ὄντος in the Demiurge.

The Psychic Realm

Before considering the Soul itself, I wish to examine two passages (*In Tim.* Frr. 55 and 56) in which Iamblichus discusses the relation of Intellect to the psychic realm.

In the exegesis of the passage *Tim.* 36C (καὶ τῇ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐν ταὐτῷ περιαγομένῃ κινήσει πέριξ αὐτὰς ἔλαβε), Iamblichus takes the motion here described not as referring to the Soul, as had his predecessors, but to Intellect.

Soul participates Intellect, καθόσον ἐστὶ νοερά, and through it is joined to the Divine Intellect. The Intellect which Soul participates is Participated or non-separable Intellect (νοῦς μεθεκτός, ἀχώριστος). It is a necessary intermediary between Soul and the 'separate' Intellect, νοῦς χωριστός, with which the Soul can have no direct contact. This is made clearer in Fr. 56,[1] where the νοῦς χωριστός is depicted as enclosing the two Souls, while the participated Intellect mingles with them and directs them, and is the intermediary through which Soul is united to the Demiurge. We see here again the three moments of any hypostasis in post-Plotinian metaphysics, (the third mome ntof Intellect, νοῦς κατὰ μέθεξιν, is merely the second moment, νοῦς μεθεκτός, considered as operating in Soul).

In fr. 50 (ad *Tim.* 34B: ψυχὴν δὲ εἰς τὸ μέσον αὐτοῦ θείς, κ.τ.λ.) we find Iamblichus interpreting the Soul described in this passage as the ἀμέθεκτος ψυχή, 'ἐξῃρημένη καὶ ὑπερκόσμιος καὶ ἀπόλυτος καὶ πᾶσιν ἐνεξουσιάζουσα', a characteristically Iamblichean string of epithets. This Soul is set above all the souls in the cosmos as a monad (ὑπὲρ πάσας τὰς ἐγκοσμίους ὡς μονάδος τεταγμένης), this monad being the transcendent source of both the Soul of the Cosmos and the individual souls (cf. *In Tim.* Fr. 54).

Time

The internal structure of the psychic realm has also to accommodate Transcendent Time (ὁ ἐξῃρημένος χρόνος), which holds

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[1] *ad* Tim. 36C, 'καὶ τὸν μὲν ἔξω, τὸν δὲ ἐντὸς ἐποιεῖτο τῶν κύκλων. τὴν μὲν οὖν ἔξω φορὰν ἐπεφήμισεν εἶναι τῆς ταὐτοῦ φύσεως, τὴν δὲ ἐντὸς τῆς θατέρου'.

[2] In this transitive use of 'participate', I follow the precedent of Dodds (see p. 4 n. 1 of the *Elements of Theology*). Thus used, it is a convenient technical term.

the same position in the psychic realm as Aeon holds in the noetic. Time is the subject of *In Tim.* Frr. 62-68, of which 62, 63, 67 and 68 are from Simplicius. Here we see Iamblichus concerned primarily with the essence of *transcendent* time. Fr. 62 is simply an argument against the Aristotelian definition of Time as Motion. In Fr. 63 we find him identifying Time 'in activity' with the διακόσμησις which is the immanent agent of the ordering of the universe. In a phrase which caught the attention of Proclus (III, 30, 30ff.) he declares that it can be described as a τάξις not as ταττομένη,, but as τάττουσα, not as the ordered thing, but as the ordering force. He lays stress on its creation *simultaneously* with the heavens ((διακοσμῶν ἅμα οὐρανὸν ποιεῖ... *Tim.* 37D). Time proceeds not ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεως ἢ ζωῆς but ἀπὸ τῆς προιούσης ἀπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ νοερᾶς διακοσμήσεως. It is not a subjective phenomenon, but a real hypostasis. The last statement is amplified in a most interesting manner by fr. 65, where the three separate qualities which Time derives from the three hypostases of the noetic world, ὄν, ζωή and νοῦς (all of which are encompassed by the Demiurge), are enumerated, albeit in a somewhat strained interpretation of the lemma *Tim.* 38A. Fr. 64 describes in some detail how Time reflects Aeon, whose image (εἰκών) in the extended world it is. Time, indeed, is the first, the highest image, since Aeon itself cannot be an image of the One, of which there can be no image. Frr. 67 and 68 add to this discussion of Time as an Image.[1]

Space

The discussion of Time raises the problem of Space, since Time operates in spatial extension. We know Iamblichus' views on Space only from *In Tim.* Fr. 90, from Book V of his Timaeus Commentary (preserved by Simplicius). Iamblichus seems to have declined to recognise any reference to physical space, or to the material world, before the introduction of the ὑποδοχή in *Tim.* 48Eff.

Space, in its essence, is συμφυὴς τοῖς σώμασιν. It is therefore reasonable that Timaeus should introduce the discussion of it along with the first creation of bodies. Space should not be considered apart from its αἰτία, apart from the Demiurgic plan. Iamblichus thus dismisses the theories of Space of Aristotle and the Atomists.

[1] On Iamblichus' doctrine of Time, see S. Sambursky and S. Pines, *The Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism*, The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Jerusalem 1971, where the matter is well set out (esp. pp. 12-17).

What definition, then, he asks, would best express its essential character? <ἢ> ἡ δύναμιν αὐτὸν σωματοειδῆ τιθεμένη τὴν ἀνέχουσαν τὰ σώματα καὶ διερείδουσαν καὶ πίπτοντα μὲν ἀνεγείρουσαν διασκορπίζοντα δὲ συνάγουσαν, συμπληροῦσαν δὲ αὐτὰ ἅμα καὶ περιέχουσαν πανταχόθεν. This is a description of Space as a δύναμις σωματοειδής, (but not itself material), which maintains, separates and surrounds σώματα. 'Τόπος' is not actually mentioned in the *Timaeus* until 52A (γιγνόμενον τε ἔν τινι τόπῳ) and I tentatively take fr. 90 as a comment on that passage.

The Individual Soul

Before leaving the psychic, or *noeric* realm, we must examine Iamblichus' theory of the individual soul, and its relation to the body. In this matter, the surviving evidence of the Platonic Commentaries will be considerably clarified by that of the *De Anima*. There we see Iamblichus firmly setting himself in opposition, on a number of questions, to a group in which are included Plotinus and Porphyry. The first passage (ap. Stob. I 365, 7ff. Wachs.) concerns the nature of the Soul:

εἰσὶ δή τινες, οἳ πᾶσαν τὴν τοιαύτην οὐσίαν ὁμοιομερῆ καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μίαν ἀποφαίνονται, ὡς καὶ ἐν ὁτῳοῦν αὐτῆς μέρει εἶναι τὰ ὅλα· καὶ τἀγαθὸν καὶ πάντα τὰ πρεσβύτερα γένη αὐτῆς ἐνιδρύουσι καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ὡσαύτως πάντα εἶναι ἀποφαίνονται, οἰκείως μέντοι κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ἐν ἑκάστοις. καὶ ταύτης τῆς δόξης ἀναμφισβητήτως μέν ἐστι Νουμήνιος, οὐ πάντῃ δὲ ὁμολογουμένως Πλωτῖνος, ἀστάτως δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ φέρεται Ἀμέλιος. Πορφύριος δὲ ἐνδοιάζει περὶ αὐτήν, πῇ μὲν διατεταμένως αὐτῆς ἀφιστάμενος, πῇ δὲ συνακολουθῶν αὐτῇ, ὡς παραδοθείσῃ ἄνωθεν. κατὰ δὴ ταύτην νοῦ καὶ θεῶν καὶ τῶν κρειττόνων γενῶν οὐδὲν ἡ ψυχὴ διενήνοχε κατά γε τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν.

Having thus put all his immediate predecessors in one camp, basically asserting that the Soul is in no way different from the classes of Being higher than it, Nous, the gods and daemons, and even The Good, he attaches himself, though in a somewhat oblique way, to the contrary view (365, 22ff.):

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἥ γε πρὸς ταύτην ἀνθισταμένη δόξα χωρίζει μὲν τὴν ψυχήν, ὡς ἀπὸ νοῦ γενομένην δευτέραν καθ' ἑτέραν ὑπόστασιν, τὸ δὲ μετὰ νοῦ αὐτῆς ἐξηγεῖται ὡς ἐξηρτημένον ἀπὸ τοῦ νοῦ, μετὰ τοῦ κατ' ἰδίαν ὑφεστηκέναι αὐτοτελῶς, χωρίζει δὲ αὐτὴν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν

κρειττόνων γενῶν ὅλων. ἴδιον δὲ αὐτῇ τῆς οὐσίας ὅρον ἀπονέμει ἤτοι τὸ μέσον τῶν μεριστῶν καὶ ἀμερίστων <τῶν τε σωματικῶν καὶ ἀ>σωμάτων γενῶν, ἢ τὸ πλήρωμα τῶν καθόλου λόγων, ἢ τὴν μετὰ τὰς ἰδέας ὑπηρεσίαν τῆς δημιουργίας, ἢ ζωὴν παρ' ἑαυτῆς ἔχουσαν τὸ ζῆν τὴν ἀπὸ νοῦ προελθοῦσαν, ἢ τὴν αὖ τῶν γενῶν ὅλου τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος πρόοδον εἰς ὑποδεεστέραν οὐσίαν.

"The doctrine opposed to this, however, makes the soul a separate entity, inasmuch as it is generated second after Intellect as a different hypostasis, and that part of it which is accompanied by Intellect is explained as dependent on the Intellect, along with the power of subsisting independently on its own, and it separates the soul also from all the classes of being superior to itself, and assigns to it, as the particular definition of its essence, either the mean between the divisible and indivisible, the corporeal and the incorporeal, beings, or the totality of the universal reason-principles, or that which, after the ideas, is at the service of the work of creation, or that Life which has life of itself, which proceeds from Intellect, or again the procession of the classes of Real Being as a whole to an inferior substance."

This, says Iamblichus, is the doctrine of Plato himself and Pythagoras, and of Aristotle and ἀρχαῖοι πάντες, if one interprets their statements μετ' ἐπιστήμης. The long, Iamblichean, list of alternative definitions amount to a separate, subordinate rank for the Soul in the hierarchy of Being.

The controversy with his predecessors comes to the surface in Fr. 87 of the *Timaeus Commentary*, an exegesis of *Tim.* 43CD (Pr. III 334, 3ff.). The point of dispute is as to whether any part of our soul remains ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἀεὶ νοοῦν. The protagonist of this view is named as Plotinus (cf. *Enn.* III 4, 3; IV, 1, 10.). Iamblichus enters upon an eloquent argument against him to demonstrate that *no* part of the Soul remains permanently in this state. One point is particularly worth quoting:

"εἰ δὲ ὅταν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν κράτιστον τέλειον ᾖ, καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἡμῶν εὔδαιμον, τί κωλύει καὶ νῦν ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας εἶναι ἀνθρώπους ἅπαντας, εἰ τὸ ἀκρότατον ἡμῶν ἀεὶ νοεῖ καὶ ἀεὶ πρὸς τοῖς θείοις ἐστίν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τοῦτο, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν· εἰ δὲ μόριον ψυχῆς, εὐδαίμων καὶ ἡ λοιπή."

"But if when the best part of us is perfect, then the whole of

us is happy, what would prevent us all, the whole human race, from being happy at this moment, if the highest part of us is always enjoying intellection, and always turned towards the gods? If the Intellect is the highest part, that has nothing to do with the soul; if it is a part of the soul, then the rest of the soul also must be happy."

It was certainly Plotinus' view that there was within us a hidden divine element, which we could uncover by contemplation.[1] Iamblichus contends that if this hidden generator, so to speak, was continually humming away, how could we not feel the effects?

Another point of dispute with Plotinus, Amelius and Porphyry concerns the relation of the individual to the universal soul, and the question of different grades of soul (*De An.* ap. Stob. I 372). Here Plotinus and Amelius are on one side, and Porphyry on the other. Neither side, however, satisfies Iamblichus.

"Πότερον οὖν πασῶν τῶν ψυχῶν τὰ αὐτὰ ἔργα ἀποτελεῖται, ἢ τὰ μὲν τῶν ὅλων τελεώτερα, τὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ἕκασται διειλήχασι τὴν προσήκουσαν ἑαυταῖς τάξιν;"

"Do all souls", asks Iamblichus, "accomplish the same acts, or are those of universal souls more perfect, while those of other souls correspond to the appropriate rank of which each partake?"

"καί που Πλωτῖνος καὶ Ἀμέλιος ἐπὶ ταύτης εἰσὶ τῆς δόξης (ἐνίοτε γὰρ <οὐχ> ὡς ἄλλην τὴν μεριστὴν ψυχὴν παρὰ τὴν ὅλην, μίαν δὲ αὐτὴν πρὸς ἐκείνην εἶναι ἀφορίζονται)· ὡς δ' ἂν εἴποι Πορφύριος, πάντῃ κεχώρισται τὰ τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς παρὰ τὴν μεριστὴν ἐνεργήματα."

For Plotinus this can be documented from *Enn.* IV 3, 4. For Amelius, and for Porphyry's contrary view, this is useful information, not elsewhere attested.

Iamblichus produces a third view, a kind of synthesis of those of his predecessors, which from the method of its introduction we know to be his own (372-3):

"γένοιτο δὲ κἂν ἄλλη δόξα οὐκ ἀπόβλητος, ἡ κατὰ γένη καὶ εἴδη τῶν ψυχῶν ἄλλα μὲν τὰ τῶν ὅλων παντελῆ, ἄλλα δὲ τὰ τῶν θείων ψυχῶν ἄχραντα καὶ ἄϋλα, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ τῶν δαιμονίων δραστήρια, τὰ δὲ τῶν

[1] See Armstrong, *Arch. of Intell. Univ.* ch. VI, for a good survey.

ἡρωικῶν μεγάλα, τὰ δὲ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις θνητοειδῆ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως ἔργα διαιρουμένη."

The 'acts', then, of divine, daemonic, heroic, human and animal souls are suitably distinguished, each with an Iamblichean epithet, and if the acts are different, the souls are different.

"οἱ μὲν γὰρ μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν πανταχοῦ ψυχὴν διατείνοντες ἤ τοι γένει ἢ εἴδει, ὡς δοκεῖ Πλωτίνῳ. ἢ καὶ ἀριθμῷ, ὡς νεανιεύεται οὐκ ὀλιγάκις 'Αμέλιος, εἶναι αὐτὴν ἐροῦσιν ἅπερ ἐνεργεῖν.

(Amelius, it seems, went even further than Plotinus, in identifying *numerically* the individual souls with the Universal Soul.)

"οἱ δ' ἀσφαλέστερον τούτων διαταττόμενοι καὶ προόδους πρώτας καὶ δευτέρας καὶ τρίτας οὐσιῶν τῆς ψυχῆς διισχυριζόμενοι προχωρεῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσω, οἵους ἄν τις θείη τοὺς καινῶς μὲν ἀπταίστως δὲ ἀντιλαμβανομένους τῶν λόγων, τὰ μὲν τῶν ὅλων ψυχῶν καὶ θείων καὶ ἀύλων ἐνεργήματα ἐροῦσιν οὗτοι πάντως δήπου καὶ εἰς οὐσίαν ἀποτελευτᾶν. τὰ δὲ τῶν μεριστῶν κρατουμένων ἐν ἑνὶ εἴδει καὶ διαιρουμένων περὶ τοῖς σώμασιν οὐδαμῶς συγχωρήσουσιν εὐθὺς εἶναι ταῦθ' ἅπερ ἐνεργοῦσι.

"Others make a more prudent distinction, and insist that it is a downward sequence of primary, secondary and tertiary processions, that the different essences of souls continually proceed, such as one would expect of those who enter upon the discussion (of these matters) with arguments which are unfamiliar but unshakeable, will say inevitably that the operations of universal and divine and immaterial souls come to accomplishment in their essences also; but they will by no means agree that individual souls, confined as they are in one single form and divided out among bodies, are immediately identical with their acts."

If one penetrates the jargon here, it will become apparent that Iamblichus' distinctive position is that there are various grades of soul, about which different truths can be predicated. Divine souls, for instance, perform acts which do not end in any accomplishment distinct from their essence (this is the meaning of the obscure phrase καὶ εἰς οὐσίαν ἀποτελευτᾶν), whereas in the case of human souls, their acts extend outwards and are not identical with their essences.[1]

[1] In Stob. 373, 13f. he speaks of the acts of (human) souls as being like the putting forth of fruit by plants (ἐοικέναι ταῖς τῶν καρπῶν ἀπογεννήσεσιν) i.e. eparable from their essences.

This has some bearing on Iamblichus' interpretation of the Return to the Mixing-bowl in *Tim.* 41D (*In Tim.* Fr. 82). For him, the mixing-bowl is ζῳογόνος τις αἰτία, putting forth creative λόγοι which penetrate all of life and all the orders of souls (ψυχικαὶ τάξεις). These "allot to each soul within its proper sphere suitable measures of coherence (μέτρα τῆς συνοχῆς πρέποντα), to the original souls *primal* measures because of their first mixture, and to those who are mixed in the second session *secondary* measures; for according as is their rank relative to each other, such is the procession (πρόοδος) from the mixing-bowl which they are allotted, receiving thence the defining laws of life."

The distinction here seems to be between divine and human souls. What precisely the μέτρα τῆς συνοχῆς are is not certain, but they are probably the proportions of each of the three elements which go to make up souls (see Comm. ad. loc.). We see mention of 'primary' and 'secondary' measures, and of a πρόοδος from the Bowl, which seem to connect us with the passage from the *De Anima*.

We can see from *In Tim.* Fr. 83 (III 257, 24ff.) that Iamblichus was noted for allotting a transcendent superiority (ἐξῃρημένη ὑπεροχή) to 'those classes which make up divine souls', so that his opposition to the more optimistic Plotinian view was quite marked.

The same difference with his predecessors, though from another angle, appears in a passage from Nemesius of Emesa (*De Nat. Hom.* sect. 51, p. 117 Matthaei). The question here concerns interchange between, and therefore the essential homogeneity of, the souls of men and of irrational animals.

"Κρόνιος μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ Περὶ παλιγγενεσίας (οὕτω δὲ καλεῖ τὴν μετενσωμάτωσιν), λογικὰς πάσας εἶναι βούλεται· ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ Θεόδωρος ὁ Πλατωνικὸς ἐν τῷ Ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ πάντα τὰ εἴδη ἐστί, καὶ Πορφύριος ὁμοίως· Ἰάμβλιχος δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν τούτοις δραμών, κατ' εἶδος ζῴων ψυχῆς εἶδος εἶναι λέγει, ἤγουν, εἴδη διάφορα. γέγραπται γοῦν αὐτῷ μονόβιβλον ἐπίγραφον, Ὅτι οὐκ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων εἰς ζῷα ἄλογα, οὐδὲ ἀπὸ ζῴων ἀλόγων εἰς ἀνθρώπους αἱ μετενσωματώσεις γίνονται, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ ζῴων εἰς ζῷα, καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνθρώπων εἰς ἀνθρώπους."

Iamblichus is here figured by Nemesius as opposing Cronius, Theodoros (of Asine),[1] and Porphyry in the matter of the homo-

[1] We may note that Iamblichus cannot, if we preserve the chronology, have contradicted Theodoros, who wrote somewhat after him. What is

geneity of the souls of men and animals. From the title of his essay, we can see that he was opposed to the idea of metempsychosis into and from animals, still preserving his grades of soul. Man was not to be ranked with the gods and angels, but he was not down among the pigs and wolves either.[1]

The significance of this development of Iamblichus', particularly his separation of the soul from the class above it, is well summed up by Dodds, in his Introduction to *The Elements of Theology* (p. xx):

> "This change is a natural corollary to the humbler cosmic status assigned by Iamblichus and most of his successors to the human soul. As the ancient world staggered to its death, the sense of man's unworthiness grew more oppressive, and the mystical optimism of Plotinus came to seem fantastic and almost impious: not by the effort of his own brain and will can so mean a creature as man attain the distant goal of 'unification'."

This is very much the spirit which informs Fr. 88 of the *Timaeus Commentary*. Iamblichus asserts that it is not possible for us to comprehend how the Gods create the body, or its life, and how they link them together:

'ταῦτα γὰρ ἄγνωστα ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει. καὶ ὅτι μὲν ἀπὸ θεῶν ὑφέστηκε πάντα, εἰς τὴν ἀγαθότητα αὐτῶν ἀποβλέποντες καὶ τὴν δύναμιν διατεινόμεθα, πῶς δὲ ἐκεῖθεν πρόεισιν, ἡμεῖς γιγνώσκειν οὐχ οἷοι τέ ἐσμεν. αἴτιον δέ, ὅτι τὸ προνοεῖν καὶ τὸ γεννᾶν ἐξαίρετόν ἐστι τῆς θείας ὑπάρξεως ἄγνωστον ἐχούσης ὑπεροχήν.'

Pious sentiments indeed! This attitude must provide a fertile ground for theurgy. Dodds in the same passage quotes a passage of the *De Mysteriis* (II, 11:96-7), which suitably sums up Iamblichus' attitude. I give Dodds' translation:

"It is not thought that links the theurgist to the gods: else what should hinder the theoretical philosopher from enjoying

probably the case is that Iamblichus contradicted *Amelius*, whom Theodoros is following, as is often the case in the *Timaeus Commentary*. Who, then, is Nemesius' immediate source for this doxography? Syrianus? Or perhaps nobody. Not Porphyry, at any rate.

[1] It is also Chaldaean doctrine that there is no metempsychosis into animals (*Or. Chald.* Fr. 160 Des Places), and this doubtless influenced Iamblichus.

theurgic union with them? The case is not so. Theurgic union is attained only by the perfective operation of the unspeakable *acts* correctly performed, acts which are beyond all understanding; and by the power of the unutterable symbols which are intelligible only to the gods."

The Vehicle (ὄχημα) *of the Soul*

The history of this concept has been adequately set out by Dodds, *Elements of Theology*, App. II, pp. 313ff., and I will not go into the subject here.[1] The composition and fate of the ὄχημα was a point of dispute between Iamblichus and his predecessors, particularly Porphyry. I have discussed the subject fully in the Commentary to *In Tim.* Fr. 81, and refer the reader thither. Briefly, what was in dispute between Iamblichus and his predecessors was the precise composition of the 'vehicle', and its fate after its separation from the body. On the latter point, Iamblichus believes, strangely, that the 'vehicle' did not dissolve after death, as Porphyry would maintain, but survived in some way within the cosmos, following in this, it would seem, Chaldaean doctrine.

Nature and Matter

These subjects are touched on only incidentally in the surviving fragments of the Commentaries. Iamblichus certainly rejected, as did the general consensus of Platonists, the belief of Plutarch and Atticus in the creation of the world in Time, and the previous existence of an evil World-Soul. He does, however, have a strong sense of the power of Fate (εἱμαρμένη), which is in fact the power of the material world (φύσις) over the human soul. His fullest surviving discussion of this occurs in his *Letter to Macedonius on Fate*,[2] though the same subject also comes up in the *De Mysteriis*.[3] Although his view of the power of the Soul is less optimistic than that of Plotinus or Porphyry, he grants Fate power only over the second soul (the ὄχημα), and recognises that the pure soul may free itself by the practice of theurgy.

To create the world, Matter is given form by the Demiurge, whose λόγοι penetrate it unceasingly. The characteristic of Matter is ἑτερότης, which may be traced back to the Dyad in the realm

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[1] See also R. C. Kissling, 'The OXHMA — ΠΝΕΥΜΑ of the Neoplatonists and the *De Insomniis* of Synesius of Cyrene.' AJP 43 (1922) pp. 318ff.

[2] Fragments in Stobaeus, I, 80, II 173ff. Wachs.

[3] VIII 7, and X 5. Cf. also *In Phaedr.* Fr. 6A.

of the One.[1] In *In Tim.* Fr. 9 we find a reference to the power of Matter to introduce ἑτερότης into the λόγοι:

'. . . καὶ οἱ αὐτοὶ λόγοι πόσην ἐξαλλαγὴν ἐπιφαίνουσιν, . . . ἐσχάτως ἐν ὕλῃ γεγονότες καὶ αὖ περὶ τὴν ὕλην μετὰ τῆς ὁμοιότητος παμπόλλην τὴν ἑτερότητα δεικνύντες.'

This 'differentiating quality' is proper to the whole cosmos, above and below the Moon. Iamblichus takes issue with Porphyry in *In Tim.* Fr. 46 for Porphyry's suggestion that ἑτερότης and multiplicity was characteristic only of the sublunary sphere. The most that Iamblichus will grant is that some forms in the cosmos 'rejoice in sameness' (τὰ μὲν τῶν εἰδῶν ταυτότητι χαίρει καὶ στάσει). What he is combating is the setting up of any too sharp distinction between the higher and lower parts of the material cosmos.

The Gods and Daemons

We can see from *In Tim.* Fr. 74 that Iamblichus was opposed to any rationalisation of the gods of a Euhemeristic nature, as well as to any identification of them with the 'elements', but he certainly did not believe in the Olympians in their traditional forms. The curious series of identifications which he gives for the gods mentioned *Tim.* 40E (*in Tim.* Frr. 75-8) show that he envisaged them as immaterial forces operating at various levels above and within the universe. Sallustius' division [2] of Gods into (1) ἐγκόσμιοι and ὑπερκόσμιοι, (2) of the ὑπερκόσμιοι a threefold division into those who make the οὐσία, the νοῦς and the ψυχή of Gods, and (3) of the ἐγκόσμιοι, a fourfold division into οἱ ποιοῦντες (τὸν κόσμον), οἱ ψυχοῦντες, οἱ ἁρμόζοντες and οἱ φρουροῦντες [3] and Proclus' division in props. 151-9 of ET of the classes of gods into τὸ πατρικόν, τὸ γεννητικόν, τὸ τελεσιουργόν, and τὸ φρουρητικόν, we may suspect of being Iamblichean in origin.

Much work needs to be done before one can confidently declare how much of Proclus' theory of Gods can be traced back to Iamblichus. I suspect that the systematic formulation of the theory of different manifestations of the same god at successive levels of

[1] The cosmic ἐναντίωσις goes all the way up to ἡ μετὰ τὸ ἓν δυάς, *In Tim* Fr. 7.

[2] *De Diis et Mundo*, ch. VI.

[3] Sallustius actually uses verbal phrases (οἱ μὲν εἶναι ποιοῦσι τὸν κόσμον, etc.) but I follow Dodds, (ET p. 278 n. 2) in making participial phrases, as being more convenient.

reality is to be attributed to Syrianus rather than to Iamblichus, but Iamblichus seems at least to have envisaged certain gods, such as Asclepius, as being emanations of certain others, such as Apollo (*In Tim.* Fr. 19), and the identifications in *In Tim.* Frr. 75-8 seem to involve a descending series of gods ending in a tetrad Zeus-Hera-Poseidon-Hades, the number proper to physical creation.

The question of Daemons arises in connexion with Iamblichus' exegesis of Tim. 24AB (*In Tim.* Fr. 16). As a background to that, I will give an account of Iamblichus' doctrine on daemons in the *De Mysteriis*.

We are introduced in *De Myst.* I, 5 : *15-17* to a fourfold distinction in the physical world, modelled, perhaps, on Plato's distinction of the four elements in the *Timaeus*. The highest place is held by the gods, the lowest by 'pure' souls (ψυχαὶ ἄχραντοι). Between the ἄκρα are two μεσότητες, one, the *heroes*, being more akin to the gods, though still far inferior to them. The daemons serve the will of the gods, make manifest their hidden goodness, and give form to their superior formlessness (16, 13ff.); they also serve to pass on the graces in which they participate to the classes of being below them ('παρέχουσαν δ' αὐτὴν ἀφθόνως τοῖς μεθ' ἑαυτὴν γένεσι καὶ διαπορθμεύουσαν', with a reminiscence of the *Symposium* 202E).

"These median classes (daemons and heroes) fill out the common bond (τὸν κοινὸν σύνδεσμον) between gods and souls, and render indissoluble their connexion, and bind together one continuous link from highest to lowest and make indivisible the community of the universe (τῶν ὅλων)" and so on (17, 8ff).

We find, then, in Book I, a four-layer spiritual universe, with the daemons, if we may so express it, taking the place corresponding to air in the material universe, and, with the heroes, helping to bind the whole together.

In the *De Mysteriis*, as in the *Timaeus-Commentary*, heresies of Porphyry are being combated. Porphyry, in framing his questions, has failed to distinguish properly between the οὐσίαι, δυνάμεις and ἐνέργειαι of the superior beings (I 4:*11*). He erroneously tries to introduce a distinction between those which are subject to passions (ἐμπαθές) and those which are not (ἀπαθές) (I, 10:*34* which 'Abammon' rejects. To none of the κρείττονα γένη, he maintains, can either of those terms be properly applied; they are above such distinctions.

How, then, does 'Abammon' distinguish daemons from gods? In ch. 15 (45-46) he opposed a distinction which Porphyry offers between gods and daemons. Porphyry (either giving his own views or those of οἱ πόλλοὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων) defines gods as νόες καθαροί, daemons as νοῦ μέτοχοι and ψυχικοί (45, 10ff.), a definition which is condemned as confused. The true distinction between gods and daemons is revealed in ch. 20 (*63*): gods, both visible and invisible, have general and universal power in the universe; daemons μοίρας τινὰς μεριστὰς τοῦ κόσμου κατατεινάμενοι ταύτας κατευθύνουσιν' — their powers are essentially *partial*. Further (*64*) τὸ μὲν θεῖον ἐστιν ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ προιστάμενον τῆς ἐν τοῖς οὖσι διατάξεως, διακονικὸν δὲ τὸ δαιμόνιον καὶ παραδεχόμενον ἅπερ ἄν παραγγείλωσιν οἱ θεοὶ προθύμως, αὐτουργίᾳ τε χρώμενον περὶ ὧν οἱ θεοὶ νοοῦσί τε καὶ βούλονται καὶ ἐπιτάττουσιν.

At the beginning of Book II, daemons are distinguished from heroes, according to οὐσία, δύναμις and ἐνέργεια (*67*).

"I say then that *daemons* are produced by reason of the generative and demiurgic powers of the gods (κατὰ τὰς γεννητικὰς καὶ δημιουργικὰς τῶν θεῶν δυνάμεις) in the furthest extremity of their procession and of their ultimate divisions (τῶν ἐσχάτων διαμερισμῶν); heroes, by reason of the principles of Life in the divine beings (κατὰ τοὺς τῆς ζωῆς ἐν τοῖς θείοις λόγους) and the primal and perfect degrees of souls take them as their end and cause of division (?) (ἀποτελευτᾶν ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ ἀπομερίζεσθαι)".

The οὐσία (*67*, 10) of daemons is ἀπεργαστικὴ καὶ τῆς καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν γιγνομένων ἐπιστασίας, while that of heroes is ζωτικὴ καὶ λογικὴ καὶ ψυχῶν ἡγεμονική.

The δυνάμεις (*67*, 15) of daemons are γόνιμοι, ἐπιστατικαί τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ τοῦ συνδέσμου τῶν ψυχῶν εἰς τὰ σώματα; those of heroes are ζωοποιοί, ἡγεμονικαὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, γενέσεως ἀπολελυμέναι.

The ἐνέργειαι (*68*, 3) of daemons are μᾶλλον περικόσμιοι, διατείνουσαι ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐν τοῖς ἀποτελουμένοις ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν, those of heroes are ἐπ' ἔλαττον μὲν διήκουσαι, παρὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν ψυχῶν διάταξιν ἐπιστρεφόμεναι.

I have left the descriptions in the Greek, as it would serve little purpose to turn jargon of such density into English. Generally, daemons are revealed as active principles of the gods, while heroes are more concerned with saving souls and leading them upwards.

The distinctions are fairly artificial, and inevitably tend to overlap, but Iamblichus must preserve his four-fold hierarchy.

He continues (II *2:68*, 8ff.) with an analysis of the nature of ψυχαὶ ἄχραντοι, the lowest class in the hierarchy. These are a somewhat free-ranging class of beings, and exhibit a number of peculiarities. They are endowed with very partial powers, but on the other hand are able to associate themselves with, and withdraw themselves from whom they please, joining themselves to the gods κατ' ἄλλας ἁρμονίας οὐσιῶν καὶ δυνάμεων ἢ καθ' οἵας δαίμονές τε καὶ ἥρωες πρὸς αὐτοὺς συνεπλέκοντο. They are deficient to these latter in eternity of uniform life (τὸ ἀίδιον τῆς ὁμοίας ζωῆς), but on the other hand can ascend ἀνωτέρω, even to the rank of angel (ἐπὶ μείζονα τάξιν, τὴν ἀγγελικήν), through the goodwill of the gods. This is the first mention of angels, and the first intimation that the four-fold division hitherto prevailing is about to be invaded by archangels, angels and two varieties of archon.

The souls thus described seem to retain about themselves something of the universal potentialities of the human soul according to Plotinus; they range widely about the spiritual world.

The more elaborate distinction may be partly Porphyry's fault. At the beginning of II, 3 (*70*) he is made to ask how one is to recognise *apparitions*: 'τί τὸ γνώρισμα θεοῦ παρουσίας ἢ ἀγγέλου ἢ ἀρχαγγέλου ἢ δαίμονος ἢ τινος ἄρχοντος ἢ ψυχῆς';'. But of course Iamblichus could have denied separate existence to such beings, had he been so inclined. Instead, he answers the question in detail. The new order which emerges (*71*) is: gods, archangels, angels, daemons (in a new four-fold grouping), heroes, sublunary archons (or cosmocrators), hylic archons,[1] souls. What seems to have taken place is a further unveiling of μεσότητες, between gods and daemons on the one hand, and between heroes and souls on the other.

At the beginning of II, 5 (*79, 7* ff.), we get a useful summary of the activities proper to each class of being:

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[1] In case any reader should be unfamiliar with the distinction between sublunary and hylic archons, I give Iamblichus' description of the work of each (*71*, 4ff.): the sublunary (whom he also called ἡγεμονικοί) τὰ ὑπὸ σελήνην στοιχεῖα (διοικοῦσι); the hylic (ἔνυλοι) τῆς ὕλης (προεστήκασι). A dualistic element threatens here, as the ἔνυλοι ἄρχοντες would normally be villains, evil and destructive forces, if Chaldaean influence were paramount. However, we only gather that they preside immediately over the realm of Matter.

καὶ μὴν τό γε ἀποκαθαρτικὸν τῶν ψυχῶν τέλεον μέν ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀρχαγγέλοις ἀναγωγόν· ἄγγελοι δὲ λύουσι μόνον τῶν δεσμῶν τῆς ὕλης, δαίμονες δ' εἰς τὴν φύσιν καθέλκουσιν· ἥρωες δὲ κατάγουσιν εἰς τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔργων· ἄρχοντες δ' ἤτοι τὴν προστασίαν τῶν περικοσμίων ἢ τὴν τῶν ἐνύλων ἐπιστασίαν ἐγχειρίζουσι, ψυχαὶ δ' ἐπιφαινόμεναι κατατείνουσί πως ἐπὶ τὴν γένεσιν.

This survey of Iamblichus' demonology, which does not in fact help greatly in the elucidation of Fr. 16, is included partly to show the complexity of the problem of presenting an account of Iamblichus' philosophy which is both coherent and comprehensive. It is these classes of being which Iamblichus made the subject of Hyp. III of the *Parmenides* (cf. *In Parm.* Frr. 2, 12, and 13), in contrast to all other interpreters of the dialogue, who allot no separate hypothesis to these beings.

The vexed question of the influence of the Chaldaean Oracles on Iamblichus must await a full collection of the fragments, and I will not comment on it further here.

Certain Philosophical Concepts

To conclude, I will list a number of concepts used by Proclus in *The Elements of Theology*, which Dodds (Intro. p. xxi) traces to Iamblichus, and which can be documented from the fragments.

(1) *The doctrine of unparticipated* (ἀμέθεκτα, ἐξῃρημένα) *terms*. Cf. *In Tim.* fr. 60: δεῖν γὰρ μὴ ἀθροάν γίνεσθαι τὴν μετάβασιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξῃρημένων ἐπὶ τὰ μετέχοντα, ἀλλὰ μέσας εἶναι τὰς συντεταγμένας τοῖς μετέχουσιν οὐσίας. To this we may add the whole doctrine of moments within an hypostasis.

(2) The doctrine of αὐθυπόστατα, or 'self-constituted' principles. This word, used to describe an entity which is capable of hypostatising itself, seems to have been first used by Iamblichus, in the *Letter to Macedonius* (ap. Stob. II p. 174 Wachs.), with reference to the power of the higher soul to free itself from Fate.

(3) *Much of Proclus' teaching about Time and Eternity*, that is to say, their relation to each other, and to the noetic and psychic worlds respectively, Cf. *In Tim.* Frr. 61-68.

(4) *The Classification of Gods.* This has been mentioned above. Dodds traces Proclus' doctrine back through Sallustius to Iamblichus, but I am not at present able to document it with confidence. See however Comm. ad *In Tim.* Fr. 74.

(5) *The Classification of Souls.* This can be best documented from the *De Anima*; see above, on *The Individual Soul.*

(6) *The Denial that the Soul ever attains release from the cycle of birth.* Again, Dodds traces this to Iamblichus through Sallustius, ch. xx. *In Phaed.* Fr. 5 seems to reveal Iamblichus' doctrine on this matter.

(7) *The Denial That any part of the Soul remains "Above".* This is the issue in *In Tim.* Fr. 87, discussed above, under *The Individual Soul.*

Conclusion

This must be regarded as a preliminary, interim survey of a somewhat neglected area in the history of Philosophy. Zeller [1] does cover it at some length, though with certain hostile prejudices. Mau, in PW, deals with it rather sketchily. Praechter [2] deals well with Iamblichus' relation to Porphyry, but his concern is primarily with Iamblichus' proper place in the development of Neoplatonism, and not with his philosophical position as such. A. C. Lloyd, in *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Mediaeval Philosophy, Ch. 18,* gives an adequate survey, but does not, inevitably, probe the depths of the subject.[3]

Zeller's references are characteristically comprehensive, but detailed quotation is really necessary in order to view clearly Iamblichus' differences with his predecessors, as well as his own distinctive formulations.

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[1] *Phil. d. Gr.* III² pp. 613-646.

[2] 'Richtungen und Schulen', esp. pp. 134ff.

[3] See now also the excellent account in R. T. Wallis, *Neoplatonism*, Ch. 4. Duckworth, 1972.

CHAPTER THREE

THE IAMBLICHEAN COMMENTARY

The Procline Format

In coming to a decision on the general form and scope of Iamblichus' commentaries, I find myself in agreement with A. R. Sodano, in the introduction to his collection of the fragments of Porphyry's *Commentary on the Timaeus.*[1] He traces back to Porphyry, in the case of the *Timaeus* (and, presumably, of the other Platonic dialogues on which he commented), the kind of detailed exegesis which we find practised in the existing commentaries of Proclus. This involved commenting on the continuous text of the dialogue in question from beginning to end, prefacing one's comments with the relevant sections of the text, or *lemmata.*

The evidence of Proclus's commentaries show that his arrangement was not original (indeed he makes no such claim); on most passages he gives proper attention to the opinions of others either when they differ from his own, or, in some cases, when they seem to put something particularly well. In the case of his references to Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Syrianus [2] it is frequently obvious that they are commenting on the same lemma as he is himself; occasionally we can see that he has divided up further the lemma on which they were commenting. Where Proclus is original, apart from his distinctive doctrines and formulations, is merely in the vast comprehensiveness of his exegesis. Where he himself has created a lemma (by subdivision), this is clear from the relative brevity of the κεφάλαιον and its lack of doxography.[3]

In the case of what I believe to be his innovation in dividing a traditional Book III (dealing with Tim. 31B σωματοειδὲς δὲ δὴ . . . to 40E . . . καὶ λεγέσθω) into two (his Books III and IV),

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[1] *Porphyrii In Platonis Timaeum Commentariorum Fragmenta,* collegit et disposuit A. R. Sodano, Napoli, A.D. MCMLXIV.

[2] I omit Amelius and Theodore of Asine from the reckoning, as quotation from them is less regular, but in fact the same holds true of them when they are quoted.

[3] e.g. I 32, 20ff. (on 17C); I 328, 12ff. (on 29ff.) These are random examples from a multitude. In general, this phenomenon occurs after a long section, in which preceding opinions are reviewed.

this is shown by Book IV's lack of a προοίμιον. We can see [1] that Porphyry and Iamblichus (and doubtless Syrianus) prefaced each book of their commentary with a preface, and that Proclus is merely following tradition in doing the same. The lack of a preface to Book IV, therefore, is most significant. The importance of this for Iamblichus' commentary will be discussed below.

Porphyry observed, as far as we can see, the form of the commentary as we see it in Proclus, and Iamblichus is essentially a follower (if a continuously dissident one)[2] of Porphyry. The form of the pre-Porphyrian commentary on Plato (I leave Amelius out of the reckoning, the evidence being too unclear), can be judged from two surviving examples, the anonymous *In Theaetetum* [3] and Calcidius *In Timaeum*.[4] I believe Calcidius's surviving commentary to be a good example of one type of Middle Platonic commentary. He chooses *topics* from the dialogue or work to be commented on, consecutive, but not continuous, and discusses those. He feels no need, for example, to comment on, or see higher meaning in, introductory passages, where Socrates is apparently chatting or settling down. Calcidius begins to comment at 31C, dismissing the resumé of the Republic and the Atlantis Myth in an introductory passage. We learn from Pr. *In Tim.* I 204, 17 (v. Fr. 25) that *Severus* too began his commentary at least after 27C; we find *Calvisius Taurus* (ap. Philop. *De Aet. Mundi*, p. 520 4ff. Rabe) commenting on σωματοειδὲς δὴ κ.τ.λ. 31B, in the '*first* Book of his Commentaries on the *Timaeus*' which suggests to me that he too did not pay much attention to the introductory parts. *Longinus* and *Origen* certainly paid attention to the Atlantis Myth and the introductory part generally (Longinus especially seeming to criticise it rather more as literature than as philosophy), but they fade out of the picture after 27C.[5] It was also possible, like Plutarch, to write essays on specific topics, such as 'The Creation

[1] From refs. in Proclus' own prefaces, e.g. (for Iamblichus), *In Tim.* frr. 1, 26, 74.

[2] Of 85 frr. from Proclus, I have counted 32 in which Iamblichus is noted as referring to Porphyry; in 25 cases he is attacking him, while in only 7 is he in agreement with him.

[3] Ed. Diels-Schubart, Berliner Klassikertexte, Heft II, 1905.

[4] Ed. J. H. Waszink, Plato Latinus Vol. IV. The Warburg Institute. 1962.

[5] It is probable that in the case of Origen at least, we are dealing with, not a Commentary on the *Timaeus*, but his book Περὶ τῶν δαιμόνων (Cf. Porphyry, *V.Plot.* 3, and Lewy, *Chald. Or.* Exc. XI), or simply with oral expositions reported by Longinus or Porphyry.

of the Soul in the Timaeus.' *Atticus*, too, seems chiefly interested in the creation of the world in Time. As for *Adrastus*, it may be suspected that his interests were chiefly mathematical and astronomical, and that in fact it is probably his example that Calcidius is following in beginning at 31C.

The *Theaetetus-Commentary*, on the other hand, is much more akin to the Neoplatonic commentaries. After a preface, the commentator begins to discuss consecutive, though not always continuous, lemmata. The content is ethical and explanatory, rather than theological. Diels and Schubart have shown convincingly that the author is closely connected with the School of Gaius, the approach being noticeably similar to that of Albinus' *Epitome* and *Didascalicus*. On the other hand, differences of style count against identification with Albinus himself. Gaius himself is a possibility, but nothing of his work survives. The author is sufficiently tied down, however, if one assumes him to be a 2nd Cent. A.D. follower of the School of Gaius. Whoever the man was, he mentions also his own Commentaries on the *Timaeus* (35, 12), the *Phaedo* (48, 10), and the *Symposium* (70, 12).

Tedious as the work may be, it is a most valuable piece of evidence that the form of the Commentary as we find it in Proclus goes back at least this far in the history of Platonic exegesis.

If, then, the form of the Neoplatonic commentary which Iamblichus is following goes back to Porphyry and in large measure to Middle Platonism, what is there, if anything, that Iamblichus himself has contributed? His main contribution, I feel, was the concept of the unity of the σκοπός, the *subject*, of each dialogue, and the laying down of a canon of dialogues in a definite order, to constitute a complete teaching course in Platonic philosophy.[1] I give the relevant texts in the Commentary on *In Tim.* Fr. 1, whither I refer the reader. The result of this innovation was that every part of the dialogue, even the most apparently casual introductory portions, must not only be commented on, but related to the overall aim of the dialogue, be it physical, ethical or theological.[2] Iamblichus frequently criticises Porphyry for not observing

[1] See K. Praechter, *Richtungen und Schulen im Neuplatonismus*, Genethliakon für Karl Robert, Berlin 1910, an essay to which every student of Iamblichus must stand indebted.

[2] It is plain from the *Anon. In Theaet.* that Middle Platonists formulated the subject of each dialogue. Some of the Platonists, says our author, considered that the dialogue was about the κριτήριον, (2, 11), others considered it

this canon of criticism. Porphyry comments μερικώτερον, he himself ὁλικώτερον or ἐποπτικώτερον.[1]

I have felt justified, then, as has Sodano, in preserving Proclus' lemmata (except in a few cases where it is plain that Proclus has divided a lemma which Iamblichus is following).[2] I have confined myself to passages explicitly attributed to Iamblichus (except in two cases, Frr. 5 and 61, where, however, the attribution seems clear enough), although it is not improbable that the whole of Proclus' commentary is shot through with Iamblichean influence. However, the attempt to disentangle these with any certainty from the contributions of Syrianus and Proclus must, I think, be postponed until, assisted by a full collection of the fragments, we have a more accurate grasp of Iamblichus' philosophical position and vocabulary than is the case at present.

Nature of Proclus' Quotations

Proclus, unlike, for example, Simplicius or Philoponus,[3] does not feel obliged to give *verbatim* quotations of his predecessors. Verse he will quote, perforce, but prose authors he prefers to incorporate into the body of his work, though without depriving them of credit (or discredit) for their opinions. There are two passages only, (my *Timaeus* Frs. 34 and 64) which Diehl feels justified in giving as verbatim quotations, and even these may have been interfered with to some extent by Proclus.

We have unfortunately only minimal controls from which to determine the accuracy of his attributions. We can check his references to Aristotle,[4] and Plato, and even Plotinus (of prose authors), but none of these were writing commentaries on the *Timaeus*, and so, particularly in the case of Aristotle, might be

to be about ἐπιστήμη (2, 32). Our author accepts these latter, with the qualification that it is the οὐσία, not the ὕλη, of ἐπιστήμη that is the real subject of the dialogue. However, the symbolisation of the characters, such as we see Iamblichus engaged in in the *Sophist* (Comm. *ad* Fr. 1), and the scheme of dialogues given in *Anon. Prol.* (*loc. cit.*), seem to be his original contribution.

[1] Cf. *In Tim.* fr. 25 and Comm.

[2] e.g. Tim. 24AB, cf. Iambl. fr. 16; Tim. (28C-29A), Iambl. fr. 35.

[3] e.g. (as regards authors relevant to us) frr. 62, 63, 67, 69, 90 of the *Timaeus* Comm. (from Simplicius), and frr. XXXIV, XXXV, XXXVIII, XLVII, XLIX, LVIII, LIX, LX of Sodano's edition of Porphyry (from Philoponus).

[4] In the case of Aristotle, I have drawn attention to his practice in one place, v. Comm. ad Fr. 49.

subject to far greater looseness of quotation (often, no doubt, from memory) than in the case of a Neoplatonic commentator on the text. Porphyry is also quoted, this time verbatim, by John Philoponus, but the passages do not, unfortunately, correspond to any quotation in Proclus. For Iamblichus, we have a number of verbatim quotations by Simplicius (Frs. 62-3, 67-8 and 90 of the *Timaeus* Commentary) and in the case of two of them (Frs. 63 and 67) we do have corresponding passages of Proclus, which show us, I think, his essential faithfulness (v. *ad loc.*). What I feel that we can gather from these two parallels is that if Proclus says that Iamblichus said something, he is telling the truth, if not the whole truth. If a statement or theory is attributed expressly by Proclus to Iamblichus, i.e. either directly or introduced by γάρ, with Indirect Speech, I maintain that the substance and phraseology of the passage is Iamblichean, and that the philosophy and philosophical terminology therein contained can be reclaimed for Iamblichus.

A more difficult question arises in the case of continuative passages following the initial attribution, introduced habitually by γάρ but normally themselves in *Direct Speech.* To settle the status of these as quotations seems to me to be of considerable importance for the present work.

My view of the matter is as follows. The use of Direct or Indirect Speech in a continuative passage introduced by γάρ, in so far as it follows any system at all, seems to be governed by the extent to which *Proclus himself approves of the opinion expressed in the passage*, rather than by the verbal closeness of the passage to the original. We cannot, of course, judge the closeness to the original, but we can, I think, see a pattern emerging if we consider the total of passages in which this phenomenon occurs. First, however, I will take three passages to serve as paradigms.

1. *Fragment 14* (Proclus *In Tim.* I 145, 5ff.)

After the initial passage, in which Iamblichus raises the problem as to how the gods are said to receive the governance of certain definite areas at certain definite times, the text continues:

εἰ γὰρ ἄρχονταί ποτε τῆς κληρώσεως, καὶ παύοιντ' ἄν ποτε· τὸ γὰρ χρόνῳ παραμετρούμενον ἅπαν τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν· κ.τ.λ.

The setting out of the ἀπορία continues in this way for some

ten lines (to 145, 19), and is then picked up by 'ταῦτα δὴ διαπορήσας ἐπιλύεται λέγων . . .' followed by Indirect Speech, thus making it plain that the previous passage is Iamblichus' own amplification of his problem. Proclus has no objection to this formulation, as is shown by his continuation (ll. 24ff.), which merely expands on Iamblichus' solution, and that, I feel, is why we have τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, rather than τοιοῦτον εἶναι.

2. *Fragment 54* (II 240, 4ff.)

In this passage Iamblichus is discussing the splitting of the soul-stuff, and the two 'lengths' or 'circles' (Tim. 36B).

ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος 'ἄνω' που 'μετεωροπολεῖ' καὶ 'τἀφανῆ μεριμνᾷ', τήν τε μίαν ψυχὴν καὶ τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῆς προελθούσας δύο.

Iamblichus is thus postulating three elements in the soul, rather than two. This must be explained. The text continues:

πάσης γὰρ τάξεως ἡ ἀμέθεκτος ἡγεῖται μονὰς πρὸ τῶν μετεχομένων, καὶ ἔστιν οἰκεῖος ἀριθμὸς τοῖς ἀμεθέκτοις καὶ συμφυής, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἡ δυάς, ὥσπερ ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν θεῶν.

This is a formulation of which Proclus thoroughly approves. He states it in proposition 21 of the *Elements of Theology*: πᾶσα τάξις ἀπὸ μονάδος ἀρχομένη πρόεισιν εἰς πλῆθος τῇ μονάδι σύστοιχον. Why, then, could this not be Proclus' own contribution to the argument here? First of all, it would leave Iamblichus without any defence of his own position; this we could tolerate, but, much more fatally for the theory, the text continues:

"καὶ οὖν καὶ ὁ Τίμαιος", φησί (*sc.* Iamblichus),". . . τὴν δυάδα παράγει ἀπ' αὐτῆς·" making clear that it is Iamblichus' explanation with which we are involved. This in turn is continued by 'ἡ μὲν γὰρ σχίσις τὴν δημιουργικὴν δηλοῖ διαίρεσιν, κ.τ.λ.

Proclus thus has the habit of subtly merging himself with Iamblichus (and even more with his own master Syrianus) when they take a position, or give an explanation, of which he basically approves. The fact that he should frequently go on to amplify such a passage does not detract from this basic approval.

3. *Fragment 16* (I 152, 28ff.)

We may now, as an example of the opposite situation, consider

Fragment 16, where Proclus is reporting an argument in which he does not feel directly involved. Iamblichus is refuting Porphyry's identifications of the component classes of the primitive Athenian state. But both Iamblichus and Porphyry are proceeding on the assumption of a five-fold division of classes, whereas Proclus, following Syrianus, adopts a six-fold division. Hence the long passage elaborating on Iamblichus' objection to Porphyry is introduced by γάρ and *Indirect Speech*—'οὔτε γὰρ τοὺς ἀρχαγγέλους ἠξιῶσθαί που μνήμης ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος . . .'. The Indirect Speech here does not mean that the passage is more accurately quoted than was the passage in Fr. 14; rather, it signifies that Proclus is dissociating himself from the whole argument.

This survey is, I think, sufficient to show the rationale behind my policy of attribution. I am heartened to find Sodano at least in tacit agreement with me in his edition of the fragments of Porphyry's *Commentary*. We find γάρ with Direct Speech attributed (correctly, in my view) to Porphyry in his Frs. I, III, IV, VII, VIII, XVI, XXI et al.[1] Sodano nowhere explains his policy in this matter, but his actions seem to speak for themselves.

I feel free, then, to claim such passages, which abound in the fragments, for Iamblichus. I stop short, however, of claiming any of Proclus' quotations as Iamblichus' *ipsissima verba*. The matter is not of primary importance, as Iamblichus was not, on Eunapius' admission,[2] much of a Greek prose stylist; what we need to be sure of is his theories and his philosophical vocabulary, and in these matters I feel that we can trust Proclus. If he says that Iamblichus made such and such an identification, using such and such technical terms, then we may, I feel, claim this as evidence for what Iamblichus thought and said.

The Quotations from Simplicius

As I have mentioned above, our second source for Iamblichus' *Commentary on the Timaeus* is Simplicius, in his *Commentary on*

[1] Note also a continuative γοῦν in Fr. II, an explanation of Longinus' given without approval by Porphyry with γάρ and Ind. Speech in Fr. IX, and Porphyry reported without approval by Proclus in Ind. Speech introduced by γάρ in Fr. XXIII.

[2] Eunapius, *VP* 458: οὔτε γάρ εἰς ἀφροδίτην αὐτοῦ καὶ χάριν τὰ λεγόμενα βέβαπται, οὔτε ἔχει λευκότητά τινα καὶ τῷ καθαρῷ καλλωπίζεται· οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀσαφῆ παντελῶς τυγχάνει, οὐδὲ κατὰ τὴν λέξιν ἡμαρτημένα, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἔλεγε περὶ Ξενοκράτους ὁ Πλάτων, ταῖς ἑρμαικαῖς οὐ τέθυται Χάρισιν.

Aristotle's Physics,[1] and, for one reference, in his *Commentary on the De Anima*. Four of the quotations from Iamblichus' *Timaeus-Commentary* occur in two corollaries, or additional essays, on Space and Time respectively, which Simplicius inserts into his Commentary, (my frr. 63, 67, 68 and 90). A fifth, fr. 62, occurs in the body of the commentary, *ad Phys.* IV 218a 31ff. The sixth is a *testimonium* (fr. 89) from his commentary on the *De Anima*, p. 133, 31ff. CAG. The quotations from the *Physics Commentary* are verbatim and thus of peculiar value.

One large problem, however, arises from Simplicius' attribution of these passages. His introduction to fr. 62 reads (p. 702, 20): ὁ δὲ Ἰάμβλιχος ἐν τῷ ὀγδόῳ τῶν εἰς Τίμαιον ὑπομνημάτων καὶ ταῦτα πρὸς τὴν δόξαν ἐπήγαγεν·

Fr. 63 is introduced (793, 23): προσκείσθω δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰς Τίμαιον ὑπομνημάτων. ἐν τοίνυν τῷ ὀγδόῳ βιβλίῳ ... παραδίδωσι ... λέγει δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ς' κεφαλαίῳ ταῦτα·

Fr. 67 (just below) is introduced by:
'ἅμα δὲ περὶ τούτου ... ἐν τῷ ι' κεφαλαίῳ τάδε γέγραφε·'

We seem thus to be involved with an Eighth Book of the *Commentary*, in which there were at least ten chapters. There are, however, certain difficulties in the way, and I believe them to be weighty ones. First of all, we can see, from the passages themselves, that they are comments on 37D (Fr. 63) and 38BC (Fr. 67), at which stage Proclus is in the early stages of his 4th Book. This would suggest a commentary in about 20 Books on Iamblichus' part, but this is no bar for a man who wrote at least 28 Books on the *Chaldaean Oracles*. However, from the examination of these same fragments, 63 and 68, we seem to discern that Iamblichus' *Commentary* was somewhat briefer than that of Proclus. Proclus has four κεφάλαια between 37D and 38BC, as against three of Iamblichus' (κεφ. 7-9), from which one might extrapolate the conclusion that Iamblichus' Commentary was about 3/4 of the length and detail of Proclus', a proportion which fits the evidence in other respects. Iamblichus' Eight Books would need, then, to have been very slim volumes.

But there is a worse difficulty. The other fragment from Simplicius (my Fr. 90) concerns Space, and is from the 2nd κεφάλαιον

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[1] Ed. Diels, CAG Vol. IX Berlin MDCCCLXXXII.

of Iamblichus' *Fifth* Book. Now, while one cannot pin down with certainty the lemma on which he is here commenting, the evidence of Calcidius shows that only at 52A and later was the discussion of Space traditionally undertaken. At all events, Iamblichus himself reminds us that he has already discussed Time (ll. 15-16) "καὶ ὥσπερ τὸν χρόνον ἐπειραθήμεν ὁμοφυῆ πρὸς τὴν δημιουργίαν ἀποδοῦναι, οὕτω καὶ τὸν τόπον ἐξηγεῖσθαι."

One cannot progress from an Eighth Book to a Fifth Book. There is, admittedly, an embarrassing textual variation: for ἐν τῷ ε' βιβλίῳ τῶν εἰς Τίμαιον ὑπομνημάτων, the Ms. E has ἐν τῷ ιε' βιβλίῳ. This would destroy our argument. Diels, however, does not accept this variation, and I feel that he is right. The ιε' arises, I feel, either from a wrong division of ΤΩΙΕΒΙΒΛΙΩΙ or from an 'intelligent' emendation of a reader (or scribe) who knew that one discussed Time before Space in a *Timaeus Commentary*, and wished to remove the discrepancy in Simplicius' reference. Of these two possible explanations I incline to the former, as being simpler.

What, then, are we to do with ἐν τῷ ὀγδόῳ βιβλίῳ? It is, after all, *twice* mentioned. I think we can see, from the writing of τὸ ε' βιβλίῳ, that there was a stage when the former reference was written ἐν τῷ η' βιβλίῳ. My suggestion is simply that η' is a misreading of γ'. When the scribe did it once, he was predisposed to do it again. We are, then, I suggest, in the *third* Book of Iamblichus' *Commentary*, and in the latter part of it. Herein lies the point of my previously-expressed doubt that Proclus' Book IV is traditional (i.e. Porphyrian). The lack of a προοίμιον marks it out as peculiar.[1] The sixth κεφ. of Iamblichus' Book Three is the second κεφ. of Proclus' Book Four, and Iamblichus' 10th κεφ. is Proclus' 7th. I suggest that Iamblichus' *Book III* comprised Proclus' Books *III* and *IV*, while Iamblichus' *Book V* (κεφ. 2 of which seems most probably to be concerned with Tim. 52A) begins at the end of Proclus' *Book V*, which we can see from a reference in Philoponus [2] continued at least up to 50C.

It seems to me that we have no way of deciding whether Iamblichus commented on the whole dialogue. It seems [3] that Proclus

[1] See Festugière, *Proclus: Commentaire sur le Timée*, Vol. III p. 7, who discerns that Proclus' Books III and IV are one continuous whole.

[2] *De Aet. Mundi*, 11, 11, p. 364 Rabe—quoted at the end of Diehl's edition of Proclus, *In Tim.*

[3] Festugière, *op, cit.* Vol. I, pp. 10-11. The discovery of an Arabic ms. in Constantinople (*Cod. arab. unic.* Agia Sophia 3725) shortly before 1941

did in fact comment on the whole dialogue, but in fact the latter half of the dialogue invites a different type of comment, more medical and strictly physical in nature. It seems to me probable that Calcidius is following some tradition in leaving off at 53C, with a discussion of Matter. For whatever reason, Porphyry ceases to be quoted by Proclus after 41E (III 272, 16ff. Diehl; Sodano Fr. LXXXI), and we have no other clear evidence that he went further. As for Iamblichus, it is plain that, with the failing of Proclus' evidence, we are deprived of our chief means of knowing how far he went. Simplicius does seem to carry us to 52A, and, since we appear to be there near the beginning of a book, we must assume that Iamblichus continued some way further. More detailed speculation, however, would hardly be profitable.

The Other Sources

These investigations have been concerned exclusively with the *Timaeus Commentary*, as is inevitable in view of the preponderant bulk and detail of its fragments. Also, I believe that the Procline format does preserve most closely, of all our surviving sources, the procedure followed by Iamblichus. However, something must also be said of the other commentators with whom we are involved, Hermeias (on the *Phaedrus*), Olympiodorus (on the *Alcibiades* and the *Phaedo*), and Damascius (on the *Philebus* and the *Parmenides*).

Hermeias, the fellow-pupil, with Proclus, of Syrianus, adopts a simpler, less formal and comprehensive, procedure than his distinguished contemporary. Indeed, his commentary seems to be no more than a fairly faithful record of Syrianus' seminar. He takes consecutive passages of the original, but more loosely than Proclus, quoting only the initial sentence or phrase of the passage to be commented on, the length of which varies widely according to the subject-matter. His commentary is more akin to a collection of scholia, and such, indeed, is its title.

Olympiodorus, writing about a century later, is more structured than Hermeias. He divides his commentaries into *praxeis*, each of which may have represented a lecture of an hour or so. The subject-matter of each *praxis* covers approximately one Stephanus

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revealed a translation of Proclus' Comm. on *Tim.* 89E4-90C7, divided into four lemmata. Festugière has published these frr. at the end of Vol. 5 of his translation.

page of Plato. We have first the *theoria*, then the *lexis*, each phrase to be discussed being quoted separately.

A.-J. Festugière [1] has made a useful analysis of the structure of the Neoplatonic commentary, specifically the distinction of *theoria*—the general survey of the doctrine contained in or arising from the lemma—and *lexis*—the individual words and phrases requiring comment. We can see from the preserved fragments of both Porphyry and Iamblichus that they commented under both these categories, though how rigid the distinction was for them we cannot be certain. Even Hermeias observed it, however, and for Proclus and all commentators following him it was a basic method of exegesis. It is, after all, a pretty logical way to proceed.

The *B*, *C* and *D* Scholia on the *Phaedo* appended to Olympiodorus *In Phaedonem*, and the scholia on the *Philebus* attributed persuasively by Westerink to Damascius, are simply lecture notes, probably of students, and show no particular form, but are consistent with *praxeis* in the style of Olympiodorus. It is often, unfortunately, difficult to know whether a reference to Iamblichus in these notes is to a passage from a commentary, but I have included all references, noting my degree of uncertainty in each case.

Damascius' *Problems and Solutions on the First Principles* (from c. 127 on, at least) is in fact a commentary on a commentary, to wit, the now-lost portion of Proclus' *Commentary on the Parmenides*, from the Second Hypothesis onwards. The commentary form becomes more and more structured as the work proceeds, and follows in general a division into discussions of *theoria* and *lexis*, though Damascius obscures Proclus' format by posing a series of *aporiai* on the text, or on Proclus' interpretation thereof, and then answering them. His references to Iamblichus present problems. First, if the latter part of Proclus' Commentary was anything like the first part, he did not quote Iamblichus, or anyone else, explicitly at least. Damascius will then have had direct access to a commentary by Iamblichus, as he seems also to have had to a commentary of Syrianus (see *In Parm.* Fr. 6A and comm.). It is sometimes difficult, however, to discern precisely which passage of the *Parmenides* is being commented on, or whether a reference to Iamblichus is in fact to his Commentary at all (in the first

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[1] *Mus. Helv.* XX 1963, 77-100.

half of the work many of the references to Iamblichus are plainly to other works), and these difficulties are reflected in my arrangement of the 'fragments'. Indeed, I have made a distinction, particularly necessary in the case of references taken from Damascius, between certain (or even probable) fragments, and those which are dubious. If I have had a serious doubt that a reference is in fact to a Commentary, I have numbered it with a capital letter after the next preceding accepted fragment. It may be asked why such passages should be included at all. My feeling has been that in the present state of scholarship concerning Iamblichus such passages deserve at least a temporary home. When a full collection is made of the fragments of Iamblichus, then perhaps it may be thought desirable to remove such fragments from a revised edition of the Platonic Fragments, and place them somewhere else, in which case this can be done without disturbing the present order.

Survival of the Commentaries

It seems as though knowledge of Iamblichus' Commentaries did not long survive the closing of the Platonic School at Athens in 529 A.D. Damascius seems to have direct knowledge of his *Commentary on the Parmenides.*[1] Olympiodorus quotes independently of Proclus from his *Commentary on the Alcibiades,*[2] and Simplicius gives us many valuable quotations from a number of his Commentaries on Plato and Aristotle.[3] Philoponus ignores him, while quoting Porphyry, in the *De Aet. Mundi,* although he wrote a treatise against his Περὶ Ἀγαλμάτων (Photius, *Bibl.* cod. 215). Lydus seems to be using Iamblichus' Περὶ θεῶν, his Περὶ καθόδου ψυχῆς and his *Commentary on the Chaldaean Oracles,* but thereafter only his exoteric works survive, even to our own day, along with the *De Mysteriis.*[4] Sodano [5] has shown that Psellus and the Byzantine scholars after him knew neither Iamblichus' nor Porphyry's commentaries at first hand, but relied on Proclus

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[1] Damascius, *Dub. et Sol.* passim. See Ruelle's Index.

[2] Olympiodorus, *In Alc.* See Westerink's Index.

[3] See references in Intro. Sect. 1: *Works.*

[4] Johannes Stobaeus is acquainted with his *De Anima* and with his *Letters,* for both of which works he is our only source. These may have survived somewhat longer than the Commentaries.

[5] *Op. cit.* Intro. p. X. ff.

for their references. It seems plain that within a few generations the voluminous commentaries of Proclus had wiped out those of his predecessors; their works ceased to be copied, and the oblivion which Simplicius feared for them did indeed soon after his time fall upon them.

CHAPTER FOUR

EDITIONS

I have not thought it worth while, in compiling this edition of the fragments, to go beyond the published texts of the source authors. Occasionally emendation has seemed necessary, but nothing, I think, which would have benefited from a scrutiny of the mss.

For most of the works there are modern, scientific editions, those of Westerink, and those of the editors of the Teubner texts and, for Simplicius, the *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* (CAG) edition of Diels, the latter of which, however, I found to require emendation (see *In Tim.* Fr. 63). For Damascius *Dub. et Sol.*, on the other hand, the edition of Ruelle is very slipshod, and requires supplanting,[1] as does Victor Cousin's edition of Proclus' *In Parmenidem*. As for Proclus' *Platonic Theology*, the absurd situation of being dependent on Portus' edition of 1618 is finally being rectified by the excellent Budé edition of Saffrey and Westerink, which has, however, to date reached only Book I. Couvreur's edition of Hermeias *In Phaedrum*, left barely finished by the author's death, seems adequate, needing only an *index verborum*.[2]

The texts used, then, are as follows:

In Alcibiadem:

Proclus, *Commentary on the First Alcibiades of Plato*, ed. L. G. Westerink, North-Holland Publishing Co., 1954.

In Phaedonem:

Olympiodorus, *In Platonis Phaedonem Commentaria*, ed. W. Norvin, Teubner, 1913.

In Sophistam:

Scholia Platonica, ed. W. C. Greene, American Philological Assoc. Monographs VIII, Haverford, Penn. 1938.

In Phaedrum:

Hermiae Alexandrini In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia, ed. P.

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[1] A new edition in the Budé series, by Me. Galperine is now announced.

[2] This has now been supplied by C. Zintzen, in a reprint of this edition by Olms, 1971.

Couvreur. Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études: Sciences Historiques et Philologiques, Vol. 133, 1901. (repr. Olms, 1971),

Proclus, *In Platonis Theologiam Libri Sex*, ed. Aemilius Portus. Hamburg and Frankfurt am Main, 1618.

In Philebum:

Damascius, *Lectures on the Philebus*, ed. L. G. Westerink. North-Holland Publishing Co., 1959.

In Timaeum:

Proclus Diadochus, *In Platonis Timaeum Commentaria*, ed. E. Diehl. Teubner, 3 vols. 1903-6 (repr. Hakkert 1965).

Simplicius, *In Aristotelis Physicorum Libros Commentaria*, ed. H. Diels. Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca (CAG) IX, 1882.

Simplicius, *In Aristotelis De Anima Commentaria*, ed. M. Hayduck, CAG XI, 1882.

In Parmenidem:

Syrianus, *In Metaphysica Commentaria*, ed. W. Kroll, CAG VI: 1, 1902.

Proclus, *Opera inedita*, ed. Victor Cousin, 2nd Ed. Paris 1864 pp. 617-1258.

Damascius, *Dubitationes et Solutiones de Primis Principiis*, ed. C. A. Ruelle, 2 vols. Klinksieck, Paris 1889.

The following translations I have found helpful in varying degrees:

In Alcibiadem:

O'Neill, W. *Proclus, Alcibiades I: A Translation and Commentary*. Nijhoff, The Hague, 1965.

In Philebum:

Westerink's ed. includes a translation.

In Timaeum:

Taylor, Thomas. *The Commentaries of Proclus on the Timaeus of Plato*, 2 vols. London 1820.

Festugière, A.-J. *Proclus, Commentaire sur le Timée*. Trad. et notes, 5 vols. Vrin, 1966-1968.

In Parmenidem:

Chaignet, A. Ed., Damascius le Diadoque, *Problèmes et Solutions touchant les premiers Principes*, 3 vols. Leroux, Paris, 1898.

TEXT AND TRANSLATION

SIGLA

Proclus, *In Alcibiadem*

N	Neapolitanus III E 17, saec. XII/XIV
M	Marcianus gr. 190, saec. XIV
R	Laurentianus 85, 5, a. 1489

Olympiodorus, *In Alcibiadem*

M	Marcianus gr. 196 c. 900 A.D.

Olympiodorus, *In Phaedonem*

M	Marcianus gr. 196, c. 900 A.D.
Finckh	C. E. Finckh, ed. 1847, Heilbronn

Scholia Platonica (*In Sophistam*)

B	codex Clarkianus, et scholia Clarkiana uncialibus litteris ab Aretha ut videtur adscripta, saec. IX
T	codex Venetus, et scholia Veneta litteris sive minusculis sive uncialibus parvis adscripta saec. XI-XII
W	codex Vindobonensis, et scholia Vindobonensia, saec. X (?)

Hermeias, In Phaedrum

A	Parisinus gr. 1810, saec. XIII exeuntis
A^a	manus secunda, saec. XVI-XVII
M	Monacensis 11, saec. XVI

Damascius, *In Philebum*

No variants.

Proclus, *In Timaeum*

C	Coislianus 322, saec. XI/XII
M	Marcianus 195, saec. XIV exeuntis
P (olim F)	Parisinus 1840, saec. XVI
N	Neapolitanus Borbonicus III D 28, a. 1314
R	Riccardianus 24, saec. XIV incipientis
Q (olim P)	Parisinus suppl. gr. 666, saec. XIV
ς	recensio vulgata (A: Monacensis 382
	(b: editio Basileensis a. 1534
S	Schneider, qui edidit a. 1847 Vratislaviae
t	Taylor, qui vertit in linguam Anglorum a. 1820 Londinii

Simplicius, *In Physica*

E	Marcianus 229, saec. XIII exeuntis
F	Marcianus 227 saec. XIII
a	editio Aldina, 1526.

Syrianus, *In Metaph.*

C	Parisinus Coislinianus 161, saec. XIV

Proclus, *In Parmenidem*

A	Parisinus gr. 1810, saec. XIII exeuntis
B	Parisinus gr. 1836
C	Parisinus gr. 1835
D	Parisinus gr. 1837

Damascius, *Dubitationes et Solutiones*

A	Marcianus 246, saec. X ineuntis.
B	Parisinus 1989, saec. XV-XVI
F	Hamburgensis philos. I, olim Lucae Holstenii, saec. XVI
E	Monacensis 5, olim 243, saec. XVI

(B, F and E are in fact of no independent authority)

Fr. 1

Procl., *In Alc.* 11, 12 Creuz.

ΠΡΟΟΙΜΙΟΝ

καί μοι δοκεῖ καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος τὴν πρώτην αὐτῷ διδόναι τάξιν ἐν τοῖς δέκα διαλόγοις ἐν οἷς οἴεται τὴν ὅλην τοῦ Πλάτωνος περιέχεσθαι φιλοσοφίαν, ὥσπερ ἐν σπέρματι τούτῳ τῆς συμπάσης ἐκείνων διεξόδου προειλημμένης.

Fr. 2

Procl., *In Alc.* 13, 17

Ἐκεῖνος δὴ οὖν ὁ τρόπος τῆς τοῦ διαλόγου τομῆς ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ πάντων εἶναι τελεώτατος, ὅν καὶ ὁ φιλόσοφος Ἰάμβλιχος ἐνέκρινεν, ὁ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὁρμώμενος τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ συνάγων εἰς τρία κεφάλαια τὴν ὅλην οἰκονομίαν τοῦ συγγράμματος καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα ἀναφέρων τάς τε συλλογιστικάς μεθόδους καὶ τὰς λεκτικὰς μεταχειρίσεις. δεῖ γὰρ ἀεὶ τὰ δεύτερα καὶ τὰ ὀργανικὰ τῶν πρώτων καὶ κυρίων μερῶν ἀντέχεσθαι κἀκείνων ἐστοχασμένως παραδίδοσθαι. πῶς οὖν φαμὲν τὸν διάλογον εἰς τὰ προσεχῆ καὶ κυριώτατα μέρη διαιρεῖσθαι; πῶς δὲ ἄλλως ἢ ἐπειδὴ σκοπὸς μέν ἐστιν αὐτῷ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκφῆναι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐπιστρέψαι πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστον ἡμῶν ἀπὸ τῆς εἰς τὰ ἔξω βλεπούσης ὁρμῆς καὶ τῆς ἀλλοτριοπραγμοσύνης, ταύτην δὲ ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι τὸν μὲν λόγον ἡμῶν καθαιρόντων ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπιπροσθούντων αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν ἐπιστροφὴν διακοπτόντων, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον παιδευόντων καὶ πρὸς τὴν κατὰ τὸν λόγον τελείωσιν ἀνακαλουμένων, προηγεῖται μὲν κεφάλαιον ἕν, τὸ τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἀφαιροῦν τοῦ λόγου καὶ τὰ ἐμπόδια τῆς ἐπιστήμης τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν γένεσιν ἀναστέλλον πολλοῖς δή τισι καὶ παντοδαποῖς συλλογισμοῖς· δεύτερον δὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τέτακται τοῦ διαλόγου μέρος τὸ κατασκευάζον ὡς οὐ χρὴ τοῖς φυσικοῖς πλεονεκτήμασιν ἀρκούμενον ἀπολιμπάνεσθαι τῶν κατὰ τὴν τελείαν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτηδευμάτων· τρίτον δὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸ τὴν ἀνάμνησιν πορίζον τῆς ἀληθινῆς ἡμῶν οὐσίας καὶ τῆς ἐπιμελείας τῆς ὀρθῆς τὴν εὕρεσιν καὶ τέλος τὸ προσῆκον ἐπάγον τῇ ὅλῃ προθέσει τῶν λόγων;

5 ὄργανα N. 9 τοῦ: τὴν N. 11 ταύτην: τοῦτο ci. Cousin. 13 τὸν λόγον R: λόγον N, τοῦ λόγου M.

IN ALCIBIADEM

Fr. 1

And indeed it seems to me that it is for this reason that the divine Iamblichus allotted it the first place among the ten dialogues in which he conceives the whole philosophy of Plato to be contained, their entire subsequent development being anticipated as it were in seminal form in this dialogue.

Fr. 2

That method of dividing the dialogue seems to me to be the most perfect of all, which the philosopher Iamblichus also fixed on. This bases itself on the actual subject-matter and gathers into three sections the whole substance of the work, and relates to this the division according to syllogisms and that which takes account of the forms of discourse. For those aspects which are secondary and in the role of instruments must be made to depend on those which are primary and truly determinative, and must be so set out as to make their dependence on them plain. How then do we say that the dialogue is divided into its immediate and most basic parts? How else but that since the object of the dialogue is to reveal the being of Man and to turn each of us towards himself, away from the impulse towards what is external and interest in the affairs of others, and since this will necessarily come about when we purify our Reason from the things which obstruct it and interrupt its turning inward, and when we discipline our irrational element and recall it to the perfection it attains when it acts in accordance with the Reason, there comes first therefore one section which removes ignorance from the Reason and does away by means of a copious variety of syllogisms with all those obstacles to knowledge which exist as the result of generation; second after this is placed a section of the dialogue which proves that we should not rest content with advantages coming to us from Nature, and

Fr. 3

Procl., *In Alc.* 25, 19ff.

<Ὦ παῖ Κλεινίου, οἶμαί σε θαυμάζειν ὅτι πρῶτος ἐραστής σου γενόμενος τῶν ἄλλων πεπαυμένων μόνος οὐκ ἀπαλλάττομαι. 103A.>

Ἔτι δὴ λέγομεν ὅτι καὶ τοῖς περὶ τοῦ ἔρωτος λόγοις ἐστὶ τοῦτο διαφερόντως προσῆκον, ὥσπερ δή φησι καὶ ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος· τὸ γὰρ ἀρρενωπὸν τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἐρωτικῆς καὶ τὸ ἐγηγερμένον ἀπὸ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τὸ δραστήριον ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐνδείκνυται κλῆσις.

Cf. Olymp., *In Alc.* 24,2ff. West.: ἢ ὅτι διεγηγερμένη ἡ πρὸς πατρὸς κλῆσις <καὶ> οἰκεία τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς καὶ αὐτοῖς τοιούτοις οὖσι καὶ πολὺ ἔχουσι τὸ ἀρρενωπόν . . .

Fr. 4

Procl., *In Alc.* 84, 1ff.

<Τούτου δὲ τὸ αἴτιον γέγονεν οὐκ ἀνθρώπινον, ἀλλά τι δαιμόνιον ἐναντίωμα, οὗ σὺ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ὕστερον πεύσῃ. 103A>.

[ἕπεται δὲ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν εἰπεῖν, τί δήποτέ φησιν ὁ Σωκράτης. οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ δαιμόνιον ὕστερον ἔσεσθαι τῷ νεανίσκῳ γνώριμον, ἀλλὰ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ. λέγει γὰρ οὕτως· 'οὗ σὺ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ὕστερον πεύσῃ'.] πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ῥητέον, ὃ καὶ ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχός φησιν, ὅτι τὰς μὲν ὑπάρξεις τῶν δαιμόνων καὶ ὅλως τῶν κρειττόνων ἡμῖν θεωρῆσαι χαλεπώτατόν ἐστι τοῖς μὴ τελέως ἐκκεκαθαρμένοις τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦν, ὅπου γε καὶ ψυχῆς οὐσίαν κατιδεῖν οὐ ῥᾴδιον παντί (μόνος γοῦν ὁ Τίμαιος ἅπασαν αὐτῆς τὴν οὐσίαν ἐξέφηνεν· 'οἷον' γὰρ 'ἐστι πάντῃ πάντως θείας καὶ μακρᾶς' δεῖται 'διηγήσεως', ὥς πού φησι καὶ ὁ ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ Σωκράτης)· τὰς δὲ δυνάμεις αὐτῶν καὶ ἰδεῖν καὶ διασαφῆσαι ῥᾶον. ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν, ὧν εἰσὶ προσεχῶς αἱ δυνάμεις μητέρες, καὶ αὐτῶν ἐκείνων ἐπαισθανόμεθα· μέση γὰρ ἡ δύναμίς ἐστι τῆς τε οὐσίας καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας, προβαλλομένη μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας, ἀπογεννῶσα δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν.

10 *Phaedr.* 246 A.

neglect those practices which lead to the perfect level of virtue; and third after these is that which provides a recollection of our true essence and a way of discovering the correct practices for attaining it and which places a fitting culmination upon the whole sequence of the discussion?

Fr. 3

Further, we claim that this is particularly fitting to a discourse on Love, as indeed is also pointed out by the divine Iamblichus; for the method of address by the father's name indicates the mainly aspect of true love, and its quality of being awakened from Matter and its powers of action.

Fr. 4

(The next thing to be discussed is, what Socrates may mean by saying that, not the daemonic force itself will be known to the young man, but its power. For he says "the *power* of which you shall learn presently,") The first point to make, as is noted, indeed, by the divine Iamblichus, is that the essences of daemons and in general of the entities superior to us are extremely difficult to comprehend for those who do not have the mind of their soul thoroughly purified—inasmuch as even the essence of the soul is not easily perceptible to everyone (only the Timaeus at any rate has given a full revelation of its essence; for 'what it is in itself' requires 'a thoroughly divine and lengthy exposition', as Socrates says in the *Phaedrus*)—but to perceive and make clear the *powers* of daemons is easy enough. We attain to a perception of them through their activities, of which the powers are the immediate mothers; for a power is median between an essence and an activity, put forth from the essence on the one hand, and itself generating the activity on the other.

Fr. 5

Procl., *In Alc.* 88, 10.

<Νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐναντιοῦται, οὕτω προσελήλυθα· εὔελπις δέ εἰμι μηδὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐναντιώσεσθαι αὐτό. 103AB.>

Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν αἱ τοιαῦται πᾶσαι ἀπαντήσεις σαθραὶ καὶ εὐδιάλυτοι πεφήνασι, λέγομεν ἡμεῖς ἑπόμενοι τῷ τε θείῳ Ἰαμβλίχῳ καὶ τῷ ἡμετέρῳ καθηγεμόνι τρία ταῦτα χρῆναι διαφερόντως ἐν τῇ λύσει τῆς προκειμένης ἀπορίας διασώζειν· ἓν μὲν τὸ πρέπον τῷ ἐφιέντι δαίμονι τὴν συνουσίαν, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ καθῆκον τῷ Σωκράτει τῷ καὶ πρότερον ὁρμήσαντι περὶ τὴν τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου πρόνοιαν καὶ νῦν ἀπηντηκότι πρὸς αὐτόν, τρίτον δὲ τὸ τοῦ νεανίσκου συμφέρον. δεῖν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς συνουσίας ἐπιδεῖξαι ταύτης ὠφελημένον, οὐ γὰρ ἀποχρῆναι μὴ χείρω γεγονέναι. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὁ τῷ μοχθηρῷ <συνὼν κερδαίνοι ἄν>, τὸ μὴ χείρων ἀποτελεσθῆναι, τῷ δὲ σπουδαίῳ πρέποι ἂν ἀμείνους δήπου τοὺς συνόντας ποιεῖν.

[<γ'> ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ὁ νεανίσκος, ἵνα ἀπὸ τῶν ἀτελεστέρων ἀρξώμεθα, καλλίων ἀποτετέλεσται, δηλοῖ καὶ τὸ Πλατωνικὸν Συμπόσιον, ὅπου δή, καὶ ταῦτα μεθύων, ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης ὑπόκειται θαυμάζων μὲν 'τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγους' ὡς δραστηρίους καὶ 'ἀγριώτερον ἐχίδνης' τῶν εὐφυίᾳ διαφερουσῶν ψυχῶν ἀντιλαμβανομένους, ἐξομνύμενος δὲ καταψηφίζεσθαι ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀμαθίας, ὅταν ἀκούῃ διαλεγομένου Σωκράτους, καὶ ἀποθαυμάζειν μὲν αὐτοῦ τὰ 'ἔνδον ἀγάλματα' τῶν ἀρετῶν ὡς σεμνὰ καὶ τίμια, ἄθλιον δὲ ἑαυτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τῆς ἕξεως ἕνεκα τῆς κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν. πρὸς γὰρ ταῦτα ὠφελημένος ὑπὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους οὐ σμικρὰν οἶμαι προσθήκην ἔσχεν εἰς τὴν τῶν φυσικῶν πλεονεκτημάτων τελείωσιν. εἰ δὲ καὶ πέπρακταί τινα αὐτῷ πλημμελῆ, τὸ ἀτελὲς αἰτιώμεθα καὶ τὸ μὴ πάντῃ κατωρθωμένον τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ ζωῆς. οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔφαμεν ὡς σπουδαῖον αὐτὸν ἡ Σωκράτους ἀπείργασται συνουσία, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀπώνατο λέγομεν. <καὶ> ἔστω πρὸς τὸν παρόντα βίον μηδὲν αὐτῷ γενονέναι τι διὰ τὴν συνουσίαν ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ πρός γε τὸν μέλλοντα προὔργου τι πάντως ἐγένετο. καὶ νῦν μὲν ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς ὑπὸ μοχθηρᾷ πολιτείᾳ τρεφόμενος οὐκ ἔσχε τελέως ἀπόνασθαι τῶν λόγων, πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀνθελκόντων· ἀποπλήσας δὲ τὰς ἐμπλήκτους ὁρμὰς τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ἐν γαλήνῃ τῶν τοιούτων γενόμενος κακῶν κατὰ σχολὴν προβάλλων τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους ὁρᾷ τὸ διάφορον τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ζωῆς πρὸς τὴν φιλόσοφον συμβουλήν. οὕτω γὰρ δὴ καὶ ὁ ἐν Πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης περὶ Θρασυμάχου φησὶν ὅτι 'εἰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν μὴ πέπεισταί μοι, πρός γε τὸν ἔπειτα βιόν εἴη ἄν τι προὔργου γεγονός'.

9 δεῖν Westerink: δεῖ N. 11 ὅτῳ μοχθηρῷ τὸ καὶ χεῖρον mss.: correctionem sugg. West.

Fr. 5 [1]

Now since all such replies are evidently unsound and easy to refute, we assert, following both the divine Iamblichus and our own master, that these three points especially must be maintained in the solution of the present difficulty: (1) The appropriateness of the guardian spirit in permitting the association, (2) the fittingness of Socrates both in his previous eagerness to make provision for Alcibiades and in having now accosted him, (3) the benefit of the young man. For we must show him to have profited from this association; it will not be enough that he merely not become worse. For this result—not ending up worse—he might acquire even from association with a villain, but surely it would befit the good man to improve those who associate with him. (3) (Well then, that the young man has been rendered nobler—to begin from the less perfect—is made clear by Plato's *Symposium*,[2] where Alcibiades, even though drunk, is represented as marvelling at "the arguments in philosophy" as efficacious and laying hold of souls that excel in natural disposition "more fiercely than an adder", swearing that he condemns himself and his ignorance whenever he hears Socrates conversing, and wonders greatly at "the inward images" of his virtues as worthy of respect and honour, but considers himself wretched because of his state of soul. Helped by Socrates in these respects I think he received no small addition towards the perfection of the advantages of nature. If some things were done by him amiss, let us blame that on the lack of perfection and complete correction of his way of life. For we did not say that the association with Socrates made him into a worthy citizen, but we do say that he derived benefit from it. Granted that as regards the present life no good befell him because of the association, yet at any rate it surely proved of some use towards the future. As it is, probably, reared under a bad form of government, he was unable

[1] I have borrowed for this lengthy passage the translation of William O'Neill (see *Bibl.*), since I found very little in it to quarrel with. I have, however, chosen to translate σπουδαῖος simply as 'good' rather than 'serious-minded', and have kept the term 'daemon' except in the case of 'the guardian spirit'.

[2] *Symp.* 218A-222A.

καὶ θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν καὶ τὸν δαίμονα πρὸς τὴν ὅλην περίοδον ἀποβλέποντα τῶν ψυχῶν ἐφιέναι τῷ Σωκράτει διαλεχθῆναι. καθάπερ γὰρ οὖν καὶ τὰς κολάσεις ἃς ἐπάγουσιν οἱ δαίμονες οὐκ ἀξιωτέον πρὸς ἕνα βίον μόνον ἀναφέρειν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἅπασαν τὴν περίοδον, κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ δὴ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ τὰ ἀπ' αὐτῶν προτεινόμενα καὶ τὰς ὠφελείας εἰς τὸ ὅλον τῆς περιόδου τέλος ἀνενεκτέον. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ βραχὺ βλέπουσιν οἱ κρείττους ἡμῶν, οὐδ' ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλ' ἅτε τοὺς βίους ἡμῶν ἐπεσκεμμένοι πάντας καὶ τὰς ὅλας περιόδους, ἐκείνων στοχαζόμενοι πολλὰ δρῶσιν εἰς ἡμᾶς ὡς πρὸς ἕνα βίον ἀσύμφωνα τοῖς πολλοῖς φαινόμενα· διὸ καὶ θαυμάζεται ὑπ' αὐτῶν εἰ κατὰ δαίμονα τὰ τοιαῦτα δίδοται. καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐκεῖνα ῥητέον πρὸς τήνδε τὴν ζήτησιν, ὅτι καὶ οἱ δαίμονες καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ σπουδαῖοι δι' ἑαυτοὺς ἐνεργοῦσι καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀγαθόν, καὶ πράττουσιν, ἃ ἂν πράττωσι, διὰ τὸ τέλος ὅπερ ἐνεστήσαντο τούτων ἑκάτεροι τῆς ζωῆς· καὶ οἱ μὲν δαίμονες προτείνουσι τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν δόσεις ἀφθόνως, οἱ δὲ εὐεργετεῖν σπουδάζουσι τοὺς συνόντας. καὶ ὥσπερ ὁ ἥλιος ἀφίησι τὸ φῶς οὐ διωρισμένως, ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τοῖς δυναμένοις ἀπολαύειν, μετέχει δὲ ὁ δυνάμενος· καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἡλίου πάντα μετέχει, τὸ δέ γε μὴ μετέχον διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ παραιτεῖται τῆς μεθέξεως· οὕτω δὴ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν δαιμόνων ἀεὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ διδόντων καὶ τῶν ἐκείνοις συντεταγμένων ἀνδρῶν, τὸ μὴ διατίθεσθαι κατ' αὐτὰ συμβαίνει τοῖς ἄλλοις παρὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀνεπιτηδειότητα. καὶ εἰ προεγίνωσκεν οὖν ὁ δαίμων ὡς οὐ πεισθήσεται ὁ νεανίσκος, κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀγαθότητα ἐνήργει τὸν Σωκράτην μὴ ἀεὶ τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀποτρέπων συνουσίας· καὶ τῷ μὲν δαίμονι καὶ οὗτος ὠφέληται, τῇ δὲ οἰκείᾳ αἱρέσει τῆς ὠφελείας ἀποπέπτωκεν. ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ Πύθιος ὁ τῷ Λαΐῳ χρήσας μὴ σπείρειν τέκνων ἄλοκα δαιμόνων βίᾳ' πάντως προῄδει τὸν Λάιον μὴ πεισόμενον, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀγαθὸς ὢν προὔτεινεν αὐτῷ τὴν ἀμείνω τῆς ζωῆς αἵρεσιν; καὶ ὁ Λάιος αὐτῷ μὲν οὐχ ἥμαρτε, διὰ δὲ τὴν οἰκείαν ἄνοιαν τοῖς ὕστερον περιπετὴς ἐγένετο δυστυχήμασι.

<β> καὶ τοίνυν καὶ ὁ Σω<κράτης τοῦ καθήκοντος ἔτυχε>· πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ τοῦ σπουδαίου πράξεις πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔχουσι τὴν ἀναφοράν· ἐνεργήσας οὖν εὐεργετικῶς καὶ θεοπρεπῶς ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ τέλος ἔχει, καὶ εἰ μὴ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἐκτὸς ἐνέργειαν τετελείωται.

ταῦτά μοι δοκεῖ καὶ τῷ Πλάτωνι σύμφωνα καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐξηγητῶν εἰρῆσθαι πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀπορίας διάλυσιν.]

65 em. West.

to derive complete benefit from the discussions, since many were the forces pulling him the other way; but once he has satisfied the capricious impulses of the soul, and reached a calm free from such evils, when at leisure he brings up such discussions, he sees the difference between his own life and philosophic counsel. Similarly Socrates in the *Republic* [3] observes of Thrasymachus that "although for the present you are not convinced by me, yet it will prove to be of some use for your future life."

(1) It is no cause for wonder that the guardian spirit, having regard for the whole cycle of souls, should permit Socrates to converse. Just as we should not presume to refer the chastisements which daemons apply to one life alone, but to the whole cycle, in the same way we must refer the benefits held out to us by them and their services to the whole outcome of the cycle. Our superiors are not short-sighted, like us men, but since they observe all our lives and our entire cycles, out of regard for them they do much to us that appears to the many not to fit in with one particular life; and so they wonder whether such gifts are made by the favour of a daemon. Further in regard to this subject of enquiry we must observe that both daemons and good men act on their own account and on account of the good in them, and do whatever they do for the end which both classes have set over their lives; the daemons offer gifts of good things ungrudgingly, and the others are eager to benefit their associates. As the sun releases its light not partially but upon all who can enjoy it, and he who can share in it (and all things share the sun, or at any rate what does not share it is excluded from so doing on account of its own weakness), so also since the good daemons and the men classed with them are ever bestowing good things, the lack of a disposition to receive them is a condition occasioned in others by their own lack of suitability. Even if, then, the guardian spirit foresaw that the young man would not be persuaded, yet in view of his own goodness he activated Socrates by not always deterring him from association with Alcibiades; and the latter too was helped by the guardian spirit, but of his own choice fell away from his aid. For the Pythian god who warned Laius "not to sow a furrow of children in despite of the gods", also certainly foreknew that Laius would not obey, but, because he was good, offered him the better choice of life; and Laius did not go astray because of his own folly.

[3] *Rep.* VI 498CD.

Fr. 6

Procl., *In Alc.* 126, 22ff.

<Καὶ ἴσως γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι σμικρόν με ἔφθης. ἐγὼ γάρ τοι ἐν νῷ εἶχον πρότερός σοι προσελθὼν ταῦτα ἐρέσθαι, τί ποτε βούλει καὶ εἰς τίνα ἐλπίδα βλέπων ἐνοχλεῖς με ἀεί, ὅπουπερ ἂν ὦ ἐπιμελέστατα παρών; τῷ ὄντι γὰρ θαυμάζω ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστι τὸ σὸν πρᾶγμα, καὶ ἥδιστα ἂν πυθοίμην. 104CD.>

Τὸ δὲ 'ἐνοχλεῖς με' οὐκ ἔστι τοιοῦτον οἷον τὸ πρόσθεν εἰρημένον τὸ 'δι' ὄχλου ἐγένοντό σοι'—ἀλλ' ὥς φησιν ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος, ἴσον δύναται τῷ 'εἰς ἀπορίαν με καταβάλλεις ζητοῦντα τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς σιωπῆς καὶ τῆς συντόνου ταύτης παρακολουθήσεως'. καὶ γάρ ἐστιν ὄντως τὸ ἀπορεῖν δεσμός τις τῆς ἀπορούσης ψυχῆς καὶ κώλυσις τῆς ἐνεργείας καὶ οἷον ὄχλησις.

Fr. 7

Olymp., *In Alc.* 59, 22ff. Cr.

<?Εἶεν; εἰ δὲ δή ὅτι μάλιστα ταῦτα διανενόημαι, πῶς διὰ σοῦ μοι ἔσται καὶ ἄνευ σοῦ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο; ἔχεις λέγειν; 106A.>

'Πῶς διὰ σοῦ μοι ἔσται;' ἐνταῦθα γενόμενος ὁ φιλόσοφος Ἰάμβλιχος ἠπόρησεν ὅτι φαίνεται ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης τελειότερος ὢν τοῦ Σωκράτους. οὗτος μὲν γὰρ εἶπεν ὅτι 'διὰ σοῦ', πρόσρημα ὀργανικῆς αἰτίας, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ὅτι 'μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ', πρόσρημα ποιητικῆς αἰτίας, καὶ συνέταξεν ἑαυτὸν τῷ θεῷ, οὗτος δὲ ὡς ὀργάνου ὄντος τῷ θεῷ τοῦ Σωκράτους εἶπεν 'διὰ σοῦ'. ἔλυσε δὲ αὐτὸς παγκάλως λέγων ὅτι ἐν ἑτέροις φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων ὅτι αἱ μὲν τελειότεραι ψυχαὶ συνεπιτροπεύουσι τὰ τῇδε τῷ θεῷ καὶ συνδιοικοῦσιν, αἱ δὲ ἀτελέστεραι ὡς ὄργανόν εἰσι καὶ οὕτως χρῆται αὐταῖς ὁ θεὸς πρὸς τὰ ἐνταῦθα· οὐ μόνον δὲ ταῖς ἀτελεστέραις,

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6 105 e 5 8-9 *Phaedr.* 246BC.

(2) So Socrates also achieved the activity befitting him; for all the actions of the good man have reference to this; if he has acted, then, beneficently and in a divine manner, he achieves his end in his activity, even if the accidental result of his activity in the outside world has not been brought to a successful completion.

(Such are the views expressed by commentators to solve the difficulty, which in my opinion accord both with Plato and the actual facts).

Fr. 6

The phrase "you are bothering me" is not to be taken in the same way as the phrase "they were a nuisance to you" uttered a little earlier; but, as Iamblichus says, it has the same force as "you were involving me in perplexity as I sought the reason and the purpose for your silence and this assiduous custom of following me about." For indeed perplexity is in truth a kind of fetter of the soul which experiences it and a hindrance to its activity and, one might say, a bother.

Fr. 7

'How by means of you will I be able...?' At this point the philosopher Iamblichus raises the difficulty that Alcibiades appears as superior in perfection to Socrates. For he has said 'by means of you', this being the term proper to the instrumental cause, whereas Socrates has said "with the aid of God", the term proper to the creative cause, and has associated himself with god, whereas Alcibiades has used the phrase 'by means of you', as if Socrates was merely an instrument of God. He solved this difficulty very neatly by saying that Plato says elsewhere (*Phaedr.* 246BC) that the more perfect souls assist God in the overseeing and administration of this realm, whereas the less perfect are in the position

ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ ταῖς κακαῖς, οἷον φονεῦσιν πρὸς τὸ δίκην ἀξίαν δοῦναι τοὺς ὀφείλοντας. ὁ μὲν οὖν Σωκράτης πρὸς τὰς τελειοτέρας αὑτοῦ δυνάμεις ἀποβλέψας εἶπεν 'μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ'; ὁ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης πρὸς τὰς ἀτελεστέρας, διὸ 'διὰ σοῦ' εἶπεν καὶ ἐπήγαγεν πάλιν 'καὶ ἄνευ σοῦ', πρόσρημα ὕλης.

13 αὐτοῦ M: corr. Creuzer.

Fr. 8

Olymp., *In Alc.* 110, 13ff. Cr.

<Καί μοι λέγε· τῶν δικαίων φῂς ἔνια μὲν συμφέρειν, ἔνια δ' οὔ; Ναί. τί δέ; τὰ μὲν καλὰ εἶναι αὐτῶν, τὰ δ' οὔ; πῶς τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς; Εἴ τις ἤδη σοι ἔδοξεν αἰσχρὰ μέν, δίκαια δὲ πράττειν; Οὐκ ἔμοιγε. Ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλά; Ναί. 115A.>

ὁ δὲ θείος Ἰάμβλιχος οὐ διακρίνει τὰ ὑψηλότερα ἀπὸ τῶν κοιλότερων τῇ πλείονι μεταδόσει (πάντα γὰρ ἄχρι τῆς ὕλης κάτεισι· δόγμα γάρ ἐστιν, ἀφ' οὗ ἄν τι ἄρξηται ἐνεργεῖν μὴ παύεσθαι ἄχρι τῶν ἐσχάτων· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἰσχυρότερόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ δύναται διὰ τῆς πόρρω διαστάσεως ἀντανίσωσις γίνεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀσθενέστερον), ἀλλὰ διακρίνει τῷ δριμυτέραν τήν μετάδοσιν τῶν ὑψηλοτέρων εἶναι. μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐφιέμεθα εἶναι ἤπερ ζωῆς, καὶ μᾶλλον τοῦ ζῆν ἤπερ τοῦ νοεῖν.

of instruments, and are used as such by God in this realm; and not only the less perfect, but sometimes even the evil souls, as for instance murderers, for the purpose of inflicting suitable punishment on those who deserve it. Socrates, then, used the term 'with the help of God' looking to the powers more perfect than himself, whereas Alcibiades said 'by means of you', and added, again 'and without you', the term proper to Matter, looking to the less perfect.

Fr. 8

But the divine Iamblichus does not distinguish the higher principles from the lower by the greater extent of their influence (for all the principles in his view, extend downwards as far as Matter; for this is a law <of his>, that, irrespective of what point a principle begins to operate, it does not cease its operation before extending to the lowest level; for even if <the influence of a higher principle> is stronger, nevertheless the fact of its greater separation can create a balancing factor, rendering it weaker), but he distinguishes them by the fact that the influence of the higher principles is more piercing, more keenly felt. For we strive for Being more basically than for Life, and for Life more basically than for Intelligence.

IN PHAEDONEM

Fr. 1

Olymp., *In Phaed.* p. 57, 1ff. N.

<Παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἔστι τις ὁ λόγος οὗτος, οὗ μεμνήμεθα, ὡς ἐνθένδε ἀφικόμεναι ἐκεῖ, καὶ πάλιν γε δεῦρο ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ γίγνονται ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων. 70C.>

Πρῶτον τοῦτο, ὅτι ὁ σκοπὸς τῷ προκειμένῳ λόγῳ δεῖξαι οὐκ ἀθάνατον τὴν ψυχήν, ἀλλ' ἐπιδιαμένουσαν χρόνον τινὰ μετὰ τὸν χωρισμὸν τοῦ σώματος, καὶ οὐ καθάπερ Ἰάμβλιχος οἴεται, ἕκαστον λόγον δεικνύναι τὴν ἀθανασίαν τῆς ψυχῆς· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐνθουσιῶν ὡς κατὰ περιωπήν φησιν, οἷος ἐκείνου θυμός, οὐ μὴν τῇ λέξει ταῦτα οἰκεῖα·

Fr. 2

Olymp., *In Phaed.* p. 60, 11ff. N.

<Μή τοίνυν κατὰ ἀνθρώπων, ἦ δ' ὅς, σκόπει μόνον τοῦτο. 70 D.>

Τινὲς ἐκ τούτου τοῦ ῥησιδίου ἀπατηθέντες ᾠήθησαν τὸν Πλάτωνα πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἀπαθανατίζειν· σκόπει γάρ, τί φησιν· μὴ μόνον κατὰ ἀνθρώπων σκόπει μοι τὸν λόγον ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ' ἀλόγων καὶ φυτῶν, ὡς ἂν καὶ τὴν ἄλογον ψυχὴν καὶ τὴν φυτικὴν ἀθάνατον αὐτοῦ βουλομένου. καὶ κατασκευάζουσι τοῦτο οὕτως, ὅτι πᾶσα ψυχὴ ζωῆς οὖσα χορηγὸς οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται θάνατον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ᾧ ἐπάγει τὸ ἐναντίον ἐπιδέχεται· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ πῦρ θερμότητα ἐπάγον ψύξεώς ἐστι δεκτικόν, ὅπου γε, ὥς φησιν ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος, οὐδὲ ὃ ἐπάγει δέχεται· οὐδὲ γὰρ θερμότητα χορηγοῦν θερμότητα δέχεται.

7 οὐδὲν Finckh: οὐδὲ M.   8 γε] γὰρ M

IN PHAEDONEM

Fr. 1

The first thing to be said is this, that the aim of the present argument is to demonstrate, not that the soul is immortal, but merely that it continues to exist for a time after its separation from the body, and not as Iamblichus thinks, that each argument demonstrates the immortality of the soul; for he makes these statements as inspired utterances, so to speak, from his watch-tower, as is his wont, but they are simply not derivable from the text.

Fr. 2

Some, deceived by this phrase, have believed that Plato made all souls immortal. For consider what he says: 'Do not consider the validity of this argument only with relation to men, but also to irrational animals and plants', as though he intended to make both the irrational soul and the vegetative soul immortal. And they prove this as follows: Every soul, being an introducer of life, does not admit death; for nothing admits the opposite to what it introduces; fire, for instance, being the introducer of heat, is not receptive of cold—seeing that, as Iamblichus says, it does not even admit to itself what it introduces to something else; for not even in introducing heat does it itself receive heat.

Fr. 3

Olymp., *In Phaed.* p. 65, 13ff. N.

<καὶ μὴν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης ὑπολαβών, καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνόν γε τὸν λόγον, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθής ἐστιν, ὃν σύ εἴωθας θαμὰ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡμῖν ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη που ἡμᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ μεμαθηκέναι ἃ νῦν ἀναμιμνῃσκόμεθα. 72E.>

Ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἰάμβλιχος οἴεται ἑκάτερον λόγον καθ' αὑτὸν δεικνύναι τὴν ἀθανασίαν τῆς ψυχῆς; εἰ γάρ, φησί, τὸ ζῶν καὶ τεθνεὸς ἐξ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἀεὶ ἐξ ἀλλήλων, ἀΐδιος ἄρα ἡ ψυχή· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἰ ἀεὶ αἱ μαθήσεις ἀναμνήσεις, ἀΐδιος ἄρα καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἡ ψυχή.

Fr. 4

Olymp., *In Phaed.* p. 78, 15ff.

<Οὐκοῦν τοιόνδε τι, ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Σωκράτης, δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἀνερέσθαι ἑαυτούς, τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ ἄρα προσήκει τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν, τὸ διασκεδάννυσθαι, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποίου τινὸς δεδιέναι μὴ πάθῃ αὐτό, καὶ τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ <οὔ> · καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὖ ἐπισκέψασθαι πότερον [ἡ] ψυχή ἐστιν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων θαρρεῖν ἢ δεδιέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς; 78B.>

Ὁ δὲ φιλόσοφος Ἰάμβλιχος καὶ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον βούλεται τελείαν ἀποδεικνύναι τὴν ἀθανασίαν τῆς ψυχῆς· ὅσον μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῆς ὁμοιότητος πολυχρονιωτέραν ἀπέδειξεν, ἐκ δὲ τῶν κειμένων ἐν τῇ λέξει λημμάτων ἡ ἀθανασία τῆς ψυχῆς συνάγεται· ἀσύνθετον γὰρ αὐτὴν εἶπεν καὶ δεσπόζειν τοῦ σώματος, κάλλιστα δὲ τῷ Πλωτίνῳ ἤρεσεν πᾶν φθειρόμενον δι' ἕνα τῶν δύο τρόπων τούτων φθείρεσθαι, ἢ ὡς σύνθετον ἢ ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὄν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀσώματα διὰ τὸ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι φθείρεται, τὰ δὲ σώματα ὡς σύνθετα. εἰ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδὲ σύνθετός ἐστιν, ὥς φησιν ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος, καὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ λέξις ἐδήλωσεν· οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ ἀόρατον αὐτὴν εἶπεν, ἀλλὰ ἀσύνθετον, ὡς ἂν ταὐτοῦ ὄντος ἀοράτου καὶ ἀσυνθέτου· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν, εἴ γε δεσπόζει τοῦ σώματος, ζῳοποιοῦσα αὐτὸ καὶ αὐτοκίνητος οὖσα, κατ' οὐδένα ἄρα τρόπον φθαρήσεται οὐδὲ ὡς σύνθετος οὐδὲ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ.

Fr. 3

For Iamblichus considers that either argument by itself demonstrates the immortality of the soul; for if, he says, the living and the dead arise out of each other and do this eternally, the soul will thus be eternal; but further, if items of knowledge are always reminiscences, then according to this argument too the soul is eternal.

Fr. 4

The philosopher Iamblichus wants this argument also to be a complete proof of the immortality of the soul; for to the extent that he has shown on the basis of similarity that it is longer-lived, and from the premisses laid down in the text, the immortality of the soul may be concluded. For he has stated that it is non-composite and that it rules over the body, and, as Plotinus very finely lays it down, everything destructible is so in one of these two respects, either as being composite or as being in a containing subject, while corporeal things perish through being composite. If then the soul is not composite, as Iamblichus says,—as is plain from the text; for Plato never refers to the soul as invisible, but as incomposite, implying that to be invisible and to be incomposite are implied by one another—and it is not on the other hand 'in a containing subject', seeing that it rules over the body, giving it life and being itself the cause of its own motion, then on neither count, neither as composite nor as being in a containing subject, will it be subject to destruction.

Fr. 5

Olymp., *In Phaed.* p. 191, 26ff. N.(a) and 203, 26ff. N. (b)

<Τυχόντας δὲ ἐκεῖ ὧν δὴ τυχεῖν καὶ μείναντας ὃν χρὴ χρόνον ἄλλος δεῦρο πάλιν ἡγεμὼν κομίζει ἐν πολλαῖς χρόνου καὶ μακραῖς περιόδοις. 107E. (?)>

(α) Ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀεί τινα μένειν, οὔτε ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, ὡς Ἰάμβλιχος· εἴπερ γὰρ κατῆλθεν, πέφυκεν κατιέναι ποτέ.

(β) Πῶς ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος τὸ ἐνάντιον φησὶ περὶ τῶν τελέως ἀποκαθισταμένων; ἢ τὰ ἀντίστροφα πάντα ἐροῦμεν, οὐδέποτε κατιέναι αὐτάς, ἢ κατά τινα περίοδον καθόδων αἰτίαν οὐκ ἔχουσαν ἀναγκαίαν, ἢ ὅσον γε ἐπὶ τῇ οἰκείᾳ ζωῇ μὴ ῥεπούσῃ πρὸς γένεσιν, ἢ τὸ τρίτον κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τῆς ζωῆς ἀγένητον ποιουμένης τὴν κάθοδον καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἐκεῖ ἀδιάκοπον, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν ἐπιστολαῖς γράφει, ὑπὲρ τοῦ οἰκείου λόγου ἀπολογούμενος τὸν τρίτον ῥηθέντα τρόπον.

Fr. 5

(a) It is not possible to remain always in the noetic realm either, as Iamblichus maintains; for if one has descended in the past, it is natural that one should descend again at some time.

(b) How does Iamblichus say the opposite of those who have been restored to a state of perfection? Shall we say just the converse [1] about them, that they never descend, either during a certain period in which there is no compelling necessity for descents, or because their essential life does not incline towards the realm of generation, or thirdly, by reason of the form of their life which creates a descent which does not involve generation and which never breaks its connexion with the higher realm, as he himself writes also in his *Letters*, explaining his own theory along the third line of argument above-mentioned.

[1] i.e. the converse of the solution proposed just before (203, 14ff.), in respect of the damned, that they never ascend.

IN SOPHISTAM

Fr. 1

Hermann, *Plat. Dial.* VI pp. 249-50, and Greene, *Scholia Platonica*, pp. 40 = 445-6.

<Προοίμιον>

Ἔστι γὰρ κατὰ τὸν μέγαν Ἰάμβλιχον σκοπὸς νῦν περὶ τοῦ ὑπὸ σελήνην δημιουργοῦ. οὗτος γὰρ εἰδωλοποιὸς καὶ καθαρτὴς ψυχῶν, ἐναντίων λόγων ἀεὶ χωρίζων, μεταβλητικός, καὶ νέων πλουσίων ἔμμισθος θηρευτής, ψυχὰς ὑποδεχόμενος πλήρεις λόγων ἄνωθεν ἰούσας, καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνων παρ' αὐτῶν τὴν ζωοποιΐαν τὴν κατὰ λόγον τῶν θνητῶν. οὗτος ἐνδέδεται τῷ μὴ ὄντι, τὰ ἔνυλα δημιουργῶν, καὶ τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος ἀσπαζόμενος, τὴν ὕλην. βλέπει δὲ εἰς τὸ ὄντως ὄν. οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ πολυκέφαλος, πολλὰς οὐσίας καὶ ζωὰς προβεβλημένος, δι' ὧν κατασκευάζει τὴν ποικιλίαν τῆς γενέσεως. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς καὶ γόης, ὡς θέλγων τὰς ψυχὰς τοῖς φυσικοῖς λόγοις, ὡς δυσαποσπάστως ἔχειν ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως. καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἔρως γόης, καὶ ἡ φύσις ὑπό τινων μάγος κέκληται διὰ τὰς συμπαθείας καὶ ἀντιπαθείας τῶν φύσει. νῦν οὖν τὸν παντοδαπὸν σοφιστὴν βούλεται διδάσκειν. καὶ γὰρ ὁ φιλόσοφος σοφιστὴς ὡς μιμούμενος τόν τε οὐράνιον δημιουργὸν καὶ τὸν γενεσιουργόν. καὶ ἡ διαιρετικὴ μιμεῖται τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς τῶν ὄντων πρόοδον, καὶ ὁ γενεσιουργὸς τὸν οὐράνιον δημιουργόν· διὸ καὶ σοφιστής. καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ σοφιστὴς ἄνθρωπος ὢν διὰ τὸ τὰ μεγάλα μιμεῖσθαι σοφιστὴς καλεῖται· ὅθεν καὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν πολυκέφαλον εἴρηκεν. ὁ δὲ ξένος εἰς τύπον τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν δημιουργῶν νοείσθω ὑπερουράνιος καὶ ἐξῃρημένος, οἱ δὲ ἀκροαταὶ εἰς τὰς δημιουργικὰς νοήσεις, ὁ μὲν εἰς τὴν τοῦ Διός, ὁ δὲ εἰς τὴν ἀγγελικὴν ὡς Ἑρμαικὸς καὶ γεωμετρικός. καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ δημιουργία ἐκ τοῦ ἀτελοῦς εἰς τὸ τέλειον, διὰ τοῦτο πρῶτον ὁ ξένος τῷ Θεοδώρῳ συγγίνεται. εἶτα δι' ἐπιστροφῆς τῷ Διίῳ Σωκράτει.

2 καθαρτὴς] καθαρσις (sic.) T. 3 λόγων] λόγον B μεταβλητικῶς BW 4 ἀποδεχόμενος W λόγων T: ἀλόγων BW 6 ἐνδέδεται] ἐνδέχεται B 11 καὶ γὰρ] καὶ γὰρ καὶ B ὑπό τινων om. W. 14 οὐράνιον] οὐρανοῦ B 21 ἀτελοῦς] τέλους B.

Fr. 1

The subject of the present dialogue, according to the great Iamblichus, concerns the sublunar demiurge. For he is an image-maker and purifier of souls, always separating them from contrary arguments (*or* reason-principles?), able to produce change, and 'a hired hunter of rich young men', receiving souls full of reason-principles coming down from above, and taking as payment from them the giving of life according to rational principles to mortal things.

He is bound up with Non-Being, engaged in the creation of material things, and embracing the 'veritable lie', Matter. He fixes his gaze, however, on Real Being. He is the 'many-headed' being, putting forth many essences and lives, through which he brings about the variety of generation. He is also a 'sorcerer', inasmuch as he charms the souls with the principles of Nature, so that they may be hard (*or* unwilling?) to separate from the realm of generation. For Love also is a sorcerer, and Nature is called by some a magician by reason of the system of sympathies and antipathies among physical things. Here, then, he wants to show us the Sophist of manifold forms. For indeed the philosopher is a sophist inasmuch as he imitates both the heavenly Demiurge and the Demiurge who presided over generation.

The Art of Division, again, imitates the procession of entities from the One, as does the Demiurge who presides over generation the heavenly Demiurge; for which reason he too is a sophist. And the Sophist himself, being a man, is called a sophist through his imitation of great things; for which reason he called the Sophist 'many-headed'. The Stranger should be conceived in the role of the Father of the Demiurges, being supercelestial and transcendent, and his hearers as the demiurgic thoughts, the one in the role of the thought of Zeus, the other in the role of a messenger (or angel), as being Hermaic and a geometer. And since creation is from the incomplete to the complete, for this reason the Stranger first communes with Theodorus, then, in the process of return to himself, with Socrates, who is analogous to Zeus.

IN PHAEDRUM

Fr. I

Hermeias, *In Phaedr.* 9, 6ff. Couvr.

ΠΡΟΟΙΜΙΟΝ

(a) Πάντες <οὖν> οὗτοι μερῶν τινων τῶν ἐν τῷ διαλόγῳ δραξάμενοι, περὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἀπεφήναντο τὸν σκοπόν· ἕνα δὲ πανταχοῦ χρὴ εἶναι τὸν σκοπὸν καὶ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα <πάντα> παρειλῆφθαι, ἵνα ὡς ἐν ζῴῳ πάντα τῷ ἑνὶ συντάττηται. διὸ περὶ τοῦ παντοδαποῦ καλοῦ φησιν ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος εἶναι τὸν σκοπόν, ὡς ἐφεξῆς ἐροῦμεν.

ibid., 11, 16ff.

(b) Οὔτε οὖν πολλοὺς εἶναι φατέον τοὺς σκοποὺς (πρὸς γὰρ ἕν τι πάντα δεῖ τετᾶσθαι ἵν' ὥσπερ ἓν ζῷον ὁ λόγος ὑπάρχῃ) οὔτε ἀπὸ μέρους περὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἀποφαίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸν λόγον εἰς ἕνα συντάττειν σκοπόν. ἔστι δὲ οὗτος, ὡς συνελόντι εἰπεῖν, περὶ τοῦ παντοδαποῦ καλοῦ [εἰπεῖν]. διὸ ἄρχεται μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ φαινομένου κάλλους τοῦ ἐν τῇ μορφῇ τοῦ Φαίδρου, οὗπερ ἐραστὴς ἦν ὁ Λυσίας, κατὰ ἀπόπτωσιν τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ ἐραστοῦ ἀκόλαστος ὢν ἐραστής. εἶτα μέτεισιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις καλόν, οὗ ἐραστὴς παραδίδοται Φαῖδρος, ἐρώμενος δὲ ὁ Λυσίας ἢ ὁ τοῦ Λυσίου λόγος· διὸ ἀντερῶσιν ἀλλήλων Λυσίας καὶ Φαῖδρος, καὶ ἀμφότεροι ἐρασταί εἰσι καὶ ἐρώμενοι, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔρωτα· διὸ καὶ βελτίους ἄμφω κατά τι καὶ χείρους· καθὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐραστής, βελτίων ὁ Φαῖδρος, χείρων δὲ ὁ Λυσίας. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Λυσίας τοῦ σώματος ἤρα καὶ τῆς ἀκολάστου ἐπιθυμίας, ὁ δὲ Φαῖδρος τοῦ ἐν λόγοις καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἐν τῇ συνθέσει τῶν ῥημάτων, ὃ ἀυλότερόν πώς ἐστι· καθὸ δὲ ἐρώμενος, βελτίων ὁ Λυσίας ἐστὶ (τουτέστιν ὁ Λυσίου λόγος), χείρων δὲ ὁ Φαῖδρος, τῷ πάλιν ἐρώμενον μὲν εἶναι τοῦ Φαίδρου τὸν λόγον Λυσίου, ἐρώμενον δὲ τοῦ Λυσίου τὸν Φαῖδρον. εἶτα ἐπαναβιβασμοῖς χρώμενος ὁ Σωκράτης ἐπάνεισιν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις καλοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ ψυχικὸν

1 <οὖν> add. Couvreur. 2 τοῦ παντὸς Couvr.: τούτων Aa: τοῦτον M. 7 τετᾶσθαι] τετάχθαι Ast. ὑπαρχῃ ὁ λόγος M παντὸς om. M. 9 εἰπεῖν secl. Couvr.

IN PHAEDRUM

Fr. I

(a) All these, then, have lit upon certain parts of the dialogue, and declared the subject of the whole dialogue on the basis of these; but in fact there should be one subject equally relevant to all parts, so that as in the case of a living organism all should be related to this one principle. It is for this reason that Iamblichus declared the subject to be 'the Beautiful on every level', as we shall expound below.

(b) So then, one must not declare that there are many subjects (of the dialogue)—for everything in the dialogue must relate to some one end, that the dialogue may be so to speak one living being—nor should one fix the subject of the whole dialogue on the basis of a part, but one must identify one subject-matter to embrace the dialogue as a whole. And this is, in a word, the Beautiful on every level.

For this reason he begins from the visible beauty in the bodily form of Phaedrus, with whom Lysias is in love, he being a wicked lover, a deviation from the true lover. Then he passes on to beauty as manifested in discourse, of which Phaedrus is declared to be a lover, and Lysias, or rather the discourse of Lysias, the object of his love. So Lysias and Phaedrus are mutually in love, and both are lovers and beloved, but not by reason of the same type of love. Wherefore each is in some respect both better and worse than the other. As a lover, Phaedrus is better, Lysias worse; for Lysias loves the body and wicked lust, while Phaedrus loves beauty in discourse and the combination of words, which is a more immaterial type of love. As beloved, Lysias is the better (that is to say, Lysias' *discourse*), and Phaedrus the worse, by reason of the fact that the object of Phaedrus' love was the discourse of Lysias, while the object of Lysias' love was Phaedrus.

κάλλος, τουτέστι τὰς ἀρετάς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμας. εἶτα ἐπὶ τὸ τῶν ἐγκοσμίων θεῶν ἐν τῇ παλινῳδίᾳ. εἶτα ἐπὶ τὸ νοητὸν κάλλος καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν πηγὴν τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τὸν θεὸν Ἔρωτα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν. ὅθεν πάλιν κάτεισι διὰ τῆς διαιρετικῆς ἐπὶ τὸ ψυχικὸν κάλλος καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν. εἶτ' αὖ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις καλόν, καὶ συνάπτει τελευτὴν ἀρχῇ.

24 τὸ om. M. 24-5 ἐγκοσμίων θεῶν] ἐγκοσμίων καὶ θείων sugg. Couvr. (nisi θεῶν ex θεά fluxerit).

Fr. 2

Hermeias, *In Phaedr.* 113, 23ff.

<ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος. τὸ γὰρ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον· 245C>

Ἀλλὰ πῶς οὐχὶ καὶ ἡ μερικὴ φύσις ἔσται ἀθάνατος, αὐτοκίνητος οὖσα; ἢ πρῶτον μὲν ἰστέον ὡς ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος καὶ ὁ φιλόσοφος Πορφύριος οὐδὲ αὐτοκίνητόν φασι τὴν μερικὴν φύσιν, ἀλλ' ὄργανον οὖσαν τῆς ψυχῆς κινεῖσθαι μὲν ὑπ' αὐτῆς, κινεῖν δὲ τὰ σώματα, καὶ ταύτην εἶναί φασι τὴν ἐνάτην κίνησιν.

3 et 5 φασὶ A. 4 σώματα] σωζόμενα M. 5 ἐννάτην M.

Fr. 3

<Ὁ μὲν δὴ μέγας ἡγεμὼν ἐν οὐρανῷ Ζεύς, ἐλαύνων πτηνὸν ἅρμα, πρῶτος πορεύεται, διακοσμῶν πάντα καὶ ἐπιμελούμενος. 246E.>

Hermeias, *In Phaedr.* 136, 17ff.

(a) Ὁ μέντοι θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος τοῦ τοῦ Διὸς ὀνόματος δραξάμενος ἐπὶ τὸν ἕνα δημιουργὸν τοῦ κόσμου, περὶ οὗ καὶ ἐν Τιμαίῳ εἴρηται, μεταφέρει τὸν λόγον.

Proclus, *Theol. Plat.* IV, 188, 15ff. Portus.

(b) Εἰ δέ τις νοητὸν λέγει τὸν οὐρανὸν ἐφ' ὃν ἡγεῖται μὲν ὁ Ζεύς, ἕπονται δὲ πάντες οἱ θεοὶ καὶ μετὰ τούτων οἱ δαίμονες, τῇ τε φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων συμφώνους ἀποδώσει τὰς τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐνθέους ὑφηγήσεις, καὶ τοῖς κλεινοτάτοις τῶν ἐξηγητῶν κατακολουθῆσαι. καὶ γὰρ Πλωτῖνος καὶ Ἰάμβλιχος νοητόν τινα τὸν οὐρανὸν τοῦτον ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι.

10 *Enn.* V 8.10.

Then by means of mounting stages Socrates ascends from beauty as exhibited in discourse to the beauty of the Soul, that is, virtues and types of knowledge; then, in the 'palinode' to the beauty of the cosmic gods; then to Beauty in the Intellect and the very fount of the beautiful, the God Eros and the Beautiful Itself. And from this he descends again by means of Division to Beauty in the Soul and the beauty of virtue and knowledge, and then again to the beauty in discourse, thus linking the end to the beginning.

Fr. 2

But how will the individual life-force not be immortal, seeing that it is self-moving? First of all we may note that the divine Iamblichus and the philosopher Porphyry do not grant even self-motion to the individual life-force, but take it as a mere instrument of the soul, which is moved by the soul and itself moves bodies, and this they declare to be the ninth motion.

Fr. 3

(a) The divine Iamblichus, however, drawing on the name 'Zeus', refers the subject of the present passage to the single Demiurge of the cosmos, who is described also in the Timaeus.

(b) If one declares that the 'heaven' towards which Zeus leads the way, and all the Gods follow, and along with them the daemons, is of the intelligible order, he will be giving an inspired interpretation of Plato in accordance with the facts, and he will be in agreement with the most renowned of the commentators. For Plotinus and Iamblichus consider this 'heaven' to be an intelligible entity.

Fr. 4

Hermeias, *In Phaedr.* 143, 23ff.

<Πολλαὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ μακάριαι θέαι τε καὶ διέξοδοι ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ, ἃς θεῶν γένος εὐδαιμόνων ἐπιστρέφεται πράττων ἕκαστος αὐτῶν τὸ αὑτοῦ. 247A.>

τὸ δὲ 'εὐδαιμόνων' καὶ ὡς ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχός φησι 'τῶν γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν παρεχόντων·' καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν θεῶν δυνατὸν τὸ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἀκούειν κατὰ τὸ ἕπεσθαι τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ἡγεμόσι καὶ ἀεὶ αὐτῶν ἔχεσθαι.

Fr. 5

Proclus, *Theol. Plat.* IV 215, 21ff. Portus.

<Ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρὸς δαῖτα καὶ ἐπὶ θοίνην ἴωσιν, ἄκραν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπουράνιον ἁψῖδα πορεύονται πρὸς ἄναντες, 247AB.>

Ὁ δὲ δὴ μέγας Ἰάμβλιχος νοητῶν τινὰ τάξιν θεῶν, ἔστι δὲ ὅπου τῷ δημιουργῷ τὴν αὐτὴν τὸν μέγαν οὐρανὸν προστησάμενος, τὴν ὑπ' αὐτῷ προσεχῶς ἱδρυμένην διακόσμησιν καὶ οἷον ὑπεζωκυῖαν τὸν οὐρανόν, ὑπουράνιον ἁψῖδα τίθεται. καὶ ταῦτα ἐν τοῖς τοῦ Φαίδρου γέγραφεν ὑπομνήμασι.

Fr. 6

Hermeias, *In Phaedr.* 150, 24ff.

<ψυχῆς κυβερνήτῃ μόνῳ θεατῇ [νῷ]. 247C.>

Ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος κυβερνήτην τὸ ἓν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκούει· ἡνίοχον δὲ τὸν νοῦν αὐτῆς· τὸ δὲ 'θεατῇ' οὐχ ὅτι καθ' ἑτερότητα ἐπιβάλλει τούτῳ τῷ νοητῷ ἀλλ' ὅτι ἑνοῦται αὐτῷ καὶ οὕτως αὐτῆς ἀπολαύει· τοῦτο γὰρ δηλοῖ τὸν κυβερνήτην τελειότερόν τι τοῦ ἡνιόχου καὶ τῶν ἵππων· τὸ γὰρ ἓν τῆς ψυχῆς ἑνοῦσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς πέφυκεν.

Fr. 6A

Hermeias, *In Phaedr.* 200, 28ff.

<Οὐ γὰρ δήποτε εἵμαρται κακὸν κακῷ φίλον οὐδ' ἀγαθὸν μὴ φίλον ἀγαθῷ εἶναι. 256B.>

Εἱμαρμένην δὲ λέγει τὴν περὶ τὴν σωματοειδῆ ζωὴν καὶ τάξιν· ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος δὲ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ παντὸς εἱμαρμένην καλεῖ.

Fr. 4

The expression 'happy' may be taken as the divine Iamblichus takes it, in the sense of 'providing happiness'—and it is also possible to predicate 'happiness' even of the gods in reference to the fact of their following their own leaders and always remaining in contact with them.

Fr. 5

The great Iamblichus, having declared the great heaven to be an order of intelligible gods, which he has in some places identified with the Demiurge, takes the 'inner vault of heaven' as the order of creation situated immediately beneath it and as it were the membrane covering the heaven. This is what he has said in his *Commentaries on the Phaedrus.*

Fr. 6

The divine Iamblichus takes the 'helmsman' as being the One of the soul; its Intellect is the charioteer; the term 'spectator' is used not to signify that it directs its gaze on this object of intellection as being other than it, but that it is united with it and appreciates it on that level; for this shows that the 'helmsman' is a more perfect entity than the charioteer and the horses; for it is the essential nature of the One of the soul to be united with the gods.

Fr. 6A

The Fate which he is referring to is that which is concerned with bodily life and order. Iamblichus defines Fate as the nature of the universe.

Fr. 7

Hermeias, *In Phaedr.* 215, 12ff.

<Λέγεται δ' ὥς ποτ' ἦσαν οὗτοι ἄνθρωποι τῶν πρὶν Μούσας γεγονέναι, 259B.>

Ἡ δὲ ἐξήγησις τοῦ θείου Ἰαμβλίχου ῥηθήσεται νῦν· ἀνθρώπους λέγει τὰς ψυχὰς τὰς ἐν τῷ νοητῷ διατριψάσας· αἱ γὰρ ψυχαί, πρὶν τὸν θνητὸν βίον διαζήσωσιν, ἄνω εἰσὶν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, αὐτὰ τὰ εἴδη θεωροῦσαι, ἅμα τοῖς θεοῖς τοῖς ὑπερκοσμίοις οὖσαι· οὕτως οὖν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἦσαν πρὶν γενέσθαι τὰς Μούσας, τουτέστι τὰς σφαίρας καὶ τὸν αἰσθητὸν κόσμον. τὸ δὲ 'πρίν γε' μὴ χρόνῳ ἀκούσῃς ἀλλὰ πρὶν εἰς τὸ ἐμφανὲς ταύτην τὴν πρόοδον γενέσθαι τῶν σφαιρῶν· αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ γένεσις τῶν Μουσῶν ἡ ἔκφανσις ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ γενομένη εἰς τὸν αἰσθητὸν κόσμον. ἦσαν οὖν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἐν τῷ νοητῷ κόσμῳ· ἅμα οὖν ἐγένοντο αἱ Μοῦσαι καὶ αἱ σφαῖραι καὶ ὁ αἰσθητὸς κόσμος καὶ ἡ ὅλη ψυχὴ τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου, συμπροῆλθον καὶ αἱ μερικαὶ ψυχαὶ αἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· καὶ ἅτε δὴ νεοτελεῖς οὖσαι καὶ μνήμην ἔχουσαι τῶν ἐκεῖ, ἀπόστροφοι ἦσαν τῆς γενέσεως καὶ οὐκ ἤθελον οὐδὲ φαγεῖν οὐδὲ πιεῖν, τουτέστι μεταλαβεῖν αἰσθητῆς δόξης οὐκ ἠβούλοντο· εἶχον γὰρ τὴν νοητὴν τροφήν· διὸ ὑπὸ λιμοῦ τῶν ἐνταῦθα ἀπέθανον, ἀντί τοῦ ἀνήχθησαν.

7 πρίν Plat. χρόνῳ] χρονον M 9 ἔκφανσις] ἔμφασις M.

Fr. 7

We will now turn to the interpretation of the divine Iamblichus. He understands by the 'men' of the text souls who have spent time in the intelligible realm; for souls, before they live their mortal lives, are above in the intelligible realm, having a vision of the Forms in their true nature, and consorting with the supracosmic gods. In this sense, then, 'men existed before the Muses were born', that is to say, before the heavenly spheres and the physical world. However, one must not understand 'before' in a temporal sense but as meaning 'before this procession of the spheres became manifest'; for this is 'the birth of the Muses'—the manifestation coming forth from the Demiurge into the sensible universe. So then men existed in the intelligible universe, and the Muses came into being along with the heavenly spheres and the sensible universe and the universal soul of the whole universe, and together with these entities there proceeded the individual human souls. And inasmuch as they were newly-initiated, and still retained a memory of the other realm, they turned away from the realm of generation and refused to eat or drink, that is to say, they did not wish to have any share in sense-perception; for they had their intellectual nourishment. For which reason they perished from starvation of things of this realm, which means that they were raised up again to their former level.

IN PHILEBUM

Fr. 1

Damascius, *In Philebum* 5, p. 5, West.

ΠΡΟΟΙΜΙΟΝ

Ὅτι ὁ σκοπὸς κατὰ Ἰάμβλιχον καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὸν Συριανὸν καὶ τὸν Πρόκλον περὶ τοῦ τελικοῦ αἰτίου πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσιν, ὅ ἐστι περὶ τοῦ διὰ πάντων διήκοντος ἀγαθοῦ. [οὐχ ἁπλῶς δὲ οὕτως· οὐ γὰρ δήπου τοῦ ἐξῃρημένου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὰ τὰ ὄντα θεωρουμένου καὶ ἐφ' ὃ σπεύδει τὰ πάντα καὶ οὗ ἐφικνεῖται· τὸ γὰρ ἐξῃρημένον ἀνέφικτον. προσποιεῖται μὲν γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου ζητεῖν ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀνάγει δὲ τὸ ζήτημα εἰς τὸ πανταχοῦ τοιοῦτον, οἷον καὶ ἐν νοῖς καὶ ἐν θεοῖς μέχρι τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις μέχρι τῆς ὕλης.]

Fr. 2

Damascius, *In Philebum* 10, p. 7 West.

Τίς ἄμεινον διατάττεται, Πορφύριος ἢ Ἰάμβλιχος, ὁ μὲν τὸν κατὰ νοῦν βίον προτιμῶν, ὁ δὲ Ἰάμβλιχος τὸν μικτόν; ἢ οὐδὲ διαφωνοῦσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πορφύριος νοῦν μὲν ἐκδέχεται τὸν τελεώτατον, ἡδονὴν δὲ τὴν ἄλογον, Ἰάμβλιχος δὲ ἡδονὴν μὲν τὴν νῷ συμφυᾶ, νοῦν δὲ μόνην τὴν γνωστικὴν ἰδιότητα· οὕτω μέντοι καὶ Πλάτων.

Fr. 3

Damascius, *In Philebum* 57, p. 29, West.

<Θεῶν μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις, ὥς γε καταφαίνεται ἐμοί, ποθὲν ἐκ θεῶν ἐρρίφη διά τινος Προμηθέως ἅμα φανοτάτῳ τινὶ πυρί· 16C.>

Ὅτι ὁ μὲν Προμηθεὺς τὰς εἰς τὴν φύσιν τῶν θεῶν ἐκφαίνει προόδους, ὁ δὲ Ἐπιμηθεὺς τὰς εἰς τὸ νοητὸν ἐπανιούσας ἐπιστροφάς. οὕτως εἰρηκέναι τὸν Ἰάμβλιχον κατὰ Πυθαγόραν.

IN PHILEBUM

Fr. 1

The subject, according to Iamblichus and to the school of Syrianus and Proclus, is the Final Cause of all existing things, that is, the Good that penetrates all things; (with this restriction, however, that it is not of course the transcendent Good, but the Good that is manifested in existing things themselves, towards which all things aspire and which they attain; for the transcendent Good is unattainable. Socrates does admittedly profess to be inquiring only into the Good on the human level, but he extends the enquiry to the Good on every level, as for instance among Intellects and among Gods, up to the First Principle, and in the lowest levels of existence, as far as Matter.)

Fr. 2

Which takes the better view, Porphyry or Iamblichus? The former gives first place to the life guided by Intelligence, while Iamblichus prefers the mixed life. In fact they are not at variance, for Porphyry takes 'intelligence' in its most perfect sense, and understands by 'pleasure' the irrational kind, while Iamblichus understands by pleasure that type which is cognate with the activity of the intellect, and in 'intellect' includes only the cognitive quality, as does Plato also, after all.

Fr. 3

Prometheus reveals the lines by which the gods proceed down into the physical realm, Epimetheus the routes of their returns upward into the intellectual realm. Such is said to be the account of Iamblichus, following Pythagoras.

Fr. 4

Damascius, *In Philebum* 105, p. 49-51 West.

< ?Τούτων δὴ τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ δύο τιθώμεθα, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τούτοιν ἕν τι ξυμμισγόμενον. εἰμὶ δέ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγὼ γελοῖός τις ἄνθρωπος τά τ' εἴδη διιστὰς καὶ συναριθμούμενος. 23CD.>

Ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ διακόσμῳ ἡ πάντῃ διάκρισις. ἡ γὰρ περιγεγραμμένη εἰδοποιία νοῦ πρώτου ἐστίν, νοῦς δὲ πρῶτος ὁ καθαρὸς νοῦς· διὸ καὶ Ἰάμβλιχος ἐν τούτῳ ὑφίστασθαι λέγει τὰς τῶν εἰδῶν μονάδας, <μονάδας> τὸ ἑκάστου λέγων ἀδιάκριτον· διὸ νοητὸν ὡς ἐν νοεροῖς καὶ οὐσίας αἴτιος εἰδητικῆς, ὡς ὁ δεύτερος ζωῆς, ὡς ὁ τρίτος εἰδοποΐας ἐν νοεροῖς.

7. <μονάδας> add. West.

Fr. 5

Damascius, *In Philebum*, 130 p. 63 West.

< ?Ὅτι σμικρόν τε τούτων ἕκαστον παρ' ἡμῖν ἔνεστι καὶ φαῦλον καὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς εἰλικρινὲς ὂν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν οὐκ ἀξίαν τῆς φύσεως ἔχον· ἐν ἑνὶ δὲ λαβὼν περὶ πάντων νόει ταὐτὸν. οἷον πῦρ μὲν ἔστι που παρ' ἡμῖν, ἔστι δ' ἐν τῷ παντί. 29B.>

Ἆρα οὖν ὅσα ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν ἢ ὅσα ἐν ἡμίν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις; πῶς οὖν τὰ μὲν ὅλα, τὰ δὲ μέρη; ὁ μὲν οὖν Πορφύριος καὶ Ἰάμβλιχος ὁμόσε τῷ λόγῳ χωροῦσιν πάντα εἶναι πανταχοῦ λέγοντες, ἄλλως μέντοι καὶ ἄλλως.

Fr. 6

Damascius, *In Philebum* 227, p. 107 West.

< ? Καὶ νῦν δή τις λόγος ἐμήνυσεν ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχάς, μὴ ζητεῖν ἐν τῷ ἀμίκτῳ βίῳ τἀγαθὸν ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ μικτῷ. 61B.>

Διὰ τί τῷ μικτῷ ἐπιδίδωσιν ἑαυτὴν ἡ αἰτία; ἢ ὡς παντελεῖ πάντα οὖσα. τὸ γὰρ ἁπλοῦν οὐχ οἷον τέ ἐστι χωρῆσαι τὴν ἀρρήτως ὑπὲρ τὸ ἓν ἅπαντα συλλαβοῦσαν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν. ταῦτά τοι φησὶν ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος ἀδύνατον εἶναι τῶν κοινῶν τάξεων καθ' ἕνα μεταλαβεῖν, εἰ μὴ σὺν τῷ θεσπεσίῳ χορῷ τῶν ὁμονοητικῶς ἀναγομένων.

Fr. 4

Not even in the second realm is there separation properly so called. For the creation of distinct forms is a function of Intelligence in the first place, and the first Intelligence is the Pure Intelligence; for which reason Iamblichus declares that on this level one may place the monads of the Forms, meaning by 'monads' the undifferentiated element in each. Wherefore it is the object of intellection for the intellective realm, and the cause of Being for the Forms, even as the second element is the cause of Life in the intellective realm, and the third the cause of their creation *as Forms.*

Fr. 5

Are then all the elements which are in the universe also within us, and all that are in us also in the universe? How then is the whole to be distinguished from the parts? Porphyry and Iamblichus meet this problem by saying that 'all things are everywhere, but in different modes in different places.'

Fr. 6

Why is it upon the mixed life that the Cause bestows itself? Because as being all things it has an affinity with that which is all-embracing. For that which is simple is not capable of receiving the power of the Cause, which ineffably, transcending unity, embraces all things. For this reason the divine Iamblichus declares that it is impossible to partake as an individual of the universal orders, but only in communion with the divine choir of those who, with minds united, experience a common uplift.

Fr. 7

Damascius, *In Philebum* 243, p. 115 West.

<Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ μιᾷ δυνάμεθα ἰδέᾳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν θηρεῦσαι, σὺν τρισὶ λαβόντες, κάλλει καὶ ξυμμετρίᾳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ, λέγωμεν ὡς τοῦτο οἷον ἓν ὀρθότατ' ἂν αἰτιασαίμεθ' ἂν τῶν ἐν τῇ συμμίξει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὂν τοιαύτην αὐτὴν γεγονέναι. 65A.>

Ὅτι καὶ Ἰάμβλιχος τὰς τρεῖς μονάδας φησὶν ἀπὸ τἀγαθοῦ προελθούσας κοσμῆσαι τὸν νοῦν· ἄδηλον δέ, ὁποῖον νοῦν, πότερον τὸν μετὰ τὴν ζωὴν ἢ τὸν ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ νοῦν πατρικὸν ὑμνούμενον· ἔνιοι γὰρ οὐ τοῦτον, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνον ἤκουσαν. καὶ μὴν ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς ἐν τῷ μυθευομένῳ ᾠῷ τὰς τρεῖς ἐκφανῆναι μονάδας φησίν.

Fr. 7

Iamblichus also says that the three monads, proceeding from the Good, adorn the Intellect; it is not clear, however, to which Intellect he is referring, that which follows on Life, or that which resides in Essence, the so-called Paternal Intellect. For some have taken it to be not the latter but the former. However, he declares that the three monads come to light in the Egg of the mythological system of the Orphic Poems.

ΒΙΒΛΙΟΝ α'

Fr. 1

5A, I 13, 14.

ΠΡΟΟΙΜΙΟΝ

Ὀρθῶς ἄρα φησὶν ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος τὴν ὅλην τοῦ Πλάτωνος θεωρίαν ἐν τοῖς δύο τούτοις περιέχεσθαι διαλόγοις, Τιμαίῳ καὶ Παρμενίδῃ· πᾶσα γὰρ ἡ περὶ τῶν ἐγκοσμίων καὶ ὑπερκοσμίων πραγματεία τέλος ἔχει τὸ ἄριστον ἐν αὐτοῖς, καὶ οὐδεμία τάξις τῶν ὄντων ἀδιερεύνητος παραλέλειπται.

3 περὶ om. P.

Fr. 2

= Fr. 23

[Ὁ δέ γε θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος θαυμαστόν τινα τρόπον διὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀντιλογίαν μερικώτερον ἀντιλαβομένους τῆς ἀναλύσεως οὐδὲ ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀκροᾶσθαι τὸν λόγον διέγνωκε,] καίτοι γε ἐν προοιμίοις αὐτὸς ἀφορμὰς ἡμῖν τῶν τοιούτων λόγων παραδεδωκώς.

Fr. 3

6 EF, I 19, 9.

<Ἀσθένειά τις αὐτῷ ξυνέπεσεν, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἑκὼν τῆσδε ἀπελείπετο τῆς συνουσίας. 17A>.

Ὁ δέ γε θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος ὑψηλολογούμενος ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ῥήσει τοὺς περὶ τὴν τῶν νοητῶν θέαν ἐγγεγυμνασμένους ἀσυμμέτρως ἔχειν φησὶ πρὸς τὴν περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ διατριβήν· ὥς που καὶ αὐτὸς εἴρηκεν ὁ Σωκράτης ἐν Πολιτείᾳ τοὺς ἐν αὐγῇ καθαρᾷ τεθραμμένους ἀμβλυώττειν εἰς τὸ σπήλαιον καταβάντας ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐκεῖ σκότους, ὥσπερ καὶ τοὺς ἀναβάντας ἐκ τοῦ σπηλαίου διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαί πω πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἀντωπεῖν· καὶ

5 Rep. VII 516E ss.

4 ἐγγεγυμνασμένους schol. M. cum Ϛ. 5 περὶ om. P.

BOOK I

Fr. 1

For indeed the divine Iamblichus is quite right in saying that the whole theory of Plato is contained in these two dialogues, the *Timaeus* and the *Parmenides*; for the whole philosophic treatment of the things in the cosmos and above the cosmos has its best culmination in them, and no level (or system) of beings has been left uninvestigated.

Fr. 2

(But the divine Iamblichus has decided, because of his opposition to the other commentators who undertake the analysis of the dialogue in too piecemeal a fashion, to understand the passage remarkably, in precisely its surface meaning), although in his preface he himself has given us promptings to such types of exegesis.

Fr. 3

The divine Iamblichus, however, taking an exalted line on this passage, says that those practised in the contemplation of the noetic realm are unsuited to discourse about the sensible; as indeed Socrates himself said, in the *Republic*, that those brought up in pure daylight are blinded when they go down into the cave by the darkness there, as also those going up out of the cave, through not being able yet to look directly at the light; and it is for this reason, he says, that the fourth one is absent, as being suited to another subject of contemplation, that of the noetic

διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπολείπεσθαι τὸν τέταρτον, ὡς ἄλλῃ προσήκοντα θέᾳ, τῇ τῶν νοητῶν, καὶ δὴ καὶ εἶναι τὴν ἀσθένειαν αὐτοῦ ταύτην δυνάμεως ὑπερβολήν, καθ' ἣν ὑπερέχει τῆς παρούσης θεωρίας· ὡς γὰρ ἡ τῶν κακῶν δύναμις ἀδυναμία μᾶλλόν ἐστιν, οὕτως ἡ ἀσθένεια ἡ πρὸς τὰ δεύτερα δυνάμεώς ἐστιν ὑπεροχή.

Fr. 4

8D, I 24, 17.

<Οὐκοῦν σὸν τῶνδέ τε ἔργον καὶ τὸ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀπόντος ἀναπληροῦν μέρος. 17A.>

Ὁ δὲ Ἰάμβλιχος ἅπαξ τὸν ἀκατονόμαστον ὑποθέμενος εἶναι κρείττονα τῶν παρόντων καὶ φιλοθεάμονα τῶν νοητῶν, ἐνδείκνυσθαί φησι τὸν Σωκράτην διὰ τούτων ὅτι, κἂν ἀπολείπηται τὰ γεννήματα τὰ τῆς φύσεως τῶν ὄντως ὄντων, ἀλλὰ παρασπᾶταί τινα ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητα πρὸς αὐτά· κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ καὶ ἡ περὶ τὴν φύσιν στρεφομένη θεωρία μετέχει πως τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῶν νοητῶν, καὶ τοῦτο ἡ ἀναπλήρωσις δηλοῖ.

2 ἀκατωνόμαστον MNP: corr. S. 4 σωκράτη MN. γεννήματα τά P: γένη τὰ M: γενητὰ N. 5 παρασπᾶσαί P. ἀπ' αὐτῶν om. P.

Fr. 5

10BC, I 30, 2.

<Χθές που τῶν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ῥηθέντων λόγων περὶ πολιτείας ἦν τὸ κεφάλαιον οἵα τε καὶ ἐξ οἵων ἀνδρῶν ἀρίστη καταφαίνετ' ἄν μοι γενέσθαι. 17BC.>

[Οἱ μὲν τὴν ἐπάνοδον τῆς Πολιτείας ἠθικώτερον λέγοντες ἐνδείκνυσθαί φασιν ἡμῖν, ὅτι δεῖ τὰ ἤθη κεκοσμημένους ἅπτεσθαι τῆς θεωρίας τῶν ὅλων·] οἱ δὲ ἀξιοῦσιν ὡς εἰκόνα τῆς τοῦ παντὸς διακοσμήσεως προκεῖσθαι τῆς συμπάσης φυσιολογίας· εἶναι γὰρ τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις ἔθος πρὸ τῆς ἐπιστημονικῆς διδασκαλίας προτιθέναι τὴν διὰ τῶν ὁμοίων καὶ τῶν εἰκόνων τῶν ζητουμένων σκεμμάτων δήλωσιν καὶ μετὰ ταύτην ἐπάγειν τὴν διὰ τῶν συμβόλων ἀπόρρητον περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔνδειξιν, ἔπειθ' οὑτωσὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀνακίνησιν τῆς ψυχικῆς νοήσεως καὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄμματος διακάθαρσιν προσφέρειν τὴν ὅλην τῶν προκειμένων σκεμμάτων ἐπιστήμην. κἀνταῦθα τοίνυν ἡ μὲν τῆς Πολιτείας πρὸ τῆς φυσιολογίας ἐπιτετμημένη παράδοσις εἰκονικῶς ἡμᾶς ἐφίστησι τῇ δημιουργίᾳ τοῦ παντός, ἡ δὲ περὶ τῶν Ἀτλαντίνων ἱστορία συμβολικῶς· καὶ γὰρ οἱ μῦθοι τὰ πολλὰ διὰ τῶν συμβόλων εἰώθασι τὰ πράγματα ἐνδείκνυσθαι· ὥστε εἶναι τὸ φυσιολογικὸν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ διαλόγου διῆκον, ἀλλ' οὗ μὲν ἄλλως, οὗ δὲ ἄλλως, κατὰ τοὺς διαφόρους τρόπους τῆς παραδόσεως.

16 ὥστε P: ὥστ' N: ὡς M. 16-17 οὐ..... οὐ M.

realm, and indeed that this weakness of his is a superabundance of power, by reason of which he is superior to the present investigation; for as the power of evil things is actually a powerlessness, so inability to face things of a secondary order is a superfluity of power.

Fr. 4

But Iamblichus, having once postulated that the nameless (guest) is greater than those present, and a contemplator of the noetic realm, says that Socrates shows by these words that, even though the products of nature fall short of the really existent, nevertheless they draw off from them some likeness to them; and in the same way the branch of philosophy which is concerned with Nature partakes in some way of the knowledge of the noetic world, and this is what the 'fulfilling' signifies.

Fr. 5

(Some, (sc. Porphyry), taking the recapitulation of the Republic in an ethical sense, say that it reveals to us that we must enter upon the contemplation of the Universe in an ethically ordered frame of mind;) others (sc. Iamblichus), consider that it has been placed before the whole physiological enquiry as an image of the organisation of the Universe; for the Pythagoreans had the habit of placing before their scientific instruction the revealing of the subjects under enquiry through similitudes and images, and after this of introducing the secret revelation of the same subjects through symbols, and then in this way, after the reactivation of the soul's ability to comprehend the intelligible realm and the purging of its vision, to bring on the complete knowledge of the subjects laid down for investigation. And here too the relating in summary of the Republic before the physiological enquiry prepares us to understand the orderly creation of the Universe through the medium of an image, while the story of the Atlantids

Fr. 6

17F-18A, I 55, 10

<Ἆρ' οὖν δὴ διεληλύθαμεν ἤδη καθάπερ χθὲς ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίοις πάλιν ἐπανελθεῖν, ἢ ποθοῦμεν ἔτι τι τῶν ῥηθέντων, ὦ φίλε Τίμαιε, ἀπολειπόμενον; 19A.>

Πότερον δὲ ἡ λέξις τοῦτό φησιν, ὅτι ἣν χθὲς διῆλθε πολιτείαν, νῦν ἐν κεφαλαίοις διελήλυθεν, ἢ καὶ χθὲς ἐν κεφαλαίοις καὶ τήμερον πάλιν ἐν κεφαλαίοις παρέλαβεν αὐτήν, ζητεῖν οὐδὲν ἔχει πραγματειῶδες· εἴτε γὰρ χθὲς μὲν ποικιλώτερον εἶπε, νῦν δὲ ἐν κεφαλαίοις, εἴτε ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ἐν κεφαλαίοις, ἀρέσκεται ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος, καὶ οὐδὲν ἡμῖν διοίσει.

5 πραγματιῶδες C. 6 εἴτε.... κεφαλαίοις om. C.: εἴτε ἐν κεφαλαίοις ἐν ἀμφοτέροις P.

Fr. 7

24DE, I 77, 24.

<Ἄκουε δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, λόγου μάλα μὲν ἀτόπου, παντάπασί γε μὴν ἀληθοῦς, ὡς ὁ τῶν ἑπτὰ σοφώτατος Σόλων ποτὲ ἔφη. 20 D.>

Ἀλλ' οὗτοί γε καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ θειοτάτου κατὰ γ' ἐμὴν Ἰαμβλίχου κομιδῇ γενναίως ηὐθύνθησαν. ἀρέσκει δὲ τούτῳ τε καὶ τῷ ἡμετέρῳ καθηγεμόνι τὴν ἐναντίωσιν ταύτην οὐκ ἐπ' ἀθετήσει τῶν φαινομένων—τοὐναντίον μὲν οὖν, ἐκείνων πάντως δεδογμένων ὡς γεγονότων—ἀλλ' ὡς εἰώθαμεν τὰ πρὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων τοῖς διαλόγοις ἀνάγειν εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν τοῖς διαλόγοις σκοπόν—ἀρέσκει δὴ οὖν οὑτωσὶ καὶ κατὰ τὸν ὅμοιον τύπον καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐναντίωσιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἄραντας διὰ παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου καὶ μάλιστα τῶν γενητῶν διατείνειν, καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα τὴν διάνοιαν ἐκτείνειν, ὅπῃ μετέχει τῆς ἐναντιώσεως θεωροῦντας κατὰ τὴν ποικιλίαν τῶν δυνάμεων· ἐπεὶ γὰρ πάντα καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἑνός ἐστι καὶ ἐκ τῆς μετὰ τὸ ἓν δυάδος, καὶ ἥνωταί πως ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἀντίθετον ἔλαχε φύσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς γένεσι τοῦ ὄντος ἔστι τις ἀντίθεσις ταὐτοῦ

3 κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν MP; ἐμὴν<γνώμην> Radermacher. 4 γενναῖος C. τε om. C. 5 ταύτην om. C. ἐπατήσει C sic. 7 πρὸς C; πρῶτον ὑποκείμενα ci. Radermacher. 8 οὑτωσὶ Ϛ: οὕτως εἰ CMP. 12 ἐκ om. C. 13 ἔτυχε M. 14 ὡς ὅπερ P.

acts as a symbol; for indeed myths in general tend to reveal the principles of actuality through symbols. So the physiological theme in fact runs through the whole dialogue, but appears in different forms in different places according to the different methods of revelation.

Fr. 6

Whether the phrase means this, that he has now gone through in summary the polity which he described yesterday, or that he ran through it yesterday in summary and today again ran through it in summary, it is of no importance to enquire; for whether he spoke in more detail yesterday, but now in summary, or on both occasions in summary, is a matter of indifference to the divine Iamblichus; and it will make no difference to me either.

Fr. 7

But these commentators were corrected in a truly worthy manner, in my opinion, by the most divine Iamblichus. It is his view, and that of my own master (Syrianus), that this conflict should be understood in such a sense as not to deny the historicity of the physical events—quite on the contrary, since it is generally agreed that they took place—but as we are accustomed to refer those parts before the real subject in dialogues to the same aim as is present in the dialogues themselves—it is their view, that in the same way and according to the same general principle, we should raise this conflict from the human level and extend its significance throughout the whole cosmos and in particular through the generated part of it, and extend the reference of it to all levels, considering in what respect the cosmos partakes of conflict by reason of the variety of its powers; for since all things derive both from the One and from the Dyad after the One and are united in a way with each other, and have been allotted an antithetical nature, so also

πρὸς θάτερον καὶ κινήσεως πρὸς στάσιν, πάντα δὲ μετέχει τῶν γενῶν τούτων τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι τὴν διὰ πάντων διήκουσαν ἐναντίωσιν θεωρεῖν.

Fr. 8

26A, I 82, 11

<Ἦν μὲν οὖν οἰκεῖος ἡμῖν καὶ σφόδρα φίλος Δρωπίδου τοῦ πάππου, καθάπερ λέγει πολλαχοῦ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῇ ποιήσει. πρὸς δὲ Κριτίαν τὸν ἡμέτερον πάππον εἶπεν, ὡς ἀπεμνημόνευσεν αὖ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὁ γέρων, ὅτι μεγάλα καὶ θαυμαστὰ τῆσδε εἴη παλαιὰ ἔργα τῆς πόλεως, ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ φθορᾶς ἀνθρώπων ἠφανισμένα. 20E.>

[Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθὲς τοιοῦτον.] ὁ δέ γε θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος ἄλλως πως παραδίδωσι τὴν τοῦ γένους διαδοχήν· αὐτόθεν γὰρ τοῦ Δρωπίδου παῖδα τὸν Γλαύκωνα ποιεῖ.

5 ἄλλος C.

Fr. 9

27C, I 87, 6

<Ἐγὼ φράσω παλαιὸν ἀκηκοὼς λόγον οὐ νέου ἀνδρός. 21A.>

Ὁ δὲ δὴ μέγας Ἰάμβλιχος ἀξιοῖ μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα τῶν λόγων τὴν ποικιλίαν ἀνάγειν καὶ ὁρᾶν, ὅπως καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει τὰ ἐναντία τῷ ἑνὶ κεκράτηται, καὶ τὸ ἓν ὅπως ποικίλλεται, καὶ οἱ αὐτοὶ λόγοι πόσην ἐξαλλαγὴν ἐπιφαίνουσιν, ἄλλως μὲν ὄντες ἐν τῷ νῷ τοῦ παντός, ἄλλως δὲ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ ἄλλως ἐν τῇ φύσει καὶ ἐσχάτως ἐν ὕλῃ γεγονότες καὶ αὖ περὶ τὴν ὕλην μετὰ τῆς ὁμοιότητος παμπόλλην τὴν ἑτερότητα δεικνύντες· ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ἐπάξια τῆς τοῦ Πλάτωνος διανοίας, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ πολυπραγμοσύνη τῆς λέξεως.

2 δὴ om. N. 3 alterum καὶ om. N. 4 τῷ ἑνὶ om. CP. 6 ἐν <τῇ> ὕλῃ sugg. Diehl.

in the major categories of Being there is a certain antithesis of the Same as against the Other, and of Motion as opposed to Rest, and all things that are in the cosmos partake of these classes, it would indeed be suitable to consider the conflict as extending through all things.

Fr. 8

The true account is as above. The divine Iamblichus, however, gives a somewhat different account of the genealogy; for he makes Glaucon the immediate offspring of Dropides.

Fr. 9

But the great Iamblichus considers rather that we should refer the diversity in Plato's expressions to objective reality and see how in nature opposites are overcome by the One, and how the One is diversified, and how much variation the same principles exhibit, existing in one form in the Mind of the All, and coming to be differently in Soul, differently again in Nature, and ultimately in Matter, and again at the level of Matter exhibiting along with similarity a great amount of diversity; for these matters are worthy of the intellect of Plato, and not a fiddling attention to language.

Fr. 10

29BC, I 93, 15

<Εἶπεν οὖν τις τῶν φρατέρων, εἴτε δὴ δοκοῦν αὐτῷ τότε, εἴτε καὶ χάριν τινὰ τῷ Κριτίᾳ φέρων, δοκεῖν οἱ τά τε ἄλλα σοφώτατον γεγονέναι Σόλωνα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ποίησιν αὖ τῶν ποιητῶν πάντων ἐλευθεριώτατον. ὁ δὴ γέρων, σφόδρα γὰρ οὖν μέμνημαι, μάλα τε ἥσθη καὶ διαμειδιάσας εἶπεν· Εἴ γε, ὦ Ἀμύνανδρε, μὴ παρέργῳ τῇ ποιήσει κατεχρήσατο, ἀλλ' ἐσπουδάκει καθάπερ ἄλλοι, τόν τε λόγον ὃν ἀπ' Αἰγύπτου δεῦρο ἠνέγκατο ἀπετέλεσε, καὶ μὴ διὰ τὰς στάσεις ὑπὸ κακῶν τε ἄλλων, ὅσα εὗρεν ἐνθάδε ἥκων, ἠναγκάσθη καταμελῆσαι, κατὰ γ' ἐμὴν δόξαν οὔτε Ἡσίοδος οὔτε Ὅμηρος οὔτε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ποιητὴς εὐδοκιμώτερος ἄν ποτε ἐγένετο αὐτοῦ. 21BCD.>

ὁ δὲ Ἰάμβλιχος οὐδὲν εἶναί φησι τούτων ἀληθές, ἀλλὰ σημαίνεσθαι διὰ τούτου τὸ ἀπόλυτον τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τὸ ἀδέσποτον τῆς ἀρετῆς τοῦ Σόλωνος καὶ τὸ σεμνὸν καὶ ὑπερέχον πάντα τὰ ἄλλα. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τὸ μειδιᾶν τὸν Κριτίαν φησὶν ὁ αὐτὸς ἐξηγητὴς δηλοῦν τὴν τελείαν ἀπογέννησιν τῶν αἰτίων, τὴν ἐπιγήθουσαν τοῖς γεννήμασιν ἑαυτῆς, τὴν δὲ σφόδρα μνήμην τὴν σωτηρίαν τῶν ποιητικῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ λόγων ἐνδείκνυσθαι. διὰ τί οὖν ἐσπούδασεν ἂν ὁ Σόλων ἐν ποιήμασι παραδοῦναι τὸν Ἀτλαντικὸν πόλεμον; διότι, φησί, πάντα τὰ φυσικὰ ἔργα καὶ ἡ κοσμικὴ ἐναντίωσις διὰ μιμήσεως ὑφέστηκεν· ἀναλογεῖ γὰρ τοῖς ποιητικοῖς αὐτῆς καὶ πρωτουργοῖς αἰτίοις, ὡς ὁ Κριτίας τοῖς προσεχέσι καὶ δευτερουργοῖς. διὰ τί δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν στάσεων ἐκωλύθη; διότι τὰ ἔνυλα κινήματα καὶ ὁ ἔνυλος θόρυβος ἐμποδὼν γίνεται τοῖς ποιητικοῖς λόγοις τῶν ἐγκοσμίων, ὡς εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον.

Fr. 11

31C, I 100, 29

<Καί ποτε προαγαγεῖν βουληθεὶς αὐτοὺς περὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων εἰς λόγους, τῶν τῇδε τὰ ἀρχαιότατα λέγειν ἐπιχείρειν, περὶ Φορονέως τε τοῦ πρώτου λεχθέντος καὶ Νιόβης, καὶ μετὰ τὸν κατακλυσμὸν αὖ περὶ Δευκαλίωνος καὶ Πύρρας ὡς διεγένοντο μυθολογεῖν, καὶ τοὺς ἐξ αὐτῶν γενεαλογεῖν, καὶ τὰ τῶν ἐτῶν ὅσα ἦν οἷς ἔλεγε πειρᾶσθαι διαμνημονεύων τοὺς χρόνους ἀριθμεῖν· 22AB.>

Ἀσσύριοι δέ, φησίν Ἰάμβλιχος, οὐχ ἑπτὰ καὶ εἴκοσι μυριάδας ἐτῶν

Fr. 10

But Iamblichus says that none of this[1] is true, but that there is signified by this[2] the unfettered nature of the mind, and the autonomous nature of the virtue, of Solon, and its authority and superiority over all other things. And further, the same commentator says that the fact that Critias smiles shows the perfect generating activity of the causal principles, which rejoices in its creations, and the exact memory shows the preservation of the creative principles in the cosmos.

Now why would Solon have been eager to transmit the Atlantic War creatively, in poetic form? Because, he says, all the works of nature and the cosmic conflict owe their existence to the process of imitation; for he (Solon) is analogous to its creative and primary causes, even as Critias is analogous to the proximate and secondary ones.

And why was he hindered by the civil disturbances? Because the movements in matter and the turmoil of Matter are an obstacle to the principles which create what is in the cosmos, as has been said also previously.[3]

[1] Origen's explanation—See Comm.
[2] The epithet ἐλευθεριώτατος.
[3] By Proclus, I 91, 17ff.

Fr. 11

And the Assyrians, says Iamblichus, preserved records not

μόνας ἐτήρησαν, ὥς φησιν Ἵππαρχος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλας ἀποκαταστάσεις καὶ περιόδους τῶν ἑπτὰ κοσμοκρατόρων μνήμῃ παρέδοσαν· πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ πρὸς ταῦτα παραβάλλεσθαι ἡ παρ' Ἕλλησι πολυθρύλητος ἀρχαιολογία. ᾧ καὶ δῆλον, ὅτι ἡ παροῦσα ἀφήγησις οὐ πρὸς μικρὸν ὀφείλει βλέπειν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον καὶ πᾶν.

7 Σχ εἰ μὲν ἔτη τὰ δέκατὰ λεπτὰ ἢ εἰκοστὰ λέγεις, ἴσως ἀληθεύεις· εἰ δὲ ἔτος τὴν ἀπὸ κριοῦ εἰς κριὸν περίοδον λέγεις, τίς ἄν σοι πιστεύσειεν; εἴποιμι ἂν ἐγὼ πρὸς Ἰάμβλιχον.

7 μόνον P. 9 παραβάλλεσθαι om. C. πολυθρύλλητος mss. 10 ὧ δὴ καὶ P. 12 ἀλλὰ καὶ N.

Fr. 12

36D, I 117, 18

<Τότε οὖν ὅσοι κατ' ὄρη καὶ ἐν ὑψηλοῖς τόποις καὶ ξηροῖς οἰκοῦσι, μᾶλλον διόλλυνται τῶν ποταμοῖς καὶ θαλάττῃ προσοικούντων. 22D.>

Ὅ γε μὴν φιλόσοφος Ἰάμβλιχος φυσικῶς ταῦτα ἀξιοῖ θεωρεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἠθικῶς. ἐκπυρώσεως οὖν γιγνομένης μᾶλλον διόλλυσθαί φησι τοὺς ἐν ὑψηλοῖς οἰκοῦντας ὄρεσιν, ὡς πορρώτερον ὄντας τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος ἀναθυμιάσεων· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ πολὺ αἴρονται διὰ τὴν βαρύτητα τῆς ὑγρᾶς οὐσίας. οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν ἔνικμος ὁ περιέχων αὐτοὺς ἀήρ, ἀλλα ξηρός, καὶ ὑπέκκαυμα γίνεται τῷ πυρὶ φύσει πρὸς τὰ ἄνω φερομένῳ. ἀνάπαλιν δὲ κατακλυσμῶν γιγνομένων οἱ ἐν τοῖς κοίλοις οἰκοῦντες φθείρονται μᾶλλον, ἐπειδὴ πάντα τὰ βαρέα πρὸς τὸ κάτω φέρονται φύσει.

4 οὐχ ἠθικῶς C. γενομένης P. 7 ξηράς C. 8 τὰ ἄνω C: τῶ ἄνω P: τὸ ἄνω M. 10 φέρεται P. φύσει C. κατὰ φύσιν MP.

Fr. 13

37BC, I 120, 10

<Κατὰ δὲ τήνδε τὴν χώραν οὔτε τότε οὔτε ἄνωθεν ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρούρας ὕδωρ ἐπιρρεῖ· τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον κάτωθεν πᾶν ἐπανιέναι πέφυκεν. ὅθεν καὶ δι' ἃς αἰτίας τὰ ἐνθάδε σῳζόμενα λέγεται παλαιότατα. 22E.>

Ὁ δὲ Ἰάμβλιχος οὐδέν φησι χρῆναι τοιοῦτον ζητεῖν, ἀλλ' ἁπλούστερον ἀκούειν τὴν ἐπάνοδον τοῦ ὕδατος τὴν κάτωθεν, ἣν εἰώθασι λέγειν ἀνάβασιν· διπλῆν δ' αἰτίαν ἀποδιδούς, δι' ἣν οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι καὶ τοὺς αὐχμοὺς καὶ τοὺς κατακλυσμοὺς διαφεύγουσι, δῆλός ἐστι δοκιμάζων τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ὄμβρων αὔξησιν. λέγει γὰρ πρωτίστην μὲν αἰτίαν εἶναι τῆς τῶν Αἰγυπτίων σωτηρίας τὴν τῶν εἰληχότων αὐτοὺς θεῶν βούλησιν καὶ

4 τοιοῦτο P. 6 πλὴν CMP: διπλῆν ϛ: πλὴν διπλῆν coni. Diehl. 8 ὄμβρων CM: νείλων P. 9 τῶν om. P.

only for 270,000 years, as Hipparchus says, but actually handed down to memory whole periodic returns and cycles of the seven rulers of the cosmos; it is indeed incongruous, therefore, to weigh against this the much-vaunted ancient history of the Greeks. By which it is plain, that the present exposition ought not to look to anything small, but to the Whole and the All.

Fr. 12

The philosopher Iamblichus, however, prefers a physical, rather than an ethical, interpretation of this. He says, therefore, that when a destruction by fire takes place those are destroyed particularly who live on high mountains, as being farther removed from exhalations from the water; for they do not rise far, by reason of the heaviness of their wet substance. The air, then, which surrounds the former is not moisture-laden, but dry, and becomes combustible matter for the fire, which is naturally borne upwards. And conversely when destructions by flood happen, those living in hollow parts are more prone to be destroyed, since all heavy things are by nature borne downwards.

Fr. 13

But Iamblichus says that this line of investigation is not to be pursued; one should rather understand more straightforwardly the rising up of the waters from below, which they are accustomed to call 'inundation'. And in giving a double explanation, why the Egyptians avoid both droughts and floods, he obviously approves the theory of increase due to rains. For he says that the prime reason for the preservation of the Egyptians is the will of the gods to whom they have been allotted and the original

τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὅρον τῆς δημιουργίας, δευτέραν δὲ τὴν τῶν ἀέρων κρᾶσιν· αἵ τε γὰρ ὧραι ἠναντίωνται ἐν τοῖς ἀντοίκοις, ἀφ' ὧν ῥεῖ ὁ Νεῖλος πρὸς τοὺς τῇδε τόπους, καὶ ἡ τῶν αὐχμῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπομβριῶν γένεσις ἐπαμείβεται ἐν αὐτοῖς.

10 εἰλαχότων C.

Fr. 14

44F-45A, I 145, 5.

<Προτέραν μὲν τὴν παρ' ὑμῖν ἔτεσι χιλίοις ἐκ τῆς τε καὶ Ἡφαίστου τὸ σπέρμα παραλαβοῦσαν ὑμῶν, τήνδε δὲ ὑστέραν. 23DE.>

Ἀπορήσας δὲ ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος, πῶς οἱ θεοὶ κατὰ χρόνους ἀφωρισμένους λαγχάνειν λέγονται τόπους τινάς, οἷον Ἀθηνᾶ πρότερον μὲν τὰς Ἀθήνας, ὕστερον δὲ τὴν Σάιν· εἰ γὰρ ἄρχονταί ποτε τῆς κληρώσεως, καὶ παύοιντ' ἄν ποτε· τὸ γὰρ χρόνῳ παραμετρούμενον ἅπαν τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν· ἔτι δὲ ὅν ποτε λαγχάνουσι τόπον, πότερον ἀδέσποτον ὄντα λαγχάνουσιν, ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλων θεῶν προστατούμενον· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀδέσποτον, πῶς ἂν εἴη τι τοῦ παντὸς ἔρημον θεοῦ παντελῶς; πῶς δ' ἂν διαμένοι τις τόπος ὅλως ἀφρούρητος ὑπὸ τῶν κρειττόνων; πῶς δ' ἄν, εἰ αὐτάρκης ἐστὶν εἰς τὸ σῴζειν ἑαυτόν, ὕστερον κλῆρος γένοιτο θεῶν τινός; εἰ δὲ ὑπ' ἄλλον ἡγεμόνα τελεῖ καὶ ἄλλος αὐτὸν λαγχάνει θεός, καὶ οὕτως ἄλογον· οὔτε γὰρ παρασπᾶται ὁ δεύτερος τὴν ἐπιστασίαν τοῦ προτέρου καὶ τὸν κλῆρον, οὔτε ἀντιμεταλαμβάνουσι τοὺς ἀλλήλων τόπους· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ δαίμονες ἐναλλάττουσι τὰς ἑαυτῶν λήξεις—ταῦτα δὴ διαπορήσας ἐπιλύεται λέγων ἑστάναι μὲν τὰς κληρώσεις ἀιδίους τῶν θεῶν, τὰ δὲ μετέχοντα αὐτῶν ποτὲ μὲν ἀπολαύειν τῶν ἡγεμόνων, ποτὲ δὲ στέρεσθαι, καὶ ταύτας εἶναι τὰς μεθέξεις τὰς χρόνῳ μετρουμένας, ἃς δὴ πολλάκις οἱ ἱεροὶ θεσμοὶ γενέθλια καλοῦσι θεῶν.

ground-rules of their creation, while the mixture and composition of the air is a secondary reason. For the seasons are reversed in the antipodal regions, from which the Nile flows to the regions we inhabit, and the occurrence of droughts and rains is contrary there (to what it is here).

Fr. 14

The divine Iamblichus raises the problem as to how the gods are said to receive the allotment of certain places according to defined times, such as for instance Athena first being allotted Athens, and later Sais; for if they begin their presidency at a point in time, they would also end it at a point in time; for everything measured in time is of this nature. And again, as regards whatever place they have been allotted, did they receive it as being previously without a ruler, or as presided over by other gods; for if it was without a ruler, how would any part of the All be completely devoid of God? And how would any place survive entirely unprotected by the superior ones? And how, if (a place) is of itself sufficient for its own protection and survival, would it then become the allotment of one of the gods? But if it is ranked under another leader and another god has it for his lot, in this way too absurdity results; for neither does the second wrest the domination and the allotment from the former, nor do they assume in turn each other's areas; for not even the daemons change allotments with each other.

Having raised these difficulties he goes on to solve them by saying that the allotments of the gods do indeed stand eternal, but those things that partake of them sometimes enjoy the influence of their rulers, and at other times are deprived of it, and these are the participations measured in time, which indeed the sacred ordinances in many places call the birthdays of the gods.

Fr. 14A

45B, I 146, 9

<Τῆς δὲ ἐνθαδὶ διακοσμήσεως παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς γράμμασιν ὀκτακισχιλίων ἀριθμὸς ἐτῶν γέγραπται. 23E.>

Ἔτι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἱερῶν γραμμάτων τὴν ἀφήγησιν ταύτην ποιούμενος, ὃ δηλοῖ τῶν κοσμικῶν θείων εἰδῶν τὴν μόνιμον φρουράν, ὡς φαίη ἂν ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος.

Fr. 15

45E, I 147, 24

<. . . . . ibid. . . . .>

Πᾶσαν δὲ ταύτην τὴν ἐξήγησιν ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος ἀποδοκιμάζει λέγων μὴ περὶ βίων εἶναι τὸν λόγον ἐν τούτοις, ἀλλὰ περὶ διαφόρων μέτρων τῆς Ἀθηναικῆς μεθέξεως. ἄτοπον οὖν γίνεσθαι τὴν μνήμην τῶν ἐν Φαίδρῳ περιόδων.

Fr. 16

47BCD, I 152, 28

<Πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τῶν ἱερέων γένος ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων χωρὶς ἀφωρισμένον. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ τῶν δημιουργῶν, ὅτι καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἕκαστον, ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐκ ἐπιμιγνύμενον δημιουργεῖ, τό τε τῶν νομέων καὶ τὸ τῶν θηρευτῶν, τό τε τῶν γεωργῶν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ μάχιμον γένος ᾔσθησαί που τῇδε ἁπάντων τῶν γενῶν κεχωρισμένον, οἷς οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου προστετάχθη μέλειν. 24AB.>

Ὁ δέ γε θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος ἐπιτιμήσας τούτοις ὡς οὔτε Πλατωνικῶς οὔτε ἀληθῶς λεγομένοις—οὔτε γὰρ τοὺς ἀρχαγγέλους ἠξιῶσθαί που μνήμης ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος, οὔτε τὸ μάχιμον γένος εἶναι τῶν εἰς σώματα ῥεπουσῶν ψυχῶν· οὐ γὰρ δεῖ ταύτας ἀντιδιαιρεῖν θεοῖς ἢ δαίμοσιν· καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον, εἰ ταύτας μὲν ἐν τῷ μέσῳ γένει τάξομεν, θεοὺς δὲ καὶ δαίμονας ἐν τοῖς δημιουργικοῖς τοῖς ἐσχάτοις· οὔτε νομέας ὑπάρχειν ἐκείνους τοὺς ἀποτυχόντας μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρωπικοῦ νοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ζῷα σχόντας τινὰ συμπάθειαν· οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι τοῖς δαίμοσι τοῖς ἐπιτροπεύουσι τὴν θνητὴν φύσιν· οὔτε θηρατὰς τοὺς ὥσπερ ἐν ζωγρείῳ κατακλείοντας τῷ σώματι τὴν ψυχήν· οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι συζεύγνυται, οὐδὲ φιλόσοφος ὁ τρόπος οὗτος τῆς θεωρίας, ἀλλὰ βαρβαρικῆς ἀλαζονείας μεστός· οὔτε τοὺς γεωργοὺς εἰς τὴν Δήμητραν ἀνενεκτέον· ἐξῄρηνται γὰρ οἱ θεοὶ τῶν προσεχῶν αἰτίων τῆς φύσεως

7 γενομένοις M: γινομένοις P. 8 παρὰ τοῦ πλάτωνος P. 9 δὴ N. 13 τινὰ MN: τὴν P. 18 ἐξήρτηνται P.

Fr. 14A

And further basing this narration on the sacred writings, which shows the permanent watch of the cosmic divine forms, as Iamblichus might say.

Fr. 15

But the divine Iamblichus rejects all this exegesis, saying that the discussion in this place is not about lives, but about different degrees of participation in Athena—which makes the reference to the periods of time in the *Phaedrus* out of place.

Fr. 16

The divine Iamblichus, on the other hand, criticises these theories as being neither good Platonism nor true, –for archangels never merit so much as a mention in Plato, nor is the *warlike class* that of the souls that are inclined towards bodies; for these should not be distinguished from gods or daemons; and indeed it is absurd, if we rank these in the middle class, and gods and daemons among the lowest demiurgic classes; nor should those be *shepherds* who have failed of human mind, but have a certain sympathetic connection with living things; for it is not from the human species that those daemons who watch over human nature derive their essences; nor are they *hunters* who shut up the soul in the body as in a cage; for this is not the way that the soul is united with the body, nor is this a type of theory proper to philosophy, but one full of unhellenic trumpery; nor are the *farmers* to be related to Demeter; for the gods transcend the immediate causes of Nature.

—τούτοις δ' οὖν ἐπιτιμήσας τοὺς μὲν ἱερέας ἀνάλογον ἵστησι δι' ὁμοιότητος πρὸς πάσας τὰς δευτέρας οὐσίας καὶ δυνάμεις, ὅσαι τὰς προτέρας ἑαυτῶν αἰτίας τιμῶσι καὶ θεραπεύουσι, τοὺς δὲ νομέας πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τὴν ἐπιστασίαν λαχοῦσι τῆς εἰς τὸ σῶμα ῥεπούσης ζωῆς καὶ τῶν ἀλογίστων δυνάμεων καὶ ταύτας ἐν τάξει διανέμουσι, τοὺς δὲ θηρευτὰς δυνάμεσι καθολικαῖς, κοσμητικαῖς τῶν δευτέρων διὰ τῆς θήρας τοῦ ὄντος, τοὺς δὲ γεωργοὺς τοῖς παρασκευάζουσι τὴν τελεσιουργίαν τῶν ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ φερομένων ἐπὶ γῆν σπερμάτων, τοὺς δὲ μαχίμους τοῖς τὸ μὲν ἄθεον πὰν ἀνατρέπουσι, τὸ δὲ θεῖον κρατύνουσιν.

19 δι' ὁμοιότητος ἀνάλογον ἵστησι P. 24 δια τῆς N: δια τὰς P: διτὰς M sic.

Fr. 17

48D, I 156, 31.

<Ἔτι δὲ ἡ τῆς ὁπλίσεως αὐτῶν σχέσις ἀσπίδων καὶ δοράτων, οἷς ἡμεῖς πρῶτοι τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν ὡπλίσμεθα, τῆς θεοῦ καθάπερ ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς τόποις παρ' ὑμῖν πρώτοις ἐνδειξαμένης. 24B.>

Ὁ δέ γε θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος ἐνθεαστικῶς, ἐπειδὴ πᾶν τὸ θεῖον καὶ δρᾶν χρὴ καὶ μὴ πάσχειν, ἵνα τῷ μὲν δρᾶν μὴ ἔχῃ τὸ ἀδρανὲς τῇ ὕλῃ προσόμοιον, τῷ δὲ μὴ πάσχειν μὴ ἔχῃ τὸ δραστήριον τοῖς ἐνύλοις ἐοικός, ἃ μετὰ πάθους ποιεῖ, τὰς μὲν ἀσπίδας δυνάμεις εἶναι τίθεται δι' ἃς ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἄχραντον μένει τὸ θεῖον, ἄρρηκτον ἐν ἑαυτῷ φρουρὰν περιβεβλημένον, τὰ δὲ δόρατα δυνάμεις καθ' ἃς χωρεῖ διὰ πάντων ἀναφῶς καὶ δρᾷ εἰς πάντα, τὸ ἔνυλον ἀποκόπτον καὶ πᾶν τὸ γενεσιουργὸν εἶδος ἀμυνόμενον.

Fr. 18

49B, I 159, 13

<Τὸ δ' αὖ περὶ τῆς φρονήσεως, ὁρᾷς που τὸν νόμον τῇδε ὅσην ἐπιμέλειαν ἐποιήσατο εὐθὺς κατ' ἀρχὰς περί τε τὸν κόσμον ἅπαντα μέχρι μαντικῆς καὶ ἰατρικῆς πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἐκ τούτων θείων ὄντων εἰς τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀνευρών, ὅσα τε ἄλλα τούτοις ἕπεται μαθήματα πάντα κτησάμενος. 24B.>

'Περὶ δὲ τὸν κόσμον ἅπαντα', διότι καὶ ἀφανεῖς εἰσιν αἰτίαι τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τεταγμένων, ἃς θεωρεῖ πρὸ τούτων ἡ τελέα φρόνησις· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος τεχνικόν, ὥς φησι Πορφύριος, ἢ πρὸς

Having made these criticisms, he establishes the *priests* as analogous through their similarity to all the secondary essences and powers, such as honour and serve the causes prior to themselves, and the *shepherds* to all those (beings) in the cosmos that have been allotted dominion over that life which inclines towards the body and over the irrational powers, and which arrange these in order, and the *hunters* to the general powers, which order the secondary powers by means of their search for Being, and the *farmers* to those who bring about the efficacy of those seeds which are borne down from heaven to earth, and the *warriors* to those who overthrow all that is godless, and make the divine to triumph.

Fr. 17

But the divine Iamblichus, in an inspired manner, puts the matter as follows: since everything that is divine should both be able to act and not be subject to passions, in order that by being able to act it may not have the impotence associated with matter, and that by not being subject to passions it may not possess the sort of activeness associated with material things, whose action involves passion, the shields must be powers through which the divine remains impassible and undefiled, having thrown around itself an unbreakable defence, and the spears powers by virtue of which it passes through all things without contact and acts upon everything, while beating off the material and warding off the whole class of things concerned with generation.

Fr. 18

"Concerning the whole cosmos"—because there are invisible causes of what is established in the cosmos, which the perfect wisdom contemplates before these; for the form of this wisdom

τέχνας ἐπιτήδειον· Ἡφαίστου γὰρ τοῦτο δῶρον, ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἀθηνᾶς, ὥς φησιν Ἰάμβλιχος.

Fr. 19

49CD, I 159, 25

<. . . . . ibid. . . . .>

[Πορφύριος δὲ εἰκότως φησὶ καὶ ἰατρικὴν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς ἥκειν, διότι καὶ ὁ Ἀσκληπιὸς νοῦς ἐστί Σεληνιακός, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἀπόλλων Ἡλιακὸς νοῦς.] οἷς καὶ ὁ θεῖος ἐπέπληξεν Ἰάμβλιχος ὡς οὐ καλῶς συγχέουσι τὰς τῶν θεῶν οὐσίας οὐδὲ ὀρθῶς ἀεὶ κατὰ τὸ παρὸν τοὺς νοῦς καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν ἐγκοσμίων διανέμουσιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ Ἀσκληπιὸν ἐν Ἡλίῳ θετέον καὶ ἀπ' ἐκείνου προιέναι περὶ τὸν γενητὸν τόπον, ἵν' ὥσπερ ὁ οὐρανός, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡ γένεσις κατὰ δευτέραν μετοχὴν ὑπὸ τῆς θεότητος ταύτης συνέχηται, συμμετρίας καὶ εὐκρασίας ἀπ' αὐτῆς πληρούμενος.

6 <εἶναι> θετέον Kroll. 7 δὴ om. P. 9 scil. ὁ γενητὸς τόπος, nisi potius πληρουμένη cum ς scrib.

Fr. 20

51A, I 164, 22

<Ἐκλεξαμένη τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ γεγένησθε, τὴν εὐκρασίαν τῶν ὡρῶν ἐν αὐτῷ κατιδοῦσα, ὅτι φρονιμωτάτους ἄνδρας οἴσοι. 24C.>

Ὁ δέ γε θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος 'τόπον' ἤκουσεν οὐδεμίαν σωματοειδῆ διάστασιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν διὰ τῆς γῆς διήκουσαν ἀσώματον αἰτίαν, τὴν ἀνέχουσαν τῇ ζωῇ τὰ σώματα καὶ περιέχουσαν πᾶσαν διάστασιν· εἰς γὰρ τὸν τοιοῦτον τόπον ἡ θεὸς δημιουργεῖ, φησί, καὶ κατοικίζει τοὺς ὄντως ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας.

4 αἰτίαν ς: τὴν αἰτίαν CMN.

Fr. 21

51B, I 165, 16

<Ἅτε οὖν φιλοπόλεμός τε καὶ φιλόσοφος ἡ θεὸς οὖσα τὸν προσφερεστάτους αὐτῇ μέλλοντα οἴσειν τόπον ἄνδρας τοῦτον ἐκλεξαμένη πρῶτον κατῴκισεν. 24D.>

Ὁ δὲ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος τούτοις ἐπιπλήξας <ὡς> οὐ καλῶς τὴν ἀναλογίαν διασωσαμένοις τὸν μὲν πόλεμον ἐξηγεῖται τὸν ἀναιρετικὸν ἄρδην ὅλης τῆς ἀτάκτου καὶ πλημμελοῦς καὶ ἐνύλου φύσεως, σοφίαν δὲ τὴν ἄυλον

3 ὡς add. Kroll. 4 τὸ μὲν C.

is not practical, as Porphyry says, or oriented towards crafts; for this latter is the gift of Hephaestus, but not of Athena, as Iamblichus says.

Fr. 19

(Porphyry says plausibly that medicine also comes from Athena, because Asclepius is Lunar Mind, even as Apollo is Solar Mind.) But the divine Iamblichus attacks these (identifications) inasmuch as they grossly confuse the essences of the gods, and incorrectly allot the minds and souls of the encosmic gods variously according to the context; since Asclepius also is to be located in the Sun and proceeds from him all about the realm of creation, in order that, even as the Heaven, so the sphere of Becoming, may be held together by this divinity in accordance with a secondary participation, being filled from it with symmetry and good temperament.

Fr. 20

But the divine Iamblichus understands by 'place' no material extension but the immaterial cause that pervades the earth, which sustains bodies with life and encloses all extension; for it is upon such a place that the goddess exercises her creative activity and settles those men who are truly good.

Fr. 21

But the divine Iamblichus condemns this interpretation as not correctly preserving the analogy. He explains the 'war' as that faculty which utterly destroys the unordered and irregular and material nature, and the 'wisdom' immaterial and transcendent intellection, and that this goddess is the cause of both. And the

νόησιν καὶ χωριστήν, ἀμφοτέρων δὲ τὴν θεὸν αἰτίαν εἶναι ταύτην· ἣν καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι μιμοῦνται διὰ τῆς ἔμφρονος ζωῆς καὶ πολεμικῆς, καὶ ὁ τόπος <ὁ> Ἀθηναικὸς εὖ συνήρμοσται πρὸς τὴν ὑποδοχὴν τῶν τοιούτων ψυχῶν.

6 τῶν θεῶν M. 8 ὁ add. Kroll.

Fr. 22

53E, 171, 17

<Πολλὰ μὲν οὖν ὑμῶν καὶ μεγάλα ἔργα τῆς πόλεως τῇδε γεγραμμένα θαυμάζεται, πάντων γε μὴν ἓν ὑπερέχει μεγέθει καὶ ἀρετῇ, 24D.>

Ὁ δὲ Πορφύριος 'μεγάλα μὲν ἔργα καὶ θαυμαστὰ' ψυχῶν ἤκουσεν, ὅσα πρὸς ὕλην καὶ τοὺς ὑλικοὺς πράττεται τρόπους, ὑλικοὺς δὲ τρόπους ἀποκαλεῖ τοὺς δαίμονας· δύο γὰρ εἶναι δαιμόνων εἴδη, τὸ μὲν ψυχάς, τὸ δ' ἕτερον τρόπους, εἶναι δὲ τούτους ὑλικὰς δυνάμεις, ἠθοποιοὺς τῆς ψυχῆς. καὶ ὑπέρ γε τῶν δογμάτων τούτων εὐθύνας παρέσχετο τῷ μετ' αὐτὸν ἐξηγητῇ.

3 μὲν om. M. 7 τῷ om. C.

Fr. 23

54A, I 174, 28

<Λέγει γὰρ τὰ γεγραμμένα, ὅσην ἡ πόλις ὑμῶν ἔπαυσέ ποτε δύναμιν ὕβρει πορευομένην ἅμα ἐπὶ πᾶσαν Εὐρώπην καὶ Ἀσίαν, 24E.>

Ὁ δέ γε θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος θαυμαστόν τινα τρόπον διὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀντιλογίαν μερικώτερον ἀντιλαβομένους τῆς ἀναλύσεως οὐδὲ ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀκροᾶσθαι τῶν λόγων διέγνωκε, καίτοι γε ἐν προοιμίοις αὐτὸς ἀφορμὰς ἡμῖν τῶν τοιούτων λόγων παραδεδωκώς. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν θεῖος οὗτος ἀνὴρ πολλά τε ἄλλα καὶ δὴ καὶ ταῦτα ἡμᾶς παιδεύσας εὐμενὴς ἔστω.

σχ. CMR Σιμπλικίου εἰς τὸ 'ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος εὐμενὴς ἔστω'·
Σιμπλικίου πόνος οὗτος, Ἰαμβλιχε δῶτερ ἐάων,
ἵλαθι νικηθείς, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ σῶν ἐπέων.

4 αἰτιολογίαν mss.: em. Kroll. ἀντιλαμβανομένους C.

Athenians imitate her through their intelligent and warlike mode of life, and the area of Athens is well fitted for the reception of such souls."

Fr. 22

"Porphyry took this as signifying great and marvellous deeds of souls, such as are done against Matter and the material modes, by which 'material modes' he means daemons. For there are, he says, two types of daemon, the one souls, the other modes, and that these latter are material powers, formative of characteristics in the soul.

But for these opinions he has had to answer to the commentator who followed him."

Fr. 23

"But the divine Iamblichus has decided—surprisingly, in view of his opposition to the other (commentators) who undertake the analysis (of the dialogue) rather in too piecemeal a fashion—to take the passage in precisely its surface meaning, although in his Preface he has himself given us promptings to such types of exegesis. But may this divine man, who has been my teacher in this, as in many other things, be gracious to me."

Fr. 24

60D, I 195, 22

<Ὡς δή τοι, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὰ παίδων μαθήματα θαυμαστὸν ἔχει τι μνημεῖον. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἃ μὲν χθὲς ἤκουσα, οὐκ ἂν οἶδα εἰ δυναίμην ἅπαντα ἐν μνήμῃ πάλιν λαβεῖν· ταῦτα δὲ ἃ πάμπολυν χρόνον διακήκοα, παντάπασι θαυμάσαιμ᾽ ἂν εἴ τί με αὐτῶν διαπέφευγεν. ἦν μὲν οὖν μετὰ πολλῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ παιδικῆς τότε ἀκουόμενα, καὶ τοῦ πρεσβύτου προθύμως με διδάσκοντος, ἅτ᾽ ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἐπανερωτῶντος, ὥστε οἷον ἐγκαύματα ἀνεκπλύτου γραφῆς ἔμμονά μοι γέγονεν. 26B.>

Εἰ δέ τις πρὸς ταύταις ταῖς ἀποδόσεσι καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀντέχοιτο τῆς ὅλης θεωρίας, ἀκουέτω λέγοντος Ἰαμβλίχου τὴν μὲν τῶν παίδων μνήμην ἐνδείκνυσθαι τὴν ἀεὶ νέαν καὶ ἀκμάζουσαν μόνιμον τῶν λόγων ποίησιν, τὸ δὲ ἀνέκπλυτον τῆς γραφῆς, ἢ τῆς βαφῆς—λέγεται γὰρ ἀμφοτέρως—τὴν ἀέναον καὶ ἀνέκλειπτον δημιουργίαν, τὸ δὲ πρόθυμον τοῦ διδάσκοντος τὴν ἄφθονον τῶν πρεσβυτέρων αἰτίων εἰς τὰ δεύτερα χορηγίαν·

9 μονίμων ci. S. 11 ἀμφότερον P. ἀέναον P: ἀένναον CN.

Fr. 25

63B, I 204, 24

<Τελέως τε καὶ λαμπρῶς ἔοικα ἀνταπολήψεσθαι τὴν τῶν λόγων ἑστίασιν. σὸν οὖν ἔργον λέγειν ἄν, ὦ Τίμαιε, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἢ καλέσαντα κατὰ νόμον θεούς. 27B.>

[Μέχρι δὴ τούτων συμπεπλήρωται τὸ τοῦ Τιμαίου προοίμιον, ὅπερ Σευῆρος μὲν οὐδὲ ἐξηγήσεως ἠξίωσε τὸ παράπαν, Λογγῖνος δὲ οὐ πᾶν ἔλεγε περιττόν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσα παρεισκυκλεῖται περὶ τῶν Ἀτλαντίνων καὶ τῶν τοῦ Αἰγυπτίου διηγήσεων, ὥστε καὶ εἰώθει συνάπτειν τῇ Σωκράτους δεήσει τὴν ἀπαγγελίαν τοῦ Κριτίου, λέγω δὲ τῷ 'πάρειμί τε οὖν κεκοσμημένος ἐπ᾽ αὐτὰ καὶ πάντων ἑτοιμότατος δέχεσθαι' τὸ 'σκόπει δὴ τὴν τῶν ξενίων σοι διάθεσιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ᾗ διέθεμεν.']

Πορφύριος δὲ καὶ Ἰάμβλιχος τῇ πάσῃ τοῦ διαλόγου προθέσει σύμφωνον ἀπέφηναν, ὁ μὲν μερικώτερον, ὁ δὲ ἐποπτικώτερον· ὥστε εἰ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐνταῦθα τὸ βιβλίον περιγράψαιμεν, σύμφωνον τῷ τε Πλάτωνι καὶ τούτοις παρεξόμεθα τὴν ἑαυτῶν τάξιν.

2 ἢ om. N. ἐπικαλέσαντα A, Plat. 13 εἰ om. N. sed sscr N′ post ἡμεῖς. 14 τε om. C.

Fr. 24

But if one, in addition to these explanations, were to cling fast also to the general consideration of reality, let him listen to Iamblichus when he says that the memory of children signifies the ever new and flourishing permanent creation of the reason-principles and the 'indelibility of the drawing' or 'the dye'—for both readings are extant—the overflowing and neverfailing creation, and the 'enthusiasm' of the teacher the ungrudging supplying of the secondary causes by those superior to them.

Fr. 25

(This completes the introductory portion of the Timaeus, which Severus did not even consider worth commenting on at all, while Longinus declared that it was not *all* superfluous, but only the digression about the war with Atlantis and the conversation with the Egyptian priest, so that his practice was to join the appeal to Socrates with the announcement of Critias, I mean the phrase 'So here I am decked out to hear this and supremely ready to receive it' (20C) with 'Here then, Socrates, is the plan of the entertainment which we have laid out for you.' (27A))

But Porphyry and Iamblichus declared the introduction to be in accord with the overall theme of the dialogue, the former dealing with it in a somewhat piecemeal way, however, the latter with insight into higher mysteries. So that if we too bring the book to a conclusion here, we will bring our own arrangement into accord with Plato and these two commentators.

ΒΙΒΛΙΟΝ β′

Fr. 26

64CD, I 209, 1

ΠΡΟΟΙΜΙΟΝ

Ὁ δέ γε θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος τὴν μὲν τοιαύτην ἱστορίαν οὐδὲν ἡγεῖται προσήκειν [ἐν] τοῖς προκειμένοις· οὐ γὰρ περὶ ἀθέων ἀνθρώπων ὁ λόγος τῷ Πλάτωνι νῦν, ἀλλὰ περὶ σωφρονούντων καὶ θεοῖς προσομιλεῖν δυναμένων, οὐδὲ περὶ ἀμφισβητούντων πρὸς τὰ ἔργα τῆς ὁσιότητος, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν σῴζεσθαι βουλομένων ὑπὸ τῶν τὰ ὅλα σῳζόντων· παραδίδωσι δὲ τήν τε δύναμιν τῆς εὐχῆς καὶ τὴν τελειότητα θαυμαστήν τινα καὶ ὑπερφυῆ καὶ πᾶσαν ὑπεραίρουσαν ἐλπίδα.

2 [ἐν] del. Diehl.   5 βουλομένων N: δυναμένων CP.

Fr. 27

67D, I 218, 8

<Ἡμᾶς δὲ τοὺς περὶ παντὸς λόγους ποιεῖσθαί πῃ μέλλοντας ἢ γέγονεν ἢ καὶ ἀγενές ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ παντάπασι παραλλάττομεν, 27C.>

Ὁ δέ γε θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος 'πῇ' μὲν περὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἔσεσθαί φησι τὸν λόγον, 'πῇ' δ' οὔ· τὴν γὰρ ὕλην ἅτε ἀόριστον οὖσαν καὶ ἀνείδεον ἄρρητον ἀφίησι, τὴν δὲ εἰδητικὴν πᾶσαν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ποικιλίαν ἀνασκέψεται.

4 γὰρ CM: γε P.

Fr. 28

67D, I 219, 20

<. . . . . ibid. . . . .>

Πορφύριος δὲ καὶ Ἰάμβλιχος ἀμφότερα ψιλοῦσιν, ἵν' ᾖ τὸ λεγόμενον, πότερον γέγονε τὸ πᾶν, ἢ ἀγενές ἐστι· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐπισκέψεται πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων· [καὶ γὰρ μεγίστην ἐν τῇ ὅλῃ φυσιολογίᾳ παρέχεται συντέλειαν ὀρθῶς ὑποτεθὲν ἢ μή, τό γενητὸν ἢ ἀγένητον εἶναι τὸν κόσμον;]

2 πρὸς C.   3 πάντων P: om. C.   ἐν τῇ ὅλῃ φυσιολογίᾳ μεγίστην P.   4 μὴ om. C.

BOOK II

Fr. 26

But the divine Iamblichus considers that a survey such as this has no relevance to the matter at hand. For Plato is not at the moment discussing atheists, but men of prudence, who are capable of associating with gods; nor men who dispute the efficacy of holiness, but those who wish to be saved by those (powers) who save (or preserve) the Universe; and he describes the power of prayer, a marvellous, extraordinary consummation, exceeding all expectation.

Fr. 27

But the divine Iamblichus says that the discussion will be 'in some way' about the All, and 'in some way' not; for Plato leaves aside Matter as being unlimited and formless, but the Forms he will investigate rigorously, in all the variety which they assume within the cosmos.

Fr. 28

But Porphyry and Iamblichus give smooth breathings to both, in order that the meaning may be 'whether the All came to be, or is uncreated;' for it is this that he will be enquiring into above all else; (for indeed the correct establishing of whether the cosmos is created or uncreated is of the greatest importance to the whole theory of Nature.)

Fr. 29

70E, I 230, 5

<Τί τὸ ὂν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ γενόμενον μέν, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε; 27D.>

᾿Αλλ᾿ ὁ θεῖος ᾿Ιάμβλιχος ἐμβριθῶς διαμάχεται τῷ λόγῳ, τὸ ἀεὶ ὂν κρεῖττον καὶ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος καὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν ἀποφαινόμενος καὶ ἐπ᾿ ἄκρῳ τῆς νοητῆς οὐσίας ἱδρύων αὐτὸ πρώτως μετέχον τοῦ ἑνός. τούτοις δὲ μαρτυρεῖ καὶ τὰ ἐν Παρμενίδῃ γεγραμμένα περὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος καὶ τὰ ἐν Σοφιστῇ· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ πρὸ τοῦ ὅλου τάττει τὸ ἓν ὂν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ παντὸς τοῦ νοητοῦ, καίτοι καὶ τὸ ὅλον νοητόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ πᾶν. ἀλλ᾿ ἐνταῦθά γε σαφῶς τὸ παράδειγμα ἀεὶ ὂν ὁ Πλάτων προσηγόρευσε καὶ ὅλον καὶ παντελές· τοῦτο μὲν οὖν αὐτόθεν· παντελὲς γὰρ αὐτὸ καλεῖ ζῷον καὶ ὅλον δέ, ὅταν λέγῃ· ‘οὗ δέ ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα μόρια καθ᾿ ἓν καὶ ‹κα›τὰ γένη.’ ὥστε εἰ τὸ παράδειγμα ὅλον καὶ παντελές, τὸ δὲ πρώτως ὂν ὑπὲρ τὸ ὅλον καὶ πᾶν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ παράδειγμα ταὐτὸν κἀκεῖνο τὸ ὄν.

5 Parm. 142Bff. 6 Soph. 244D, 245A-E. 10 Tim. 30C.

8 συνηγόρευσε P. 9 τοῦτο — αὐτόθεν om. P. 10 οὑ δέ Ϛ: οὐδὲ CMP. <κα> τὰ sugg. Diehl. 13 εἰ CP: εἰς M.

Fr. 30

79C, I 258, 23

<Πᾶν δὲ αὖ τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπ᾿ αἰτίου τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι· παντὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αἰτίου γένεσιν ἔχειν. 28A.>

᾿Επειδὴ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων τούτων ἐναργέστερόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον ἧττον γνώριμον καὶ σαφές, τὸ μὲν ὡς μέσον, τὸ δὲ ὡς συμπέρασμα τίθησι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ‘πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπ᾿ αἰτίου γίγνεσθαι τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης’ συμπέρασμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ‘παντὶ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αἰτίου γένεσιν σχεῖν’ μέσος, ἵν᾿ ὁ συλλογισμὸς ᾖ κατηγορικὸς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ σχήματι τοιοῦτος·

τὸ γιγνόμενον ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αἰτίου γίγνεσθαι·
πᾶν δέ, ὃ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αἰτίου γίγνεσθαι, τοῦτο ὑπ᾿ αἰτίου τινὸς [ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι·
πᾶν ἄρα τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπ᾿ αἰτίου τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεται.

Fr. 29

But the divine Iamblichus vigorously opposes the argument, declaring the ‘Always-Existent’ to be superior to the genera of Being and the Ideas, and situating it at the summit of the noetic realm, enjoying primary participation in the One.

And there is evidence for this theory, in what is written both in the Parmenides about the One-Existent, and in the Sophist; for there he ranks the One-Existent before Universal Being and before the sum of intelligible things, although the Universe in its entirety is also Intelligible.

But in the present work, (one may object), Plato clearly calls the Paradigm ‘always-existent’ and ‘universal’ and ‘a complete summation’. For the latter epithets there is *prima facie* evidence, for he calls it the consummation of the class of Animals, and the universal of Animal as well, when he says: “and that of which the other Animals are parts, both individually and generically.” So that if the Paradigm is the universal sum of things, but Primal Being transcends the universal sum, then the Paradigm would not be the same as that (level of) Being.

Fr. 30

But since the one of these statements before us is more obvious, while the other is less familiar and clear, he takes the one as a middle term, the other as a conclusion; for the statement ‘everything that comes to be necessarily comes to be from some cause’ is the conclusion, and the sentence ‘for it is impossible for anything to experience coming-to-be apart from a cause’ is the middle term, so that the syllogism may be categorical in the first figure, as follows:

It is impossible that what comes to be does so without a cause:
But, everything for which it is impossible to come to be without a cause must come to be by reason of some cause:

κάλλιον γὰρ οὕτω συνάγειν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος ἐπέκρινεν, ἢ ὥσπερ ἄλλοι τινὲς ὑποθετικὸν ποιεῖν συλλογισμόν.

Fr. 31

84D, I 275, 20

<Σκεπτέον δὴ οὖν περὶ αὐτοῦ πρῶτον, ὅπερ ὑπόκειται περὶ παντὸς ἐν ἀρχῇ δεῖν σκοπεῖν. 28B.>

Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τῶν Πλατωνικῶν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τὸ 'περὶ παντὸς' ἤκουσαν ἐπὶ παντὸς πράγματος κατὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ ῥηθέν, Πορφύριος δὲ καὶ Ἰάμβλιχος ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ παντός, ὡς δέον ὂν περὶ τοῦ παντὸς εἰπεῖν πρῶτον, ποτέρως ἔχει φύσεως, εἴτε ἀγένητον, εἴτε αὖ γενητὸν τυγχάνει ὄν, εἰδέναι χρή, ὅτι μᾶλλον ἡ προτέρα ἐξήγησις ἔχει τὸ αὐτοφυές· καὶ γὰρ τὸ 'περὶ παντὸς' εἰς τὸ 'περὶ τοῦ παντὸς' μεταλαμβάνειν ὑπόψελλόν ἐστιν.

4 cf. Phaedr. 237BC.

5 ὂν del. sugg. Diehl.

Fr. 32

85A, I 277, 8.

<Πότερον ἦν ἀεί, γενέσεως ἀρχὴν ἔχων οὐδεμίαν, ἢ γέγονεν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τινος ἀρξάμενος. 28B.>

Οἱ δὲ περὶ Κράντορα τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐξηγηταί φασι γενητὸν λέγεσθαι τὸν κόσμον ὡς ἀπ' αἰτίας ἄλλης παραγόμενον καὶ οὐκ ὄντα αὐτόγονον οὐδὲ αὐθυπόστατον, Πλωτῖνος δὲ καὶ οἱ μετὰ Πλωτῖνον φιλόσοφοι, Πορφύριος καὶ Ἰάμβλιχος, τὸ σύνθετόν φασιν ἐν τούτοις κεκλῆσθαι γενητόν, τούτῳ δὲ συνυπάρχειν καὶ τὸ ἀφ' ἑτέρας αἰτίας ἀπογεννᾶσθαι.

5 cf. Enn. V 9, 3 (?)

Fr. 33

89A, I 290, 3.

<Γέγονεν· ὁρατὸς γὰρ ἁπτός τέ ἐστι καὶ σῶμα ἔχων· πάντα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα αἰσθητά· τὰ δ' αἰσθητά, δόξῃ περιληπτὰ μετ' αἰσθήσεως, γιγνόμενα καὶ γενητὰ ἐφάνη. 28BC.>

Οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖναι χώραν ἔχουσιν, ὅσαι λογικώτερον ἀποδίδονται, οἷον ὅτι κατ' ἐπίνοιαν μόνην ἡ γένεσις ἐπὶ τοῦ κόσμου λέγεται—οὕτω

therefore everything which comes to be necessarily does so by reason of some cause.

It is better to formulate it thus, as the divine Iamblichus also decided, than to make a hypothetical syllogism, as do some others.

Fr. 31

Since the general run of Platonists understand the expression περὶ παντός, as meaning 'about every matter' as in the *Phaedrus* whereas Porphyry and Iamblichus take it as meaning 'about the All', inasmuch as it is necessary in dealing with the sum of things to assert first whether its nature is that of an ungenerated entity or, again, of a generated one, it must be realised that it is rather the former interpretation that is the natural one; indeed to take 'about all' as meaning 'about the All' smacks somewhat of solecism.

Fr. 32

Those commentators on Plato who are of Crantor's persuasion say that the cosmos is called 'created' as being produced from a cause outside itself and not being self-generating or self-substantial. Plotinus, however, and the philosophers after Plotinus, Porphyry and Iamblichus, say that it is its compositeness that is here called 'created', and to this is subsidiary the fact of being generated from an external cause.

Fr. 33

What is more, those interpretations are not to be trusted as valid either which, in a spirit of excessive rationalism, explain,

γὰρ ἂν καὶ ὅτι δημιουργός ἐστι τοῦ παντὸς κατ' ἐπίνοιαν συλλογισαίμεθα καὶ οὐ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ γενητὸν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον δέδεικται, ὅτι ποιητική τίς ἐστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ δημιουργικὴ αἰτία—ἢ αὖ ὅτι σαφηνείας ἕνεκα διδασκαλικῆς ὑπέθετο γιγνόμενον τὸ πᾶν, ἵνα διδάξῃ, πόσων ἀγαθῶν ἐκ τῆς δημιουργικῆς προνοίας μετείληχε· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἔστι μέν πως ἀληθές, οὐκ αὔταρκες δὲ πρὸς τὴν Πλάτωνος θεωρίαν· τὸ γὰρ σαφὲς τίμιόν ἐστι, φησὶν Ἰάμβλιχος, ὅταν οἰκεῖον ᾖ πρὸς ἐπιστήμην· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀιδίου τοῦ παντὸς ῥηθέντος δυνατὸν ἦν ἐνδείξασθαι τὰ εἰς αὐτὸ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν διδόμενα ἀγαθά.

12 ἐστι om. P. οἰκεῖον CM: σαφὲς P. 14 ἐνδεδομένα M: ἐνδεόμενα P.

Fr. 34

94AB, I 307, 14.

<Τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὑρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὑρόντα εἰς ἅπαντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν. 28C.>

Ἀλλὰ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτον ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος πολλὰ μὲν ἀντιγράψας πρὸς τὴν Πορφυρίου δόξαν καὶ ὡς <μὴ> Πλωτίνειον αὐτὴν οὖσαν καταβαλών, αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ παραδιδοὺς θεολογίαν πάντα τὸν νοητὸν κόσμον ἀποκαλεῖ δημιουργόν, ὥς γε ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον, αὐτὸς τῷ Πλωτίνῳ συμφθεγγόμενος. λέγει γοῦν ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν οὕτω· 'τὴν ὄντως οὐσίαν καὶ τῶν γιγνομένων ἀρχὴν καὶ τὰ νοητὰ τοῦ κόσμου παραδείγματα, ὅν γε καλοῦμεν νοητὸν κόσμον, καὶ ὅσας αἰτίας προυπάρχειν τιθέμεθα τῶν ἐν τῇ φύσει πάντων, ταῦτα πάντα ὁ νῦν ζητούμενος θεὸς δημιουργὸς ἐν ἑνὶ συλλαβὼν ὑφ' ἑαυτὸν ἔχει.'

4 <μὴ> add. Kroll. οὖσαν om. P. 8 οὐσίαν CP: αἰτίαν N. 9 ἀρχῶν P. 9 τε mss: em. Kroll. 11 ὑφ' CN: ἐφ' P.

for example, that generation is attributed to the cosmos only as a device for the comprehension of its actual nature—for on this line of interpretation we should have to conclude that the Demiurge of the universe is a fictive device, too, and is not meant to be taken literally, inasmuch as the notion that there is an efficient and demiurgic cause of the cosmos is proved by derivation from the principle that the cosmos is generated—or which explain, in turn, that he has posited the universe as being in process of generation only for the sake of clarity of presentation, in order that he might thus make dramatically vivid the number of benefits allotted to the universe from the storehouse of the demiurgic providence; for though this interpretation is in a sense true, it fails to support itself when measured against the doctrine which Plato was expounding here, for, as Iamblichus says, "Clarity is to be honoured, when it contributes to knowledge"; since even if the universe had been declared to be 'eternal', it still remained within his power to have shown the benefits which pass into it from the gods as a result of their continuous generosity.

Fr. 34

But after him (Porphyry) the divine Iamblichus, attacking the theory of Porphyry at length, and condemning it as being un-Plotinian, in giving his own theology, denominates the whole intelligible cosmos as the demiurge, being in agreement himself, to judge at least by what he writes, with Plotinus. At any rate, he says in his *Commentaries*: 'Real Existence and the beginning of created things and the intelligible paradigms of the cosmos, which we term the intelligible cosmos, and such causes as we declare to pre-exist all things in Nature, all these things the Demiurge-God whom we are now seeking gathers into one and holds within himself.'

Fr. 35

98B, I 321, 24.

<Τόδε δ' οὖν πάλιν ἐπισκεπτέον περὶ αὐτοῦ, πρὸς πότερον τῶν παραδειγμάτων ὁ τεκτηνάμενος αὐτὸν ἀπειργάζετο, πότερον ὡς πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον ἢ πρὸς τὸ γεγονός. εἰ μὲν δὴ καλός ἐστιν ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ὅ τε δημιουργὸς ἀγαθός, δῆλον ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἀίδιον ἔβλεπεν· εἰ δέ, ὃ μηδὲ εἰπεῖν τινι θέμις, πρὸς τὸ γεγονός. παντὶ δὴ σαφές, ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ἀίδιον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ κάλλιστος τῶν γεγονότων, ὁ δὲ ἄριστος τῶν αἰτίων. οὕτω δὴ γεγενημένος πρὸς τὸ λόγῳ καὶ φρονήσει περιληπτὸν καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον δεδημιούργηται. 28C-28A.>

['Ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ θεατέον, τί τὸ παράδειγμα τοῦτο καὶ ποίας τάξεως τῶν ὄντων· ἄλλοι γὰρ ἄλλως ἔθεντο τῶν παλαιοτέρων.] ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος αὐτὸ τὸ ὅπερ ὄν, ὃ δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν ἐστιν, ἀφωρίσατο τὸ παράδειγμα τοῦ παντός, τό μὲν ἓν ἐπέκεινα τιθέμενος τοῦ παραδείγματος, τὸ δὲ ὅπερ ὂν αὐτῷ σύνδρομον ἀποφαίνων, ἑκάτερον δὲ νοήσει περιληπτὸν ἀποκαλῶν.

11/12 τὸ μὲν. . . παραδείγματος om. C. 12 αὐτῶ N: αὐτὸ O: P (-ο). 12 ἀποφαῖνον P. 13 περιληπτῶν C: περιληπτικὸν P.

Fr. 36

102E, I 336, 16.

<Τούτων δὲ ὑπαρχόντων αὖ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τόνδε τὸν κόσμον εἰκόνα τινὸς εἶναι. 29B.>

Πάντα ἄρα μετείληχεν ἀλλήλων τὰ αἴτια καὶ ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ὥστε καὶ ὁ τὸν δημιουργὸν λέγων ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ παράδειγμα περιέχειν ἔστιν ὅπῃ φησὶν ὀρθῶς, καθάπερ ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος διατάττεται, καὶ ὁ τὸ παράδειγμα δημιουργὸν ἀποφαινόμενος, ὥσπερ ὁ γενναῖος Ἀμέλιος· ἑώρα γὰρ ὃ μὲν ἐν τῷ παραδείγματι δημιουργικὸν ἰδίωμα προϋπάρχον· ἐκεῖ γὰρ ὁ πρώτιστος ἐστι Ζεὺς καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐποίει τὸν Φάνητα δημιουργόν· ὃ δὲ ἐν τῷ δημιουργῷ τὸ παράδειγμα· ἦν γὰρ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ καταποθεὶς ὁ Μῆτις· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰς ταὐτὸν ἦγε τῷ δημιουργικῷ τὸ παραδειγματικὸν αἴτιον.

3 ὁ om. CP. αὐτῶ C sic: ἀύτῶ N. 5 ἀμέλιος CN: ἰάμβλιχος P. 9 μήτης N: μῖτις C.

Fr. 37

116CD, I 382, 12.

<Οὕτω δὴ πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν παραλαβὼν οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον, ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας, ἡγησάμενος ἐκεῖνο τούτου πάντως ἄμεινον. 30A.>

οἱ δὲ περὶ Πορφύριον καὶ Ἰάμβλιχον ταύτην μὲν ἐπιρραπίζουσι τὴν

4 ῥαπίζουσι P.

Fr. 35

(And this is next to be considered, what is this Paradigm, and of what order of existents; for various of the older commentators have given various accounts.) The divine Iamblichus, for instance, defined the paradigm of the Universe as no other than the very Essence of Being, which is the object of intellection in combination with reasoning; he thus places the One beyond the Paradigm, declaring the Essence of Being to be coincident with it (the Paradigm), and each of them he describes as the object of intellection.

Fr. 36

So all the causes share in each other and are in each other, so that whoever says that the Demiurge encompasses the Paradigm in himself is correct up to a point, as is the divine Iamblichus when he lays this down, and so is any one who declares the Paradigm to be the Demiurge, as does the noble Amelius; for the latter saw the characteristics of the Demiurge pre-existing in the Paradigm—for there is situated the first Zeus and for this reason he made Phanes the demiurge—while the former saw the Paradigm in the Demiurge—for it was also in the Demiurge that Metis was swallowed—and that is why he identified the paradigmatic with the demiurgic cause.

Fr. 37

Porphyry and Iamblichus and their school condemn this

δόξαν ὡς τὸ ἄτακτον πρὸ τοῦ τεταγμένου καὶ τὸ ἀτελὲς πρὸ τοῦ τελείου καὶ πρὸ τοῦ νοεροῦ τὸ ἀνόητον ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις ἀποτιθεμένην καὶ οὐ μόνον περὶ τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν ἀσεβοῦσαν τὸν δημιουργὸν καὶ ἤτοι αὖ τὴν ἀγαθοειδῆ βούλησιν αὐτοῦ τὸ παράπαν ἀναιροῦσαν, ἢ τὴν γόνιμον δύναμιν· ἀμφοτέρων γὰρ συντρεχουσῶν ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν κόσμον δημιουργεῖσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦ διαιωνίως.

αὐτοὶ δέ φασιν, ὅτι τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ πρόνοιαν τὴν εἰς τὸ πᾶν καθήκουσαν ὁ Πλάτων ἐνδείξασθαι βουλόμενος καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ νοῦ χορηγίαν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς παρουσίαν ὅσων ἐστὶ τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ ἡλίκων [αἰτίων] ἀγαθῶν αἰτία πρότερον αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς θεωρεῖ τὴν ὅλην σωματοειδῆ σύστασιν, ὅπως ἐστὶ πλημμελὴς καὶ ἄτακτος, ἵνα δὴ καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ ψυχῆς τάξιν καὶ τὴν δημιουργικὴν διακόσμησιν καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἰδὼν ἔχῃς ἀφορίζεσθαι, ποίαν μὲν τὸ σωματοειδὲς καθ' αὑτὸ φύσιν, ποίαν δὲ ἔλαχεν ἀπὸ τῆς δημιουργίας διακόσμησιν, αὐτοῦ μὲν ὄντος ἀεὶ τοῦ κόσμου, τοῦ δὲ λόγου διαιροῦντος ἀπὸ τοῦ ποιοῦντος τὸ γιγνόμενον καὶ παράγοντος κατὰ χρόνον τὰ ὁμοῦ συνυφεστηκότα, διότι σύνθετόν ἐστι πᾶν τὸ γενητόν.

7 ἀσεβοῦσι C. 8 ἀναιροῦσιν C. 13 αἰτίων om. P, merito. 16 ἔχοις P: ἔχεις M. 17 τὸ om. P.

Fr. 38

117D, I 386, 8.

<. . . . . ibid. . . . .>

Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἡ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων παράδοσις τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ αὐτῆς φησιν· ὅ γέ τοι θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος ἱστόρησεν, ὅτι καὶ Ἑρμῆς ἐκ τῆς οὐσιότητος τὴν ὑλότητα παράγεσθαι βούλεται· καὶ δὴ καὶ εἰκὸς κἀκ τούτου τὸν Πλάτωνα τὴν τοιαύτην περὶ τῆς ὕλης δόξαν ἔχειν.

2 ὅ γέ M: ὁ δέ sscr. γε C: ὁ δέ P. ἑρμῆς om. P. 3 sec. καὶ om. M. 4 περὶ om. P.

opinion [1] on the grounds that in the Universe it ranks the unordered anterior to that which is brought to order, the incomplete before the completed, and the mindless before what is endowed with mind, thus expressing impiety not only about the cosmos, but about the Demiurge himself, and utterly abolishing either his supremely good will or else his creative power; for if both of these are combined it necessarily follows that the cosmos is the eternal beneficiary of his creative activity.

But their own view is that Plato, through wishing to make clear how the Providence coming down into the universe from the Demiurge and the ordering influence coming from Mind and the presence of the Soul are causes of so many and such varied good principles in the cosmos, takes under consideration the whole corporeal structure separately by itself, in all its random disorganisation, precisely in order that, when once you have seen the order coming from Soul and the arrangement introduced by the Demiurge, you may be able to distinguish what is the nature allotted to the corporeal in and of itself, and what articulation it has received from the action of the Demiurge, since in fact the cosmos is eternally in being, but the exigencies of exposition must distinguish between the efficient cause and his creation and bring into being in a time-sequence things that cannot substantially be separated, because everything that is subject to generation is composite.

[1] That of Plutarch and Atticus. See Commentary.

Fr. 38

And indeed the tradition of the Egyptians has the same account of it (Matter); at least, the divine Iamblichus relates that Hermes wishes materiality to be created out of substantiality; and indeed it is likely that it is from this source that Plato derived such a doctrine of Matter."

Fr. 39

121D, I 398, 26.

<Λογισάμενος οὖν εὕρισκεν ἐκ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ὁρατῶν οὐδὲν ἀνόητον τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος ὅλον ὅλου κάλλιον ἔσεσθαί ποτ' ἔργον, 30AB.>

Ὁ δέ γε θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος πᾶσαν μὲν τὴν τοιαύτην ἐξήγησιν ὡς ἂν λίαν περιττῶς διεσκευωρημένην ἐπιρραπίζει, λογισμὸν δὲ ἀφορίζεται τὸν κατ' αἰτίαν τῶν ὄντων προηγούμενον καὶ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς δημιουργικὸν καὶ τὸν κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἑστηκότα ὡσαύτως, ἀφ' οὗ πάντες οἱ λογισμοὶ συνέχονται καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσιν.

3-4 ἂν λίαν N: ἀλίαν MP: λίαν S. 4 διεσκευωρημένως MP. 5 τῶν κατ' αἰτίαν τὸν (sscr. ω) M. 6 ὡς αὐτὸς MP.

Fr. 40

121E-122A, I 399, 28.

<. . . . . ibid. . . . .>

Τὰ δὲ 'κατὰ φύσιν ὁρατὰ' τὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ λέγειν παντελῶς ἄτοπον· ταῦτά τε γὰρ οὔπω διετέτακτο τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ τὸν δημιουργὸν ἐπιστρέφειν εἰς αὐτὰ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστί· πῶς γὰρ νεύει πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἢ ὁποίαν ἔμφασιν δέχεται τῶν ἐνύλων, ἐφ' ἃ μηδὲ τῇ μερικῇ ψυχῇ τὸ νεύειν εὐτυχές; ἄμεινον οὖν, ὡς ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος ὑφηγεῖται, τὰ νοητὰ τοιαῦτα νομίζειν· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ὁρατά ἐστι, δῆλον ἐξ ὧν ὁρᾶν αὐτά φησι τὸν δημιουργόν· "ἧπερ οὖν νοῦς ἐνούσας ἰδέας ἐν τῷ ὅ ἐστι ζῷον, ὅσαι τε καὶ οἷαι, καθορᾷ," μικρὸν ἐρεῖ προελθών. ὅτι δὲ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ὁρατά, δῆλον εἰ ἐνθυμηθείης, ὅτι τὰ μέν ἐστι πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὁρατά, τὰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ τὰ μὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὁρατὰ τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει σκοτεινά ἐστι καὶ ἀσαφῆ, τὰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ὁρατὰ ὄντως γνωστὰ καὶ τῷ θείῳ φωτὶ καταλαμπόμενα· τοιαῦτα δὲ τὰ νοητά ἐστι.

8 Tim. 39E

4 ποίαν N. 5 το γονεύειν M. 8 ἧπερ N cum Plat.: ᾗπερ M: εἴπερ P. νοῦν P.

Fr. 39

But the divine Iamblichus condemns such an interpretation [1] as being too elaborately fabricated, and defines 'the calculating reflection' (of the Demiurge) as that which is aetiologically prior to the components of True Reality, is demiurgic of the essential being itself which they possess, and is, while remaining itself unmoved and self-same, the source and potency from which all his subsequent designs follow without a break, and have their being.

[1] That of Amelius. See Commentary.

Fr. 40

To take the 'things visible by nature' as things perceptible by the senses is quite absurd; for these things are not yet organised, according to the account, and for the Demiurge to turn his attention to them is an impossibility; for how does he incline towards the worse, or what sort of impression does he receive from material objects, towards which it is a misfortune even for the individual soul to incline? It is better then to follow the interpretation of the divine Iamblichus, and take these objects as the intelligibles; for that they are 'visible' is clear from the fact that Plato says that the Demiurge sees them: 'According, therefore, as Mind *beholds* forms existing in the Living-Being-that-truly-is, as many and of how many sorts (there are)', as he will say a little further on. And that they are 'visible by nature' is clear if you reflect that some things are visible from our point of view, and others by nature, and those things that are visible from our point of view are by their own nature murky and unclear, while those things that are visible by nature are truly knowable and illuminated by divine light, and such are the intelligibles.

Fr. 41

125E, I 412, 12.

<Οὕτως οὖν δὴ κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα δεῖ λέγειν τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ζῷον ἔμψυχον τε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ γένεσθαι πρόνοιαν. 30BC.>

Ἰάμβλιχος δὲ τὸ μὲν ζῷον ἐπὶ παντὸς τάττει τοῦ ζωὴν ἔχοντος, τὸ δὲ ἔμψυχον ἐπὶ τῆς ἰδίας τῶν ψυχῶν μετουσίας. ἴσως δὲ καὶ οὗτος διὰ μὲν τοῦ ζωὴν ἔχοντος καὶ τὰ νοητὰ ζῷα περιείληφε, διὰ δὲ τοῦ ἐμψύχου μόνα τὰ αἰσθητά.

Fr. 42

129AB, I 423, 9.

<Τῶν μὲν οὖν ἐν μέρους εἴδει πεφυκότων μηδενὶ καταξιώσωμεν· ἀτελεῖ γὰρ ἐοικὸς οὐδέν ποτ' ἂν γένοιτο καλόν. 30C.>

Ὁ δέ γε θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος ἀξιοῖ προστιθέναι τὸ 'ὡς' τῷ 'ἐν εἴδει' καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἀκούειν 'ἐν μέρους ὡς [ἐν] εἴδει' πεφυκὸς πᾶν τὸ μερικὸν ζῷον ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τὸ μέρος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἐκείνοις τοιοῦτον, οἷον ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς—ἕκαστον γὰρ ἐκεῖ πάντα ἐστὶν ὅσα τὸ ὅλον κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τάξιν—διὰ τοῦτο προσθεῖναι τὸ 'ὡς' ‹τῷ› 'ἐν εἴδει' τὸν φιλόσοφον, ἵνα τὴν μέρους προσηγορίαν οἰκείως τοῖς εἴδεσι θεώμενος μὴ διαστηματικῶς μηδὲ διῃρημένως ἀκούσῃς καὶ τῆς τῶν ἡνωμένων καὶ ἀμερίστων οὐσιῶν ἑνώσεως ἀπολείφθῃς· ἀμέριστα γὰρ ἐκεῖνα καὶ ἡνωμένα κατ' αὐτόν ἐστι τὸν φιλόσοφον.

3 τὸ ὡς τὸ ἐν εἴδει P. 4 ἀκούει C [ἐν] del. Kroll. 6 ἐν om. C. 7 <τῷ> suppl. Festugière. 9-10 ἀμερίστων καὶ ἡνωμένων MP. 10 ἀπολείφθῃς MP: ἀπολειφθεῖσαν C, Diehl.

Fr. 43

129E-130A, I 426, 3.

<Οὗ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα καθ' ἓν καὶ κατὰ γένη μόρια, τούτῳ πάντων ὁμοιότατον αὐτὸν εἶναι τιθῶμεν. 30C.>

ὁ δέ γε θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος τὴν ἐναντίαν τούτοις ἅπασιν ἐτράπετο τῆς ἐξηγήσεως ὁδόν. οὗτοι μὲν γὰρ τὸ 'καθ' ἓν' καταδεέστερον καὶ μερικώτερον ποιοῦσιν τοῦ 'κατὰ γένη'. ὁ δὲ ἔμπαλιν σεμνότερον, ὥσπερ δὴ καὶ προσήκει τὴν ἑνάδα προηγεῖσθαι τοῦ πλήθους ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς. λέγει δὴ οὖν, ὅτι τοῦ αὐτοζῴου πάντα τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα καθ' ἓν καὶ κατὰ

5 τοῦ κατὰ γένη ποιοῦσιν M. 7-8 καθ' ἓν καὶ κατὰ γένη S. καθ' ἓν κατὰ MP.

Fr. 41

Iamblichus takes 'living being' as denoting all that has life, and 'ensouled' as denoting its distinguishing feature, participation in souls. And perhaps he, too includes the intelligible living beings in the class of 'that which has life', confining the extension of the 'ensouled' to the sensibles alone.

Fr. 42

The divine Iamblichus, however, thinks that we should add 'as it were' to 'in the category' and to understand the whole phrase 'belonging by nature as it were to the category of part', as referring to every particular being among the intelligibles; for, he says, since 'part' in that realm is not such as it is in the sensible realm—for in that realm each 'particular' is the total equivalent of the universal in its own ('vertical') order—for this reason the Philosopher added '*as it were*, in the category' in order that you might witness the application of the term 'part' to the ideas in the appropriate sense, and should not understand it as denoting spatial distinction or real separation, and fall short of comprehending the unity of the unified and indivisible essences; for they are indivisible and unified, by the Philosopher's own assertion.

Fr. 43

But the divine Iamblichus in his exegesis took the opposite road to all these.[1] For these take 'individually' as being inferior to and more partial than 'generically'. He, by contrast, gives it a more exalted status, even as it is the part of the henad to have priority over multiplicity in the intelligible realm. He says, then,

[1] Atticus, Amelius, Xenarchus, (Theodorus). See Commentary.

γένη μόριά ἐστι· καὶ γὰρ καὶ κατὰ τὰ πλήθη τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἑνάδας ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτοζῷον τελεῖ, καὶ οὐδέν ἐστιν αὐτῶν, ὃ μὴ ἐκ τοῦ νοητοῦ προελήλυθε· τὸ γὰρ νοητὸν ζῷον πάντων ἐστὶ τῶν μετ᾽ αὐτὸ περιληπτικόν, οὐχ ὡς συμπληρούμενον ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν—πρὸ γὰρ τῶν μερῶν ἐστιν ὅλον καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν μερῶν—οὐδὲ ὡς κατηγορούμενον αὐτῶν—αἴτιον γάρ ἐστι τῶν πολλῶν—ἀλλ᾽ ὡς πρωτουργὸς ἀρχὴ καὶ ὡς πληροῦσα πάντα ἑαυτῆς καὶ ἡνωμένως περιέχουσα πάντα, ὅσα διῃρημένως τὰ μετ᾽ αὐτήν. ἀμερίστως οὖν περιέχει τὰ καλούμενα μόρια καὶ ἑνοειδῶς τὰ πόλλὰ γένη καὶ εἴδη συνείληφε καὶ παντελῶς τῶν δευτέρων παραδειγμάτων προϋφέστηκεν· ἐκείνη μὲν γὰρ τὸ πᾶν ἦν νοητῶς, τῶν δὲ μετ᾽ αὐτὴν τὸ μέν ἐστιν οὐρανίως πάντα, τὸ δὲ ἡλιακῶς, τὸ δὲ γηίνως, τὸ δὲ ἄλλον τρόπον κατὰ τὰς διαφόρους τῶν ἐγκοσμίων αἰτίας· ὥστε ἡ μὲν παντελῶς πάντα περιέχει, τῶν δὲ ἕκαστον μερικῶς ὡς πρὸς τὴν παντότητα τὴν νοητήν.

ἔστιν οὖν ὁ κόσμος καὶ τούτοις μὲν τοῖς μερικοῖς ζῴοις ὅμοιος, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ δημιουργῷ παραπλήσιός ἐστιν, ὁμοιότατος δὲ τῷ αὐτοζῴῳ· διότι δὴ τὸ παντελὲς τὸ ἐκείνου καὶ τὸ φανὸν μεμίμηται, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁρατός· μᾶλλον δὲ ἔστι μὲν καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τῇδε ζῴων, καθόσον ἐστὶ ζῷον, τὸ δὲ πάντων ὁμοιότατον ἐκείνῳ τὸ πᾶν ἐστι, πρώτως ὂν ὁρατὸν ζῷον, ὡς ἐκεῖνο πρώτως νοητὸν ἦν ζῷον. διχῶς οὖν ὁμοιότατον, ἢ ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅμοιον ἢ ὅτι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὅμοια ἐκείνῳ· <καὶ> μάλιστα δὲ τὸ πᾶν [καὶ μάλιστα] ἐκείνῳ ὅμοιον.

12 ὅλων C.

that all the other living beings unitarily and generically are parts of the Essential Living Being and further that they attain fulfilment under the Essential Living Being according to the multiplicities and henads contained in them, and there is none of them that does not proceed from the intelligible; for the intelligible Living Being encompasses all those genera that come after it, not as being completed by them—for it is a Whole *before* its parts and not *of* its parts—nor as being predicated of them—for it is a *cause* of their multiplicity—but as primary principle of causation both as bringing to completion all things from within itself and as encompassing without loss of unity all things which are subsequent to it in spatial separation.

Therefore it contains its 'parts' without being, itself, divisible into parts, and it is the collective totality of the multiple genera and species (of this world) while remaining, itself, an unique form and indivisible unit, and, as their presubstantiation, it is the perfect model of the secondary paradigms. For while it is the entire universe in the intelligible order and sense, the genera and species which follow it are, variously, the sum of things in the celestial, solar, and earthly orders, and so on down the scale, answering to the differentiae of the encosmic causes. So that, although it contains all the genera and species without loss of its own perfection, it can still contain each of them as its 'part' in the sense that each and every one of them is relative to it as their intelligible totality.

The Universe, therefore, is similar also to these partial living beings, since it also resembles the Demiurge himself, but it is most like the Essential Living Being; and indeed because it has imitated its completeness and its brightness, it is itself visible. Or rather, while each of the living beings here is similar to the Complete Living Being, inasmuch as it is a living being, the *most* similar to it is the Universe, inasmuch as it is the prime visible living being even as the Essential Living Being is the primary intelligible living being. It is 'most similar', therefore, in two ways, either because it is similar also to the rest (of living beings), or because the rest are similar to it; but in either case the Universe is similar to the Essential Living Being.

Fr. 44

131C, I 431, 23.

<Τῷ γὰρ τῶν νοουμένων καλλίστῳ καὶ κατὰ πάντα τελείῳ μάλιστα αὐτὸν ὁ θεὸς ὁμοιῶσαι βουληθείς, ζῷον ἓν ὁρατὸν πάντα ὅσα αὐτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν συγγενῆ ἐντὸς ἔχον ἑαυτοῦ συνέστησεν, 30D 31A.>

Μέσος δὲ ἀμφοῖν ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος, συνάπτων καὶ ἑνίζων τῷ δημιουργῷ τὸ παράδειγμα διὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν τὴν τοῦ νοῦ πρὸς τὸ νοητόν.

Fr. 45

133BC, I 437, 25.

<Πότερον οὖν ὀρθῶς ἕνα οὐρανὸν προσειρήκαμεν, ἢ πολλοὺς καὶ ἀπείρους λέγειν ἦν ὀρθότερον; 31A.>

Περὶ δὲ τῆς λέξεως ἀμφισβήτουσιν οἱ ἐξηγηταί· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ δύο εἶναι τὰ διαιρούμενα νῦν ὑπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, τό τε ἓν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος πᾶν, καὶ μαρτυρεῖν αὐτοῖς φαίνεται καὶ τὸ "πότερον", ἐπὶ δυοῖν πραγμάτων ταττόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν παλαιῶν. τοῖς δὲ τρία εἶναι τὰ διαιρούμενα καταφαίνεται, τὸ ἕν, τὸ πεπερασμένον πλῆθος καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον. καὶ εἰσὶ ταύτης προστάται τῆς ἐξηγήσεως Πορφύριός τε καὶ Ἰάμβλιχος, κατά τε τὰ πράγματα λέγοντες εὖ καὶ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Πλάτωνος διδασκαλίαν· μικρῷ γὰρ ὕστερον δύο μὲν ἀναιρήσει, καταλείψει δὲ ἓν ἐκ τῆς διαιρέσεως. ἐκ δὲ τρίων γίνεται δυοῖν ἀναίρεσις, ἑνὸς δὲ θέσις, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐκ δυοῖν μόνοιν. δοκεῖ δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀντιφθέγγεσθαι τὸ "πότερον". θεραπευτέον δὴ καὶ τοῦτο λέγοντας ἢ τῷ "ἆρ᾽ οὖν" τὸ "πότερον" σημαίνειν ταὐτὸν—πολλάκις γὰρ καὶ οὕτω παραλαμβάνεται πρὸς τῶν παλαιῶν—ἢ ἐνδεῖν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ "ἢ οὔ", καὶ εἶναι τὸ αὐτοτελές· "πότερον ὀρθῶς ἕνα οὐρανὸν προσειρήκαμεν ἢ οὔ; καὶ εἰ μὴ τοῦτο, πότερον πολλοὺς ἢ ἀπείρους;" ταῦτα δὲ διὰ συντομίαν παρεικέναι τὸν Πλάτωνα.

10 Tim. 31B.

1 καὶ MP: κατὰ C. 5 δυσὶν M: δυσὶ C. 9 τὰ om. M. 10 μικρὸν MP. 11 primum δὲ om. M. 12 δὲ C,: μὴν MP. 13 ἢ τὸ ἄρ᾽; C. 14 σημαίνει P 14 πρὸ C. 15 τῶ αὐτοτελὲς M. 16 ἢ καὶ ἀπείρους MP.

Fr. 46

134AB, I 440, 16.

<Ἕνα, εἴπερ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα δεδημιουργημένος ἔσται. 31A.>

Ὁ δέ γε θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος ταύτην μὲν ἐπιρραπίζει τὴν ἀπόδοσιν ὡς

Fr. 44

"The divine Iamblichus takes a middle position between these two,[1] linking together and uniting the Paradigm to the Demiurge through the unity of Mind with the Intelligible.

[1] Atticus and Porphyry. See Commentary.

Fr. 45

There is some dispute among the commentators about the interpretation; some consider that Plato here is making a twofold distinction, as between the One and Multiplicity in general, and the 'whether' seems to them to be evidence of this, since the ancients used this (only) for a twofold distinction. To others, however, it seems clear that three terms are being distinguished, the One, Limited Multiplicity, and the Unlimited, the champions of this interpretation being Porphyry and Iamblichus, and in this they accord well with with the facts and with the teaching of Plato; for a little further on he will eliminate two terms and leave one, out of the division. And it is from three terms that one takes away two, and leaves one, not from only two. The 'whether', however, seems to them to conflict with this interpretation. They take account of this by saying that either the 'whether' means the same here as a simple interrogative—there are many examples of this among ancient authors—or else the text requires the addition of 'or not', and its complete form would read, "(whether) do we correctly say that the Heaven is one or not? And if not this, (whether) many or unlimited?" They assume then that Plato omitted this in striving for conciseness.

Fr. 46

The divine Iamblichus, however, condemns this account [1]

[1] That of Porphyry. See Commentary.

μηδὲν τῶν ἀποριῶν ἐπιλυομένην· ἔστω γὰρ πᾶς ὁ αἰσθητὸς κόσμος μεριστῶς ἔχων τὰ ἀμέριστα καὶ διῃρημένως τὰ ἀδιαίρετα καὶ πεπληθυσμένως τὰ μοναδικά, διὰ τί οὖν τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ μὲν ἔτι μένει μοναδικά, τὰ δὲ οὔ; τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀπορηθέν. αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπάγει τινὰ τῷ ἀπόρῳ λύσιν, θαυμαστὴν μέν, παραμυθίας δέ τινος δεομένην· λέγει γὰρ οὖν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν τῶν εἰδῶν ταυτότητι χαίρει καὶ στάσει, τὰ δὲ κινήσει καὶ ἑτερότητι, καὶ ὡς τὰ μὲν μοναδικῶν ἐστιν αἴτια καὶ ἀιδίων, τὰ δὲ κινουμένων τε καὶ πεπληθυσμένων.

4 μεριστὸς MP. 5 ἔτι om. C.

ΒΙΒΛΙΟΝ γʹ

Fr. 47

140C, II 4, 20.

<Σωματοειδὲς δὲ δὴ καὶ ὁρατὸν ἁπτόν τε δεῖ τὶ γιγνόμενον εἶναι. χωρισθὲν δὲ πυρὸς οὐδὲν ἄν ποτε ὁρατὸν γένοιτο οὔτε ἁπτὸν ἄνευ τινὸς στερεοῦ, στερεὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ γῆς. ὅθεν ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς τὸ τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχόμενος συνιστάναι σῶμα ὁ θεὸς ἐποίει. 31B.>

Εἰ δέ τις καὶ τὰ ἔνυλα εἴδη καὶ αὐτὰς λέγοι τὰς ποιότητας αἰσθήσει μὲν εἶναι ληπτάς, ἀσωμάτους δέ, καὶ ὅμως γένεσιν ἔχειν, ἴστω, φησὶν ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος, ὅτι συντελεῖ καὶ ταῦτα πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν τῶν σωμάτων καὶ μετ᾽ ἐκείνων συνθεωρεῖται.

Fr. 48

150CD, II 36, 24.

<Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐπίπεδον μέν, βάθος δὲ μηδὲν ἔχον ἔδει γίγνεσθαι τὸ τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα, μία μεσότης ἂν ἐξήρκει τά τε μεθ᾽ ἑαυτῆς ξυνδεῖν καὶ αὑτήν· νῦν δέ — στερεοειδῆ γὰρ αὐτὸν προσῆκεν εἶναι, τὰ δὲ στερεὰ μία μὲν οὐδέποτε, δύο δὲ ἀεὶ μεσότητες προσαρμόττουσι, 32AB.>

Ὁ μὲν θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος—οὗτος γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ διαφερόντως ἀντελάβετο τῆς τοιαύτης θεωρίας, τῶν ἄλλων ὥσπερ καθευδόντων καὶ περὶ τὸ μαθηματικὸν

6 cf. Rep. III 390 B.

5 ὁ om. MP.

as contributing nothing to a solution of the difficulties; for, he says, if we postulate the whole sensible cosmos as a system containing partless things under the aspect of parts and undivided things under the aspect of division and unitary things under the aspect of plurality, why then do some of the things in it remain unique and some not? This after all is the original problem.

He himself produces a solution to the problem which is remarkable, but requires some qualification; for he says that some of the ideas incline to Sameness and Rest, and others to Motion and Otherness, and that the former are the causes of unique and eternal things, and the latter of things subject to motion and multiplicity.

BOOK III

Fr. 47

But if anyone were to say that the forms-in-matter and qualities in themselves are comprehensible by the senses but immaterial, and nevertheless are subject to creation, let him know, says the divine Iamblichus, that these things also contribute to the composition of bodies and are considered in conjunction with them.

Fr. 48

The divine Iamblichus,—for this man had an exceptional grasp of this type of enquiry, seeming to leave the rest of the commentators asleep at the post, wallowing in solely mathematical speculations—seems to me to distinguish simple things from composite, parts from wholes, and, in a word, the powers and forms

καλινδουμένων μόνον—διακρίνειν μοι δοκεῖ τὰ ἁπλᾶ τῶν συνθετῶν καὶ τὰ μέρη τῶν ὅλων καὶ ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν τὰς ἐνύλους δυνάμεις καὶ τὰ εἴδη τὰ ἔνυλα τῶν συμπληρουμένων ἀπ' αὐτῶν οὐσιῶν, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπίπεδα καλεῖν, τὰ δὲ στερεά· καθάπερ γὰρ τὸ ἐπίπεδον ἔσχατος ὅρος ἐστὶ τοῦ μαθηματικοῦ σώματος, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὸ ἔνυλον εἶδος καὶ ἡ δύναμις ἡ τῶν <φυσικῶν> σωμάτων μορφὴ καὶ πέρας ἐστὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων. οὕτω δὲ τούτων διῃρημένων ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἁπλῶν ἐξαρκεῖν τὴν μίαν μεσότητα, διότι <εἰ> τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ ἔτι <τῆς> ζωῆς ἐστιν ἑτερότης, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς κοίνους συνδέσμους τῶν λόγων <καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν> καὶ τῆς ζωῆς μία γίγνεται μεσότης· ποιότης οὖν ποιότητι καὶ δύναμις δυνάμει μονοειδῶς συμπλέκεται κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἑτερότητα καὶ ταυτότητα τῶν εἰδῶν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν συνθετῶν εἰκότως δύο μεσότητες· ἡ γὰρ δυὰς συνθέσεώς τε καὶ διαιρέσεως πάσης χορηγός. ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν συνθέτων ἐκ πλειόνων ἐστὶν οὐσιῶν καὶ δυνάμεων, διὸ πλείους αἱ μεσότητες, καὶ αὗται διτταὶ τοὐλάχιστον· ἄλλη γὰρ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος μεσότης καὶ ἄλλη κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον.

12 <φυσικῶν> conj. Kroll. 14 <εἰ> addidi. 14 <τῆς> add. Diehl. 15 <καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν> add. Diehl. 20 διὸ Q: δὶς MP.

Fr. 49

161B-E, II 72, 6.

<Σχῆμα δὲ ἔδωκεν αὐτῷ τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὸ ξυγγενές· τῷ δὲ τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ ζῷα περιέχειν μέλλοντι ζῴῳ πρέπον ἂν εἴη σχῆμα τὸ περιειληφὸς ἐν αὐτῷ πάνθ' ὅσα σχήματα. διὸ καὶ σφαιροειδές, ἐκ μέσου πάντῃ πρὸς τὰς τελευτὰς ἴσον ἀπέχον, κυκλοτερὲς αὐτὸ ἐτορνώσατο, πάντων τελεώτατον ὁμοιότατόν τε ἑαυτῷ σχημάτων, νομίσας μυρίῳ κάλλιον ὅμοιον ἀνομοίου. 33B.>

[Αὐτὸ δὲ καθ' αὑτὸ τὸ δόγμα ἡμεῖς ἐπισκεψώμεθα παντοδαπῶς τε συνέλωμεν, καὶ πρῶτον φιλοσόφως αὐτὸ καταδησώμεθα ταῖς Ἰαμβλιχείοις ἐπιβολαῖς.]

(α) Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν δεῖ τὸν κόσμον ἀφομοιοῦσθαι πρὸς τὴν ὅλην ψυχὴν τὴν ἐποχουμένην αὐτῷ, δεῖ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ζῳογόνον σχῆμα τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτὸν προσεοικέναι. καθάπερ οὖν ἐκείνην κατὰ δύο κύκλους ὑπέστησεν ὁ δημιουργός, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πᾶν σφαιροειδὲς ἀπετέλεσε πρὸς τὴν αὐτοκινησίαν αὐτῆς ἀπεικαζόμενον. διὸ καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον ὄχημα σφαιρικὸν ἀποτελεῖται καὶ κινεῖται κυκλικῶς, ὅταν διαφερόντως ὁμοιωθῇ πρὸς τὸν νοῦν ἡ ψυχή· μιμεῖται γὰρ τὴν νοερὰν ἐνέργειαν ἥ τε τῆς ψυχῆς νόησις καὶ ἡ κυκλοφορία τῶν σωμάτων, ὥσπερ τὰς ἀνόδους καὶ

15-16 τῶν ψυχῶν Q.

in matter from the substances completed by their presence, and to call the former 'planes' and the latter 'solids'; for as the plane is the farthest bound of mathematical body, so the form-in-matter and the power of physical bodies is the shape and bound of their substrata. As a consequence of these distinctions (we may conclude that) in the case of simple entities one mean is sufficient, because although there is a principle of Otherness in the reason-principles and in the forms and indeed in Life, (yet) by reason of the common bonds of the reason-principles and the forms and Life (only) one mean arises; therefore quality is linked with quality and power with power by a single mean by reason of the actual principles of Sameness and Otherness in the forms. In the case of composite entities, however, there are, as one might expect, two means; for the Dyad is the originator of all compositeness and division. Each composite entity is composed of a multiplicity of essences and powers, wherefore the means are multiple, and are double at the least; for there is one mean connected with the form and another connected with the substratum.

Fr. 49

(Let us examine the teaching all on its own, and gather together all the arguments for it of every kind, and first of all let us establish it securely with Iamblichean methods of argument):

(1) Since, then, the cosmos must be rendered similar to the universal Soul that presides over it, it must be made to resemble the lifegiving pattern of the Soul. Therefore, according as the Demiurge has established it in terms of two circles, so he constructed the Universe in the form of a sphere, to be an image of the Soul's self-motion. For which reason also our vehicle is made spherical, and is moved in a circle, whenever the Soul is especially assimilated to Mind; for the intellection of the soul and the circular motion of bodies imitates the activity of Mind, even as the ascents and descents of souls motion in a straight line, for these are motions of bodies which are not in their proper places.

καθόδους τῶν ψυχῶν ἡ κατ' εὐθεῖαν κίνησις· καὶ γὰρ αὗται σωμάτων εἰσὶν οὐκ ὄντων ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις τόποις.

(β) ἔτι τοίνυν τῇ ἀπείρῳ δυνάμει προσέοικεν ἡ ἀκατάληκτος κίνησις τοῦ παντὸς καὶ τῇ ἁπλότητι τῆς οὐσίας ἡ μονοειδὴς περιφορά, τῇ δὲ διαιωνίῳ στάσει ἡ ὡσαύτως καὶ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ κέντρον περιπορευομένη τῶν ὅλων ἀνακύκλησις.

(γ) ἔτι δὲ ὡς ἡ μία κίνησις τοῦ κόσμου πάσας περιέχει τὰς κινήσεις καὶ ἡ μία ὁλότης πάντα τά τε ὅλα καὶ τὰ μέρη τὰ σωματικά, καὶ ὡς ἡ μία φύσις πάσας τὰς δευτέρας καὶ τρίτας φύσεις, οὕτως τὸ ἓν σχῆμα τὸ κοσμικὸν πάντων εἶναι δεῖ σχημάτων περιληπτικόν. τοιοῦτον δὲ τὸ σφαιρικόν, ἅμα ἓν ὂν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος περιέχειν δυνάμενον, ὃ δὴ θεῖόν ἐστιν ὄντως, τὸ μὴ ἐξιστάμενον τῆς ἑνότητος παντὸς τοῦ πεπληθυσμένου κρατεῖν.

(δ) ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις ὡς τὸ νοητὸν ζῷον πάντα περιέχει τὰ νοητὰ ζῷα κατὰ μίαν ἕνωσιν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ κόσμος πρὸς τὸ παράδειγμα ὡμοιωμένος πάντα περιέχει τὰ ἐγκόσμια σχήματα κατὰ τὸ σφαιρικὸν σχῆμα· σφαῖρα γὰρ μόνη δύναται πάντα τὰ στοιχεῖα περιλαμβάνειν. ὥσπερ οὖν κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν ἀπεικονίζεται τὸ νοητὸν πᾶν, οὕτω καὶ κατὰ τὸ σφαιροειδὲς μιμεῖται τὴν ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῶν ὅλων περιοχήν.

(ε) ἔτι πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ κάλλος ὁμοιοῦται τὸ νοητὸν ὁ κόσμος διὰ τοῦδε τοῦ σχήματος. τὸ γὰρ πάντη ὁμαλὲς καὶ σύμμετρον καὶ ὅμοιον πῶς οὐχὶ διαφερόντως καλόν; εἰ τοίνυν ἔδει κάλλιστον αὐτὸν εἶναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἔδει καὶ σχήματος αὐτῷ τοιούτου, πανταχόθεν ἴσου καὶ ὡρισμένου καὶ ἀκριβοῦς.

(ϛ) ἔτι πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ πέρας οἰκειότατόν ἐστι τὸ σφαιρικόν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα σχήματα διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐπιπέδων καὶ τὰς γωνίας ἢ τὰς κλάσεις ἀφίσταται τοῦ ὅρου καὶ τοῦ πέρατος· ἡ δὲ σφαῖρα μοναδική τε οὖσα καὶ ἁπλῆ καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ πανταχόθεν εἰς τὴν αἰτίαν ἀνήκει τοῦ πέρατος.

(ζ) ἔτι τὸ συναγωγὸν τῶν πολλῶν εἰς ἓν καὶ τὸ γεννητικὸν καὶ τὸ σπερματικὸν τῷ τοιούτῳ χαίρει σχήματι. καταφανὲς δέ ἐστι τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σπερμάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις κυριωτάτων μορίων· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα σφαιροειδῆ κατὰ δύναμιν ἡ φύσις ἀποτελεῖ.

(η) ἔτι τὸ ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἄθραυστον καὶ ἀΐδιον οἰκειότατά ἐστι τῷ σφαιρικῷ σχήματι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πανταχόθεν εἰς ἑαυτὸ συννεύειν δυνατώτατόν ἐστι· τὸ γὰρ κέντρον ἑνοποιόν ἐστι καὶ συνεκτικὸν τῆς ὅλης σφαίρας. εἰκότως ἄρα τὸ ἑαυτοῦ συνεκτικὸν σφαιροειδὲς ὑπέστησεν ὁ δημιουργήσας τὸ πᾶν.

18 εἰσὶν om. Q in spatio. 35 ἓν om. P. 39 πάντοθεν Q. 49 σφαιροειδεῖ Q.

(2) Then again the unceasing movement of the Universe resembles infinite power and simple circular motion the simplicity of being, and the revolution of Wholes going about the same centre in the same way the eternal motionlessness.

(3) Again, as the single motion of the cosmos takes in all motions and its single wholeness all bodily wholes and parts, and as its one nature takes in all secondary and tertiary natures, so the one shape of the cosmos must be capable of taking in all shapes. Such a shape is the spherical, which is both itself one and capable of containing multiplicity, which indeed makes it truly divine, in that while not departing from its oneness it dominates all the multiple.

(4) Again, in addition to this, as the Intelligible Living Being takes in all the intelligible living beings in one unity, so the cosmos, in its assimilation to the Paradigm, takes in all the shapes in the cosmos by reason of its spherical shape; for the sphere is the only shape that can include all the elements. Therefore, as by its singleness it reflects its similarity to the intelligible Universe, so by its spherical shape it imitates that Universe's containing of the wholes.

(5) Again, the cosmos assimilates itself to the Essential Intelligible Beauty through this shape. For how will that which is uniform and symmetrical and alike (in all its parts) not be outstandingly beautiful? If therefore it was necessary that it should be the most beautiful of all sensible objects, it was necessary that it should have such a shape as this, equal on all sides and bounded and exact.

(6) Again the spherical shape is that most appropriate to the idea of Limit; for the other shapes, because of their multiplicity of surfaces and angles and bends are remote from Bound and Limit, but the sphere, being uniform and simple and the same on all sides, harks back to Limit as its cause.[1]

(7) Again, the characteristic of gathering many into one, and the generative and procreative faculties rejoice in such a shape as this. This is plain to see in the case of seeds and in the ruling parts of living things;[2] for Nature makes these as far as possible spherical.

[1] Taking τοῦ πέρατος as descriptive genitive; otherwise 'the cause of Limit' = the One, but this would be introduced strangely at this point.
[2] i.e. the head.

(8) Again, unchangeableness and indestructibility and eternity are most proper to the spherical shape; for owing to the fact that it converges upon itself it is the most powerful. For the centre (of the sphere) is responsible for unifying and holding together the whole sphere. It is to be expected that he who fashioned the Universe made that which holds itself together in the form of a sphere.

Fr. 50

171DE, II 104, 30.

<Ψυχὴν δὲ εἰς τὸ μέσον αὐτοῦ θεὶς διὰ παντός τε ἔτεινε καὶ ἔτι ἔξωθεν τὸ σῶμα αὐτῇ περιεκάλυψεν, 34B.>

Ἀλλὰ τούτοις πᾶσιν ἀντιγράφουσι Πορφύριός τε καὶ Ἰάμβλιχος, ἐπιρραπίζοντες αὐτοὺς ὡς τοπικῶς καὶ διαστηματικῶς τὸ μέσον ἀκουοντας καὶ ἔν τινι μορίῳ κατακλείοντας τὴν ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου ψυχήν, τὴν πανταχοῦ παροῦσαν ὁμοίως καὶ πᾶσιν <ἐν>εξουσιάζουσαν καὶ πάντα ἄγουσαν ταῖς ἑαυτῆς κινήσεσιν.

[αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν θείων τούτων ἀνδρῶν ὁ μὲν Πορφύριος ψυχὴν εἶναι λαβὼν ταύτην τὴν τοῦδε τοῦ παντός, τό μέσον κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐξηγεῖται τὴν ψυχικήν· μέση γάρ ἐστι τῶν τε νοητῶν καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν. καὶ οὑτωσί μὲν ὁ λόγος ῥηθείς οὐδὲν ἄν δόξειεν λέγειν ὡς πρός γε τὴν τοῦ Πλάτωνος ῥῆσιν· εἰ δὲ ἐκεῖνο λάβοιμεν, τὸ τὸ πᾶν ἐκ νοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος συμπεπληρῶσθαι καὶ εἶναι ζῷον ἔμψυχον ἔννουν, μέσην εὑρήσομεν ἐν τῷ συστήματι τούτῳ τὴν ψυχήν. τοῦτο οὖν ὁ Πλάτων προειπὼν καὶ νῦν οὐδὲν ἄλλο δόξειεν ἄν λέγειν ἢ ὅτι διὰ παντὸς τέταται ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ κόσμου, μέσην ἐν αὐτῷ λαχοῦσα τάξιν· μετέχει γὰρ ἀεὶ τὰ δεύτερα τῶν πρὸ αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ σῶμα ψυχῆς, ἔσχατον ὂν μέσης, καὶ ψυχὴ νοῦ πρὸ αὐτῆς ὄντος.]

ὁ δὲ δὴ φιλόσοφος Ἰάμβλιχος ἀξιοῖ ψυχὴν ἀκούειν ἡμᾶς τὴν ἐξῃρημένην καὶ ὑπερκόσμιον καὶ ἀπόλυτον καὶ πᾶσιν ἐνεξουσιάζουσαν· μηδὲ γὰρ εἶναι περὶ τῆς κοσμικῆς τῷ Πλάτωνι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς ἀμεθέκτου ψυχῆς καὶ ὑπὲρ πάσας τὰς ἐγκοσμίους ὡς μονάδος τεταγμένης· εἶναι γὰρ τοιαύτην τὴν πρώτην ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ μέσον ἐπὶ ταύτης ὡς πάντα ὁμοίως ψυχούσης καὶ πάντων ἴσον ἀφεστώσης· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλων μὲν ἧττον, ἄλλων δὲ μᾶλλον ἀφέστηκεν—ἄσχετος γὰρ—ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἁπάντων, εἰ καὶ μὴ πάντα τὸν αὐτὸν αὐτῆς ἀφεστήκοι τρόπον· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μετέχουσι τὸ μᾶλλόν ἐστι καὶ ἧττον.

6 ἐξουσιάζουσαν mss.: em s(ad l.20). 7 ἑαυταῖς P. 9 ἐξουσίαν P. 12 alterum τὸ om. Q. 13 εὕρομεν Q. 17 αὐτῶν Q. σῶμα ὥσπερ Q. ψυχὴν Q. νοῦ <τοῦ> sugg. Diehl. 24/25 ἄλλον....ἄλλον Q. 25 ὁμοίων Q. 26 ἀφεστήκει P.

Fr. 50

But Porphyry and Iamblichus oppose all these,[1] criticising them for understanding 'the middle' in a spatial and dimensional sense and shutting up the soul of the whole cosmos in some particular part of it, a being which is present everywhere equally and exerting authority over all alike and leading all things by its own motions.

(But of these same divine men, Porphyry takes this soul as being that of this universe, and explains 'the middle' in terms of the essential position of the soul, that is, its middle position between the noetic and sensible realms. But if the passage is taken in this sense it seems to contribute nothing to the progress of Plato's argument; if we take it as meaning that the Universe is made up of Mind and Soul and Body and is a Living Being possessed of Soul and Mind, we shall find the Soul to occupy a middle position in this arrangement. But, since Plato has already said this, he would now seem to be merely saying again that the soul of the cosmos is extended throughout the Universe, having been allotted in it the middle rank; for secondary things always partake of what is prior to them, as Body, the lowest essence, partakes of Soul, the middle one, and Soul of Mind, which is prior to it.)

But the divine Iamblichus considers that we should understand here that Soul which is transcendent and hypercosmic and independent and exerting authority over all; for Plato is not here concerned with the Soul of the cosmos, but that soul which is imparticipable and placed over all the souls in the cosmos as their monad; for such, he says, is the nature of the first soul, and 'the middle' refers to it as being equally present to all things, through

[1] See Commentary.

Fr. 51

173A, II 109, 7.

<Καὶ κύκλῳ δὴ κύκλον στρεφόμενον οὐρανὸν ἕνα μόνον ἔρημον κατέστησεν, 34B.>

Ἔτι δὲ μειζόνως ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος διττὸν εἶναί φησι τὸν κύκλον, τὸν μὲν ψυχικόν, τὸν δὲ σωματικόν, καὶ θατέρῳ κινεῖσθαι τὸν λοιπόν· δῆλον δέ, ποτέρῳ πότερον· τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ τοῖς προειρημένοις ἐστὶν ἀκόλουθον καὶ τοῖς ῥηθησομένοις σύμφωνον· κατὰ γὰρ τὸν ψυχικὸν κύκλον κινήσει τὸν σωματικὸν προιὼν αὐτὸς ὁ φιλόσοφος καὶ τὰς διττὰς ἀνακυκλήσεις εἰς ἀναλογίαν ἄξει τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ περιόδων.

6 Tim. 36CD.

3 τῶν λοιπῶν P. 6 τὸν Kroll: τὸ mss. 7 ἄξει s: ἕξει mss.

Fr. 52

183E, II 142, 27 and 184A, II 143, 21.

<Τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐχούσης οὐσίας καὶ τῆς αὖ περὶ τὰ σώματα μεριστῆς τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ συνεκεράσατο οὐσίας εἶδος, 35A.>

(a) [Καὶ εἰ βούλει τὰ τοῦ γενναίου Θεοδώρου παραλαμβάνειν ἐν τούτοις, ὁ μὲν νοῦς ἄσχετός ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ζωὴ ἐν σχέσει, μέση δὲ ἡ ψυχή, ἡμίσχετός τις οὖσα.] καὶ κατὰ τὸν μέγαν Ἰάμβλιχον ὁ μὲν ἐξῃρημένος, ἣ δὲ συντεταγμένη τοῖς ὄγκοις, ἣ δὲ ἐξῃρημένη τε ἅμα καὶ συντεταγμένη.

(b) . . . ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἰάμβλιχος καὶ μετὰ τούτου Θεόδωρος εἰς τὴν ὑπερκόσμιον ψυχὴν ἀνάγουσι τοὺς λόγους.

6 ὁ δὲ συντεταγμένη Q.

being the soul of no body nor yet being yet relative in any way, both ensouling everything equally and being equally separate from everything; for it is not less distant from some things and more from others—it is, after all, unrelated,—but equally distant from all, even though all things might not be distant from *it* in the same way; for it is in the things that participate that degrees of more and less arise.

Fr. 51

"But the divine Iamblichus makes the more significant remark [1] that there are two circles, a psychic one and a bodily one, and the one is moved by the other. And it is clear which is moved by which; for this follows from what has been said before, and is in harmony with what follows; for the Philosopher himself further on will move the bodily circle by means of the psychic circle and will bring the double circuits into analogical relation with the revolutions in the soul.

[1] sc. than Porphyry. See Comm.

Fr. 52

(And if you wish to adopt the terminology of the excellent Theodorus at this point, the Mind is 'unrelated', the Life-about-Body is 'in relation', and the Soul is median, being, as he says, 'semirelated'.) And according to the great Iamblichus, the one (Mind) is transcendent, the other (Life-about-Body) organically united with bodily substances, and the other (Soul) is both transcendent and united with body.

. . . Iamblichus and after him Theodorus refer this passage to the supracosmic Soul.

Fr. 53

206AB, II 215, 5.

<Ἤρχετο δὲ διαιρεῖν ὧδε. μίαν ἀφεῖλε τὸ πρῶτον ἀπὸ παντὸς μοῖραν. μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἀφῄρει διπλασίαν ταύτης, τὴν δὲ αὖ τρίτην ἡμιολίαν μὲν τῆς δευτέρας, τριπλασίαν δὲ τῆς πρώτης, τετάρτην δὲ τῆς δευτέρας διπλῆν, πέμπτην δὲ τριπλῆν τῆς τρίτης, τὴν δ' ἕκτην τῆς πρώτης ὀκταπλασίαν, ἑβδόμην δ' ἑπτακαιεικοσιπλασίαν τῆς πρώτης· 35B.>

Ὁ δέ γε θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος ἐξυμνεῖ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς μετὰ πάσης δυνάμεως ὡς θαυμαστῶν τινων ἰδιωμάτων ὄντας περιεκτικούς, τὴν μὲν μονάδα ταυτότητος καὶ ἑνώσεως αἰτίαν ἀποκαλῶν, τὴν δὲ δυάδα προόδων καὶ διακρίσεως χορηγόν, τὴν δὲ τριάδα τῆς ἐπιστροφῆς τῶν προελθόντων ἀρχηγόν, τὴν δὲ τετράδα παναρμόνιον ὄντως εἶναι, πάντας ἐν ἑαυτῇ περιέχουσαν τοὺς λόγους καὶ διάκοσμον ἐν ἑαυτῇ δεύτερον ἐκφαίνουσαν, τὴν ἐννεάδα τελειώσεως ἀληθινῆς καὶ ὁμοιότητος ποιητικήν, τελείαν ἐκ τελείων οὖσαν καὶ τῆς ταὐτοῦ φύσεως μετέχουσαν, τὴν δὲ ὀγδοάδα τῆς ἐπὶ πᾶν προόδου καὶ διὰ πάντων χωρήσεως αἰτίαν προσαγορεύων, λοιπὴν δὲ τὴν ἑπτακαιεικοσάδα τῆς ἐπιστροφῆς καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐσχάτων ποιητικήν, ἵν' ἐφ' ἑκάτερα τῆς τετράδος τὸ μένον ᾖ καὶ τὸ προιὸν καὶ <τὸ> ἐπιστρέφον, οὗ μὲν πρώτως, οὗ δὲ δευτέρως· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐννεὰς ἔχει πρὸς τὴν μονάδα συγγένειαν, ἓν νέον οὖσα, καὶ ἡ ὀγδοὰς πρὸς τὴν δυάδα, κύβος ἀπ' αὐτῆς οὖσα, καὶ ἡ εἰκοσιεπτὰς πρὸς τὴν τριάδα διὰ τὴν ὁμοίαν αἰτίαν. διὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν προτέρων τοῖς ἁπλουστέροις ἐνδίδωσι τὰς μονὰς καὶ ἐπιστροφὰς καὶ προόδους, διὰ δὲ τῶν δευτέρων τοῖς συνθετωτέροις, μέση δὲ ἡ τετρὰς οὖσα, διότι μὲν τετράγωνός ἐστι, τὸ μένον ἔχει, διότι δὲ ἀρτιάκις ἀρτία, τὸ προιόν, διότι δὲ πάντων πεπλήρωται τῶν λόγων <τῶν> ἀπὸ μονάδος, τὸ ἐπιστρέφον. ταῦτα δὲ σύμβολα θείων ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπορρήτων πραγμάτων.

8 προόδον Q. 9 διακρίσεων P. 10 αὐτῇ P. 16 alterum τὸ om. P. 17 <τὸ> ins. Kroll. 22-23 δὲ <πάντα> ci. Kroll. 23 <τῶν> add. Kroll.

Fr. 54

214AB, II 240, 4.

<Ταύτην οὖν δὴ τὴν σύστασιν πᾶσαν διπλῆν κατὰ μῆκος σχίσας, μέσην πρὸς μέσην ἑκατέραν ἀλλήλαις οἷον χῖ προσβαλὼν κατέκαμψεν εἰς κύκλον, 36B.>

[Περὶ δὲ τῆς σχίσεως ταύτης καὶ τῶν δύο μηκῶν ἢ τῶν κύκλων τί

2 εἰς ἓν κύκλῳ Q ϛ cum A o Plat.: εἰς κύκλῳ P. cum T Plat: εἰς κύκλον legit *th* cum *s Plat. et Iambl. (l. 21).

Fr. 53

The philosopher Iamblichus, on the other hand, sings the praises of the numbers (under discussion) with all his power as containing various remarkable properties, calling the Monad the cause of Sameness and Unity, the Dyad the organiser of Procession and Division, the Triad leader of Return for what has gone forth, the Tetrad the true embracer of all harmony, containing in itself all the reason-principles and showing forth in itself the second cosmic order, the Ennead the creator of true perfection and similarity, being the perfect product of perfect components and partaking of the nature of the same; he calls the Ogdoad the cause of Procession to all points and of Progression through all, and finally the Heptakaieikosad the force stimulating Return even of the lowest elements (of the Universe), in order that on each side of the Tetrad there might be a static, a progressing, and a returning principle, on the one side on the primary level, on the other, on the secondary level; for the Ennead has a relationship to the Monad, being 'a new one', and the Ogdoad to the Dyad, being the cube from it, and the Eikosiheptad to the Triad for the same reason. Through the former he grants to the simpler entities stayings and processions and returns, through the second to more composite, and the Tetrad, being in the middle, through being a square has the quality of remaining static, through being even times even, the quality of proceeding, through being filled with all the reason-principles coming from the monad, the quality of returning. And these are symbols of divine and esoteric things.

Fr. 54

(It is worth considering what is to be said regarding this 'splitting' and the two lengths, or circles.) The divine Iamblichus, on the one hand, traverses the heavens above, so to speak, and 'busies

ποτε ῥητέον, ἄξιον κατιδεῖν·] ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος ἄνω που μετεωροπολεῖ καὶ τἀφανῆ μεριμνᾷ, τήν τε μίαν ψυχὴν καὶ τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῆς προελθούσας δύο· πάσης γὰρ τάξεως ἡ ἀμέθεκτος ἡγεῖται μονὰς πρὸ τῶν μετεχομένων, καὶ ἔστιν οἰκεῖος ἀριθμὸς τοὶς ἀμεθέκτοις καὶ συμφυής, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἡ δυάς, ὥσπερ ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν θεῶν. καὶ οὖν καὶ ὁ Τίμαιος. φησί, διὰ τῆς ψυχογονίας τὴν μίαν καὶ ὑπερκόσμιον τῷ λόγῳ δημιουργήσας ψυχήν, ἀφ' ἧς καὶ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι, τὴν δυάδα παράγει νῦν ἀπὸ ταύτης· ἡ μὲν γὰρ σχίσις τὴν δημιουργικὴν δηλοῖ διαίρεσιν, ἥτις ἐν ταυτότητι καὶ τελειότητι προέρχεται τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ δευτέρους ἀριθμοὺς ἀπογεννῶσα, ἡ δὲ κατὰ μῆκος διαίρεσις τὴν ἄνωθεν ἀπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καθήκουσαν πρόοδον. διὰ δὲ τούτων ἀπογεννῶνται ψυχαὶ δύο μετὰ τὴν μίαν. ὧν ἑκατέρα τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἔχει λόγους, καὶ συνάπτονταί τε ἀλλήλαις καὶ ἐν ἀλλήλαις εἰσὶ καὶ διῄρηνται ἀπ' ἀλλήλων διασῴζουσί τε τὴν ἀμιγῆ καθαρότητα μετὰ τῆς δι' ἀλλήλων ἑνώσεως· αὐτοῖς γὰρ ἥνωνται τοῖς ἑαυτῶν κέντροις. καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ 'μέσην πρὸς μέσην'. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ αὗται αἱ ψυχαὶ νοεραί εἰσι καὶ νοῦ θείου μετέχουσι, πρὶν καὶ οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι κατέκαμψεν αὐτὰς ὁ δημιουργὸς εἰς κύκλον καὶ τῇ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ κινήσει περιέλαβεν, αὐτάς τε νοερὰς ποιήσας καὶ νοῦ μεταδοὺς αὐταῖς θείου καὶ ἐνθεὶς τὴν δυάδα τῶν ψυχῶν εἰς δυάδα νοερὰν κατ' οὐσίαν αὐτῶν ὑπερέχουσαν.

5 Aristoph. fr. 672 cf. Achill. Tat. *Isag.* Ch. 1.

8 ὥσπερ καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῶν P sic. 10 ἡ s αἱ mss; cf. anima mundana. 18 αὐτῷ γὰρ Q. 21 κατ' αὐτὰ M. 23 νοερῶν P.

Fr. 55

217C, II 250, 21.

<Καὶ τῇ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐν ταὐτῷ περιαγομένῃ κινήσει πέριξ αὐτὰς ἔλαβε, 36C.>

Δαιμόνιος ὁ τρόπος ὄντως ἐστὶ τῆς ἐν τούτοις ἐπιβολῆς τοῦ θείου Ἰαμβλίχου καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ Πλάτωνος διανοίας ἀπρὶξ ἀντεχόμενος· τὴν γὰρ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ἐν ταὐτῷ περιαγομένην κίνησιν οὐχ ὡς οἱ πρὸ αὐτοῦ τῶν ἐξηγητῶν ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς οἴεται δεῖν ἀκούειν (ἐν αὐτῇ γάρ ἐστιν ἥδε καὶ οὐ περὶ αὐτὴν ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς κίνησις), ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς νοερᾶς ζωῆς· καὶ γὰρ οὐδαμοῦ φαίνεται τοῦ λοιποῦ τῷ νῷ τὴν

3 ἀπροὶξ P. 4 κατ' αὐτὰ P. ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ Q. 6 περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡ κίνησις sugg. Diehl.

himself with things invisible,' to wit, the one soul and the two proceeding from it; for at the head of every order is the unparticipated monad before the participated, and it is the number which is distinctive of and naturally related to the unparticipated, and from the One is the Dyad, as in the case of the gods themselves. And Timaeus indeed, he says, creating in speech through the generation of the soul the One and supracosmic Soul, from which (springs) the Soul of the All and the others,[1] produces from it at this point the Dyad; for the 'splitting' signifies the dividing action of the Demiurge, which goes forth in sameness and completeness, engendering the same things according to secondary numbers, and the 'division lengthwise' the procession coming down from above, from the Demiurge. And through these are generated two souls after the one, each of which has the same system of principles and are combined with each other and are in each other and are distinguished from each other and preserve unmixed purity along with their mutual unity; for they are united by their very centres, and this is the meaning of the phrase 'middle to middle'. And since these souls are intellectual and partake of divine Mind, before even the heaven came into existence the Demiurge 'bent them into a circle' and encompassed them 'with the motion that moves about the same things in the same way', making them intellectual and giving them a share in divine Mind and placing the Dyad of the Souls in the intellectual dyad which is superior to them in essence.

[1] The individual souls.

Fr. 55

Remarkable indeed is the line of exposition of the divine Iamblichus at this point, and also closely concordant with the actual meaning of Plato; for he considers that one should consider the "motion that is carried round uniformly in the same place" not as the commentators before him had explained it, of the Soul (for this motion of the Soul is *in* the Soul and not *around* it), but of the Intellect and the Intellectual Life.

For indeed nowhere else does Plato seem to join the Soul to the Intellect: but he should do so, so that, by means of this addition,

ψυχὴν συνάπτων· δεῖ δέ, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο προσθεὶς 'ζῷον ἔμψυχον ἔννουν' ἀποφαίνῃ τὸ πᾶν. οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἡμῖν ἀκουστέον 'τὴν ἐν ταὐτῷ κατὰ ταὐτὰ περιαγομένην κίνησιν', τὴν νοεράν· αὕτη γὰρ περιέχει τὴν ψυχήν, ὥσπερ ἡ ψυχὴ περικαλύπτει τὸν οὐρανόν. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν νοῦς κίνησίς ἐστιν ἀκίνητος· ὅλη γὰρ ἅμα καὶ ἑνιαίως ὑφέστηκεν· ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ κίνησις αὐτοκίνητος· καὶ ὃ μὲν μονοειδής ἐστιν, ἣ δὲ δυοειδής, καὶ ὃ μὲν εἷς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος, ἣ δὲ ἑαυτὴν διαιροῦσα καὶ πολλαπλασιάζουσα. μετέχει δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ νοῦ, καθόσον ἐστὶ νοερά, καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ συνάπτεται καὶ πρὸς τὸν θεῖον νοῦν· νοῦ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴ μετέχουσα πρὸς τὸ νοητὸν ἄνεισιν.

8 Tim. 30B.

9 ἀποφανῆ P. ἀποφήνῃ S: demonstrare cernit *th*. 10-11 in eodem et similiter *th*: ἐν ταυτῶ κατ' αὐτὰ P: ἐν αὐτῶ κατα ταυτὰ Q. 11 μὲν om. P. 12 αἰωνίως P. 13 lacunam ante καὶ sugg. Diehl.

Fr. 56

217F-218A, II 252, 21.

<Καὶ τὸν μὲν ἔξω, τὸν δὲ ἐντὸς ἐποιεῖτο τῶν κύκλων. τὴν μὲν οὖν ἔξω φορὰν ἐπεφήμισεν εἶναι τῆς ταὐτοῦ φύσεως, τὴν δὲ ἐντὸς τῆς θατέρου. 36C.>

Τούτους τοὺς δύο κύκλους ὁ μὲν θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος εἰς χωριστὸν τῶν ψυχῶν νοῦν καὶ ἀχώριστον ἀνήνεγκε καὶ τὴν ἐν ταὐτῷ περιαγομένην κίνησιν τὴν πέριξ αὐτοὺς λαβοῦσαν, ὡς τοῦ μὲν περιέχοντος τὰς δύο ψυχάς, τοῦ δὲ ἐν αὐταῖς ὄντος, καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἀμιγοῦς ἀπὸ τῆς ἄλλης ζωῆς καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς, τοῦ δὲ μιγνυμένου πρὸς αὐτὰς καὶ κατευθύνοντος, ἀφ' ἧς αἰτίας καὶ ὅλη <ἡ> ψυχὴ μονίμως ἐνεργεῖ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἑνοῦται τὸν δημιουργόν.

4 ταυτῶ P. αὐτῶ Q. 6 αὐταῖς P αὐτῇ Q. 8 <ἡ> add. Diehl.

Fr. 57

226BC, II 277, 26.

<Τὴν δὲ ἐντὸς σχίσας ἑξαχῇ ἑπτὰ κύκλους ἀνίσους κατὰ τὴν τοῦ διπλασίου καὶ τριπλασίου διάστασιν ἑκάστην οὐσῶν ἑκατέρων τριῶν κατὰ τἀναντία μὲν ἀλλήλοις προσέταξεν ἰέναι τοὺς κύκλους, τάχει δὲ τρεῖς μὲν ὁμοίως, τοὺς δὲ τέτταρας ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τοῖς τρισὶν ἀνομοίως, ἐν λόγῳ δὲ φερομένους. 36D.>

Ὁ δέ γε θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος ἅπασαν τὴν τοιαύτην θεωρίαν ἐπερράπισεν ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἀμέλιον—οὕτω γὰρ ἐπιγράφει τὸ κεφάλαιον—καὶ δὴ καὶ Νουμήνιον ἀντιρρήσεσιν, εἴτε τοῦτον εἰς ἐκείνους ἀναπέμπων

5 ἀπερράπισεν Q.

he may be able to call the Universe 'a living Being endowed with Soul and Intellect.' For it is in this sense that we must understand 'the motion that is carried round uniformly in the same place', that is, as the intellectual motion: for this motion encloses the Soul, as the Soul envelops the Heaven. But Intellect is a motionless motion; for it subsists in its entirety simultaneously and unitarily; Soul is a self-moved motion; the former is akin to uniformity, the latter to duality; the former one and indivisible, the latter dividing and multiplying itself. But the Soul partakes of the Intellect, in so far as it is Intellectual, and through Intellect it unites itself (also) to the divine Mind; for by participating in Intellect, the Soul of the Universe ascends to the Intelligible.

Fr. 56

These two circles the divine Iamblichus referred respectively to the Mind separated from souls and the unseparated Mind, as he does the 'motion carried round in the same place' which encompasses them round about, inasmuch as the former *contains* the two souls, while the latter is *in* them, and the former is unmixed with the other life [1] and the powers of the Soul, while the latter is mixed with them and organises them, for which reason the Whole Soul acts in a state of rest and is united to the Demiurge himself.

[1] sc. that of the Soul. So Festugière.

Fr. 57

The divine Iamblichus, however, criticises all such speculation in his 'Refutations of Amelius and his school, and of Numenius' —for such is the title that he gives to the chapter—whether he is ascribing Numenius' opinions to them or perhaps coming across them expressing similar opinions on these subjects, I am unable

εἴτε καὶ ἐκείνοις ἐντυχὼν που τὰ ὅμοια γράφουσι περὶ τούτων· οὐ γὰρ ἔχω λέγειν. λέγει δ' οὖν ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος πρῶτον μέν, ὡς οὐκ ἔδει διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν γραμμάτων τὴν ψυχὴν ποιεῖν τὸν σύμπαντα ἀριθμὸν ἢ τὸν γεωμετρικὸν ἀριθμόν· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα ἐκ τῶν ἴσων ἐστὶ γραμμάτων, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ μὴ ὄν· ἔσται οὖν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀριθμὸς ὁ σύμπας· πολλὰ δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλα εὕροις ἐκ τῶν ἴσων ὄντα γραμμάτων καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ τὰ ἐναντιώτατα ἀλλήλοις, ἃ δὴ πάντα συγχεῖν εἰς ἄλληλα καὶ φύρειν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει. δεύτερον δέ, ὅτι τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν χαρακτήρων ἐπιχειρεῖν οὐκ ἀσφαλές· θέσει γάρ ἐστι ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀρχαῖον ἄλλος ἦν ὁ τύπος, νῦν δὲ ἄλλος· αὐτίκα τὸ ζ, ἐφ' οὗ πεποίηται τὸν λόγον ἐκεῖνος, οὔτε παραλλήλους εἶχε τὰς ἀπεναντίον πάντως οὔτε τὴν μέσην λοξήν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ὀρθάς, ὡς καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν στηλῶν ἐστι τῶν ἀρχαίων καταφανές. τρίτον τὸ εἰς τοὺς πυθμένας ἀναλύειν καὶ περὶ ἐκείνους διατρίβειν ἀπ' ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν εἰς ἄλλους μεθίστησι τὴν θεωρίαν· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἐν μονάσιν ἑπτὰς καὶ ἡ ἐν δεκάσι καὶ ἡ ἐν ἑκατοντάσι. ταύτης οὖν ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι τῆς ψυχῆς οὔσης τί ἔδει παρεισκυκλεῖν τὸν περὶ τῶν πυθμένων λόγον; οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πάντα εἰς πάντας ἀριθμοὺς μεταβάλλοιμεν διαιροῦντες ἢ συντιθέντες ἢ πολλαπλασιάζοντες. καθόλου μὲν οὖν ταῦτα. διελέγχει δὲ καὶ ἑκάστην ἀπόδοσιν ὡς ἐσκευωρημένην καὶ οὐδὲν ἔχουσαν ὑγιές. καὶ ὅτῳ φίλον πάντων τὴν σαθρότητα κατανοῆσαι, ῥᾴδιον παραθεμένῳ τὸ βιβλίον ἀναλέγεσθαι τὰς οἰκείας ἀντιλογίας πρὸς ἕκαστον ἀπὸ τῶν γεγραμμένων.

9 δ'οὖν Q: γοῦν P. 12/13 τὸ om. P. 15 συγγραμμάτων P. 19 καταφανὲς Q: καταλαβεῖν P. 25 ἢ καθόλου P. οὖν om. P.

Fr. 58

234D, II 306, 3.

<Λόγος δὲ ὁ κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἀληθὴς γιγνόμενος περί τε θάτερον ὂν καὶ περὶ ταὐτὸν ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ ὑφ' αὑτοῦ φερόμενος ἄνευ φθόγγου καὶ ἠχῆς, 37B.>

[τὸν λόγον τοῦτον ὁ μὲν Ἀττικὸς ἐπὶ τῆς προσεκτικῆς δυνάμεως

2 ὑπ' αὐτοῦ Proclus: ὑφ' αὑτοῦ Plat. et Iambl. (cf. I.6.).

to say. At any rate, the divine Iamblichus says, first, that one should not make the soul the sum of number or the geometrical number on the strength of the number of its letters; for, after all, 'Body' is composed of the same number of letters, and even Non-Being (μὴ ὄν) itself; so that then Non-Being (μὴ ὄν) would be the sum of number. And you could find many other words made up of the same number of letters, words for things base and even mutually contradictory, all of which it is surely not correct to mix up and jumble together.

Secondly, it is not safe to base any theories on the letters themselves; for these are conventional, and their shapes have changed between ancient times and the present; Zeta, for a start, on which he[1] has based his argument, did not have its opposite angles parallel at all, nor its middle stroke slanted, but straight, as becomes plain from an examination of ancient monuments.[2]

Thirdly, reduction of the Soul to the basic numbers and wasting ones time on them transfers the speculation from one set of numbers to another; for the number seven in the units is not the same as that in the tens or that in the hundreds. Since, therefore, this heptad is present in the name of the Soul, what need was there to drag in the discourse on arithmetical bases? For in this way we could translate any thing into any number, by dividing or adding or multiplying.

These are his general objections. But he also refutes separately each statement as being contrived and having no sound basis. And if anyone is interested in learning the rottenness of the whole theory, it is easy for him to take the book and read the individual refutations of each separate point.

[1] Necessarily Amelius, but it is Theodorus whom Proclus has been quoting. See Comm.

[2] i.e. I for the more modern Z.

Fr. 58

(This 'logos' Atticus took to refer to the attentive faculty of the soul, Porphyry, to the charioteer setting in motion the two

ἤκουσεν, ὁ δὲ Πορφύριος ἐπὶ τοῦ ἡνιόχου τοῦ κινοῦντος τοὺς διττοὺς ἵππους,] ὁ δὲ Ἰάμβλιχος ἐπὶ τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς· αὕτη γὰρ ἑαυτὴν πᾶσαν κινεῖ καὶ δι' ὅλης ἑαυτῆς λόγος ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων.

Fr. 59

235DEF, II 309, 11.

<Ὅταν μὲν περὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν γίγνηται, καὶ ὁ τοῦ θατέρου κύκλος ὀρθὸς ἰὼν εἰς πᾶσαν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν διαγγείλῃ, δόξαι καὶ πίστεις γίγνονται βέβαιοι καὶ ἀληθεῖς, 37B.>

[Ἐν δὴ τούτοις περὶ τῆς τῶν αἰσθητῶν διαλέγεται γνώσεως, ὅπως ὁ λόγος ὁ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ πάντος ἀπογεννᾷ τὴν γνῶσιν ταύτην, ὅτι τὸν θατέρου κύκλον κινῶν καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐτῷ λόγους τοὺς προισταμένους τῆς διακοσμήσεως τῶν ὅλων, καὶ ἀκλινῆ φυλάττων αὐτόν·] ἡ γὰρ ὀρθότης δηλοῖ μὲν καὶ τὴν ὀρθοδοξίαν, ὡς ὅ τε Πορφύριος ἐξηγήσατο καὶ ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος ἐπέκρινε, δηλοῖ δὲ τὸ ἀδάμαστον ἐν τῇ προνοίᾳ καὶ τὸ ἀρρεπές· οἰκεῖον γὰρ νοήσει μὲν ἡ ἄκμητος καὶ ὀξυκίνητος δύναμις, προνοίᾳ δὲ καὶ γονίμοις ἐνεργείαις ἡ ἀμείλικτος καὶ ἀκλινής, καὶ ἀμερίστῳ μὲν οὐσίᾳ καθαρότης νοήσεως, μεριστῇ δὲ ἡ ἄχραντος ἐνέργεια. [<Πορφύριος> μὲν οὖν τὸν ὀρθὸν κύκλον <ἀμέριστον, μεριστὸν δὲ> τὸν μὴ ἀκριβῆ κύκλον, ἀλλὰ μετέχοντά πως τῆς εὐθείας ἀκούει, διότι φέρεταί τε εἰς τὸ ἐκτὸς ἡ γνῶσις τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ εἰς αὐτὴν πάλιν ἀνακάμπτει τὴν ψυχήν, ὡς μήτε εὐθεῖαν εἶναι μόνον οἵα ἡ τῆς αἰσθήσεως γνῶσις, μήτε κύκλον οἵα ἡ τῆς διανοίας.] Ἰάμβλιχος δὲ πᾶν τοῦτο ἀπεδοκίμασεν ὡς ταῖς ἀνθρωπίναις γνώσεσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ ταῖς θείαις προσῆκον. ὅταν τοίνυν ὁ ἡνίοχος κινῇ τὸν θατέρου κύκλον, ὃ δὲ ἀρρεπὴς μένων καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν ἐπεστραμμένος τοὺς λόγους ἀνεγείρῃ τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ εἰς πᾶσαν διαγγείλῃ τὴν ψυχὴν οἷον ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν αἰσθητῶν—πᾶσα γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ γιγνώσκει, κατὰ τοῦτον μέντοι, τὸ αἰσθητὸν πᾶν· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ταὐτοῦ κύκλος τὰ νοητὰ βλέπων, οἶδε καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν ὡς ἀπ' αἰτίας, οὗτος δὲ αὐτόθεν καὶ οἷον συστοίχως—ἐν αὐτῷ δόξαι καὶ πίστεις ἀπογεννῶνται· τῆς γὰρ θειοτέρας ψυχῆς οἷον ἐπικρινάσης, μᾶλλον δὲ νοερωτέραν ἐνέργειαν εἰς αὐτὸν ἐλλαμψάσης, ὁ δοξαστικὸς κύκλος καθαρὰν ἔχει τὴν οἰκείαν ζωήν, καὶ ἡ γνῶσις ἐν αὐτῷ μόνιμος ἀποτελεῖται, τὰ μὲν φερόμενα μονίμως, τὰ δὲ μεταρρέοντα καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα πιστῶς καὶ ἀραρότως ἐν ἑαυτῇ προειληφυῖα· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ μὲν δόξα τῆς δοξαστικῆς ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ γνῶσις, ἡ δὲ πίστις ἡ μόνιμος καὶ ἀμετάπτωτος τῆς δόξης κρίσις.

5 θάτερον D. 11 μεριστὴ mss. ἀμέριστος μὲν οὖν mss.: ἀμέριστον Ϛ: <Πορφύριος> μὲν οὖν inserui, ἀμέριστον post κύκλον ponens. 12 μέριστον δὲ ins. S: μεριστὴ δὲ Ϛ: om. QD. 19-20 καὶ εἰς . . αἰσθητῶν om. D.

horses,) Iamblichus, to the Whole Soul; for this moves itself in its entirety and through all of itself is the logos of existing things.

Fr. 59

(In this passage Plato is discussing the knowledge of sensible things, showing how the Logos which is in the Soul of the All engenders this knowledge, that is, by moving the circle of the Other and the reason-principles in this circle which preside over the orderly arrangement of the Universe, and keeping it in a straight path.) For this 'correctness' means on the one hand 'correctness of opinion', as Porphyry interpreted it,—an interpretation which Iamblichus accepted—, but it also means the inflexible and unwavering quality of Providence; for the power of inexhaustibility and rapidity of movement is proper to Intellection, the power of inflexibility and unwaveringness to Providence and the forces of generation, and purity of Intellection is proper to undivisible substance, while uncontaminated activity is proper to divisible substance. Porphyry, then, understands the upright circle as undivided, and the circle that is not exact, but partaking in some way of straightness, as being divided, because the knowledge of sensible things is both borne outwards (to the external world) and bends back again into the soul itself, so as neither to be entirely straight, like the knowledge of Sensation, nor a circle, like the knowledge proper to discursive thought.

Iamblichus, however, rejects this whole interpretation as suited to the types of knowledge in humans, but not in gods. Whenever, therefore, (he says), the charioteer stirs up the circle of the Other, and it, remaining unmoved and turned towards him, rouses up the principles of sensible things and announces them to the Whole Soul, what sort of a thing each of the perceptible things is,—for the Whole Soul has knowledge (through the medium of this, however,) of the whole sensible world; for indeed the circle of the Same, while contemplating the noetic realm, also knows the sensible, in a causal capacity, but the circle of the Other knows it

Fr. 60

236F, II 313, 15.

<Ὅταν δὲ αὖ περὶ τὸ λογιστικὸν ᾖ καὶ ὁ ταὐτοῦ κύκλος εὔτροχος ὢν αὐτὰ μηνύσῃ, νοῦς ἐπιστήμη τε ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποτελεῖται. 37C.>

Ἰάμβλιχος δὲ τὸν νοῦν τούτον πρεσβύτερον ἀκούει τῆς ψυχῆς, ἄνωθεν αὐτὴν συνέχοντα καὶ τελειοῦντα, καὶ διαγωνίζεται πρὸς τοὺς ἢ αὐτόθι τῷ παντελεῖ νῷ συνάπτοντας τὴν ψυχὴν (δεῖν γὰρ μὴ ἀθρόαν γίνεσθαι τὴν μετάβασιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξῃρημένων ἐπὶ τὰ μετέχοντα, ἀλλὰ μέσας εἶναι τὰς συντεταγμένας τοῖς μετέχουσιν οὐσίας) ἢ τὸν νοῦν ἕξιν ὑποτιθεμένους τῆς ψυχῆς (δεῖν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἐν αὑτῷ ὂν πρὸ τοῦ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὄντος).

5 νῷ om. D. δεῖ D. 8 τό ἐν αὑτῷ Q: τῷ D; αὑτῷ conieci.

Fr. 61

242DE, III 14, 16.

<Ἡ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῴου φύσις ἐτύγχανεν οὖσα αἰώνιος. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τῷ γεννητῷ παντελῶς προσάπτειν οὐκ ἦν δυνατόν· εἰκὼ δ' ἐπινοεῖ κινητόν τινα αἰῶνος ποιῆσαι, καὶ διακοσμῶν ἅμα οὐρανὸν ποιεῖ μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἑνὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἰοῦσαν αἰώνιον εἰκόνα τοῦτον ὃν χρόνον ὠνομάκαμεν. 37D.>

Πάλιν δὲ πανταχόθεν ἀνιχνεύοντες τὴν τοῦ φιλοσόφου περὶ αἰῶνος ἐπιβολὴν δραξώμεθα τοῦ 'μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἑνί'· ποίῳ γὰρ ἑνί, ζητῶμεν. ἆρα τἀγαθῷ, καθάπερ ἔδοξε τῷ θεολογικωτάτῳ τῶν ἐξηγητῶν;

directly and, as it were, by affinity—opinions and beliefs are engendered in it; for when the more divine soul sits in judgement on it, or rather illuminates it with an activity more intellectual than itself, the circle of opinion maintains its own life in a pure state, and firm knowledge is consummated within it, forming in itself preconceptions, of things in progress, permanently, of things fixed and contingent, trustworthily and fixedly; for opinion is the activity and mode of knowledge of the opiniative soul, and firm and immovable belief is the judgement of opinion.

Fr. 60

Iamblichus, however, takes this Intelligence as being prior to the Soul, holding it together and bringing it to fulfilment from above, and he takes issue with those who either connect the Soul directly with Absolute Intelligence (for the transition from the transcendent to the participating should not be immediate, but there should be as media those essences which are combined with things that participate), or who assume the intelligence here to be a state or condition of the Soul (for what is in itself must be prior to what is in another).

Fr. 61

And again, in seeking out the doctrine of the philosopher about Eternity, let us fasten on the phrase 'of Eternity remaining static in One'; for what we want to know is, What One? Does it mean the Good, as was the opinion of the most theological of the commentators?

Fr. 62

Simpl., *In Phys.* I 702, 20 CAG

<. . . . . ibid. . . . .>

Ὁ δὲ Ἰάμβλιχος ἐν τῷ †ὀγδόῳ τῶν εἰς Τίμαιον ὑπομνημάτων καὶ ταῦτα πρὸς τὴν δόξαν ἐπήγαγεν·

"εἰ πᾶσα κίνησις ἐν χρόνῳ, κινήσεις πόλλαι ὁμοῦ συνίστανται. τὰ δὲ τοῦ χρόνου μόρια ἄλλα ἄλλοτε. ἡ κίνησις περί τι μένον φέρεται, χρόνῳ δὲ οὐδὲν ἠρεμίας δεῖ. κινήσει κίνησις ἢ ἠρεμία ἐναντιοῦται τῇ μὲν ἐν γένει ἡ ἐν γένει, τῇ δὲ ἐν εἴδει ἡ ἐν εἴδει, χρόνῳ δὲ οὐδέν."

1 τρίτῳ legi (sc. γʹ pro ηʹ): ὀγδόῳ mss.

Fr. 63

Simpl., *In Phys.* I 793, 23 CAG.

<. . . . . ibid. . . . .>

[Προσκείσθω δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰς Τίμαιον ὑπομνημάτων. ἐν τοίνυν τῷ †ὀγδόῳ βιβλίῳ τῷ Πλάτωνι μάλιστα παρακολουθῶν τὴν πρὸς τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ χρόνου συνάρτησιν παραδίδωσι. διὸ καὶ περὶ ἐκείνου μάλιστα ποιεῖται τὸν λόγον τοῦ ἐξῃρημένου μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου, πάσης δὲ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ κινήσεως τὰ μέτρα περιέχοντός τε καὶ χορηγοῦντος, ὃς ἄλλος ἂν εἴη οὗτος παρὰ τὸν ὑπὸ τῶν φυσικῶν ζητούμενον χρόνον. λέγει δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ϛʹκεφαλαίῳ ταῦτα·]

"τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν τῇ προιούσῃ διακοσμήσει καὶ συνταττομένῃ πρὸς τὰ δημιουργούμενα καὶ ἀχωρίστῳ τῶν ἀποτελουμένων ὑφ' ἑαυτῆς ὑπαρχούσῃ ταύτῃ συντάττομεν. τὸ[ν] γὰρ 'διακοσμῶν ἅμα οὐρανὸν ποιεῖ' δηλοῖ τοῦτο, ὅτι συντέτακται τῇ διακοσμήσει τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ προελθούσῃ καὶ ἡ τοῦ χρόνου ὑπόστασις· καὶ δῆτα καὶ αὕτη προηγεῖται τῆς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ περιόδου, ὥσπερ δὴ καὶ ἡ διακοσμοῦσα αὐτὴν διακόσμησις προσεχῶς τε αὐτῆς προτέτακται κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῖς ἐκείνης ἐπιστασίαις· ὅλην τε καὶ αὐτὴν ἀθρόος συνείληφε διωρισμένοις τισὶ πέρασιν ἅτε διασῴζουσα τὸν λόγον τῆς αἰτίας ἀφ' ἧς παράγεται. τάξιν μὲν οὖν εἶναι τοῦ χρόνου καὶ ἡμεῖς συγχωροῦμεν, οὐ μέντοι τὴν ταττομένην, ἀλλὰ τὴν τάττουσαν, οὐδὲ τὴν ἑπομένην τοῖς προηγουμένοις, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρχηγὸν τῶν ἀποτελουμένων καὶ πρεσβυτέραν· οὐδὲ τὴν μεριστῶς κατὰ λόγους ἢ κινήσεις ἢ ἄλλας

2 τρίτῳ legi. 10 ταύτην a. 10-11 τὸν γὰρ διάκοσμον ἅμα οὐρανὸν ποιεῖν (ποιεῖ EF) mss: emendavi. 13 αὐτὴ ex αὐτῇ. 14 αὐτὴν om. E. 15 καὶ om. E. 17 οὖν om. F. 20 πρεσβυτέρων aF^2.

Fr. 62

Iamblichus, in the third book of his Commentaries on the *Timaeus*, contributed the following arguments on the subject:

"If every motion is in Time, many motions arise simultaneously. But the parts of Time are different at different times. Motion takes place in relation to something static, but Time has no need of Rest. To Motion there is opposed either (another) Motion or Rest, to general Motion general Motion (or Rest), to particular particular, but to Time there is nothing opposed."

Fr. 63

"(And let us add further his comments in his Commentaries on the *Timaeus*. In the third book, then, following Plato very closely, he gives the doctrine concerning the connection of Time with Eternity. Wherefore also he particularly concerns himself with that (Time) which transcends the cosmos, containing and ordering the measures of all motion within it, which would thus be different from the Time which is the object of observation by the physical philosophers. In his sixth chapter, then, he says the following:)

"Its essence in activity we regard as the same as this setting in order which goes forth and is united with its creations and is unseparated from the things brought to completion by it. For the phrase 'simultaneously with the construction of the Heaven he makes . . .' signifies this, that the coming into existence of Time is conjoined with the setting in order which goes forth from the Demiurge; and this after all precedes the revolution of the Heaven, as indeed the setting in order which organises it is ranked immediately prior to it in the same way by its orders. And it all together comprehends it as a whole according to certain disjoined limited periods, remaining true to the principle of the cause from which it takes its being. We too agree that there is an order of time, not however an order which is ordered, but one which orders, nor one which follows upon principles which lead it, but which is a leader

διωρισμένας δυνάμεις ἀφωρισμένην, ἀλλὰ τὴν παντελῆ καθ' ὅλας τὰς δημιουργικὰς ἀπογεννήσεις συμπεπληρωμένην. τὸ δὲ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τῇ τάξει οὐ κατὰ κινήσεων μεταβάσεις οὐδὲ κατ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον τιθέμεθα, ἀλλὰ κατ' αἰτίων προήγησιν καὶ συμπλοκὴν συνεχῆ τῶν ἀπογεννήσεων καὶ πρωτουργὸν ἐνέργειαν καὶ δύναμιν ἐπιτελεστικὴν τῶν κινήσεων καὶ κατὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα ἀφοριζόμεθα. ἔτι τοίνυν οὐ μετὰ τῆς προιούσης ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεως ἢ ζωῆς τὸν χρόνον καὶ ὁμοῦ τὸν οὐρανὸν λέγομεν ἀπογεννᾶσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς προιούσης ἀπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ νοερᾶς διακοσμήσεως· μετὰ γὰρ ταύτης ὁ χρόνος τε ἐν αὐτῷ συνυπέστη καὶ ὁ κόσμος. καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ παλαιὸς <λόγος> διαρρήδην τὸν θεὸν διακοσμοῦντα καὶ παράγοντα τὸν χρόνον ὁμοῦ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ποιεῖν ἀποφαίνεται. καὶ θείη ἄν τις αὐτὸν εἶναι μέτρον οὔτοι κατὰ τὸ μετροῦν τὴν φορὰν ἢ τῇ κινήσει μετρούμενον ἢ δηλοῦν τὴν περιφορὰν ἢ δηλούμενον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ἓν ὁμοῦ δὴ πάντων τούτων."

[ταῦτα μὲν οὖν περὶ τοῦ ἐξῃρημένου τῆς γενέσεως καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ὑφεστηκότος γέγραφεν.]

(cf. 248AB, III 30, 30: οὕτω γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἡ τοῦ χρόνου κίνησις κατὰ τὰ ἐν τῇ χρονικῇ μονάδι μέτρα προελθοῦσα πέρας ἀρχῇ συνάπτει, καὶ τοῦτο ἀπειράκις, τάξιν μὲν ἔχουσα καὶ αὐτὴ θείαν, οὐ μέντοι τὴν ταττομένην, ὥς φησι καὶ ὁ φιλόσοφος Ἰάμβλιχος, ἀλλὰ τὴν τάττουσαν, οὐδὲ τὴν ἑπομένην τοῖς προηγουμένοις, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρχηγὸν τῶν ἀποτελουμένων.)

28 καὶ om. E. τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν a. 30 παλαιὸς EF; <λόγος< add. a: Πλάτων malim. 32 οὔτοι Diels: οὔτε aE: οὐ τὸ F. 34 τούτων om. a.

Fr. 64

248E-249B, III 32, 32.

<. . . . . ibid. . . . .>

Πῶς οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος εἰκὼν ἂν εἴη τοῦ αἰῶνος; λεγέσθω γὰρ πάλιν διὰ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων δυσεπίγνωστον ἰδέαν. ὅτι, φησὶν ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος, τὸ ἓν καὶ ἄπειρον τοῦ αἰῶνος καὶ ἤδη ὂν καὶ ὁμοῦ πᾶν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν μένον καὶ ἀμέτρητον ὂν μέτρον τῶν νοητῶν ἐν ἀνελίξει κυκλικῇ καὶ ἐν συνεχείᾳ καὶ τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἐπιδείκνυσι καὶ τῷ ἀρχὰς καὶ μέσα καὶ τέλη διακρίνειν καὶ μηδ' ὁτιοῦν ἀπολείπειν τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ περιεχομένων, καὶ ὥσπερ οὐ κινητὸς ἁπλῶς, ἀλλ' ὡς πρὸς τὸν αἰῶνα κινητός, οὕτως οὐδ' ἁπλῶς εἰκών, ἀλλὰ τὸ σύνολον τοῦτο αἰῶνος εἰκὼν ἂν ῥηθείη δικαίως· ἀληθινὴ γὰρ ὢν οὐσία καὶ ἀποκαταστατικὴ καὶ μετρητικὴ καὶ περιεκτικὴ

6 διακρίνοντι mss: διακρίνειν scripsi. ἀπολείποντι mss: ἀπολείπειν scripsi. 9 μετρικὴ D.

of, and senior to, the things perfected by it. Nor do we believe it to be that order which is allotted out partially in reason-principles or motions or any other discontinuous powers, but that which is kept complete in its entirety by reason of general demiurgic generations. The notion of 'before' and 'after' in this order we do not understand in the sense of changes involving movements, nor in any other such sense, but we define it as the sequence of causes and the continuous combination of generations and primary activity and power which brings motions to fulfilment and as all things of this sort.

Further, we say that Time, and at the same the Heaven, were not created along with the motion or life proceeding from the soul, but from the intellectual setting-in-order proceeding from the Demiurge; for it is in conjunction with this that Time and the Cosmos are established in him. And indeed the ancient account unequivocally reveals God as ordering and producing Time at the same time as he makes the Heaven. And one might declare Time to be a measure, not in the sense of measuring the progress (of the Universe), or of being measured by motion, or of revealing the revolution (of the Heavens), or of being revealed as such, but in the sense of being the cause and one thing uniting all these."

(This he has written concerning that Time which is transcendent above generation and subsistent in itself.)

Fr. 64

How, then, would such an entity be an image of Eternity? Let us go over the ground again, because of the difficult nature of the subject-matter. Because, says Iamblichus, it exhibits the singleness and infinity of Eternity, and its qualities of already existing, and of omnipresence, and of being always static in the present, and being, itself unmeasured, the measure of the noetic realm—all these qualities it exhibits in the form of cyclic unfolding and continuity and successiveness, and by distinguishing beginnings and middles and ends, and in not to any extent being found wanting to any of the things encompassed by it, and as it is not in motion absolutely speaking, but only in comparison with Eternity, so it

τῶν κινήσεων ὅλως ὅμως εἰκὼν αἰῶνος εἶναι λέγεται, καὶ ἔοικεν ἡ πρώτη τῶν εἰκόνων αὐτὸς εἶναι· νοῦς μὲν γὰρ ὁ παντελὴς οὐ κυρίως εἰκὼν λέγεται τοῦ πρώτου (τί γὰρ ἂν ἀφωμοίωτο τῷ πάντη ἀνειδέῳ;), τῶν δὲ ἐπίταδε νοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀμερίστου φύσεως χρόνος ἂν εἴη τὸ πρώτιστον, καὶ ὅλως, εἰ δεῖ τῶν μετεχόντων εἶναι τὴν εἰκόνα (τύπον γὰρ ἄλλου πρεσβυτέρου διασῴζειν βούλεται, παρ' οὗ καὶ τὸ ἰδίωμα τῆς ἰδέας καταδέχεται), χρὴ μήτε ἐν ταῖς πρώτισταις οὐσίαις εἶναι τὴν εἰκόνα (οὐ γὰρ μετέχουσιν ἐκεῖναι πρώτισταί γε οὖσαι, μᾶλλον δὲ αὐταὶ ὑφ' ἑτέρων μετέχονται, οὐκ ἐγγινόμεναι τοῖς μετέχουσιν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον τρόπον αὐτὰ πρὸς ἑαυτὰς ἐπιστρέφουσαι), μήτ' ἐν ταῖς αἰσθηταῖς μόναις (μετέχει γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέσα τῶν πρώτων καὶ οὐ μόνα τὰ αἰσθητά, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ διὰ τὰς ἐκ τῶν μέσων ἐμφάσεις ἀφομοιοῦται τοῖς πρώτοις)· ὀρθῶς ἄρα καὶ ὁ χρόνος αἰῶνος εἰκὼν εἴρηται καὶ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος κατά τε ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ σῶμα τοῦ αὐτοζῴου.

[Εἰ μὲν γάρ, ὡς ᾤετο Πορφύριος καί τινες ἄλλοι Πλατωνικοί, μόνα μετεῖχε τῶν ὄντως ὄντων τὰ αἰσθητά, ἐν αὐτοῖς μόνοις ἂν ἐζητοῦμεν τὰ εἰκόνας. εἰ δ', ὡς Ἀμέλιος γράφει καὶ πρὸ Ἀμελίου Νουμήνιος, μέθεξίς ἐστι κἀν τοῖς νοητοῖς, εἶεν ἂν εἰκόνες καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς. εἰ δὲ ὁ θεῖος Πλάτων οὔτε ἐν τοῖς πρωτίστοις τῶν ὄντων ἀπέθετο εἰκόνας οὔτ' ἐν μόνοις τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, νικῴη ἂν καὶ τούτοις ὁ πάντας ἐν πᾶσιν ὀλίγου δέω φάναι κρατῶν Ἰάμβλιχος ὁ τὰς μεθέξεις ἐπί τε τῶν μέσων κἀπὶ τῶν τελευταίων θεωρεῖν παρακελευόμενος.]

10 ὅλως del. Kroll. 12 ἀφωμοιῶτο D. ἀνειδέῳ S: ἀνιδέῳ QD. 17 αὗται mss: em Kroll. 21 ἀφομοιοῦνται D S.

is not absolutely an image, but one would be more correct to call this whole totality the image of Eternity; for being true Being, and having the faculty of recurring at fixed intervals, and acting as a measure, and comprehending (all other) motions as a whole, nevertheless it is said to be an image of Eternity, and would seem itself to be the first among images; for perfect Mind cannot be properly said to be an image of the First (for what could have a resemblance to the entirely formless?), while of those things below Mind and the indivisible nature Time would seem to be the first, and in general, if being an image is a characteristic of things that participate something (for the image wishes to preserve the imprint of something else prior to it, from which it receives the characteristics of the form), it follows that there is place for images neither in the sphere of the highest Beings (for they do not participate, inasmuch as they are highest—rather, they are participated by others, not coming to be in the things that participate them, but turning the participants towards them, in another way), nor solely among sensible things, (for things of a median nature also participate the primal beings, and not only the sensible realm, since sensibles are assimilated to the primal beings by means of reflections from the median beings); quite rightly, then, is Time said to be the image of Eternity, as is the whole cosmos, both in soul and body, of the Essential Living Being.

(If, on the one hand, as was the opinion of Porphyry and certain other Platonists, only sensible objects participated in the really existent, then it would be in that quarter only that we would expect to find images; if, on the other hand, as Amelius writes, and before him Numenius, there is participation also in the noetic realm, there would be images there too. But if in fact the divine Plato situated images neither in the first rank of beings nor solely in the sensible, it follows that Iamblichus prevails in this question also—as indeed he does in pretty nearly all questions—in bidding us to accept the fact of participation in the median class of beings as well as in the ultimate.)

Fr. 65

252E, III 45, 5.

<τὸ δὲ ἦν τό τε ἔσται περὶ τὴν ἐν χρόνῳ γένεσιν ἰοῦσαν πρέπει λέγεσθαι· κινήσεις γάρ ἐστον. τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχον ἀκινήτως οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον προσήκει γίγνεσθαι διὰ χρόνον οὐδὲ γενέσθαι ποτὲ οὐδὲ γεγονέναι νῦν, οὐδ' εἰσαῦθις ἔσεσθαι, τὸ παράπαν τε οὐδὲν ὅσα γένεσις τοῖς ἐν αἰσθήσει φερομένοις προσῆψεν, ἀλλὰ χρόνου ταῦτα αἰῶνα μιμουμένου καὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν κυκλουμένου γέγονεν εἴδη. 38A.>

Τρία ταῦτα προσήκει, φησί, διὰ χρόνον τῇ γενέσει, ἓν μὲν 'τὸ ἦν καὶ τὸ ἔσται', δεύτερον δὲ 'τὸ νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι καὶ πρεσβύτερον', τρίτον 'το γίγνεσθαί ποτε ἢ νῦν γεγονέναι ἢ εἰσαῦθις ἔσεσθαι'. ὧν τὸ μὲν πρῶτόν φησι ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος δρᾶν τὸν χρόνον εἰς τὴν γένεσιν ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος προελθόντα, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ὡς ἀπὸ ζωῆς ὁρμώμενον, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ὡς τῆς νοερᾶς τάξεως ἐξηρτημένον.

Fr. 66

253EF-254A, III 48, 29.

<Καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἔτι τὰ τοιάδε, τό τε γεγονὸς εἶναι γεγονὸς καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον εἶναι γιγνόμενον, τὸ γενησόμενον εἶναι γενησόμενον καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι, ὧν οὐδὲν ἀκριβὲς λέγομεν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ταχ' ἂν οὐκ [ἂν] εἴη καιρὸς πρέπων ἐν τῷ παρόντι διακριβολογεῖσθαι. 34AB.>

[Καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀφορμὴ τῆς πόλλης χρήσεως ἐντεῦθεν ἐλήφθη ποθέν· οὐ μὴν ἀκριβὲς καὶ ἐπιστημονικὸν ἔχει τι τῆς ἐπιταράξεως ταύτης ἡ μετάθεσις.] διὸ ἐπισημηνάμενος ἐφ' ὅσον ἔπρεπε τῇ παρούσῃ σκέψει φυσικωτέρᾳ οὔσῃ, περὶ τούτων ἐπιπλέον ἐξετάζειν ἄλλης εἶναί φησι πραγματείας, ὡς μὲν οἱ πόλλοι νομίζουσι τῶν ἐξηγητῶν, λογικῆς (ἐν γὰρ ταῖς λογικαῖς συνουσίαις εἰώθασι ζητεῖν, εἰ δοξαστόν ἐστι τὸ μὴ ὄν), ὡς δὲ ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος εἶπε κἀγὼ πείθομαι, θεολογικῆς· ἔν τε γὰρ τῷ Σοφιστῇ πόλυς ὁ περὶ τοῦ παντοδαπῶς μὴ ὄντος λόγος κἀν τῷ Παρμενίδῃ, ὧν δὴ καὶ τὸ σκέμμα οἰκεῖον ὁ Τίμαιος εἶναι ἀποφαίνεται, νῦν μέν, ὥσπερ τὰ πράγματα διέκρινε καὶ διέστησεν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων εἰς τε τὸ ὂν ἀεὶ καὶ εἰς τὸ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, εἰς εἰκόνα καὶ παράδειγμα, εἰς τὸ αἰώνιον καὶ τὸ ἔγχρονον, οὕτως ἐθελήσας καὶ τὰς προσρήσεις οἰκείας ἑκατέροις ἀποδοῦναι, ὡς μήτε τὰ διὰ χρόνον τῇ γενέσει προστεθέντα μεταφέρειν ἐπὶ τὰς ἁπλουστέρας καὶ θειοτέρας οὐσίας, μήτε τὰ ἐξαίρετα τῶν κρειττόνων ἀγαθὰ συναναφύρειν τοῖς ἐν κινήσει καὶ μεταβολῇ φερομένοις, τὰς δὲ βαθυτέρας τούτων ἐρεύνας τοῖς οἰκειοτέροις ἀπονέμων καίροις· εἰωθὸς γὰρ ἦν τοῦτο καὶ αὐτῷ Πλάτωνι καὶ πρὸ

13 ἀναφαίνεται D. 21 <τῷ> post αὐτῷ sugg. Diehl.

Fr. 65

These three qualities, he says, are conferred by Time on the realm of Becoming, the first 'the idea of 'was' and 'will be', the second, 'becoming younger and older', the third 'coming to be at some time or having now come to be or destined to be on another occasion'. The first of these the divine Iamblichus says Time imposes on the realm of Becoming by virtue of its procession from Being, the second, as coming forth from Life, the third, as dependent on the Intellectual Order.

Fr. 66

(And the pretext for this widespread usage arose in some such way as this; for the correction of this confusion has nothing accurate or scientific about it.) For which reason, having indicated as much as is proper to the present enquiry, which is, on the whole, concerned with physics, he says that a more detailed treatment of these questions would be matter for another treatise—a logical one, as the majority of the commentators think (for it is in lectures on logic that one customarily enquires whether the Non-Existent is the object of Opinion), or a theological one, as the divine Iamblichus declared, and as I myself believe. For in the *Sophist* there is much discussion of the Non-Existent in its several senses, and also in the *Parmenides*, to which places indeed Timaeus declares the investigation to be proper; now, however, even as he has distinguished things and separated them from one another into that which always is and that which comes to be and passes away, into image and paradigm, into the Eternal and what is in Time, even so, wishing to accord the proper epithets to either class, so as neither to transfer what is properly applied to generation in

Πλάτωνος τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις, ὃ δὴ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης διαφερόντως ἐζήλωσε, προσφόρως ταῖς προθέσεσι τῶν πραγματειῶν τὰ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν προβλήματα μεταχειρίζεσθαι.

Fr. 67

Simpl., *In Phys.* I 794, 21.

<Χρόνος δ᾽οὖν μετ᾽ οὐρανοῦ γέγονεν, ἵνα ἅμα γεννηθέντες ἅμα καὶ λυθῶσιν, ἄν ποτε λύσις τις αὐτῶν γίγνηται, καὶ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς διαιωνίας φύσεως, ἵνα ὡς ὁμοιότατος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ κατὰ δύναμιν ᾖ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δὴ παράδειγμα πάντα αἰῶνά ἐστιν ὄν, ὁ δ᾽ αὖ διὰ τέλους τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον γεγονώς τε καὶ ὢν καὶ ἐσόμενος. (38BC.)>

["Αμα δὲ περὶ τούτου καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἐνδιδομένου τῷ κόσμῳ ἐν τῷ ιʹ κεφαλαίῳ τάδε γέγραφε·]

"διὰ δὴ ταῦτα καὶ 'κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς διαιωνίας φύσεως ὁμοιότατος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ κατὰ δύναμίν' ἐστι καὶ ὁ χρόνος· καὶ προσέοικε τῷ αἰῶνι καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὁμοιότατός ἐστι κατὰ τὸ δύνατον διὰ τὴν ὁμοιομερῆ φύσιν, διὰ μιᾶς τε ἐνεργείας ἐνίσταται καὶ πρόεισι κατ᾽ αὐτὴν καὶ ὁρίζει πάντα τὰ γινόμενα ὡσαύτως, κἂν ᾖ διαφέροντα."

2 αἰωνίας mss. Plat. 3 αὐτὸς om. mss. Plat. αὐτῷ mss. Plat. cum Procl.: αὑτῷ Iambl. 7 διὰ δὴ om. E. διαιωνίας aF: δι᾽ αἰῶνος E. 8 αὑτῷ aF[2]: αὐτῷ EF[1]. 9 ὁμοιότητός E. διὰ τὴν ἀμερῆ E: διὰ τὴν ὁμοιομερῆ F: κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιομερῆ a. κατὰ

Fr. 68

Simpl., *In Phys.* I 794, 26.

<. . . . . ibid. . . . .>

[Λέγει τοίνυν περὶ τούτων καὶ ἄλλην ἀπόδειξιν τοιαύτην·]

" 'τὸ μὲν γὰρ δὴ παράδειγμα πάντα αἰῶνά ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ αὖ διὰ τέλους τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον γέγονεν, ὥστε καὶ ὢν καὶ ἐσόμενος.' ὁ τοίνυν ἐστὶν ὡς παράδειγμα ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, τοῦτο ὡς εἰκών ἐστιν ἐν τῷ γενητῷ. καὶ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐκεῖ κατ᾽ αἰῶνα, τοῦτο ἐνταῦθα κατὰ χρόνον, καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι νῦν ἤδη παρόν, τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς τῇδε κατὰ συνέχειαν

2 αἰὼν a. 5 εἶναι om. aF.

Time to substances that are simpler and more divine, nor to confuse the particular virtues of the higher orders with those which are borne around in motion and change, he has allotted deeper investigation of these matters to more suitable occasions; for this was the custom not only of Plato but before Plato of the Pythagoreans, which indeed was something that Aristotle particularly sought, to deal with the problems of philosophy in essays devoted each to a special subject.

Fr. 67

("And both about this kind of Time and about that which is projected from it into the Cosmos he has this to say, in chapter 10:)

"For these reasons Time is also 'most like as possible unto itself according to the example of the eternal nature'. And it resembles Eternity and is most like to itself as possible by reason of its uniform nature, and it presses forward through a single activity and goes forth according to it and gives definition equally to all things that come to be, even though they be different (from one another)."

Fr. 68

(And he presents another argument on the same subject, as follows:)

"'For the Paradigm exists presently throughout all Eternity, while the copy has come to be throughout all time, so that it also is and will be'. So what exists as Paradigm in the noetic sphere, exists as Image in the generated world. And what is there according to Eternity, here exists according to Time. And what is now already present in the noetic sphere according to the category of Being,

διὰ τέλους παραγίνεται. καὶ τὸ ὂν ὡσαύτως [τὸ] ἐν ταὐτῷ γεγονός τε καὶ ἐσόμενον κατὰ τοὺς τῇδε τόπους ἐκφαίνεται. καὶ τὸ ἀδιάστατον ἐκεῖ διεστηκὸς ἐνταῦθα καθορᾶται. καὶ νῦν δὴ τοῦ χρόνου γέγονε κατάδηλος ἡ μέση διπλῆ φύσις, μέση μὲν αἰῶνός τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ, διπλῆ δὲ καθόσον συνυφίσταται μὲν πρὸς τὸν κόσμον, συντάττεται δὲ πρὸς τὸν αἰῶνα, καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἡγεῖται, τῷ δὲ ἀφομοιοῦται."

[Τοιαύτη μέν τίς ἐστιν ἡ τῶν προκειμένων λέξεων τοῦ Τιμαίου σαφήνεια κατὰ τὸν θεῖον Ἰάμβλιχον.]

(cf. Pr. 254DE, III 51, 21ff.: πῶς οὖν, εἴπερ ἡ τοῦ χρόνου φύσις, ὥς φησι καὶ ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος κἀγὼ πείθομαι, μέση ἐστὶν αἰῶνος καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἡγεῖται, τῷ δὲ ἀφομοιοῦται, χρόνος οὐρανοῦ χάριν ὑπέστη·)

6 τὸ ἐν τῷ EF: τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ a: ʼτὸ] ἐν ταὐτῷ scripsi.

Fr. 69

257B, III 59, 22.

<Σώματα δὲ αὐτῶν ἑκάστων ποιήσας ὁ θεὸς ἔθηκεν εἰς τὰς περιφοράς, ἃς ἡ θατέρου περίοδος ᾔειν, ἑπτὰ οὔσας ὄντα ἑπτά, 38C.>

Τὰς δὲ περιφορὰς αὐτῶν ἆρα τοὺς ἐπικύκλους ῥητέον ἢ τὰς ἀνελιττούσας ἢ τὰς ὅλας σφαίρας, ἐν αἷς ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν ἄστρων, ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδέν, τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τὰς νοεράς, ὥσπερ ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος ὑπέλαβεν; ὡς γὰρ τὸν ὅλον ὄγκον εἴσω τῆς ψυχῆς ἐτεκτήνατο πρότερον, οὕτω καὶ νῦν τὰ ἑπτὰ σώματα ταῖς ἑπτὰ νοεραῖς ψυχαῖς ἐντίθησιν ἅμα καὶ ψυχὰς καὶ νόας αὐτοῖς ἐφιστάς. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ θατέρου περίοδος τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς τοῖς ἑπτὰ τούτοις θείοις σώμασιν ἐπιβέβηκε πολλῷ πρότερον, εἰκότως ἐπήνεγκεν ὑπομιμνήσκων τῶν εἰρημένων ἡμᾶς· 'ἃς ἡ θατέρου περίοδος περιάγει τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς'. καὶ πάλιν τοῦτο δηλούτω ῥηθὲν ἑνικῶς, ὅτι ἄσχιστός ἐστιν ἐκείνη, κἂν ἐσχίσθαι λέγηται, καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν αὐτῆς τὸ ἓν τῇ εἰς τοὺς ἑπτὰ κύκλους κατατομῇ.

2 ᾔειν a Plat.: ἦγεν A (Θ) Plat: ἵν' (γρ.) A Plat.: εἴη r Plat.: ᾔει * Ϛ Plat. 3 ἄρα mss. 11 δηλούτω <τὸ> vel δηλοῖ τὸ sugg. Diehl.

comes to be in this realm throughout all time by continuity. And the Being which is 'in the same state in the same way' manifests itself in this realm as coming to be in the past, present and future. And what is without extension there is beheld as extended here. And at this point the median, double nature of Time becomes apparent, being median as between Eternity and Heaven, and double insofar as it comes into existence together with the Cosmos, but is ranked with Eternity, and it leads the former, while it likens itself to the latter." (And such is the divine Iamblichus' elucidation of the relevant passages of the *Timaeus*.)

Fr. 69

But are their 'circuits' to be declared to be epicycles, or counteracting spheres, or the whole spheres in which each of the heavenly bodies is situated, or none of these, but rather their intellectual souls, as the divine Iamblichus assumes? For even as he previously constructed the whole mass of physical body inside the Soul, so also now he places the seven bodies inside the seven intellectual souls, at the same time setting over them souls and intellects. And since the Circuit of the Other of the Whole Soul has long before this mounted upon these seven divine bodies, he reasonably brings it in here to remind us of what has been said: 'which the Circuit of the Other of the Whole Soul leads round'. And again, let it be observed that this is put in the singular, because it is actually undivided, even though it is said to be 'split', and thus the unity of it is not destroyed in the division into seven circles.

Fr. 70

258EF-259AB, III 65, 7.

<Σελήνην μὲν εἰς τὸν περὶ γὴν πρῶτον, ἥλιον δὲ εἰς τὸν δεύτερον ὑπὲρ γῆς, ἑωσφόρον δὲ καὶ τὸν ἱερὸν Ἑρμοῦ λεγόμενον εἰς τὸν τάχει μὲν ἰσόδρομον ἡλίῳ κύκλον ἰόντα, τὴν δὲ ἐναντίαν εἰληχότα αὐτῷ δύναμιν, ὅθεν καταλαμβάνουσί τε καὶ καταλαμβάνονται κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὑπ' ἀλλήλων ἥλιός τε καὶ ὁ τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ καὶ ὁ ἑωσφόρος. 38D.>

Ὁ δέ γε θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος οὔτε τὰς τῶν ἐπικύκλων παρεισκυκλήσεις ἀποδέχεται ὡς μεμηχανημένας καὶ ἀλλοτρίως τοῦ Πλάτωνος εἰσαγομένας, οὔτε τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ζωῆς ἐπιβολὴν ὡς μάτην ὀνειροπολοῦσαν τὰς τοιαύτας διαστάσεις καὶ εἰσόδους καὶ ἐξόδους καὶ διαπλοκὰς καὶ οὐδαμῇ τῷ Πλάτωνι συνεπομένην· ποῦ γὰρ ὁ Πλάτων ἐμέρισε τὴν διὰ ζωῆς καὶ διὰ νοῦ καὶ <δι'> οὐσίας ἐπὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀναφοραν; ποῦ δὲ τὸν μὲν Κρόνον κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἔταξε, τὸν δὲ μετ' αὐτὸν κατὰ τὸν νοῦν, τὸν δὲ τρίτον κατὰ τὴν ζωήν; ταῦτα δὲ ἀποδοκιμάζων ἁπλουστέραν παραδίδωσι θεωρίαν, τὴν μὲν σελήνην πρώτην εἰς τὸν περὶ γῆν τόπον τετάχθαι λέγων ὡς φύσεως ἔχουσαν λόγον καὶ μητρὸς πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν (πάντα γὰρ αὐτῇ συντρέπεται καὶ συναύξεται μὲν αὐξανομένης, ἐλαττοῦται δὲ ἐλασσουμένης), τὸν δὲ ἥλιον ὑπὲρ σελήνην, διότι περιφανῶς τὴν σελήνην πληροῖ δυνάμεων καὶ πατρὸς ἔχει πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν λόγον, ὑπὲρ δὲ ἥλιον Ἀφροδίτην καὶ Ἑρμῆν, ἡλιακοὺς ὄντας καὶ συνδημιουργοῦντας αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τελεσιουργίαν τῶν ὅλων αὐτῷ συντελοῦντας· διὸ καὶ ἰσόδρομοι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες ἡλίῳ καὶ περὶ αὐτόν εἰσιν ὡς συγκοινωνοῦντες αὐτῷ τῆς ποιήσεως. ἐναντιοῦνται δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἐπικύκλοις [μόνον] φοράν, ὡς [εἴπομεν πρότερον καὶ] οἱ μαθηματικοί φασιν, οὐδὲ καθ' ὅσον ὃ μὲν ἐκφάνσεως τῶν κρυπτῶν ἐστιν αἴτιος, οἳ δὲ κρύψεως, ὡς οἱ ἀστρολογικοὶ διατείνονται· [καὶ διὰ ταῦτα μὲν γάρ], ἀλλὰ [καὶ] καθ' ἣν εἶπεν αὐτὸς θείαν δύναμιν, ἡ μὲν τοῦ ἡλίου θαυμαστή τίς ἐστι καὶ ἀνυπέρβλητος δύναμις καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἀσύμμετρος, αἱ δὲ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης καὶ αἱ τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ συμμετρίαν ἐπιλάμπουσαι καὶ εὐκρασίαν διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ μετὰ ἡλίου περιπολεῖν ἐναρμόνιον παρέχονται τὴν ἡλιακὴν ποίησιν· ἄμφω γὰρ κοινωνίας εἰσὶν αἴτιοι καὶ ὁ Ἑρμῆς, κοινωνὸς ὢν ἐν ταῖς ποιήσεσι τῶν τε ἡμερινῶν καὶ τῶν νυκτερινῶν καὶ ἀρρενούμενος καὶ θηλυνόμενος, καὶ ἡ Ἀφροδίτη, συνδετικὴ ἔχουσα δύναμιν καὶ συναρμοστικὴν τῶν διεστώτων.

12 κατὰ τὴν . . . ἁπλουστέραν om. D. 18 δὲ Ϛ: δὴ QD. Ἀφροδίτην καὶ Ἑρμῆν om. Q 21 συνκοινωνοῦντες QD. 27 αἱ bis mss.: fort bis. ἡ scrib. sugg. Diehl. 30 κοινὸς QDb: om. A.

Fr. 70

The divine Iamblichus, however, accepts neither this introduction of epicycles, on the grounds that they are a fabrication and that to bring them in is foreign to the spirit of Plato, nor the theory about 'Life', deeming that such a theory involves the futile dreaming-up of such intervals and entrances and exits and combinations, and is in no way consonant to Plato. For where does Plato distinguish ascents to Being through Life, through Intellect, and through Being? And where does he identify Saturn as Being, and the one after him (Jupiter), as Intellect, and the third (Mars) as Life?

Having condemned this interpretation, he gives a simpler theory, saying that the Moon has the first rank, in the area round the earth, as having the relationship of generating power and mother to the realm of Generation (for everything turns with her, growing when she grows and declining when she declines), and the Sun above the Moon, because it manifestly fills the Moon with its powers and has the relationship of Father to the realm of Generation, and above the Sun Venus and Mercury, being solar and assisting the Sun in the work of creation, and contributing with him to the completion of everything which is the reason why they keep pace with the Sun and are around him as joining with him in his work of creation. And they oppose him not (only) because of the motion of the epicycles, as (we mentioned above and) the mathematicians assert, nor insofar as the Sun is responsible for the revelation of things hidden, while they are responsible for concealment, as the astronomers and astrologers maintain (—for these reasons, indeed), but (also) by reason of the divine power which Plato himself makes mention of, the power of the Sun being something marvellous and unsurpassable, and for this reason essentially incommensurable, while the powers of Venus and Mercury, projecting symmetry and good temperature through always circling about with the Sun, render harmonious the sun's work of creation; for both of them are causes of communion, both Mercury, who associates himself

Fr. 71

268BC, III 104, 8.

<Ἧιπερ οὖν νοῦς ἐνούσας ἰδέας τῷ ὅ ἐστι ζῷον ὅσαι τε καὶ οἷαι καθορᾷ, τοσαύτας διενοήθη δεῖν καὶ τόδε σχεῖν. 39E.>

Πρὸς μὲν οὖν τούτους καὶ ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος ἱκανῶς ἀντείρηκε προστιθείς, ὅτι καὶ τὰς διακρίσεις τῶν θείων οὐ τοιαύτας ὁ Πλάτων πεποίηται, οἵας οὗτοι λέγουσιν, ἔν τε Σοφιστῇ καὶ Φιλήβῳ καὶ Παρμενίδῃ, ἀλλὰ διωρισμένους περὶ ἑκάστης ἐκεῖ τάξεως ἀποδέδωκε λόγους καὶ διεῖλε τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, χωρὶς μὲν τὴν περὶ τοῦ ἑνός, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν περὶ τοῦ ὅλου, καὶ ἐφεξῆς ὁμοίως ἑκάστην τοῖς οἰκείοις περιγράφειν ἀφορισμοῖς.

Fr. 72

275, III 118, 16.

<Τίθησί τε εἰς τὴν τοῦ κρατίστου φρόνησιν ἐκείνῳ ξυνεπόμενον, νείμας περὶ πάντα κυκλῷ τὸν οὐρανόν, κόσμον ἀληθινὸν ἐν αὐτῷ πεποικιλμένον εἶναι καθ' ὅλον. 40A.>

Ἀλλ' οὖν, ὅπερ ἐλέγομεν, ἡ ψύχωσις τῶν ἄστρων ἐντίθησι μὲν αὐτὰ ταῖς οἰκείαις ψυχαῖς, συνάπτει δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὅλην ψυχὴν τῆς ταὐτοῦ φορᾶς, ἀνάγει δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν κοσμικὴν ψυχήν, ἐνιδρύει δὲ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ παράδειγμα τὸ νοητόν, ὃ καὶ διαφερόντως ὁρῶν ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος 'τὴν τοῦ κρατίστου φρόνησιν' ἐν τῷ παραδείγματι τίθεται.

Fr. 73

282A, III 139, 2.

<Τὴν δὲ τροφὸν μὲν ἡμετέραν, ἰλλομένην δὲ περὶ τὸν διὰ παντὸς πόλον τεταμένον, φύλακα καὶ δημιουργὸν νυκτός τε καὶ ἡμέρας ἐμηχανήσατο, πρώτην καὶ πρεσβυτάτην θεῶν ὅσοι ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ γεγόνασιν. 40BC.>

Εἰ δὲ καί, ὥς φησιν ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος, 'τὸν διὰ παντὸς τεταμένον

1 ἰλλομένην D S cum. Plat.: εἰλλομένην Q: εἰλλομένην εἰλουμένην, sim. * ς Plat.

with the creation of things of both day and night, and becomes by turns male and female, and Venus, who possesses the power of binding together and harmonising things set apart or at odds.

Fr. 71

These[1] the divine Iamblichus also has sufficiently refuted, adding that Plato did not make such distinctions in the divine orders as these men claim, in the *Sophist* and the *Philebus* and the *Parmenides*, but he has given there separate accounts concerning each order and has divided the principles of exposition of each from the other, treating separately the exposition about the One, separately that about the Universe and outlining similarly in succession each following order according to its proper definitions.

[1] Amelius and Numenius. See notes.

Fr. 72

But, as we said, the 'ensouling' of the planets places them in their proper souls, and also joins them to the Whole Soul of the revolution of the Same, and causes them also to ascend to the Cosmic Soul, and establishes them, further, in the very Intellectual Paradigm itself, a fact which Iamblichus recognises with remarkable clarity when he places 'the intelligence of the supreme' in the Paradigm.

Fr. 73

But even if, as the divine Iamblichus says, we choose to understand 'the pole that is stretched through all' as the Heaven, we

πόλον' ἐπὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ θέλοιμεν ἀκούειν, οὐδὲ οὕτως ἔξω τῆς Πλάτωνος ἀποπλανησόμεθα διανοίας· ὡς γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐν Κρατύλῳ λέγει, τὸν οὐρανὸν 'πόλον' καλοῦσιν οἱ δεινοὶ περὶ ἀστρονομίαν ὡς ἐναρμονίως περιπολοῦντα.

6 *Crat.* 405 CD.

ΒΙΒΛΙΟΝ δ'

Fr. 74

290F-291AB, III 167, 32.

ΠΡΟΟΙΜΙΟΝ

Λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν θεῶν τούτων, ὧν ἐμνημόνευσεν ὁ Πλάτων, ὁποίας ἔχειν ἐννοίας προσήκει ῥητέον, διότι καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ μὲν εἰς μύθους τὸν περὶ αὐτῶν λόγον ἀνήνεγκαν, οἱ δὲ εἰς πάτρια πόλεων, οἱ δὲ εἰς φυλακ<ικ>ὰς δυνάμεις, οἱ δὲ εἰς ἠθικὰς ἀποδόσεις, οἱ δὲ εἰς ψυχάς. οὓς καὶ ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος αὐτάρκως διήλεγξεν ὡς τῆς τε τοῦ Πλάτωνος διανοίας ἁμαρτόντας καὶ τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων ἀληθείας. ῥητέον δ' οὖν τούτον τὸν τρόπον, ὅτι Πυθαγόρειος ὢν ὁ Τίμαιος ἕπεται ταῖς τῶν Πυθαγορείων ἀρχαῖς. αὗται δέ εἰσιν αἱ Ὀρφικαὶ παραδόσεις· ἃ γὰρ Ὀρφεὺς δι' ἀπορρήτων λόγων μυστικῶς παραδέδωκε, ταῦτα Πυθαγόρας ἐξέμαθεν ὀργιασθεὶς ἐν Λεβήθροις τοῖς Θρακίοις Ἀγλαοφάμῳ τελεστᾶ μεταδόντος ἣν περὶ θεῶν Ὀρφεὺς σοφίαν παρὰ Καλλιόπης τῆς μητρὸς ἐπινύσθη· ταῦτα γὰρ αὐτός φησιν ὁ Πυθαγόρας ἐν τῷ Ἱερῷ Λόγῳ.

5 φύλακας mss.: em. s. 8 τῶν om. DS. 11 ὀργισθεὶς D. λιβήθροις Iamblichi mss.: Λειβήθροις Valkenarius. 12 τελέστα mss.: τελεύτα sim. Iambl.: τελετὰς Lobeck alii. 13 πινυσθεὶς Iambl.

Fr. 75

<Γῆς τε καὶ Οὐρανοῦ παῖδες Ὠκεανὸς καὶ Τηθὺς ἐγενέσθην. 40E.>

Οἶδά γε μήν, ὅτι καὶ ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος γῆν μὲν ἀκούει τὴν τὸ μόνιμον πᾶν καὶ σταθερὸν κατά τε οὐσίαν τῶν ἐγκοσμίων θεῶν καὶ κατ' ἐνέργειαν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀίδιον περιφορὰν καὶ δυνάμεις κρείττονας καὶ ζωὰς ὅλας περιέχουσαν, οὐρανὸν δὲ τὴν προιοῦσαν ἀπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ δημιουργικὴν ἐνέργειαν ὅλην καὶ τελείαν καὶ πλήρη τῆς οἰκείας δυνάμεως καὶ περὶ τὸν δημιουργὸν ὑπάρχουσαν, ὡς ὅρον ἑαυτῆς οὖσαν καὶ τῶν ὅλων.

2 καὶ om. D.

will not even thus stray from Plato's thought; for as he himself says in the *Cratylus*, the experts in astronomy call the Heaven 'the pole' from the fact that it revolves harmoniously.

BOOK IV

Fr. 74

It remains to declare what views we should hold about these very gods of whom Plato makes mention, because among the ancients also, some relegated discussion of them to the realm of myth, others regarded them as local cult traditions, others as guarding powers, others as moral tales, others as souls. All of whom have been adequately refuted by the divine Iamblichus as misunderstanding both the thought of Plato and the true state of affairs.

One should put it this way, then, that Timaeus, being a Pythagorean, follows Pythagorean principles. And these in turn are Orphic principles; for what Orpheus taught in mystic rites through secret doctrines, this Pythagoras learned on being initiated in Lebethra in Thrace, Aglaophamus the initiator revealing to him the wisdom which Orpheus had been taught by his mother Calliope. For this Pythagoras himself states in the *Sacred Discourse*.

Fr. 75

I know, indeed, that the divine Iamblichus understands 'Earth' as that which encompasses all that is permanent and steadfast in the substance of the encosmic gods and in their activity, and in their eternal revolution, and which encompasses the greater powers and universal life-principles, and 'Heaven' as the creative activity proceeding from the Demiurge, which is whole and perfect and full of its own powers, and which subsists around the Demiurge, as being a limit for itself and for the Universe.

Fr. 76

293EF, III 177, 28.

<. . . . . ibid. . . . .>

Ὁ δὲ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος τὴν μέσην κινητικὴν αἰτίαν αὐτὸν ἀφορίζεται θείαν οὖσαν, ἧς πρώτως αἱ μέσαι ψυχαὶ καὶ ζωαὶ καὶ νοήσεις μετέχουσιν αἵ τε δραστήριοι φύσεις καὶ τὰ πνευματικὰ τῶν στοιχείων, ὥσπερ ἀήρ τε καὶ πῦρ. τὴν δὲ Τηθὺν [οἱ μὲν τὴν ὑγρὰν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν φασίν, οἱ δὲ τὴν πολυμετάβολον φύσιν, οἱ δὲ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς εὐθημοσύνην. ὁ δὲ Ἰάμβλιχος [ποιητικὴν διάθεσιν] εἶναι αὐτὴν τὴν ἐν τῷ ἐνεργεῖν δραστήριον ὑποτίθεται κατάστασιν, ἧς αἱ μόνιμοι νοήσεις καὶ ψυχαὶ καὶ φύσεις καὶ δυνάμεις μετέχουσι καὶ πρὸς τούτοις αἱ τὴν ἕδραν παρασκευάζουσαι τῶν στοιχείων στερεαί τινες χῶραι ἢ τῆς γῆς καὶ τοῦ ὕδατος.

cf. 179, 30.

Ὡς δὲ ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος παραδέδωκε, τὴν τῆς θέσεως καὶ μονίμου καταστάσεως χορηγὸν ἀφοριστέον.

5 εὐθυμοσύνην Dς. 6 <τῷ> ποιητικὴν διάθεσιν <ἔχειν> ci. Diehl, fort. recte; seclusi. αὐτήν <καὶ> τὴν ci. s. 7 φύσεις καὶ om. D. 9 καὶ mss: ἢ ci. Diehl: immo <ἢ> καί.

Fr. 77

296D, III 187, 24.

<Τούτων δὲ Φόρκυς Κρόνος τε καὶ Ῥέα καὶ ὅσοι μετὰ τούτων, 40E.>

Ὁ δὲ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος ἐπὶ ταῖς τρισὶ σφαίραις αὐτοὺς τάττει ταῖς μεταξὺ γῆς καὶ οὐρανοῦ· οἱ μὲν γὰρ πρὸ αὐτῶν διχῇ διεῖλον τὸν ὑπὸ σελήνην κόσμον, οὗτοι δὲ τριχῇ, καὶ ὁ μὲν Φόρκυς τῆς ὑγρᾶς ὅλης οὐσίας ἐξάρχει κατ' αὐτόν, πᾶσαν αὐτὴν ἀμερίστως συνέχων, ἡ δὲ Ῥέα τῶν ῥεόντων ἐστὶ καὶ ἀεροειδῶν πνευμάτων συνεκτικὴ θεός, ὁ δὲ Κρόνος τὴν ὑψηλοτάτην χώραν καὶ λεπτοτάτην κατευθύνει τοῦ αἰθέρος, μέσος παρὰ τῷ Πλάτωνι τεταγμένος, διότι τὸ μέσον ἐν τοῖς ἀσωμάτοις οὐσίαις καὶ τὸ κέντρον κυριώτερον ὑπάρχει τῶν περὶ τὸ μέσον.

[Ἐκεῖνο μὴν γινώσκειν ἄξιον, ὡς οὐ προσῆκεν ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι περὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς τάξεως, πότερον ὁ Κρόνος ἐστὶν ὑπέρτερος ἢ ὁ Φόρκυς· ἕνωσις γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐστι καὶ ὁμοιότης.] εἰ δὲ χρὴ διαιρεῖν, ἄμεινον κατὰ τὸν θεῖον Ἰάμβλιχον τάττειν, ὡς τοῦ μὲν Κρόνου μονάδος ὄντος, τῆς δὲ Ῥέας δυάδος τινὸς προκαλουμένης τὰς ἐν αὐτῷ δυνάμεις, τοῦ δὲ Φόρκυος τελεσιουργοῦντος τὴν πρόοδον, λοιπὸν δὲ τῶν ἑξῆς βασιλέων ἀπὸ τούτου τὴν ἐμφανῆ διακόσμησιν παραγόντων· ταύτην γὰρ εἰλήχασιν οὗτοι τάξιν.

15 φόρκυνος D ς.

Fr. 76

But the divine Iamblichus defines Ocean as the median moving cause, which is divine, which is participated primarily by the middle-ranking souls and lives and intellections, and by the active natures and those among the elements which have a predominance of spirit, i.e. air and fire. Tethys (some declare to be the substance of wetness itself; others, the nature that is constantly changing; others, the good order of the Universe;) Iamblichus assumes her to be the efficacious factor in activity, which is participated by the permanent intellections and souls and natures and powers, and in addition to these by those certain solid places of either land or water which provide a foundation for the elements.

As the divine Iamblichus has taught, she is to be defined as the organiser of position and permanent systematisation."

Fr. 77

The divine Iamblichus, however, relates them (Phorcys, Cronos and Rhea) to the three spheres between Earth and Heaven; for the deities before them divided in two the sublunar cosmos, but these divide it in three; and Phorcys, according to him, rules over the whole moist substance, holding it all together without division. Rhea is the goddess who holds together the fluid and aery influences. Cronos sets in order the highest and most rarefied area of the aether, ranked in the middle by Plato because the middle and the centre among immaterial essences is more dominant than what surrounds the middle."

"(For it is worth noting that we should not make an issue of the order in which these gods are given, whether Cronos is higher than Phorcys; for they are in a state of unity and equivalence). But if one must make the distinction, it is better to follow the arrangement of the divine Iamblichus, who makes Cronos a monad, Rhea a dyad calling forth the powers latent in him, and Phorcys bringing to completion the procession, and finally the kings next in rank

Fr. 78

297C, III 190, 4.

<'Εκ δὲ Κρόνου καὶ 'Ρέας Ζεὺς "Ηρα τε καὶ πάντες ὅσους ἴσμεν πάντας ἀδελφοὺς λεγομένους αὐτῶν. 40E-41A.>

Τίνες οὖν εἰσιν οὗτοι καὶ ποίαν ἔχουσι τάξιν; ὁ μὲν δὴ θεῖος 'Ιάμβλιχος τὸν Δία μὲν εἶναι τίθεται τὸν τελεσιουργὸν πασῆς τῆς γενέσεως, "Ηραν δὲ τὴν δυνάμεως αἰτίαν καὶ συνοχῆς τοῖς πᾶσι καὶ πληρώσεως καὶ ζωῆς, ἀδελφοὺς δὲ αὐτῶν τοὺς κοινωνοῦντας αὐτοῖς τῆς γενεσιουργοῦ δημιουργίας, νόας καὶ αὐτοὺς ὄντας καὶ συμπληρουμένους κατὰ τὴν ὁμοίαν ἐκείνοις τελειότητα καὶ δύναμιν.

Fr. 79

299DE, III 197, 8.

<'Επεὶ δὲ πάντες ὅσοι τε περιπολοῦσι φανερῶς καὶ ὅσοι φαίνονται θεοὶ καθ' ὅσον ἂν ἐθέλωσι, γένεσιν ἔσχον, λέγει πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁ τόδε τὸ πᾶν γεννήσας τάδε· 41A.>

Εἰσὶ δὲ ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπερκοσμίων θεῶν δυνάμεις, εἴτε ἀπὸ τῶν δώδεκα ἡγεμόνων εἴτε ἀπ' ἄλλων τινῶν καθήκουσαι, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν οὐρανίων δὲ χορῶν πρόεισί τις εἰς τὴν γένεσιν διάταξις διπλασιαζομένη, ὥς φησιν ὁ θεῖος 'Ιάμβλιχος· ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῶν εἴκοσι καὶ ἑνὸς ἡγεμόνων γενέσθαι δύο καὶ τεσσαράκοντα καθ' ἑκάστην στοιχείου λῆξιν ἡγεμονίας θεῶν γενεσιουργῶν, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἓξ καὶ τριάκοντα δεκαδαρχῶν δύο καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα προεληλυθέναι, καὶ ἄλλους ὡσαύτως θεούς, πλήθει μὲν διπλασίους τῶν οὐρανίων, δυνάμει δὲ ἀπολειπομένους.

3 <μὲν> θεῶν ci. Diehl. 7 ἑκάστου Q.

Fr. 80

306C, III 219, 5.

<Δι' ἃ καὶ ἐπείπερ γεγένησθε, ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἐστε οὐδ' ἄλυτοι τὸ πάμπαν, οὔ τι μὲν δὴ λυθήσεσθέ γε οὐδὲ τεύξεσθε θανάτου μοίρας, τῆς ἐμῆς βουλήσεως μείζονος ἔτι δεσμοῦ καὶ κυριωτέρου λαχόντες ἐκείνων, οἷς ὅτε ἐγίγνεσθε συνεδεῖσθε. 41B.>

Αὐτὴ δὲ ἡ τοῦ θανάτου μοῖρα πολλὰς πάλιν ἡμῖν ὑποφαίνει θανάτων διαφοράς· ἄλλος γὰρ ὁ θάνατος τῶν κατὰ σχέσιν λεγομένων δαιμόνων, ἄλλος ὁ τῶν μερικῶν ψυχῶν, ἄλλος δὲ τῶν ζῴων, ἄλλος ὁ τῶν ἐψυχωμένων

6 ἐμψυχωμένων mss. em. Diehl.

producing from him (Phorcys) the visible Order; for these latter have been assigned this position.

Fr. 78

Who, then, are these, and what rank do they have? The divine Iamblichus, for his part, declares Zeus to be he who brings to completion the whole realm of Becoming, Hera to be the cause of power and coherence and fulfillment and life to all things, and their 'brothers' to be those who share with them in the creation of the realm of Becoming, being themselves Minds and being completed according to the same perfection and power as they.

Fr. 79

There exist in these powers from the supracosmic gods also, whether descending from the twelve leaders or from certain others, and there comes down also from the heavenly choirs a certain order which has a doubling faculty, as the divine Iamblichus says. For from the twenty-one leaders there arise forty-two commands of creating gods according to each allotment of an element, and from the thirty-six decan-rulers there proceed seventy-two, and other gods on the same principle, double in number to the heavenly gods, but inferior in power.

Fr. 80

And this phrase 'the lot of death', again, reveals to us by implication many different kinds of death; for there is one death of those demons who are called 'relative', another of the individual

σωμάτων, ὁ μὲν μιμούμενος οἷον χιτῶνος ἀπόθεσιν, ὁ δὲ μετὰ συμπαθείας τῆς πρὸς τὸ γενητὸν πτῶσις ὢν εἰς αὐτὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὁ δὲ διάλυσις ὢν σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, ὁ δὲ στέρησις τῆς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ οὔσης τῷ σώματι ζωῆς. τούτων δὴ πάλιν ἐξῄρηνται παντελῶς οἵ τε ἐγκόσμιοι θεοὶ καὶ [οἱ δαίμονες] οἱ κατ' οὐσίαν δαίμονες, οἱ συνεπόμενοι τοῖς θεοῖς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ πρῶτος τοῦ θανάτου τρόπος ἐφαρμόσειε τούτοις, ὡς καὶ ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος παραδέδωκεν, ἄτρεπτον φυλάττων τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς δαιμόνιον γένος.

8 γενητὸν Q: θνητὸν DϚ. 11 [οἱ δαίμονες] secl. Diehl.

Fr. 81

311B, III 234, 32.

<Τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ὑμεῖς, ἀθανάτῳ θνητὸν προσυφαίνοντες, 41CD.>

Τρίτοι δὲ αὖ εἰσιν οἱ πᾶσαν φθορὰν ἀνελόντες ἀπό τε τοῦ ὀχήματος καὶ τῆς ἀλογίας καὶ εἰς ταὐτὸν ἄγοντες τήν τε τοῦ ὀχήματος διαμονὴν καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ τὸ 'θνητὸν' ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τὸ σωματοειδὲς καὶ περὶ τὴν ὕλην ἐπτοημένον καὶ ἐπιμελούμενον τῶν θνητῶν ἐξηγούμενοι, ὡς Ἰάμβλιχος οἴεται καὶ ὅσοι τούτῳ συνᾴδειν ἀξιοῦσι, καὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων τῶν θείων αὐτῷ διδόντες τὴν ὑπόστασιν, ἵνα δὴ γενόμενον ἐκ κινουμένων αἰτίων καὶ μεταβλητὸν ᾖ κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν αὐτῶν τῶν τὸν κόσμον κατευθυνόντων καὶ πάντα διαιωνίως ποιούντων.

Fr. 82

315AB, III 247, 16.

<Καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν πρότερον κρατῆρα, ἐν ᾧ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴν κεραννὺς ἔμισγε, τὰ τῶν πρόσθεν ὑπόλοιπα κατεχεῖτο μίσγων. 41D.>

Κατὰ δὲ τὸν θεῖον Ἰάμβλιχον ὁ κρατήρ ἐστιν εἷς μέν, ζῳογόνος δέ τις αἰτία περιεκτικὴ τῆς ὅλης ζωῆς καὶ συναγωγὸς αὐτῆς, ἀνέχουσα αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν δημιουργικοῖς τισι λόγοις, οἳ διὰ πάσης μὲν τῆς ζωῆς διήκουσι καὶ δι' ὅλων τῶν ψυχικῶν τάξεων, ἐν οἰκείᾳ δὲ λήξει διεκλήρωσαν ἑκάστῃ ψυχῇ μέτρα τῆς συνοχῆς πρέποντα, ταῖς μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρῶτα διὰ τῆς πρώτης κράσεως, ταῖς δὲ εἰσαῦθις συγκερασθείσαις δεύτερα· ἣν γὰρ ἔχουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλας τάξιν, τοιαύτην ἀπὸ τοῦ κρατῆρος λαγχάνουσι πρόοδον τοὺς τῆς ζωῆς ὅρους ἐκεῖθεν παραδεχόμεναι.

5 αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν Ϛ: αὐτὴν ἑαυτὴ Q: αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴ D. 9 αὖθις DϚ. 9/10 ἀπὸ. . . ὅρους om. D.

souls, another of living things, another of ensouled bodies, one being comparable to the putting off of a tunic, another, a falling of the soul into the realm of Becoming, resulting from a sympathy with it, another, the dissolution of body and soul from one another, another, the withdrawal of the life that is in the subject body.

From all these kinds of death, accordingly, the encosmic gods and the 'essential' demons who attend these gods, are entirely exempt; for not even the first mode of death is attributable to these, as the divine Iamblichus has declared, preserving the unchangeability of the race of true demons.

Fr. 81

The third class, on the other hand, are those who remove all destruction both from the vehicle and from the irrational element and combine the survival of the vehicle and that of the irrational and explain the 'mortal' in this case as referring to the element which is corporeal and which is fascinated by Matter and concerned with mortal things, as Iamblichus considers, and such as wish to agree with him, and not simply granting it (the vehicle) an existence dependent on the divine (heavenly) bodies, in order that, coming into existence from mobile causes, it also may be changeable of its own nature, but deriving it from the gods themselves, who organise the Cosmos and perform all their acts eternally.

Fr. 82

According to the divine Iamblichus, the mixing-bowl is single, a certain life-giving cause that comprehends the whole of life and gathers it together, sustaining itself with certain demiurgic reason-principles, which penetrate through all life and through all the soul-orders, and which allot to each soul within its proper sphere suitable measures of coherence, to the original souls primal measures because of their first mixture, and to those who are mixed in the second session secondary measures; for according as is their rank relative to each other, such is the procession from

Fr. 82A

316C, III 251, 21.

<. . . . . ibid. . . . .>

Ἀξιῶ δὲ τὸν θεῖον Ἰάμβλιχον καὶ εἰς ταύτην ἀποβλέπειν τοῦ Πλάτωνος τὴν λέξιν καὶ λαμβάνειν ἀπ' αὐτῆς, ὅτι τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴν ὑπέστησεν ἐκ τοῦ κράματος τῶν μέσων γενῶν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν ὑπερουράνιον· καὶ πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἰς καιρὸν ἐκείνης ἐμέμνητο τὸ πᾶν προθέμενος, ὅπου γε καὶ τοῦ χρόνου μνησθεὶς ὑπερκοσμίαν τάξιν λαχόντος ὅμως συνέταξεν αὐτὸν τῷ οὐρανῷ, 'χρόνος δ' οὖν μετ' οὐρανοῦ γέγονε' λέγων;

Fr. 83

318B, III 257, 24.

<. . . . . ibid. . . . .>

[Τὰ δὲ ἔσχατα ταῦτα προσείρηται νῦν, 'ὑπόλοιπα τῶν πρόσθεν', ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὅμοιά πώς ἐστιν αὐτοῖς καὶ ὑφειμένα παρ' ἐκεῖνα· τὸ γὰρ ὑπολειπόμενον τῷ τε ὅλῳ πάντως, οὗ μέρος ἐστίν, ὡμοίωται καὶ ὑφεῖται τοῦ τελειοτέρου καὶ προηγουμένην ἔχοντος τάξιν.] ἀμφοτέρους ἄρα ἀποδεξόμεθα, τούς τε λέγοντας, ὅτι ταῦτα κατάλοιπά ἐστι τῶν μέσων γενῶν, καὶ τὸν θεῖον Ἰάμβλιχον ἐξῃρημένην ὑπεροχὴν ἀπονέμοντα τοῖς συμπληρωτικοῖς τῶν θείων ψυχῶν γένεσιν, ὁμοῦ τήν τε ὁμοιότητα πάντων τῶν μέσων γενῶν καὶ τὴν ἐξαλλαγὴν διασῴζοντες.

Fr. 84

321A, III 266, 24.

<Καὶ ἐμβιβάσας ὡς εἰς ὄχημα τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν ἔδειξεν. 41 DE.>

Τί οὖν ἂν εἴη τὸ ὄχημα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πῶς ἐμβιβάζει τὰς ψυχὰς ὁ δημιουργὸς εἰς αὐτό; δεῖ μὲν οὖν, ὡς εἰώθασι λέγειν καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν μέγαν Ἰάμβλιχον, ὡς καὶ ἀπὸ παντὸς τοῦ αἰθέρος γονίμην ἔχοντος δύναμιν τὴν τῶν ὀχημάτων τῶν ψυχικῶν ἀπογεννωμένην σύστασιν,

4 παντὸς τοῦ Q: παντὸς D: τοῦ παντὸς S.

the mixing bowl which they are allotted, receiving thence the defining bounds of life.

Fr. 82A

But I urge the divine Iamblichus to have regard also to this text of Plato and gather from it that it is the Soul of the Universe that he has created from the mixture of the middle classes of beings, and not the supracelestial soul; and how, indeed, would this be the place to make mention of the latter, since Plato's subject here is the Universe, whereas when dealing with Time, which has a hypercosmic rank, he nevertheless links it with the Heaven, saying 'Time, at any rate, came into being with the Heaven' (38B)?

Fr. 83

(These ultimate elements are termed here 'the residue of the previous material', since they are both similar to the former and inferior in comparison to them; for the remainder in general resembles the whole of which it is a part, and is inferior to it being more perfect and having a commanding rank). We shall, then, accept both views, both those that say that these elements are the left-overs from the median classes, and the divine Iamblichus, who allots a transcendent superiority to the classes which complete the divine souls, thus preserving (on our part) both the similarity between all the median classes, and their differences.

Fr. 84

What then would the 'vehicle' of the soul be, and how does the Demiurge embark the souls on it? It must be realised, as is also the accustomed doctrine of the great Iamblichus and his school, that the substance of the soul-vehicles is produced from the aether as a whole, which has a generative power, without either the divine

οὔτε ἐλαττουμένων τῶν θείων σωμάτων οὔτε συμπεφορημένως τούτων ὑφισταμένων, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς ζωὰς τὰς θείας προϊόντων καὶ μορφουμένων τῶν μερικῶν πνευμάτων.

Fr. 85

324CD, III 277, 31.

<"Οτι γένεσις πρώτη μὲν ἔσοιτο τεταγμένη μία πᾶσιν, ἵνα μή τις ἐλαττοῖτο ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. 41E.>

Τὴν δὲ 'πρώτην γένεσιν', ἣν νῦν ὁ φιλόσοφος παραδίδωσι καὶ ἣν ὁ δημιουργὸς τοὺς εἱμαρμένους νόμους κηρύττων προαγορεύει ταῖς ψυχαῖς, τίνα ποτὲ ῥητέον; οὐ γὰρ ἁπλοῦς ὁ περὶ αὐτῆς λόγος, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος τὴν τῶν ὀχημάτων σπορὰν πρώτην γένεσιν ἀποκαλεῖ καὶ μαρτυρεῖ γε αὐτῷ τὸ ἑξῆς· ἐπήγαγε γὰρ ὡς τούτῳ συνεχὲς τὸ 'δέοι δὲ σπαρείσας αὐτάς'.

7 τοῦτο mss.: em. s.

Fr. 86

338C, III 323, 7.

<'Αλλὰ διὰ σμικρότητα ἀοράτοις, πυκνοῖς γόμφοις συντήκοντες, ἓν ἐξ ἁπάντων ἀπεργαζόμενοι σῶμα ἕκαστον, τὰς τῆς ἀθανάτου ψυχῆς περιόδους ἐνέδουν εἰς ἐπίρρυτον σῶμα καὶ ἀπόρρυτον. 43A.>

Τοὺς δὲ 'πυκνοὺς γόμφους' οἳ μὲν τὴν τῶν τριγώνων στοιχείων συνάρμοσιν ἤκουσαν, ὁ δὲ Ἰάμβλιχος τὴν τῶν φυσικῶν λόγων κοινωνίαν, ὥσπερ τὴν 'σύντηξιν' αὐτῶν τὴν δημιουργικὴν συνοχὴν καὶ ἕνωσιν.

6 σύνταξιν Q.

Fr. 87

341DE, III 334, 3.

<Καὶ δὴ τότε ἐν τῷ παρόντι πλείστην καὶ μεγίστην παραδεχόμεναι κίνησιν, μετὰ τοῦ ῥέοντος ἐνδελεχῶς ὀχετοῦ κινοῦσαι καὶ σφοδρῶς σείουσαι τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς περιόδους, τὴν μὲν ταὐτοῦ παντάπασιν ἐπέδησαν ἐναντία αὐτῇ ῥέουσαι καὶ ἐπέσχον ἄρχουσαν καὶ ἰοῦσαν, τὴν δ' αὖ θατέρου διέσεισαν, 43CD.>

[Ἡ δὲ θατέρου διασέσεισται ψευδῶν ἀναπλησθεῖσα δογμάτων· ἡ γὰρ πρὸς τὴν ἀλογίαν γειτνίασις ποιεῖ καὶ αὐτὴν εἰσδέχεσθαί τι πάθος ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκτός. ἀπὸ δὴ τούτων ὁρμώμενοι παρρησιασόμεθα πρὸς Πλωτίνον καὶ τὸν μέγαν Θεόδωρον ἀπαθές τι φυλάττοντας ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ ἀεὶ νοοῦν· δύο γὰρ κύκλους μόνον εἰς τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς παραλαβὼν ὁ

(heavenly) bodies being diminished or the vehicles being produced by a series of contributions, but the individual spirit vehicles proceeding and being given shape in accord with the life-principles of the (encosmic) gods.

Fr. 85

As for the 'first birth' which the philosopher now relates, and which the Demiurge, in announcing the laws of Fate, declares to the souls, what are we to say that it is? For more than one view is taken of it. The divine Iamblichus, for one, calls the 'sowing' (of souls) into vehicles the first birth, and admittedly what follows bears him out; for Plato added directly following on this passage the phrase 'and how it was needful that they, when *sown* . . .'.

Fr. 86

The 'numerous pegs' some take as being the fitting together of the triangular elements, but Iamblichus as the union brought about by the reason-principles of Nature, even as their 'welding together' is the conjunction and unification brought about by the processes of creation.

Fr. 87

(The Circuit of the Other is shaken up by being filled with false notions; for its proximity to the unreasoning principle causes it also to take in certain influences from without. Starting from these principles, we address ourselves frankly to Plotinus and the great Theodorus, who want to preserve in us an element that is

Πλάτων τὸν μὲν ἐπέδησε, τὸν δὲ διέσεισεν, οὐδὲ τὸν πεπεδημένον οὔτε τὸν διασεσεισμένον ἐνεργεῖν νοερῶς δυνατόν.] ὀρθῶς ἄρα καὶ ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος διαγωνίζεται πρὸς τοὺς ταῦτα οἰομένους· τί γὰρ τὸ ἁμαρτάνον ἐν ἡμῖν, ὅταν τῆς ἀλογίας κινησάσης πρὸς ἀκόλαστον φαντασίαν ἐπιδράμωμεν; ἆρ᾽ οὐχ ἡ προαίρεσις; καὶ πῶς οὐχ αὕτη; κατὰ γὰρ ταύτην διαφέρομεν τῶν φαντασθέντων προπετῶς. εἰ δὲ προαίρεσις ἁμαρτάνει, πῶς ἀναμάρτητος ἡ ψυχή; τί δὲ τὸ ποιοῦν εὐδαίμονα τὴν ὅλην ἡμῶν ζωήν; ἆρ᾽ οὐ τὸ τὸν λόγον σχεῖν τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετήν; πάντως δήπου φήσομεν. εἰ δὲ ὅταν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν κράτιστον τέλειον ᾖ, καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἡμῶν εὔδαιμον, τί κωλύει καὶ νῦν ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας εἶναι ἀνθρώπους ἅπαντας, εἰ τὸ ἀκρότατον ἡμῶν ἀεὶ νοεῖ καὶ ἀεὶ πρὸς τοῖς θείοις ἐστίν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τοῦτο, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν· εἰ δὲ μόριον ψυχῆς, εὐδαίμων καὶ ἡ λοιπή.

τίς δὲ ὁ ἡνίοχος τῆς ψυχῆς; ἆρ᾽ οὐ τὸ χαριέστατον ἡμῶν καὶ ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις κεφαλαιωδέστατον; καὶ πῶς οὐ τοῦτο ῥητέον, εἴπερ οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ πᾶσαν ἡμῶν διακυβερνῶν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ κεφαλῇ τὸν ὑπερουράνιον τόπον ὁρῶν καὶ πρὸς τὸν 'μέγαν ἡγέμονα' τῶν θεῶν ὁμοιούμενος, 'ἅρμα πτηνὸν ἐλαύνοντα' καὶ 'πρῶτον' ἡνίοχον 'ἐν οὐρανῷ πορευόμενον'; εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν ἀκρότατον ὁ ἡνίοχος, οὗτος δέ, ὡς ἐν Φαίδρῳ λέγεται, ποτὲ μὲν μετέωρος φέρεται <καὶ> αἴρει 'τὴν κεφαλὴν εἰς τὸν ἔξω τόπον', ποτὲ δὲ δύνει καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ χωλείας καὶ πτερορρυήσεως <ἀναπίμπλησι ξυνωρίδα>, δῆλον τὸ ἐκ τούτων συμβαῖνον, ὅτι τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν ἀκρότατον ἄλλοτε ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖον. [τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ὑπέμνησται διὰ πλειόνων.]

26 ss. Phaedr. 246E. 29 Phaedr. 248Ass.

20 νοεῖ καὶ ἀεὶ om. D. 24 εἴπῃ D. 25/26 τὸν. . . ὁρῶν om. Q (20): in fenestra om. D. 29/32 ποτὲ μὲν. . ἐν ἡμῖν om. Q. 29 φέρεται D. αἴρει corr. S: <καὶ> ins. Diehl. 30 καὶ τὴν S: τῆς M². 31 <ἀναπίμπλησι ξυνωρίδα> suppl. s ex. Phaedr.

Fr. 88

348C, III 356, 6.

<Τὰ δὲ πρὸ τούτων περὶ σωμάτων κατὰ μέρη τῆς γενέσεως καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς, δι᾽ ἅς τε αἰτίας καὶ προνοίας γέγονε θεῶν, τοῦ μάλιστα εἰκότως ἀντεχομένοις οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα πορευομένοις διεξιτέον. 44CD.>

Ὅταν δὲ ὅλως ἐπὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν τῶν θεῶν ἀναπέμπῃ τὴν αἰτίαν τῶν

impassible and always enjoying intellection. For Plato employs only two circles to make up the substance of the soul, and of these he ties down the one, and shakes up the other, so that it is not possible for either that which is tied down or that which is shaken up to enjoy intellectual activity.) The divine Iamblichus is quite correct, therefore, in attacking those who hold this opinion; for what element in us is it that sins, when the unreasoning principle in us is stirred, and we chase after a lawless notion? Is it not our free will? And how would it not be this? For it is by reason of this that we differ from those beings that follow impressions without reflection. If the free-will sins, then how would the soul remain sinless? And what is it that makes happy our whole life? Is it not when Reason is in possession of its proper virtue? We would surely say that it is. But if when the best part of us is perfect, then the whole of us is happy, what would prevent us all, the whole human race, from being happy at this moment, if the highest part of us is always enjoying intellection, and always turned towards the gods? If the Intellect is this highest part, that has nothing to do with the soul. If it is a part of the soul, then the rest of the soul also must be happy.

And what is the charioteer of the Soul? Is it not the most attractive, and, one might say, consummate part of us? And how can we avoid this conclusion, if indeed this is what directs our whole being and with its own head views the supracelestial sphere and is assimilated to the 'great leader' of the gods, who 'drives a winged chariot' and 'journeys through the heaven as a first' charioteer? And if the charioteer is the highest element in us, and he, as is said in the *Phaedrus*, sometimes is carried up aloft and raises 'his head into the region outside', while at other times he descends and (fills his pair) with lameness and moulting, it plainly follows that the highest element in us experiences different states at different times. (However, this subject has been discussed at greater length elsewhere).

Fr. 88

When in general he refers the cause of created beings to the

γενητῶν, ἄρρητον αὐτοις δίδωσι καὶ κρείττονα γνώσεως τὴν πρωτίστην εἰς τὸ εἶναι πάροδον. ὅθεν δή φησιν ὀρθῶς ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος, <ὡς> οὐδὲ ταῦτα συλλογίζεσθαι δυνατόν, πῶς μὲν τὸ σῶμα παράγουσιν οἱ θεοί, πῶς δὲ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ζωήν, πῶς δὲ συμπλέκουσιν ἀμφότερα ἀλληλοῖς· ταῦτα γὰρ ἄγνωστα ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει. καὶ ὅτι μὲν ἀπὸ θεῶν ὑφέστηκε πάντα, εἰς τὴν ἀγαθότητα αὐτῶν ἀποβλέποντες καὶ τὴν δύναμιν διατεινόμεθα, πῶς δὲ ἐκεῖθεν πρόεισιν, ἡμεῖς γιγνώσκειν οὐχ οἷοί τέ ἐσμεν. αἴτιον δέ, ὅτι τὸ προνοεῖν καὶ τὸ γεννᾶν ἐξαίρετόν ἐστι τῆς θείας ὑπάρξεως ἄγνωστον ἐχούσης ὑπεροχήν.

6 <ὡς> ins. Diehl. 7 ταῦτα Q: ταυτὸ D: τοῦτο Ϛ. 11 οἷόστέ D sic.: οἷον τέ b.

Fr. 89

Simpl., *In De An.* 133, 31 Hayduck. CAG XI.

<Ὅταν οὖν μεθημερινὸν ᾖ φῶς περὶ τὸ τῆς ὄψεως ῥεῦμα, τότε ἐκπῖπτον ὅμοιον πρὸς ὅμοιον, συμπαγὲς γενόμενον, ἓν σῶμα οἰκειωθὲν συνέστη κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὀμμάτων εὐθυωρίαν ὅπῃπερ ἂν ἀντερείδῃ τὸ προσπῖπτον ἔνδοθεν πρὸς ὃ τῶν ἔξω συνέπεσεν. 45C.>

Οὐ περὶ τοῦ διαφανοῦς, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ φωτὸς τοῦτο ἐπάγων καὶ πρὸς τὸν Τίμαιον ἀποτεινόμενος· παρ' ᾧ ὅπως πυρὸς εἶδος λέγεται τὸ φῶς, καὶ ὅπως τὸ μεθημερινόν τε φῶς καὶ τὸ τῆς ὄψεως ῥεῦμα συμπαγὲς γενόμενον ἓν σῶμα συνίστασθαι λέγεται, ἐκ τῶν Ἰαμβλίχου ληπτέον εἰς τὸν Τίμαιον ὑπομνημάτων.

ΒΙΒΛΙΟΝ ε'

Fr. 90

Simpl., *In Phys.* 639, 24 Diels CAG IX.

<? Τρίτον δὲ αὖ γένος ὂν τὸ τῆς χώρας ἀεί, φθορὰν οὐ προσδεχόμενον, ἕδραν δὲ παρέχον ὅσα ἔχει γένεσιν πᾶσιν, αὐτὸ δὲ μετ' ἀναισθησίας ἁπτὸν λογισμῷ τινι νόθῳ, μόγις πιστόν, πρὸς ὃ δὴ καὶ ὀνειροπολοῦμεν βλέποντες καί φαμεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί που τὸ ὂν ἅπαν ἔν τινι τόπῳ καὶ κατέχον χώραν τινά, τὸ δὲ μήτ' ἐν γῇ μήτε που κατ' οὐρανὸν οὐδὲν εἶναι. 52AB.>

[Τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ δείξω τὸν θεῖον Ἰάμβλιχον μαρτυρόμενον. καὶ οὗτος γὰρ ἐν τῷ ε' βιβλίῳ τῶν εἰς Τίμαιον ὑπομνημάτων ἐν κεφαλαίῳ δευτέρῳ τάδε γέγραφε·]

7 τῷ ε' F: τῷ ιε' E: τῷ πέμπτῳ a. εἰς τὸν Τίμαιον aF.

providence of the gods, he grants to them a first entrance into being that is indescribable and beyond knowledge. Whence the divine Iamblichus is quite right in saying that it is not possible to conclude this either, how on the one hand the gods create the body, and how the life in the body, and how then they combine each with the other. For these things are by nature incomprehensible to us. That everything takes its existence from the Gods, we firmly maintain, looking to their goodness and power, but how things proceed from them, we are not competent to comprehend. And the reason for that is that the power of providence and generation is the peculiar province of the divine level of existence, which possesses a superiority that is incomprehensible to us.

Fr. 89

It is not about transparency, but about light that he [1] is making this remark, and he is alluding to the *Timaeus*; and for a description of how in that work it is stated that light is a kind of fire, and that the daylight and the outflow of the visual ray become joined together and form one body, the reader is referred to the Commentaries of Iamblichus on the *Timaeus*.

[1] Aristotle. See Comm.

BOOK V

Fr. 90

[And I will show the divine Iamblichus bearing witness to the same point of view. In chapter 2 of Book V of his *Commentaries on the Timaeus*, he writes as follows:]

"Πᾶν σῶμα ᾗ σῶμα ὑπάρχει ἐν τόπῳ ἐστί· συμφυὴς ἄρα τοῖς σώμασιν ὁ τόπος συνυφέστηκε καὶ οὐδαμῶς ἀπεσχισμένος αὐτῶν τῆς πρώτης παρόδου εἰς τὰ ὄντα καὶ τῆς κυριωτάτης οὐσίας. εἰκότως ἄρα ὁ Τίμαιος μετ' αὐτῆς τῆς τῶν σωμάτων ἀρχῆς τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τὸν τόπον πρώτως παράγει. ὅσοι δὴ οὖν οὐκ αἰτίας συγγενῆ ποιοῦσι τὸν τόπον εἰς πέρατα ἐπιφανειῶν ἢ χωρήματα διάκενα ἢ καὶ διαστήματα ὁποιαδητιναοῦν αὐτὸν καθέλκοντες ἅμα μὲν ἀλλότρια δοξάσματα ἐφέλκονται, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀποτυγχάνουσι τῆς ὅλης τοῦ Τιμαίου προαιρέσεως, ἥτις ἀεὶ τῇ δημιουργίᾳ τὴν φύσιν συνάπτει. ἔδει τοίνυν, ὥσπερ τὰ σώματα συγγενῶς τῇ αἰτίᾳ πρώτως παρήγαγεν, οὕτως καὶ τὸν τόπον ἠρτημένον ἀπὸ τῆς αἰτίας κατιδεῖν, ᾗπερ ὁ Τίμαιος ὑφηγεῖται. καὶ ὥσπερ τὸν χρόνον ἐπειράθημεν ὁμοφυῆ πρὸς τὴν δημιουργίαν ἀποδοῦναι, οὕτω καὶ τὸν τόπον ἐξηγεῖσθαι."

[ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιβολὰς ἀποσκευαζόμενος τὰς ἔξωθεν τῶν ἐν τόπῳ τὸν τόπον ποιούσας συμφυῆ τὸν τόπον τοῖς ἐν τόπῳ φησί. καὶ προελθὼν δὲ] "τίς οὖν δόξα" [φησί,] "τὸ τέλειον καὶ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας συγγενὲς περὶ τὸν τόπον ἀφορίζεται; <ἢ> ἡ δύναμιν αὐτὸν σωματοειδῆ τιθεμένη τὴν ἀνέχουσαν τὰ σώματα καὶ διερείδουσαν καὶ πίπτοντα μὲν ἀνεγείρουσαν διασκορπιζόμενα δὲ συνάγουσαν, συμπληροῦσαν δὲ αὐτὰ ἅμα καὶ περιέχουσαν πανταχόθεν."

["Ἔοικεν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὁρισμὸν ἀποδιδόναι τοῦ τόπου 'δύναμιν' αὐτὸν 'σωματοειδῆ' λέγων συμφυῆ τῷ ἐν τόπῳ 'τὴν ἀνέχουσαν τὰ σώματα καὶ διερείδουσαν καὶ πίπτοντα μὲν ἀγείρουσαν διασκορπιζόμενα δὲ συνάγουσαν, συμπληροῦσαν δὲ αὐτὰ ἅμα καὶ περιέχουσαν πανταχόθεν.' καὶ δῆλον ὅτι, εἴπερ συμπληροῖ τὰ σώματα ὁ τόπος, οὐκ ἂν εἴη χωριστὸς τοῦ ἐν τόπῳ. περιεκτικὸς δὲ οὕτως ὡς ὁριστικός ἐστι καὶ συναγωγὸς τῶν σωμάτων.]

10 ἀπεσχιμένος, E. πρώτου F. 13 αἰτίᾳ sugg. Diels, ex συγγενῶς τῇ αἰτίᾳ inf. 13 καὶ om. a. 16 καὶ om. aF. 16/17 τὴν δημιουργίαν τῇ φύσει a. 18 πρώτως om. a. 18 χρόνον E: τόπον aF. 24 <ἢ> add a: <ἢ> addidi. 25 τὰ σώματα iteravit E.

"Every body inasmuch as it is body subsists in Space; Space therefore comes into being congenitally with bodies and in no way cut off from their first entrance into the realm of beings and their most essential existence. Reasonably, then, does Timaeus, along with the origin of existence of bodies, grant Space also its first mention. Those, therefore, who do not make Space congenital with the cause (of bodies), perverting its essence into bounds of surfaces, or void interstices, or intervals of any sort, are guilty both of dragging in alien theories and of failing to understand the general doctrine of Timaeus, which always links Nature to the activity of the Demiurge. One must, then, seeing that he produced bodies in the first instance congenitally with their cause, view Space also as linked to the cause, as Timaeus expounds. And as we attempted to make Time connatural with the creation so now we have tried to do the same with Space."

[So then, rejecting the other views which make Space something external to what is in Space, he says that Space is connatural with the things in Space. And continuing, he says:]

"What view is it, then, which gives a definition of Space which is complete and consonant with its essence? Surely that which defines it as a corporeal power which supports bodies and forces them apart and gathers them up when they fall and collects them together when they are scattered about, at once completing them and encompassing them about from all sides."

[He seems himself here to give a definition of Space, when he calls it a 'corporeal power' connatural with what is in Space 'supporting bodies and forcing them apart and gathering them up when they fall and collecting them together when they are scattered about, at once completing them and encompassing them about on all sides.' It is clear, after all, that if Space 'completes' bodies, then it would not be separable from what is in Space. It is encompassing in the sense that it bounds and gathers together bodies.]

IN PARMENIDEM

Fr. 1

Syrianus, *In Metaph.* 38, 36ff.

<Ἦ καὶ περὶ τῶνδε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἃ καὶ γελοῖα δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι, οἷον θρὶξ καὶ πηλὸς καὶ ῥύπος ἢ ἄλλο τι ἀτιμότατόν τε καὶ φαυλότατον, ἀπορεῖς εἴτε χρὴ φάναι καὶ τούτων ἑκάστου εἶδος εἶναι χωρίς, ὂν ἄλλο αὐτῶν. ἢ ὧν ἡμεῖς μεταχειριζόμεθα, εἴτε καὶ μή; 130CD.>

Ὅπερ εἰώθει παρὰ τοῖς ἀμφὶ τὸν Παρμενίδην ἀπορεῖσθαι, τοῦτο καὶ αὐτὸς ζητεῖ, τίνων ἦν ἰδέα καὶ τίνων οὔ· δι' ἀκριβείας μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς εἰς τὸν Παρμενίδην ὑπομνήμασιν Ἰαμβλίχῳ τῷ θείῳ περὶ τούτων εἴρηται· κεῖται δὲ παρὰ Πλωτίνῳ ἐν τῷ Περὶ νοῦ καὶ ἰδεῶν καὶ τοῦ ὄντος σκέμματι. ὡς δὲ δι' ἐλαχίστων εἰπεῖν ἐν τῷ πάροντι, οὔτε τῶν τεχνητῶν ἰδέας ὑποθετέον (καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀπογιγνώσκει νῦν Ἀριστοτέλης εἶναί τινα οἰκίαν παρὰ τὰς πολλὰς οἰκίας), οὔτε τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γενητῶν· τῶν δὲ ὅλων εἰδῶν τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ παντὶ κόσμῳ καὶ τῶν ἀΰλων τῆς ψυχῆς λόγων προεστάναι φαμὲν ἀΐδια παραδείγματα νοερὰ γεννητικὰ καὶ προνοητικά.

8 Plot. *Enn.* V 9. 10/11 Arist. *Metaph.* B 4, 999b 17ff.

3. ὂν ἄλλο αὖ ἢ ὧν <τι> ἡμεῖς Burnet: αὐτῶν. ἢ ὧν Plat. mss BT, et Procl. 12 δὲ ὅλων C: δ' ἐνύλων Usener. 14 γενητικά C.

Fr. 2

Procl., *In Parm.* 1054, 34ff. Cousin.

<? Εἶεν δή, φάναι· εἰ ἓν ἔστιν, ἄλλο τι οὐκ ἄν εἴη πολλὰ τὸ ἕν. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν; Οὔτε ἄρα μέρος αὐτοῦ, οὔτε ὅλον αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι. Τί δή; 137C.>

Οἱ δὲ μετὰ τούτους κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον εἰσάγοντες τὰ ὄντα, τὴν μὲν πρώτην λέγοντες εἶναι περὶ θεοῦ καὶ θεῶν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον περὶ τοῦ ἑνός, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ πασῶν τῶν θείων ἑνάδων αὐτὴν ποιεῖσθαι τὸν λόγον <· τὴν δὲ δευτέραν περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ πλάτους καὶ τῶν θεῶν τῶν?> νοητῶν· τὴν δὲ τρίτην οὐκ ἔτι περὶ ψυχῆς, ὡς οἱ πρὸ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν κρειττόνων ἡμῶν γενῶν, ἀγγέλων, δαιμόνων, ἡρώων (ταῦτα γὰρ τὰ γένη προσεχῶς ἐξηρτῆσθαι τῶν θεῶν καὶ εἶναι καὶ αὐτῶν κρείττονα

3 σχόλ. Ἰαμβλίχου δόξα. 6 Lacunam supplevi exempli gratia.

IN PARMENIDEM

Fr. 1

Aristotle is here pursuing the same question as Parmenides and his followers used to raise, namely of what things there are forms and of what there are not. The divine Iamblichus has gone into this matter in detail in his *Commentary on the Parmenides*, and Plotinus discusses it in his essay *On the Intellect and the Ideas and on Being*. To give a brief summary in the present instance, one may say that one should not postulate forms of artificial objects (Aristotle is quite right here to dismiss the notion of an (ideal) house apart from the multitude of individual houses), nor forms of individuals; but we do say that there exist in the intelligible realm eternal paradigms of all the classes of created things and of the things which belong to the universe as a whole [1] and of the immaterial reason-principles in the soul, which have produced them and keep watch over their continued existence.

[1] Such as the heavenly bodies and the four elements, presumably.

Fr. 2

The next set of commentators follow a different method of interpretation. The first hypothesis they declare to be concerned with God and the gods; for the discussion is not only about the One, but about all the divine henads. <The second will concern the intelligible realm and the> intelligible <gods;> the third not yet about the Soul, as previous commentators had declared, but about the classes of being superior to us, angels, daemons, and heroes (for these classes of being are immediately inferior to the gods and are superior even to the universal souls—this is their most

τῶν ὅλων ψυχῶν· τοῦτο δὴ τὸ παραδοξότατόν φασι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν πρὸ τῶν ψυχῶν ἐν ταῖς ὑποθέσεσι τάξιν λαβεῖν)· τὴν δὲ τετάρτην περὶ ψυχῶν τῶν λογικῶν, τὴν δὲ πέμπτην περὶ τῶν προσυφαινομένων ταῖς λογικαῖς ψυχαῖς δευτέρων ψυχῶν, τὴν δὲ ἕκτην περὶ τῶν ἐνύλων εἰδῶν καὶ πάντων τῶν σπερματικῶν λόγων, τὴν δὲ ἑβδόμην περὶ αὐτῆς λοιπὸν τῆς ὕλης, τὴν δὲ ὀγδόην περὶ τοῦ οὐρανίου σώματος, τὴν δὲ ἐννάτην περὶ τοῦ γεννητοῦ καὶ ὑπὸ σελήνην σώματος.

Fr. 2A

Dam. *Dub. et Sol.* I 151, 18ff.

<? Οὐδ' ἄρα ὄνομα ἔστιν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ λόγος οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ αἴσθησις οὐδὲ δόξα. Οὐ φαίνεται. Οὐδ' ὀνομάζεται ἄρα οὐδὲ λέγεται οὐδὲ δοξάζεται οὐδὲ γιγνώσκεται, οὐδέ τι τῶν ὄντων αὐτοῦ αἰσθάνεται. 142A.>

Ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν οὔτε δόξῃ οὔτε διανοίᾳ οὔτε νῷ τῷ ψυχικῷ οὔτε νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τῇ τοῦ νοῦ παντελεῖ περιωπῇ οὔτε τῷ ἄνθει τοῦ νοῦ αἱρετόν, οὔτε ἐπιβολῇ ὅλως, οὔτε κατὰ ἐπέρεισιν ὡρισμένην οὔτε κατὰ περίληψιν οὔτε τινὰ τοιοῦτον τρόπον ἐκεῖνο γνωστόν, συγχωρητέον ταῦτα ἀξιοῦντι τῷ μεγάλῳ Ἰαμβλίχῳ.

7 ληπτὸ F et mrg: γρ. γνωστὸν.

Fr. 2B

Dam., *Dub. et Sol.* I 147, 22ff.

<? Ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, ἆρα οἷόν τε αὐτὸ εἶναι μέν, οὐσίας δὲ μὴ μετέχειν; Οὐχ οἷόν τε. 142B.>

[Διὸ καὶ τῶν ἐνταῦθα ἕκαστον γέγονεν ἓν καὶ πολλά, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν τῇδε τῇ τάξει καὶ ἡ οὐσία καθαρὰ γέγονε γυμνωθεῖσά πῃ τοῦ ἑνός, καὶ τὰ πολλὰ αὐτόθεν ὑπέστη, πρότερον δὲ κατὰ ἔμφασιν ἦν τὸ πλῆθος ἐν τῷ ἡνωμένῳ.] ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ μένειν τὸ νοητὸν ἀπεφήνατο, ὅτι μᾶλλον ἥνωται πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ εἰδοποιεῖται ἢ κατὰ τὸ ὄν. ἀμέλει οὐδὲ διώρισταί τι ἐν αὐτῷ, οὐκ οὐσία, οὐ νοητόν, οὐκ ἄλλο οὐδέν, ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, ἐν τῷ πάντα εἶναι κατὰ συναίρεσιν· τοῦτο δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐστι καὶ τὸ ὄντως νοητόν·

πάντ' ἔστι γάρ, ἀλλὰ νοητῶς,

φησὶ τὸ λόγιον· συνάγει γὰρ εἰς ἓν πάσας ἡμῶν τὰς νοήσεις καὶ ποιεῖ

6 πρὸς ἑαυτὸ E. 7 οὐκ οὐσία] ἡ οὐσία BF Kopp. 8 ἐν τούτῳ] ἐν δὲ τούτῳ E. 9 καὶ τὸ ὄντος BF Kopp; καὶ τοῦ ὄντος E. 10 πάντων B. ἄλλα Kopp.

remarkable view, and it is for this reason that they assert that these take a prior rank to souls in the hypotheses). The fourth hypothesis is to concern rational souls, the fifth those secondary souls which are bound onto the rational souls, the sixth immanent forms and all the seminal reason-principles, the seventh, Matter itself, the eighth, the realm of the heavens, and the ninth the realm of physical creation below the Moon.

Fr. 2A

That neither by opinion, nor by discursive reasoning, nor by the intellectual element of the soul, nor by intellection accompanied by reason is the Intelligible to be comprehended, nor yet is it to be grasped by the perfect conning-tower of the intellect, nor by the flower of the intellect, nor is it knowable by a mental effort at all, neither along the lines of a definite striving, nor by a grasping, nor by any such means as this, is a proposition to which, at the insistence of the great Iamblichus, we must accede.

Fr. 2B

(And that is why each of the things in this realm is both one and many, and for this reason in this order there is also pure Substance stripped, one might say, of the One, and the Many take their origin from this same order, whereas prior to this level Multiplicity was present only as an impression in the Unified;) and for this reason Iamblichus also maintained that the Intelligible remains in the One, because it is more united to it, and takes its form from it, rather than from Being. Not indeed that there is any distinction within it, neither Substance nor Object of Intellection, nor anything else, but its being consists in this, in its being everything in aggregate; and this is its real object of intellection:

'for it is everything, but in an intelligible mode',

μίαν συνειλημμένην ἐκ πασῶν παντελῆ καὶ ἀδιάκριτον καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡνωμένην νόησιν, οἵαν τοῦ νοητοῦ ἐκείνου τὴν νόησιν εἶναι βούλεται ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος. εἰ δὲ ἐν ἄλλοις ἐνδείκνυται οὐσίαν εἶναι τὴν ἀκρότητα τῶν νοερῶν ἢ ὁ Πλάτων, ἢ ὁστισοῦν τῶν θείων ἀνδρῶν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον· ἡ γὰρ καθαρὰ οὐσία καὶ κατὰ Ἰάμβλιχον ἐν τῇδε ἀνεφάνη τάξει· εἴη δ' ἂν αὕτη ἡ νοερὰ ἀκρότης οὐσία νοερὰ οὖσα· τοῦτο δέ ἐστι διωρισμένη καθ' αὑτήν, καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ ὑπεστρωμένη ὡς ἑτέρα ἑτέρῳ κατὰ τὴν ἐκεῖ ἀναφανεῖσαν οὐσιώδη καὶ ἑνιαίαν ἑτερότητα.

12 μίαν τὴν συνειλ. E. 16 καὶ om. E. 18 ἑτέρα om. F.

Fr. 3

Dam., *Dub. et Sol.* II 53, 29ff.

<Τί οὖν; τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερον τούτων τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος, τό τε ἓν καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἆρα ἀπολείπεσθον ἢ τὸ ἓν τοῦ εἶναι μορίου ἢ τὸ ὂν τοῦ ἑνὸς μορίου; Οὐκ ἂν εἴη. 142DE.>

[Τὸ δὴ ἓν ὂν γεννήσει ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἕνα ὄντα δύο· καὶ τί διοίσει τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου; ἢ τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὸ ἓν εἰδοποιεῖται μᾶλλον, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ὂν μᾶλλον. διὸ καὶ ὠνόμασται κατὰ τὴν ἐπικράτειαν ἑκάτερον, τὸ μὲν ἕν, τὸ δὲ ὄν, καίτοι ὂν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον. καὶ γὰρ εἰ μερίζοιτο ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅλου, ἀλλ' ὅλον ἀφ' ὅλου μερίζεται, καὶ ὅλον μένει μετὰ τὸ ὅλον μέρος ἑκάτερον.] οὕτω καὶ ὁ μέγας Ἰάμβλιχος ἐνόησεν τὸ ἓν ὂν ἐν μέρει ἑκάτερον, κατὰ τὸ πάντη ἡνωμένον καὶ ἀδιάκριτον τῆς νοητῆς γεννήσεως.

Fr. 4

Dam., *Dub. et Sol.* II 112, 13ff.

<Ἀλλ' εἴπερ γε οἶμαι ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἀεί, ἕωσπερ ἂν ᾖ, ἕν γέ τι εἶναι, μηδὲν δὲ ἀδύνατον. Ἀνάγκη. 144C.>

Ἔνατον, τί τὸ 'ἕν γέ τι' σημαίνει, καὶ τὸ 'τὶ' προσκείμενον; ἆρα ὅτι ἀντίκειται τῷ οὐδὲν τὸ τὶ ὡς Πορφύριος, ἢ ὅτι τὸ τὶ δηλοῖ τὸ μεθεκτὸν ἕν; εἰ γὰρ ἓν τὸ ἀμέθεκτον, τὸ μεθεκτὸν τὶ ἕν· ἅμα γὰρ 'τί' καὶ μεθεκτόν,

3 τί mss; τὶ sugg. Ruelle. 5 ἀεὶ γὰρ mss; εἰ sugg. Westerink.

says the Oracle; for it draws together into one all our cognitions and makes of all of them gathered together one complete and undifferentiated and truly unified cognition, such as Iamblichus maintains is the cognition of that object of Intellection.

And if elsewhere Plato or any other divine man declares the summit of the intellectual world to be Substance, we need not be disturbed. For pure substance comes to manifestation in Iamblichus' view also at this level of Being; and this summit of the intellectual realm, would be a substance by virtue of being intellectual, that is to say, by being separated off by itself, and being subject to the One as one separate entity to another, by reason of the essential and unitary Otherness that is manifested there.

Fr. 3

(The One-Being will then generate from itself two One-Beings And so how will the one differ from the Other? Must it not be by reason of the fact that the one is given form rather by the One, and the other rather by Being? For this reason each of them is named according to the dominant factor in it, the one One, the other Being, although the former is also a being; and even though it is separated off from the whole, yet it is separated as a whole from a whole, and each part remains a whole subsequent to the whole). In this way the great Iamblichus also conceived of the One-Being as being in either of its components in turn, by virtue of the completely unified and undivided nature of noetic generation.

Fr. 4

The ninth problem is, what is the meaning of 'some one thing' and what is the significance of adding the word 'some'? Is it because 'something' is the opposite of 'nothing', as Porphyry proposed, or is it because 'some' is the indicator of the participated One? For if 'one' is the term for the unparticipated One, then the partici-

ὃ σημαίνει τὸ ‘τί’, ὡς ὁ φιλόσοφος Συριανός, ἢ ὡς ὁ μέγας Ἰάμβλιχος ὅτι μετὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἕκαστον τὸ τὶ ἔστιν ἕκαστον, ὥστε μετὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἓν τὸ τὶ ἕν. εἰκότως ἄρα τοῖς μορίοις τῆς οὐσίας τὰ τινὰ πρόσεστιν ἕνα ἑκάστῳ ὄντι, ἕν γέ τι ἕκαστον.

Fr. 5

Dam., *Dub. et Sol.* II 142, 9ff.

(a) <῏Αρ’ οὖν οὕτως ἔχον οὐκ αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔσται καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ; Πῶς; τῶν μερῶν που ἕκαστον ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδὲν ἐκτὸς τοῦ ὅλου. 145B.>

[Εἰ οὖν μὴ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς μέρεσιν ἡ τοῦ ὅλου νοῦ ἰδιότης, ἢ ἀκοινώνητος ἔσται πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα, ἢ μεταδώσει αὐτοῖς, οὕτως ἔχων καὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ κοινωνίας· ἢ οὖν ἐν τῷ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ὡς ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἦν ἐν ἐκείνῳ ὡς ὅλον, ἀλλ’ ὡς μέρος· ὡς δὲ ὅλον, παραλαμβάνει ὁ Παρμενίδης· ὥστε ἐν ἄλλῳ τῷ μετ’ αὐτό, ἢ ὡς ὅλον μέν, κατὰ μέθεξιν δὲ καὶ κατὰ πρόνοιαν τὴν ὡς εἰς ἄλλο καθήκουσαν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ εἰς μέρος·] ἢ μᾶλλον, ὥς φησιν ὁ μέγας Ἰάμβλιχος, ὡς μέρη μὲν εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐπέστραπται, τὸν μερισμὸν ἀνακαλούμενος· ὡς δὲ εἴδη, ἐν ἑαυτῷ τέλειος ὑπὸ τῶν δευτέρων μετέχεται χωριστῶς.

Dam., *Dub. et Sol.* II 147, 27ff.

(b) [Τρίτον καὶ δέκατον, διὰ τί μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ προσέχους συμπεράσματος τὸ ‘ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ’ κατεσκεύασεν, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ τοῦ πορρωτέρω, καὶ ὅλως διὰ τί οἱ προσεχῶς ὑπερκείμενοι μὴ πάντως παράγουσιν τοὺς μεθ’ ἑαυτούς.]

(II 130, 30ff.).

[Ἐπὶ πᾶσι τὸ τρίτον καὶ δέκατον λέγωμεν ἓν μὲν ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι θεόλογοι τὸν νοῦν τοῦτον ἀπὸ τοῦ συνοχικοῦ διακόσμου παράγουσιν· ἕτερον δὲ ὅτι ὁ τελεταρχικὸς νοῦς οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσιοποιός, ἀλλὰ τελεσιουργός, ὥστε ἄλλον μὲν διάκοσμον συμπληροῦν, μὴ εἶναι δὲ γεννήτην διακόσμου τινὸς ἀνομοειδοῦς·] τρίτον δέ, ὥς φησιν Ἰάμβλιχος, ὅτι ἥνωται ἀλλήλοις τὰ δύο αἴτια τοῦ συμπεράσματος, [ὥστε καὶ συνειλῆσθαι τοῖς συνοχεῦσι τοὺς τελετάρχας· εἴποι γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ τοῦτο, βεβαιῶν τὸν ἐκείνου λόγον] . . .

3 ἢ ἀκοινώνητος] ἡ ἀκοιν. B. 4 αὐτοῦ] αὐτοῖς B. 12 τρισκαιδέκατον BA. 16 λέγομεν B.

pated is denominated ‘some one’; for ‘some’ and ‘participated’, which is what ‘some’ signifies, are coincidental, according to the philosopher Syrianus—or, as is the view of the great Iamblichus, it is the fact that after the absolute form of each entity there is ‘a certain’ particular form, so that after the absolute One there is the particular One. It follows reasonably then that there are present to the parts of Being particular Ones, one to each being, each of these being ‘some one thing’.

Fr. 5

(a) (If then the particular nature of the whole Intellect is not in all its parts, either it will have no communication with the Others, or it will bestow itself upon them, and will be in a state of self-communication; or it will be in that which precedes it as ‘in another’, but it would then not be in it as a whole but as a part; but Parmenides takes it as being present as a whole; so that it is in what is after it as in another, either as a whole, but by participation and by exercising providence which passes as it were into another, but not into a part;) or rather, as the great Iamblichus says, as parts it is turned back towards itself, recalling into itself the division; while as forms, perfect in itself, it is participated in without contamination to itself by the entities inferior to it.

(b) (The thirteenth problem is, why he did not derive the statement ‘in itself and in another’ from the immediately previous conclusion, but from the more remote one, and in general why those entities immediately prior are not in all cases responsible for the production of their immediate inferiors.)

(On the thirteenth and final question, let us say first that the other theologians also derive this Intellect from the Order of the Maintainers; secondly, that the Intellect of the Order of Teletarchs [1] is not a cause of being but a perfecter of it, so that it may bring completion to another order, but cannot engender another order dissimilar to itself;) thirdly, as Iamblichus says, because the two premisses of this conclusion are united with each other, (even as

[1] ‘Masters of Ceremonies’, perhaps. Like the *synocheis*, an order of Chaldaean divinities.

(147, 11ff.) Τῶν περὶ τὴν λέξιν τὸ μὲν προοίμιον 'ἆρα οὖν οὕτως ἔχον' σημαίνει τὴν ἀπόδειξιν προιέναι, καθάπερ φησὶν καὶ Ἰάμβλιχος, οὐ μόνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅλου, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν προσεχῶν συμπερασμάτων ἐν οἷς τὰ πάντα μέρη τὸ ὅλον ἦν· ἔτι δὲ τὸ αὐτοπερίγραφον ἀπὸ τοῦ σχήματος, ὥστε ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ διὰ τὸ σχῆμα. καὶ μὴν τὸ τέλειον ἐκεῖθεν. τοῦτο δὲ αὔταρκες· ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἄρα. τὸ δὲ ἑαυτῷ ἀρκοῦν καὶ ἄλλῳ δύναται μεταδοῦναι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ αὐταρκείας, καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἄρα τὸ τέλειον, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦ κρείττονος ἔχοιτο ἂν τὸ τέλειον· καὶ ταύτῃ οὖν ἐν ἄλλῳ ᾗ τέλειον. ἴσως δὲ καὶ πρὸς πάντα ἀνενεκτέον τὰ πρότερα τὸ 'οὕτω δ' ἔχον', ἐπειδὴ ἀεὶ τὰ ἑξῆς ἀπὸ πάντων πρόεισι τῶν πρεσβυτέρων· τὸ δὲ 'αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ' τὴν συναίρεσιν δηλοῖ τῆς ἀντιθέσεως· οὐ γὰρ δύο τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἀλλ' ἓν τὰ δύο, καὶ μόνας ἡ δύας, καὶ τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐν ἄλλῳ, καὶ ὃ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐν ἑαυτῷ· οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσαν ἀντίθεσιν εἰς μίαν συνάγει νόησιν ὁ μέγας Ἰάμβλιχος.

27 αὐτὸ περίγραφον BA. 29 αὐτῷ mss: ἑαυτῷ conj. Ruelle. 31 ταύτης B. 32 πρὸς τὰ πάντα B. 34 αὐτῷ mss: ἑαυτῷ conj. Ruelle.

Fr. 6

Dam., *Dub. et Sol.* II 146, 3ff.

<'Ἀλλὰ μέντοι τό γε ὅλον αὖ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέρεσίν ἐστιν, οὔτε ἐν πᾶσιν οὔτε ἐν τινί. εἰ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν ἑνί· ἔν τινι γὰρ ἑνὶ μὴ ὂν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι που δύναιτο ἕν γε ἅπασιν εἶναι. 145CD.>

[Δυοδέκατον, πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν λεκτέον πῶς τὸ ἐν πᾶσιν καὶ ἐν ἑκάστῳ, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν ἑνί, οὐδὲ ἐν πᾶσιν, ἣν κινεῖ καὶ αὐτὸς σαφέστερον. II 130, 28-9].

Ὡς δὲ τὴν Ἰαμβλίχου παραθέσθαι ἐξήγησιν, ἐκεῖνος ὁ ἀνὴρ οὐδὲ εἶναί τί φησιν ἐν τοῖς ὄντως οὖσιν ὃ ἐν πᾶσι μέν, οὐκ ἐν ἑκάστῳ δέ, τὸ γὰρ 'πᾶν ἔμπλεον ἐόντος' φάναι καὶ τὸν ἐν ἔπεσι Παρμενίδην, ὡς πᾶν ὅπερ ἂν ᾖ ἐκεῖ διὰ πάντων χωροῦν, καὶ πανταχοῦ παραφαινόμενον· καὶ λέγει 'πᾶν' καλῶς. εἰ γοῦν εἴη καὶ ἀριθμὸς ἐκεῖ τις, οὐσιώδης

8 ἐὸν ἓν πλεῖον mss: emendavi, v. not. 10 πᾶς B.

the Teletarchs are involved in the Maintainers—for one may put it this way also, by way of fortifying his argument) . . .

If we turn to the text, the introductory phrase 'Is it not the case, *this being so*, that . . .' signifies that the proof proceeds, just as Iamblichus says, not only from the Whole, but also from the immediately preceding conclusions, in which the whole was declared to be the sum of the parts; and further, the quality of self-circumscribedness proceeds from the proof about shape, so that it is 'in itself and in another' also because of having shape. And indeed its perfection is from this source. This order is self-sufficient; in this way it is 'in itself'. But what is sufficient to itself is also capable of bestowing a share of its self-sufficiency on another, and thus its perfection may be said to be 'in another', since the perfect is linked to its superior; and in this way it is perfect in so far as it is in another.

And perhaps indeed the phrase 'this being so' should be related to all the preceding arguments, since in all cases the next in order proceeds from all the entities superior to itself; and the phrase 'itself in itself and in another' demonstrates the synthesis of the antithesis; for 'in itself' and 'in another' are not two states, but the two are one, and the dyad here a monad, and what is 'in itself' is 'in another'; and what is 'in another' is 'in itself'; for thus does the great Iamblichus draw the whole antithesis into one unified conception.

Fr. 6

(We must now deal with the *twelfth* problem, to wit, how that which is in all is also in each, and if not in one, then not in all, a problem which Proclus raises more clearly.)

To present the exegesis of Iamblichus, that writer says that there is no entity in the realm of true being which is in all but not in each, for the Parmenides of the poem also says that 'All is full of Being', indicating that everything which is There permeates all things, and exhibits itself everywhere. His use of 'all' is excellent. If at any rate, there is some number There, it is an essential property which is present both in the totality and in each individual;

ἐστὶν ἰδίοτης, ὁμοῦ μέν ἐν τῷ ἀθρόισματι, ὁμοῦ δὲ ἐν ἑκάστῳ οὖσα· δυοδεκαδικὴ γὰρ καὶ ἡ τῶν δώδεκα ἡγεμόνων πληθύς· καὶ αὐτὸς ἕκαστος τῷ εἴδει συνουσίωται τῆς δυοδεκάδος· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν. μήποτε δέ, ὡς ἐδείχθη ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὡς τὰ πάντα μέρη, οὕτως ἐν ἄλλῳ δείκνυται ὡς οὐκ ὂν τὰ μέρη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ μερῶν ὁλότης ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἡ δὲ πρὸ μερῶν ἐν ἄλλῳ. τὸ δὲ πρὸ μερῶν προυπάρχει ἑκάστου, ὥστε καὶ πάντων, καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐν τῷ κρείττονι, ὥς φησιν αὐτός· εἰ δὲ ἐν τῷ χείρονι κατὰ τὸ κρεῖττον, ἀπερίγραφον τὴν εἰς τὰ ἄλλα ποιεῖται πρόνοιαν καὶ ἀμέριστον καὶ ἐξῃρημένην, ὡς Ἰάμβλιχος, κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἐπιβολήν, ὡς μὲν ἐπεστραμμένων τῶν μερῶν εἰς τὸ ὅλον καὶ ὁλουμένων ἐν ἑαύτῳ, ὡς δὲ τοῦ ὅλου μὴ ἐνόντος τοῖς μέρεσιν, ἀλλὰ μερισμοῦ μόνου ὄντος, ἐν τῷ χείρονι. χείρων γὰρ ὁ μερισμὸς τῆς ἐπιστροφῆς, ἢ καὶ ὅλος οὗτος ὁ ἐπιστρεφὴς ἐν ἑαυτῷ μερισμὸς οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐν μέρει, οὐδὲ ἐν μέρεσιν· συνειλήπται γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε. οὕτω γε μὴν ἔχων οὗτος ὁ νοῦς, ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστὶν, ἢ οὐδαμοῦ· τὸ δὲ οὐδαμοῦ οὐ προσήκει αὐτῷ, πολλῶν μὲν ὄντων πρὸ αὐτοῦ, πολλῶν δὲ μετ' αὐτόν· ἐν ἄλλῳ ἄρα ἢ τῷ κρείττονι ἢ τῷ χείρονι· καὶ μήποτε (μικροῦ γάρ με τοῦτο παρῆλθεν εἰπεῖν), ὡς μὲν πρῶτος τῆς ἐξῃρημένης τῶν ἑπτὰ κόσμων ἑβδομάδος, ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ὡς δὲ τὴν συντεταγμένην ἀπογεννῶν, ἐν ἄλλῳ, καὶ ἕκαστος τῶν ἑπτὰ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. πρῶτος δὲ οὕτω διττὸς ὁ ἅπαξ ἐπέκεινα.

15 ὄντα mss: ὂν τὰ Chaignet.

Fr. 6A

Dam., *Dub. et Sol.* II 149, 25ff.

<? Οὕτω δὴ πεφυκὸς τὸ ἓν ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἑστάναι; 145E.>

Δεύτερον δέ, εἰ ἐν τῷ δημιουργῷ τὰ γένη τοῦ ὄντος ἵδρυται, ὡς ἠξίου ὁ μέγας Ἰάμβλιχος, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ὁ τούτου ὀπαδὸς Συριανός, ὡς νῦν ἱστορεῖ καὶ αὐτός, τῷ καθηγεμόνι συνέπεσθαι ὁμολογῶν, καίτοι ἄλλοθι πολλαχοῦ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ ταῦτα τιθέμενος.

for instance, the group of the twelve leading gods is itself 'duodecadic'; each individual leader is substantially united with the form of the duodecad; and the same goes for every other number.

On the other hand, though, even as it was shown to be 'in itself' as being all its parts, so it is shown to be 'in another' as not being its parts; for the totality *of* the parts is 'in itself', the totality *prior to* the parts is 'in another'. That which is prior to the parts pre-exists each thing, and so pre-exists all things, and if it is in what is superior to it, as Proclus says; . . . [1] but if it is in what is inferior to it in a superior mode, then it is exercising a providence over the Others which is uncircumscribed and undivided and transcendent (as is Iamblichus' view, as I understand it), being 'in itself' in so far as the parts are turned back towards the whole and are being given wholeness by it, while it is in its inferior in so far as the whole is not in the parts, but is merely the partition of them. For Partition is an activity inferior to Return, or rather all this partition which involves return upon itself cannot be taken to be as 'in a part' nor 'in the parts' generally. For both the parts and the whole are subsumed in such an activity. So then, this Intellect being of this nature, either it is 'in another' or nowhere. But it is hardly meaningful to say that it is nowhere, as there are many entities prior to it, and many posterior to it. So it must be 'in another' either superior of inferior to it, and more precisely—I almost forgot to say this—'in itself' as being the first element of the hebdomad which is transcendent over the seven cosmic spheres, and 'in another' as generating the hebdomad which is inherent in them, and it is each of the seven in the same manner. And in this way the Once Beyond is the first double entity.

[1] There seems to be a gap here. We should hear some consequence of the εἰ μέν clause.

Fr. 6A

The *second* question is whether the classes of Being are established in the Demiurge, as was the view of the great Iamblichus, and indeed also if his follower Syrianus, as he himself now tells us, admitting that he is following his master, although in many other contexts he places them also in the realms above the Demiurge.

Fr. 7

Dam., *Dub. et Sol.* II 152, 7ff.

<Οὕτω δὴ πεφυκὸς τὸ ἓν ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἑστάναι; 145E.>

[Τρίτον δέ, πῶς κίνησις καὶ στάσις μετὰ τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ; (II 149, 29)].

Πρὸς δὲ δὴ τὸ τρίτον λεκτέον ἓν μὲν ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ οἷον τόποι τινές εἰσιν, ὡς καὶ Ἰαμβλίχῳ δοκεῖ· τὸ δὲ κινούμενον καὶ ἑστὼς ἐν χώρᾳ τινὶ καὶ κινεῖται καὶ ἕστηκεν. δεῖ ἄρα προϋπάρχειν τοῦ ἐν τόπῳ ἢ κινουμένου ἢ ἑστῶτος αὐτὸν τὸν τόπον.

Fr. 8

Dam., *Dub. et Sol.* II 166, 20ff.

<Ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ ἕν, αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ, ἀεὶ κινεῖσθαί τε καὶ ἑστάναι. 146A.>

[Τέταρτον, διὰ τί τὸ ἀεὶ προσλαμβάνει τοῖς προδεδειγμένοις ἀναπόδεικτον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο συνάγει στάσιν καὶ κίνησιν· τίς †γάρ; (II 165, 10-11)].

Πρὸς τοίνυν τὸ τέταρτον τὸ 'ἀεί' φαμεν παράτασιν ἔχειν· ἐν παρατάσει δὲ τὸ ἵστασθαι [καὶ κινεῖσθαι] παῦλαν ἔχει κινήσεως, καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι παῦλαν τῆς στάσεως ἐνδείκνυται. ἀνάγκη ἄρα συνεῖναι τὸ ἀεὶ τῷ ἱσταμένῳ καὶ κινουμένῳ. ἔτι δὲ εἰ ὁμοῦ κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν καὶ φύσιν κινούμενόν ἐστι καὶ ἑστὼς (ἀκολουθητέον γὰρ Ἰαμβλίχῳ συναιροῦντι πᾶσαν ἀντίθεσιν εἰς ἓν οἷον εἶδος καὶ μίαν νόησιν), ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ συνεῖναι τῷ κινεῖσθαι <τὸ ἑστάναι> καὶ τῷ ἑστάναι τὸ κινεῖσθαι· ἓν γάρ τι τὸ συναμφότερον. οὐκοῦν μένει μὲν ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαι ἡ κίνησις· ἀεὶ γὰρ κινήσεται· ἡ δὲ στάσις παραταθήσεται ἐν τῷ ἑστάναι· ἀεὶ ἄρα καὶ αὕτη ἑστήξεται, ἅτε τῆς μὲν κινήσεως οὐκ ἐώσης οἷον καθεύδειν τὴν στάσιν, τῆς δὲ στάσεως οὐ συγχωρούσης ἐκστῆναι καὶ ἑαυτῆς τὴν κίνησιν. οὕτως ἄρα τῷ ἑστάναι τε καὶ κινεῖσθαι τὸ ἀεὶ συμπέφυκεν.

4 τίς γάρ non intelligo; fort. corruptum. 6 καὶ κινεῖσθαι secl. Chaignet. τὸ ἑστηκέναι mss; τὸ κινεῖσθαι sugg. Chaign. 10 post ἀνάγκη <γὰρ τὸ> inseruit Ruelle. 11 <τὸ ἑστάναι> addidi.

Fr. 7

(The *third* question is, how does it come about that Motion and Rest come after 'in itself' and 'in another'?)

On the third point, let us say first that 'in itself' and 'in another' are, as it were, parts of space, as is also the view of Iamblichus; that which moves and that which is at rest is moved and rests in some place. The existence of Space itself must then precede that of what is moved or is at rest in Space.

Fr. 8

(*Fourthly*, why does he add 'always' to the propositions previously demonstrated, without any separate proof, and by this means draw the conclusion that rest and motion inhere in the One? And what sort of rest and motion is this?)

On the fourth question, we say that the term 'always' contains the notion of extension. It is within a context of extension that 'being stationary' involves a cessation of motion, and 'moving' indicates a cessation of rest; it is thus necessary that the word 'always' should accompany what is stationary and in motion. And further, if (the One) is in motion and at rest by reason of one same form and nature (for we must follow Iamblichus' principle of combining every antithesis into one 'idea', as it were, and one notion), being at rest must always be involved in being in motion, and being in motion in being at rest; for their combination constitutes one entity. So then Motion is permanent (stationary) in the process of being in motion (for it will *always* be in motion), while Rest will be extended in its being at rest (for it in turn will *always* be at rest), inasmuch as Motion will not allow Rest to, as it were, drop off to sleep, while Rest will not permit Motion to 'jump out of its skin'. In this way, then, the notion of 'always' is essentially bound up with both being at rest and being in motion.

Fr. 9

Dam., *Dub. et Sol.* II 181, 13ff.

<Πᾶν που πρὸς ἅπαν ὧδε ἔχει, ἢ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἢ ἕτερον. ἢ ἐὰν μὴ ταὐτὸν ᾖ μηδ' ἕτερον, μέρος ἂν εἴη τούτου πρὸς ὃ οὕτως ἔχει, ἢ ὡς πρὸς μέρος ὅλον ἂν εἴη. 146B.>

[Διαπορητέον πρότερον περὶ τοῦ κανόνος ὃν προλαμβάνει τῶν ἀποδείξεων· 'πᾶν γάρ', ἔφη, 'πρὸς πᾶν ὧδε ἔχει· ἢ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἢ ἕτερον, ἤ, εἰ μηδέτερον, μέρος ἂν εἴη τούτου πρὸς ὃ οὕτως ἔχει, ἢ ὡς πρὸς μέρος ὅλον ἂν εἴη.' (II 178, 9-12)].

[Εἶτα οὐδέ ἐστι μονοειδῶς οὔτε ταὐτὸν εὑρεῖν οὔτε ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ πᾶν πρὸς πᾶν πῇ ταὐτὸν καὶ πῇ ἕτερόν ἐστι.] διὸ καὶ ὁ μέγας Ἰάμβλιχος ἀξιοῖ τελείαν εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντων διαίρεσιν, ἢ ταὐτὸν εἶναι ἢ ἕτερον πᾶν πρὸς πᾶν, ἀλλ' ὁμῶς προσκεῖσθαι ἢ ὅλον πρὸς μέρος ἢ μέρος πρὸς ὅλον ἐξ ὑποθέσεώς φησιν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον οἰηθείη τις, ὅλον οἰήσεται πρὸς μέρος, καὶ μέρος πρὸς ὅλον, ὅ πάλιν ἐστὶ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἕτερον· πῇ γὰρ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἕτερον τὸ ὅλον καὶ μέρος· ὥστε τοῦτο μόνον διαιρεῖν κατὰ ἀλήθειαν τὸν Παρμενίδην, τὸ πᾶν πρὸς πᾶν ἢ ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον.

Fr. 10

Dam., *Dub. et Sol.* II 173, 20ff.

<Ἕτερον ἄρα ἂν εἴη τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων. Ἕτερον. 146 D.>

[Ἕκτον, πῶς ἡ πρὸς ἄλλα ἑτερότης κρείττων τῆς ὁμοταγοῦς ταυτότητος, εἴπερ ἀεὶ ἡ ταυτότης κρείττων τῆς ἑτερότητος; (II 169, 17-18)]

Τάχα δὲ καὶ ἐνταῦθα κράτιστον παραλαβεῖν τὸν Ἰαμβλίχου λόγον· ὡς γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ὅλον ἐν ἄλλῳ ἦν ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς, κατὰ δὲ τὰ μέρη ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οὕτω καὶ ὁ τρίτος κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἑτερότητα ἧττόν ἐστι δημιουργός, καὶ ταύτῃ τῶν ἄλλων ἕτερος, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ὑπερπλήρη ταυτότητα προτείνει ἑαυτὸν εἰς κοινωνίαν τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ γίγνεται αὐτοῖς ὁ αὐτός. ἔσται ἄρα ἡ μὲν πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ταυτότης ἔγγονος τῆς πρὸς ἑαυτόν, ἡ δὲ ἑτερότης τῆς ἑτερότητος, εἰ καὶ ἀνάπαλιν ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν. ὅσον τε γὰρ ὑπερανέχει τῆς ὕλης, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἐπ' αὐτὴν χωρεῖ ἀκωλύτως καὶ

Fr. 9

(We must enquire *first* about the rule which he prefixes to the proofs: 'Everything', he says, 'is in this relation to everything else: it is either the same or different, or, if neither, then it would have to be a part of that to which it is related, or conversely a whole, in relation to a part'.)

(Further, one does not find that sameness and difference are simple and absolute relations, but everything in relation to everything else is in a way different and in a way the same.) And it is for the reason that the great Iamblichus declares that this division is complete for all cases—but nevertheless, he says, the whole-part and part-whole relation was added to complete the argument. That is to say, if someone does not consider something to be either the same or different, then he will consider it as being a whole in relation to a part, or a part in relation to a whole, and that is in turn equivalent to being the same or different; for the whole-part relation involves *in some respect* sameness and difference; so that the real distinction which Parmenides is making here is that everything in relation to everything else is either the same or different.

Fr. 10

(*Sixthly*, how comes it that Otherness from the Others is made superior to its co-ordinate Sameness, in view of the fact that Sameness is always superior to Otherness?)

Perhaps here also it is best to adopt the argument of Iamblichus; for even as *qua* whole the Primal Intellect was 'in another', while *qua* parts it was 'in itself', so the Tertiary Intellect in respect of its own Otherness is that much the less a Demiurge, and by virtue of this it is other than the Others, while by virtue of its overflowing Sameness it extends itself towards communion with the Others, and becomes the same as them. So its sameness with the Others is

ἀφέτως, ὅσον τε πρόεισιν εἰς μερισμόν, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἐκφανοῦς προσδεῖται τῆς χωριζούσης καὶ ἀνεχούσης ἑτερότητος.

Fr. 11

Dam., *Dub. et Sol.* II 186, 22ff.

<Ἆρ' οὖν τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ μέρος ἐστίν; Οὐδαμῶς. Οὐδ' ἄρα ὡς πρὸς μέρος αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ὅλον ἂν εἴη, πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μέρος ὄν. Οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε. Ἀλλ' ἆρα ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἑνὸς τὸ ἕν; Οὐ δῆτα. Οὐδ' ἄρα ἑαυτοῦ γε ἕτερον ἂν εἴη. Οὐ μέντοι. Εἰ οὖν μήτε ἕτερον μήτε ὅλον μήτε μέρος αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐστιν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἤδη ταὐτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ; 146BC.>

Πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὅλον καὶ μέρη; ὅ τι φησὶν ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος, ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ προαποδεδειγμένα, νῦν δὲ ἀναιρεῖται ὅλον καὶ μέρη, ἀλλ' ἅττα; ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὅλον ἕτερον τῶν μερῶν ὡς κεχωρισμένον, ἐνταῦθα δὲ συγκέχυται πρὸς τὰ μέρη καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, καὶ τὰ μέρη τὸ ὅλον εἶναι δοκεῖ. διὸ ταῦτα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀπέφησεν, ὡς προσήκοντα μᾶλλον τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ αἰσθητοῖς.

5 ὅ τι Ruelle: ὅτι mss. 6 ἐν αὐτῷ] ἐν ἑαυτῷ B. 9 δοκεῖ Ruelle: δοκεῖν mss.

Fr. 12

Dam., *Dub. et Sol.* II 247, 15ff.

<Ἔτι δὴ τὸ τρίτον λέγωμεν. 155E.>

Λείπεται δὴ [ἢ] περὶ τῶν ἀεὶ θεοῖς ἑπομένων εἶναι τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, κατὰ τὸν μέγαν Ἰάμβλιχον. ἔστιν γὰρ αὕτη πιθανωτάτη πασῶν τῶν παλαίων ἐξηγήσεων καὶ πολλὰς ἔχουσα πρὸς πίστιν ἀφορμὰς ἐκ τῶν ἐν Συμποσίῳ δαιμονίων συμπερασμάτων.

2 ἢ secl. Ruelle.

an offspring of its sameness with itself, and its otherness from them an offspring of its otherness from itself, even though we may also correctly conclude the converse. For the more it rises superior to Matter, the more freely and unrestrainedly it enters upon it, and the further it proceeds into fragmentation, the more plainly it requires that Otherness which would separate it off and bear it upwards.

Fr. 11

How, then, is it that 'whole and part' are not among these? As Iamblichus says, those attributes which were previously demonstrated are still in it, but now whole and part are removed from it. But what kind of whole and part? In that realm, the whole is different from its parts as being separate from them, whereas in this world it is blended with its parts and has its being in them, and the whole indeed seems to be the parts. For this reason he denied these of the One, as being more proper to the Others and the world of sense.

Fr. 12

There remains the view that the Hypothesis describes those beings which are in constant attendance upon the Gods, which is the view of the great Iamblichus. For this is the most persuasive of all the ancient explanations and derives a great deal of plausibility from the remarkable conclusions laid down in the *Symposium*.

Fr. 13

Dam., *Dub. et Sol.* II 256, 22ff.

<Ἆρ᾽ οὖν, ὅτε μετέχει, οἷόν τε ἔσται τότε μὴ μετέχειν, ἢ ὅτε μὴ μετέχει μετέχειν; Οὐχ οἷόν τε. Ἐν ἄλλῳ ἄρα χρόνῳ μετέχει καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὐ μετέχει· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μόνως τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοι τε καὶ οὐ μετέχοι. Ὀρθῶς. 155E.>

Τὸ δὲ ἡμέτερον ἓν πρὸς ταῦτα νῦν ὑποκεῖται ἀλλοιούμενον· εἰ δέ τι καὶ τῶν κρειττόνων γενῶν πάσχει τινὰ κάθοδον καὶ ἄνοδον ἁμωσγέπως (ἤδη γάρ τοι καὶ τοιοῦτον ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος ἐν τούτοις αὐτοῖς ὑποτίθεται), ἀλλ᾽ ἐκπρεπέστατον τὸ πάθος ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέραις ψυχαῖς.

6 ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς BA.

Fr. 14

Dam., *Dub. et Sol.* II 286, 15ff.

<Οὕτω δὴ τὸ ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, πάντα τέ ἐστι τὸ ἓν καὶ οὐδὲ ἕν ἐστι καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως. 160B.>

[Ἕκτον, διὰ τί ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὐ προστίθησιν τὰ ὁμοῦ καταφατικὰ καὶ ἀποφατικὰ συμπεράσματα πρός τε ἑαυτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἕν;

[Ἀλλὰ δὴ τὸ ἕκτον, τίνος εἵνεκα οὐ συνήγαγεν ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑνός, τί ἅμα συμβαίνει καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει; ἆρα ὅτι ἐπὶ τοῦ συνθέτου συνήχθη ἂν ταῦτα, τὸ δὲ σύνθετον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν δεῖ ἄρα συνθεῖναι ἑκατέραν εἰς μίαν; τὸ δὲ συνθεῖναι τὴν τοῦ συνθέτου ἐνδείκνυται φύσιν· διόπερ αὐτὸς οὐ συνέθηκεν, ἄλλως τέ φησιν, 'καὶ οὐκ ἀρχὴ τὸ σύνθετον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ ἀρχῆς. ὁ δὲ διάλογός ἐστιν περὶ ἀρχῶν'.] ἢ πρὸς τοῦτό γε ἀντιτίθεμεν τὸν μέγαν Ἰάμβλιχον εὖ λέγοντα καὶ τὸ σύνθετον εἶναι ἀρχήν, οἷον τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα ἀρχὴ τῶν ζῴων καὶ τοῦ ὑποσελήνου παντός, καὶ αἱ σφαῖραι τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ὁ οὐρανὸς ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία τῆς γενέσεως.

5 ἕνεκα B. 7 συνήχθη - 8 συνθέτου om. B. 8 δεῖν ἄρα mss. ex δεῖ ἄρα 7?; τὸ δὲ scripsi. 10 περὶ] ἀπὸ B.

Fr. 13

The One in us is agreed to suffer alteration in these respects; but even if there is some type of descent and ascent experienced by the superior classes of being (for it is just some such activity that the divine Iamblichus postulates in this very passage), nevertheless this experience is most manifest in the case of our souls.

Fr. 14

(*Sixthly*, why does he not add, in the case of the Others, the simultaneously positive and negative conclusions with respect to themselves and to the One?)

(But as to the sixth question, why did he not draw the conclusion in relation to the Others, as in relation to the One, as to what both is and is not the case? Is it that these conclusions would have been drawn in the case of a composite entity, the composite entity being a combination of both elements, so that one must combine each into one; and this act of combination reveals the nature of the composite. For this reason Proclus does not make the combination, but says, on the contrary, 'The Composite is not a principle, but rather comes from a principle; the dialogue, however, is about Principles.') To this point of view we oppose the great Iamblichus, who well says that the Composite *is* a principle; for example, the four elements are the principle of living things and the whole sublunar creation, and the heavenly spheres and the Heaven are a principle and cause of generation.

COMMENTARY

IN ALCIBIADEM

Fr. 1

For a discussion of Iamblichus' order of the dialogues, I refer the reader to the *Comm. ad In Tim.* Fr. 1. The *Alcibiades* takes first place in a course of Platonic philosophy by reason of the fact that it concerns the knowledge of the self.

Proclus' elaboration of this probably reproduces the substance of Iamblichus' doctrine, so that it is perhaps worth summarising here.

(1) The starting-point for study of the dialogues of Plato, as for all philosophical enquiry, is a knowledge of our own being. This will enable us properly to understand our own good. (1, 3-4, 2).

(2) Since there are many grades of being, and so of good, from gods down to men, we must consider to what class of being man belongs, whether to those whose being is undivided and eternal (pure minds), or those which come to be in Time and are composite or dissoluble (bodies), or those intermediate between these, which are composite and existing in Time, but indissoluble (souls). (4, 3-18).

(3) The Delphic Oracle also exhorts us to begin by seeking to 'know ourselves', and this is preeminently the subject of the *Alcibiades*. Previous commentators are wrong in seeing any other subject for it. (4, 14-8, 12).

(4) The dialogue proceeds by various devices—exhortation, dissuasion, refutation, elicitation, praise and blame—first to cleanse us of false assumptions of knowledge, then to demonstrate our true nature and our proper good, even as the Mysteries first employ purification, before permitting the devoted to experience the secret rites. (8, 13-9, 15).

I would give this the status of a probable conjecture as to how Iamblichus began his commentary. We can see from the *Timaeus-Commentary* and from the summary of his views on the *Sophist* the emphasis he placed on the unity of the *skopos* of each dialogue and the proper allegorical interpretation of the characters, so it is very probable that some such statements were made in this case, and merely elaborated by Syrianus and Proclus.

The immediate occasion for Proclus' introduction of Iamblichus here 'καί μοι δοκεῖ καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν . . .' is presumably Proclus' own formulation, but it may yet represent Iamblichus' views; 'καί μοι δοκεῖ' need not mean that Proclus had no evidence to go on in coming to his conclusion. I give the preceding passage, therefore (11, 3-11):

ἀρχὴ δέ ἐστιν οὗτος ὁ διάλογος ἁπάσης φιλοσοφίας, ὥσπερ δὴ καὶ ἡ ἑαυτῶν γνῶσις· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλῶν μέν ἐστι λογικῶν ἐν αὐτῷ θεωρημάτων κατεσπαρμένη παράδοσις, πολλῶν δὲ ἠθικῶν καὶ τῶν πρὸς ὅλην ἡμῖν τὴν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας ἐπίσκεψιν συντελούντων ἀνακάθαρσις, πολλῶν δὲ εἰς φυσιολογίαν ἢ καὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν θείων ἀλήθειαν ἡμᾶς ποδηγούντων δογμάτων ὑποτύπωσις, ἵν' ὥσπερ ἐν <τύπῳ> τούτῳ τῷ διαλόγῳ πάσης φιλοσοφίας ἡ κοινὴ καὶ μία καὶ ὁλοσχερὴς ὑπογραφὴ περιλαμβάνηται δι' αὐτῆς τῆς πρώτης ἡμῖν εἰς ἑαυτοὺς ἐπιστροφῆς ἀναφαινομένη.

We may compare with this Iamblichus' division of his chosen set of dialogues into *ethical*, *logical*, *physical* and *theological*, given in *Anon. Proleg.* 26 (see diagram in Intro. to Westerink's ed. p. XL). This division concerns the middle eight dialogues; The *Alcibiades*, as the introduction to the sequence, will contain samples of all these types of virtue.

Fr. 2

We have here a fairly typical situation in Proclus' commentaries. Nowhere does he explicitly quote his predecessors *verbatim*; he prefers to absorb them into the seamless web of his prose. However, we have here a situation in which a division of the dialogue is attributed to Iamblichus (though Proclus does not explicitly say so, we may assume Iamblichus to be the author of this division), and then a series of reasons are given for the correctness of the division. These are not attributed to Iamblichus, but we must ask ourselves: (1) Do we imagine that Iamblichus gave *no* reasons for his division; (2) Do we imagine that Proclus' reasons are entirely different from those of Iamblichus? If the answers to both these questions are in the negative, as they surely must be, we are driven to the conclusion that the whole following explanation is Iamblichean *in substance*. Further than that we cannot go. My views on Proclus' methods of quotation have been set out in the Introduction,

Ch. 3, but I feel it no harm to mention them again in connexion with a specific instance. This situation will recur frequently, even in the fragments immediately following.

We have here, then, Iamblichus' division of the dialogue, based upon his principle that all parts must conform to the basic *skopos* so as to form a coherent whole.

The divisions of the dialogue on this scheme are as follows:

I 106C-119A.
II 119A-124A.
III 124A-135D.

The extant portion of Proclus' *Commentary* only runs to 116AB, still within the first division. Olympiodorus' *Commentary* covers the whole dialogue, but no references to Iamblichus are preserved beyond 115A (Fr. 8). Olympiodorus observes this triple division, and gives a useful introductory discussion of each part, which may owe a certain amount to Iamblichus.

The first part (for which, we may note, Proclus uses the term κεφάλαιον), employs a variety of syllogistic arguments to do away with obstacles to knowledge existing in the reason as a result of γένεσις, the process of coming to birth.

The second part is that in which Socrates is persuading Alcibiades not to be content with natural advantages, but to improve on them by training and self-discipline.

The third part, beginning 124A 7 'ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε, ἐμοὶ πειθόμενος καὶ τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς γράμματι, γνῶθι σαυτόν,' comes to the essence of the dialogue's purpose, the maieutic revelation of our true nature and of the ways of discovering it.

Fr. 3

This is all that we can securely claim for Iamblichus from the exegesis of this lemma. However, there is much more that may be suspected of being Iamblichean.

Proclus begins his exegesis (18, 13) with a statement of theory which we know from the *Timaeus Commentary* (Fr. 7) to have been Iamblichean, (ἀλλ' ὡς εἰώθαμεν τὰ πρὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων τοῖς διαλόγοις ἀνάγειν εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν τοῖς διαλόγοις σκοπόν, in an Iamblichean context). Following 'οἱ ἡμέτεροι καθηγεμόνες' (probably simply a plural circumlocution for Syrianus), Proclus states the principle:

τὰ προοίμια τῶν Πλατωνικῶν διαλόγων συνᾴδει πρὸς τοὺς ὅλους αὐτῶν σκοπούς, καὶ οὔτε δραματικῆς ἕνεκα ψυχαγωγίας μεμηχάνηται τῷ Πλάτωνι . . . οὔτε ἱστορίας στοχάζεται μόνης, ὥσπερ τινὲς ὑπειλήφασιν·

These τινές will be the Middle Platonists, as we may judge from the *Timaeus Commentary* (see *Comm. in Tim.* Fr. 25, and my note *ad loc.*).

The meaning wrung from the simple address 'ὦ παῖ Κλεινίου' is a good example of Iamblichus' method of exegesis. 'True love', that is, love of knowledge or wisdom, is accorded three epithets which we may take with reasonable probability as being Iamblichean:

(1) ἀρρενωπόν, being used here in a curious metaphysical sense, since Iamblichus is presumably referring to the ordering and 'epistrophic' force of the male principle. The term is used frequently by Proclus (e.g. *In Remp.* I 256, 11 Kroll, *In Tim.* I 220, 27), its opposite being θηλυπρεπές.

(2) ἐγηγερμένον is used at two other points in Proclus' *Commentary on the Alcibiades* (42, 6; 122, 6) to signify 'open to influence from above':

(i) ὁ Σωκράτης . . . εἰς ὑποδοχὴν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ συνουσίας ἑώρα τὸν ἐρώμενον ἐγηγερμένον.

(ii) τῶν μὲν τελεσιουργῶν αἰτίων πρόχειρον ἐχόντων τὴν μετάδοσιν, τῶν δὲ μεταληψομένων ἐγηγερμένων πρὸς τὴν μέθεξιν.

I do not find the perfect participle in Iamblichus, but ἐγείρω is used a number of times with this 'paracletic' force, e.g. *De Myst.* I 15: 46, τὸ θεῖον ἐν ἡμῖν . . . ἐγείρεται . . . ἐν ταῖς εὐχαῖς, and *Protr.* ch. XXI, p. 117, 25 Pistelli, of one of the Pythagorean Symbols.

(3) δραστήριον is a term much used in describing the power of daemons and other spiritual beings in influencing events on earth (e.g. Procl. *In Alc.* 72, 1; 85, 5; *In Tim.* 213, 6 and 9 (of Prayer)). This epithet is used by Iamblichus in *De Myst.* II 3: *72* & *74* in connexion with archangels, and in V 6: *206* of sacrifices, and in *In Tim.* Frr. 17 and 76 of Tethys, if the language can be claimed for Iamblichus.

Fr. 4

A typically Neoplatonic distinction. It gives Iamblichus an excuse to distinguish the οὐσίαι (ὑπάρξεις), δυνάμεις and ἐνέργειαι

of daemons, and of other spiritual forces, including the Soul. In the case of the Soul, he follows this division very firmly in his *De Anima*, discussing first the *essence* (ss. 1-8, my ed.), then the *powers* (ss. 9-15), then the *activities* (ss. 16-24). This threefold distinction can be derived, for the Soul, from Ar. *De An.* II 2-4, but it has become here a general metaphysical principle, applicable to all superior beings (cf. the elaborate distinctions in *De Myst.* II, (ss. 67ff.) covering gods, angels, daemons and heroes, quoted in Intro. pp. 49 ff.). As a scholastic distinction, it seems to go back to Middle Platonism. Tertullian, for instance, makes a fairly clear distinction, in his *De Anima*, ch. 14, between the nature of the soul, which he has just discussed (5-13), and its '*vires et efficaciae et operae*' (14, 3). But the more elaborate applications of it seem not to appear before Iamblichus.[1]

l. 8. τοῖς μὴ τελέως ἐκκεκαθαρμένοις . . . A characteristically Iamblichean remark. It requires κάθαρσις by means of special rites to attain to the highest knowledge. The τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς which undergoes purification is no doubt a development of τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα of Plat. *Rep.* VII (533 d 2), but it is a curious phrase. It must refer to that part of the soul which is *as it were* its mind, that is to say, its highest part, which could also be termed its 'eye', by which it perceives the highest level of truth. Iamblichus refers to this 'eye' also in *Comm. in Tim.* Fr. 5, in connexion with the Pythagorean system of education:

ἔπειθ' οὑτωσί μετὰ τὴν ἀνακίνησιν τῆς ψυχικῆς νοήσεως καὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄμματος διακάθαρσιν προσφέρειν τὴν ὅλην τῶν προκειμένων σκεμμάτων ἐπιστήμην.

The emphasis on purification has a Chaddaean ring, as has the term ὕπαρξις, and the description of 'powers' as μητέρες of 'activities'.

Fr. 5

Here we are faced with a typical consequence of Proclus' method of composition. It is plain that Iamblichus, and Syrianus using Iamblichus, cannot have enunciated this triadic 'solution' to the

[1] Hermeias uses the distinction in his *Phaedrus Commentary*, using the lemma ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος, 245C for a discussion of the soul's οὐσία, περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς, 246A, for a discussion of its δυνάμεις, and the lemma πῇ δὴ οὖν θνητόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον, 246B, for the discussion of its ἐνέργειαι (*In Phaedr.* 129, 18ff.). This plan is probably Iamblichean.

aporia without some explanation of the three elements which they state. The suspicion that Proclus is in fact relaying their explanation is confirmed by the final sentence:

'ταῦτα μοι δοκεῖ καὶ τῷ Πλάτωνι σύμφωνα καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐξηγητῶν εἰρῆσθαι πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀπορίας λύσιν', οἱ ἐξηγηταί being Iamblichus and Syrianus.

But the question remains, how much has Proclus himself added by way of amplification? This is difficult enough to decide by itself, but we must also ask, what has Syrianus added to Iamblichus? I prefer to put everything after the initial statement in brackets, but I believe that an Iamblichean core can reasonably be extracted from it—approximately the following [1]:

(C) The young man is in fact improved.

(1) "We know from the *Symposium* that Alcibiades felt the force of Socrates' influence and arguments." This seems a basic point to make. Probably Iamblichean, although not perhaps put at such length.

(2) "If Alcibiades was not completely reformed, we must blame his own inadequacy of character, not Socrates' lack of power." This is an application of Iamblichus' doctrine of grace, according to which the benefits to be derived from the gods are not dependent on any variability or caprice on their part, but on the ἐπιτηδειότης πρὸς ὑποδοχήν of the recipient.

(A) "The higher beings look at things in a larger context than we can. They can survey whole cycles of lives, and it is possible that in the long run Alcibiades was improved."

It is possible that the passage beginning 'καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐκεῖνα ῥητέον πρὸς τήνδε τὴν ζήτησιν . . .' is Proclus' own distinctive contribution. Certainly it begins in a way characteristic of such contributions.

(B) "In acting with good intent, Socrates has achieved his καθῆκον.[2] It is not necessary that complete success should ensue."

It seems to me that approximately this much may be taken as being the explanation given by Iamblichus in support of his identification of 'three points to note'.

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[1] Proclus has given the order of explanation 3 - 1 - 2 (ἵνα ἀπὸ τῶν ἀτελεστέρων ἀρξώμεθα). I will leave this unaltered, merely noting that it *may* be an innovation of Syrianus or of Proclus rather than the original arrangement of Iamblichus.

[2] καθῆκον probably means here 'what is fitting to him', rather than 'duty'.

Fr. 6

The idea that Socrates could ever be a 'nuisance' on the same vulgar level as the other lovers was obviously repugnant to Iamblichus, and required explaining away.

Socrates provokes *aporia* in the soul of Alcibiades, and is thus an anagogic force. The *aporia* itself is a hindrance and a bother to the soul which suffers it, and only in this sense can Socrates be thought of as a bother.

We seem here to see Iamblichus dealing in detail with the λέξις in the way outlined by Festugière [1] for Proclus and Olympiodorus. We shall see him doing the same at numerous points in the *Timaeus Commentary*, so that it seems probable that Iamblichus already followed the θεωρία—λέξις distinction in more or less the form which we observe in Proclus.

Fr. 7

The problem here stems from the distinction between the term proper to the instrumental cause (δι' οὗ) and that proper to the creative cause (μεθ' οὗ). Alcibiades in 106A speaks as if Socrates were an instrument (of the gods), rather than an agent and co-worker of the gods, in the work of his (Alcibiades') improvement, whereas Socrates has claimed to be an agent and co-worker of the gods just above, at 105 E 5. This has the sound of an 'eristic aporia', one of those objections raised by critics of Plato to embarrass Platonists, but Iamblichus makes it an occasion for the statement of some details of theology.

The explicit enumeration of the four causes is Aristotelian (*Metaph.* Δ 2, 1013 a 24ff., *Phys.* II 3, 194 b 23ff.), so that the *aporia* is guilty of mild anachronism, to add to its general absurdity, but reading Aristotle into Plato was a general fault of Middle Platonism. The expression proper to the ποιητικὴ αἰτία is really ὑφ' οὗ, but μεθ' οὗ is made to serve here, since there are really *two* efficient causes working together here, God and Socrates.

It is interesting that Proclus completely ignores Iamblichus' problem and his παγκάλη λύσις (*In Alc.* 168, 17-169, 8). He thinks that Alcibiades is quite right to regard Socrates as an ὄργανον, and to consider τὸ θεῖον as τὸ πρώτως ποιητικόν.


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[1] *Mus. Helv.* XX, 1963, pp. 77ff.

It seems that Iamblichus wanted particularly to stress that 'the more perfect souls', presumably the souls of those men who are spoken of in Fr. 5 as 'classed with the good daemons', assist in the administration of the universe.

Fr. 8

This fragment, or *testimonium*, poses a difficult problem. Olympiodorus brings in this description of Iamblichus' theory by contrast with, and following upon, the theory of Proclus concerning the extension of the influence of the hypostases, which Proclus expounds in *his* commentary, pp. 319, 12-322, 17. It receives its most formal statement in *El. Theol.* prop. 57: πᾶν αἴτιον καὶ πρὸ τοῦ αἰτιατοῦ ἐνεργεῖ καὶ μετ' αὐτὸ πλειόνων ἐστὶν ὑποστατικόν. The difference between the theories of Proclus and Iamblichus is perhaps best represented diagrammatically:



For Proclus, the higher in the scale a principle, or hypostasis, is, the further downwards its influence extends; for Iamblichus, all the hypostases extend their influences as far as Matter, but the influences of the higher are δριμύτεραι, more piercing. They do not, however, overwhelm the lower, since their *strength* is counterbalanced by the distance which they have to travel, a curiously physical conception in this connexion.

This we must infer to be the general doctrine of Iamblichus. What we have here is this doctrine applied *within* the hypostasis of Intellect to the triad ὄν—ζωή—νοῦς, as is done by Proclus also (321, 3ff.). That Iamblichus should distinguish this triad is worth noting; it is mentioned again in his *Comm. In Tim.* Fr. 65, where Time is said to derive different qualities from each of these three

moments of the hypostasis (see comm. *ad loc.* and Intro. Ch. 2. *The Noetic Triad*).

We must ask ourselves, however, whether this is to be attributed to Iamblichus' *Commentary on the Alcibiades* at all, or whether it is merely a general report by Olympiodorus on Iamblichus' doctrine. Let us consider the context. Proclus is discussing, in connexion with *Alc.* 115A, the relations between συμφέρον, καλόν, and δίκαιον. He declares that τὸ συμφέρον is to be linked to τἀγαθόν, τὸ καλόν to νοῦς, and τὸ δίκαιον to ψυχή, in such a way that what is καλόν is also συμφέρον and what is δίκαιον is also καλόν and συμφέρον, but not reciprocally—τὸ συμφέρον is ἐπέκεινα κάλλους καὶ δικαιοσύνης. He then goes on to say that an analogous situation obtains within the noetic triad; Being extends further than Life, and Life extends further than Mind. Proclus himself makes no mention of Iamblichus here (nor of any other previous thinker), but Olympiodorus, in reporting Proclus (109, 15-110, 13), subjoins the doctrine of Iamblichus.

We must ask, if this is from Iamblichus' commentary, how did he apply his doctrine to the exegesis of the text? We must presume that he distinguished the triad συμφέρον—καλόν—δίκαιον in 115A and discussed their mutual relations, pointing out that what is δίκαιον is καλόν καὶ συμφέρον, and what is καλόν is also συμφέρον, but not *vice versa*. There is a difficulty in the fact that the text declares that *not* all that is just is also advantageous, and indeed this is important to the argument. This is easily overcome by Proclus (315, 17ff.), who declares that it is only the popular conception of what is advantageous that is at variance with justice, and the road is open to our philosophical excursus. τὸ συμφέρον is declared to be equivalent to τὸ ἀγαθόν, and to be manifest at a higher level of being than τὸ καλόν and τὸ δίκαιον. Iamblichus could have followed the same line of argument as we see Proclus embarked upon, merely propounding his own version of the extension downwards of each of the principles. 'Justice', then, the virtue proper to Soul, must extend downwards all the way to Matter. This seems less reasonable a theory than that of Syrianus and Proclus, but presumably Iamblichus envisaged 'justice' as representing a different quality in, say, a stone than it does in a man.

Such a discussion could, then have formed part of Iamblichus' exegesis of this lemma. I must confess that I am by no means confident that it did; it could very well have occurred to Olym-

piodorus as a contrast to Proclus' doctrine as he was expounding it. On the other hand, Proclus, as we have seen, discussed his theory in connexion with this lemma, and the intrinsic interest of the doctrine contained in it induces me to give this 'fragment' the benefit of the doubt.

IN PHAEDONEM

Fr. 1

Olympiodorus' depiction of Iamblichus as making frenzied utterances, Zeus-like, from his divine watch-tower is delightful, although we cannot be sure if in fact Olympiodorus intends to be humorous. The impression of Iamblichus' style given here is quite in accord with comments of Proclus in the *In Tim.*, e.g. II 240, 4f. Diehl, *Iambl. In Tim.* Fr. 54: ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος ἄνω που μετεωροπολεῖ καὶ τάφανῇ μεριμνᾷ . . ., and the pronouncement of the Oracle contrasting Porphyry and Iamblichus reported by David (*In Porph. Isag.* 92, 3 Busse), 'ἔνθους ὁ Σῦρος, πολυμαθὴς ὁ Φοῖνιξ.'

This passage is testimony to a general comment by Iamblichus on approximately the passage 70C 4 σκεψώμεθα δὲ—70D 5 ἄλλου ἄν του δέοι λόγου. I have chosen as lemma merely the completion of the part-sentence quoted as a lemma by Ol. It was Iamblichus' opinion that *all* the arguments advanced in the *Phaedo* for the survival of the soul are sufficient to prove its immortality.

The first argument is the one under consideration here, the λόγος ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων, the argument from opposites, running from 69E-72E. As we see from Fr. 3 (Ol. p. 65, 13ff.), Iamblichus' view was that if the living and the dead arise out of each other, and do this eternally, then that is sufficient to prove the immortality of the soul.

We do not know the views of Porphyry or Amelius on this matter, but Plotinus' remarks in *Enn.* IV 7, 9-12 (see Comm. ad *Fr.* 4) seem to show that he at any rate regarded all the proofs in the *Phaedo* as proving immortality. From a remark of Damascius (?) at the beginning of the *C* commentary of the 'Olympiodorean' collection (p. 132, 13 Norv.), I would conclude that it was Syrianus who declared a new view of the proofs, and that this was taken up by the Athenian School and later Platonists generally. *C* speaks of Syrianus as follows (132, 11ff.):

ὁ δὲ ἐν πᾶσι συμμετρίᾳ παρισωμένος Συριανὸς τῶν τε προτέρων τὸ ἰδιωτικόν τε καὶ ἄπορον φυλαξάμενος καὶ τοῦ Ἰαμβλίχου τὸ μέγα

χαλάσας ἐπειράθη καὶ ταῖς Σωκράτους ἐπαγγελίαις ἐμμένειν καὶ τοὺς διακωμῳδοῦντας τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ἐξελέγχειν ὡς συκοφαντοῦντας.

This is a general description of his method, and we can see it at work extensively in Proclus' *Commentary on the Timaeus*, but the statement is made here in connexion with the Argument from Opposites.

Fr. 2

The nature of Iamblichus' contribution to this argument is not entirely clear. I am assuming that he is one of those who take this passage as arguing for the immortality of all Soul, his own contribution being to fortify the argument that nothing admits into itself the opposite of what it introduces with it, by the curious remark that it does not admit into itself even what it introduces. Presumably he means that fire does not, strictly, even admit into itself heat, although it introduces it into bodies into which it comes. Fire would, then, not be *absolutely* hot, but has heat only in relation to external physical objects.

Iamblichus did in fact hold that all Soul, even the irrational and the vegetative soul, was immortal, as we can see e.g. from *Comm. In Tim.* Fr. 81 (see my commentary ad loc.), and from B, *In Phaed.* p. 124, 14ff.:

οἱ δὲ μέχρι τῆς ἀλογίας (ἀπαθανατίζουσιν), ὡς τῶν μὲν παλαίων Ξενοκράτης καὶ Σπεύσιππος, τῶν δὲ νεωτέρων Ἰάμβλιχος καὶ Πλούταρχος (*schol.* Πατέριος),—a view which separated him from Porphyry, and from the Athenian School, who considered the rational soul to be immortal, but which is in agreement with Plotinus, or at least with the Plotinus of the early tractate IV 7 (2), where we find at the beginning of sect. 14:

περὶ δὲ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ψυχῆς, ὅσαι μὲν αὐτῶν σφαλεῖσαι καὶ μέχρι θηρίων ἧκον σωμάτων, ἀνάγκη καὶ ταύτας ἀθανάτους εἶναι. εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ἄλλο τι εἶδος ψυχῆς, οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς ζώσης φύσεως δεῖ καὶ ταύτην εἶναι καὶ αὐτὴν οὖσαν ζωῆς τοῖς ζῴοις αἰτίαν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς· ἅπασαι γὰρ ὡρμήθησαν ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς ζωὴν ἔχουσαι οἰκείαν ἀσώματοί τε καὶ αὗται καὶ ἀμερεῖς καὶ οὐσίαι.

It is doubtful, on the other hand, what kind of immortality Plotinus envisaged for these lower types of soul. Hardly individual

immortality, but perhaps that of the irrational soul or ὄχημα, apparently within the universe.

As an interpretation of this passage of the *Phaedo*, this view of Iamblichus' is surely erroneous. Ammonius, as Ol. records (60, 21ff.), gives the correct interpretation, pointing out that Plato is simply asking us to consider the instances of opposites arising out of each other in other cases than that of human life; there is no implication that 'ζῷα πάντα καὶ φυτά καὶ συλλήβδην ὅσαπερ ἔχει γένεσιν' all have immortal souls.

Fr. 3

There are five well-defined arguments in the *Phaedo* leading to the proof of the immortality of the soul, one of which, that about Harmony, is a negative proof:

(1) The Argument from Opposites (ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων) 69E-72E
(2) The Argument from Recollection (ἐκ τῶν ἀναμνήσεων) 72E-78B
(3) The Argument from Similarity (ἐκ τῆς ὁμοιότητος) 78B-84B
(4) The Argument about Harmony (περὶ ἁρμονίας) 84C-86D
(5) The Argument from the Forms (ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας) 102A-107A.

Iamblichus, as we have seen in Fr. 1, stoutly maintains the full validity of each of these proofs[1]. His argument here is that if all instances of 'knowledge' are in fact recollections of a previous state of knowledge, then, logically, the soul has always existed in the past. It is reasonable, then, to suppose that it will always exist in the future.

This desire of Iamblichus' that all the arguments should completely prove immortality takes no account of the dramatic development of the *Phaedo*, but it is quite consistent with his view of the divinely inspired singlemindedness exhibited by Plato in his dialogues.

That he went beyond the other commentators in this is indicated by Olympiodorus, p. 78, 9ff. N:

πάντες μὲν οὖν οἱ ἐξηγηταὶ μόνον τὸν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας φασὶ τῆς ψυχῆς δεικνύναι τὴν ἀθανασίαν αὐτῆς· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀναμνήσεων λόγος ἔδειξεν, ὅτι προυπάρχει ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώματος πάντως, οὐ μὴν ὅτι

[1] Or in the case of Argument (4), the validity of the proof of its refutation.

καὶ ἀεὶ ἔστιν. οὗτος δὲ δείκνυσιν ἐκ τῆς ὁμοιότητος <ὅτι> μεθυπάρχει ὡς μᾶλλον ἀδιάλυτος οὖσα, καὶ ἐπιδιαμένει ὡς πολυχρονιωτέρα, οὐ μὴν ὅτι καὶ ἀθάνατος.

Some commentators (65, 17ff.) would hold that the first two Arguments prove the immortality of the soul complementarily, the first showing that it is ἄφθαρτος, the second that it is ἀγένητος. Ammonius, however (ὁ φιλόσοφος 65, 23) [1] declares that either of these arguments only shows the soul's survival for a period in either direction, and that we must wait until the argument ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας for a complete proof.

Fr. 4

Here again, in the case of the Argument from Similarity, Iamblichus makes the highest claims. From the circumstance that this passage is followed immediately (79, 1ff.) by a reference to Proclus (ζητεῖ δὲ ὁ Πρόκλος, περὶ ποίων ἄρα εἰδῶν τῷ Πλάτωνι ὁ λόγος, κ.τ.λ.), although Proclus is not criticising Iamblichus, one might conjecture with some likelihood that it is from Proclus that Ol. took his references. Ol. has shown his independent knowledge of Iamblichus' commentaries in the case of the *Alcibiades*, and so perhaps here. But another passage in the Olympiodorian collection helps us to come to a decision. The *D* scholia, in section 29 (p. 213, 1ff. Norvin), deal with this same passage as follows:[2]

Ὅτι Πλωτῖνος ᾠήθη δεικνύναι πρῶτος τὴν ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον ἀποδείξας οὖσαν αὐτὴν μήτε σῶμα μήτε ἀχώριστον σώματος, καθὰ καὶ οἷς ὁ θάνατος πέφυκε παραγίγνεσθαι, τῷ μέν, ὅτι σύνθετον· διαλύεται γὰρ ἐξ ὧν συνετέθη· τῷ δέ, ὅτι ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, ἀπολλυμένου γὰρ αὐτοῦ συναπόλλυται καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀσώματον. . . . οὐ μὴν ἀρκεῖν γὲ τὸν λόγον φησὶν Πρόκλος πρὸς τελέαν ἀθανασίαν·

So here we have it; Proclus *did* criticise the view that this argument was a complete proof of immortality. It is clear from our passage in Ol. that Iamblichus quoted Plotinus to support his case, and clear from *Enn.* IV 7, 9-12 that Plotinus regarded all the arguments of the *Phaedo* as proofs of immortality. *D*'s notes have left Iamblichus out, but have included Proclus' criticism of the position he takes.

[1] Or perhaps Ol. himself.
[2] There is a less full version also in the *C* scholia, p. 160, 9-21.

It is not so clear, however, what precisely Iamblichus is quoting. The point about destruction arising from compositeness Plotinus makes in *Enn.* IV 7, 12, ll.12-13: πᾶν τε τὸ λυόμενον σύνθεσιν εἰς τὸ εἶναι εἰληφὸς ταύτῃ διαλύεσθαι πέφυκεν, ᾗ συνετέθη. Destruction arising from being in a subject is not so clearly stated, but presumably ll.17-19 imply it: ἀλλ' ἀλλοιωθεῖσα ἥξει εἰς φθοράν. ἀλλ' ἡ ἀλλοίωσις φθείρουσα τὸ εἶδος ἀφαιρεῖ, τὴν δὲ ὕλην ἐᾷ· τοῦτο δὲ συνθέτου πάθος.

Fr. 5

The status of this as a fragment of the commentary is, it must be admitted, doubtful. Nevertheless, two references are made by the *C* commentator to an opinion of Iamblichus' that souls which have attained perfection (τελέως ἀποκαθιστάμενα) in the noetic realm are henceforward exempt from descent. This opinion, says *C*, Iamblichus *also* expresses in his *Letters*, in defence of his own argument; he must then have expressed it somewhere else.

If he mentions his theory here, how does he reconcile it with the text? Olympiodorus seems to refer to this at p. 64, 2ff.:

> ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὰς τῶν θεουργῶν ψυχὰς βούλεται (sc. ὁ Πλάτων) μένειν ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατιέναι εἰς γένεσιν, περὶ ὧν φησιν τὸ λόγιον 'ἀγγελικῷ ἐνὶ χώρῳ'.

Even the soul of the adept must descend again, it seems, presumably as a *boddhisatva*, to lead his less fortunate fellow men to the truth. Iamblichus seems to hold that such an enlightened soul never loses its contact with τὰ ἐκεῖ during its period of descent, but descend it must. This is in conflict with the *Phaedrus* Myth, but in accord with Plato's plan for the philosopher in the *Republic*. Here, however, the duty of returning to help mankind is extended to beyond the grave. It was certainly felt by philosophers in Iamblichus' time that such figures as Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato were of this order. The more broad-minded among them might have included Moses and Jesus in the company. Some time later, the Emperor Julian and the Athenian School would certainly have added Plotinus and Iamblichus himself. That, really, is part of the significance of the epithet θεῖος among the Neoplatonists. We may note that such figures as Aristotle

and Porphyry are never θεῖος, although Aristotle at least is often δαιμόνιος.

One may consult also the discussion of the different modes of descent of souls which Iamblichus enters upon in his *De Anima* (ap. Stob. *Anth.* I 380 Wachs.) Cf. Comm. ad *In Phaedr.* Fr. 7.

IN SOPHISTAM

Fr. 1

This is all we have by way of comment from Iamblichus on the *Sophist*. Nor is there any certain evidence of any later commentary on the *Sophist*,[1] although it figured in Iamblichus' Canon of Dialogues. The present report would come most naturally from a discussion, in the Introduction to a Commentary, concerning the σκοπός, but Iamblichus may never have written a full commentary on the whole dialogue.

At any rate, for Iamblichus the subject of the *Sophist* was 'the Sublunary Demiurge'. This figure is clearly distinguished from ὁ οὐράνιος δημιουργός, presumably the Demiurge of the *Timaeus*. We might see this sublunar or 'genesiurgic' demiurge as corresponding to the νέοι θεοί of the *Timaeus*, but then the Heavenly Demiurge alluded to here becomes a problem. We have in this passage a succession of three entities,[2] (1) ὁ πατὴρ τῶν δημιουργῶν, who is ὑπερουράνιος καὶ ἐξῃρημένος, a situation corresponding to what we know of the Demiurge of the *Timaeus*; (2) the Heavenly Demiurge; (3) the Sublunary, genesiurgic Demiurge. Plainly there is here one creator for the heavenly bodies, and another for the sublunar world of γένεσις and φθορά, who models his activity on that of the former. This introduces us, it seems to me, to a more complicated world than that envisaged in the *Timaeus*. It does, however, seem vaguely reminiscent of the three-tiered world described in the *De Fato* of Pseudo-Plutarch, a Platonist of the School of Gaius, of the latter half of the 2nd Cent. A.D. (*De Fato*, 572F-574D), though that division stays much closer to the entities presented in the *Timaeus*, the Demiurge being the administrator of Primary Providence, the 'new gods' of Secondary Providence and Fate, and a class of daemons borrowed from the *Phaedrus* Myth the administrators of Tertiary Providence.

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1 Proclus (*In Parm.* 774, 25-6 *Cousin*) says of the question of the combining of Ideas (*Soph.* 256B) that it would be better discussed ἐν ταῖς τοῦ Σοφιστοῦ ἐξηγήσεσιν, which could imply a commentary, or simply lectures. Similarly Olympiodorus, *In Alc.* 110, 8, 'ὡς ἐν τῷ Σοφιστῇ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ ὄντος λόγοις ἀκριβέστερον μαθησόμεθα.

2 Subjects of the *Timaeus*, *Statesman*, and *Sophist* respectively.

A series of three demiurges do, however, appear in Proclus' *Commentary on the Timaeus*. A πρῶτος τῶν δημιουργῶν is distinguished from ὁ μέσος δημιουργός in I 156, 5-7, and ὁ τρίτος δημιουργός is described as co-operating with the creative activity of ὁ δεύτερος in I 74, 15-16. This third demiurge is apparently to be equated with Pluto in this passage since we have the statement (74, 16ff.): δεῖται γὰρ ἡ ὅλη γένεσις καὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ ὑποχθονίου κόσμου πάντως ἀναδόσεων. This is not quite what we want, but we must remember that the whole realm below the Moon was often thought of as the realm of Pluto.[1]

The second demiurge seems to be simply οἱ νέοι θεοὶ taken as one. At any rate they are referred to repeatedly later in the Commentary as οἱ δεύτεροι δημιουργοί (III 200, 22; 313, 6; 354, 4).

If we turn from this to Proclus' *Commentary on the Cratylus* (esp. pp. 84-7 *Pasquali*), we find an extended account of a Father of the Demiurges, who is identified with Cronos, and a triad of demiurges, identified with Zeus, Poseidon and Pluto respectively. The difficulty is that in this arrangement it is Poseidon who is allotted the administration of τὰ ὑπὸ σελήνην (as he is at *In Tim.* II 56, 21ff.), while Pluto is allotted τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς. It is Poseidon who seems more akin to the sublunar demiurge of the *Sophist*.[2]

We need not, however, it seems to me, refer back to Iamblichus all the details and elaborations which we find in Proclus, nor his identifications of the demiurges with the three sons of Cronos. What we have in this passage is, first, a transcendent Demiurge who sends forth the original creative thoughts; then a heavenly Demiurge, whom one may equate with the νέοι θεοί of the *Timaeus*; and finally our third Demiurge, who presides over generation in the realm below the Moon. He entraps souls in Matter, but he is not,

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[1] As, for instance, in Plutarch's *De Facie in Orbe Lunae* 942C-F, and the Myth of the *De Genio Socratis* 591A-C. The idea may well go back to Xenocrates (cf. Heinze, *Xenokrates*, pp. 134-7.)

[2] The beginning of the scholion, which I have not included in the 'fragment', does declare that 'Plato gives the name of sophist to Eros and to Hades and to Zeus', which may indicate that the Sublunar Demiurge is to be taken as Hades here. This may be confirmed by the fact that Lydus, *De Mens.* 83, 13ff. reports Iamblichus as stating that the three tribes of sublunary daemons are presided over by one μέγιστος δαίμων· 'οὗτος δ' ἂν εἴη μᾶλλον ὁ Πλούτων, ὥς φησιν ὁ αὐτὸς Ἰάμβλιχος'. Lydus also reports (p. 167, 22ff.), however, that in Book I of his work Περὶ καθόδου ψυχῆς Iamblichus gives to Hades the sphere *between the Sun and the Moon*, making Persephone the Moon, and declares that here is where the purified souls are situated.

it seems to me, an actively evil entity. He looks to the heavenly Demiurge for guidance, and souls may escape from him if they employ well the environment which he weaves for them. He is an inevitable consequence of the descent into Matter, which is itself inevitable for the individual soul.

l. 4. πλήρεις λόγων.

Two of the mss. read ἀλόγων, as against T's λόγων, and Greene accepts their reading. I do not see what he thinks is then the meaning. And surely ἀλογίας would be more likely, if something of this sort was meant? I take it as meaning that the souls come down full of λόγοι from above, and are then in danger of being swindled out of them by this Demiurge.

ll. 9-10 ὡς θέλγων τὰς ψυχάς. This has a Chaldaean ring, cf. *Or. Ch.* Fr. 135, 3 Des Places:

καὶ ψυχὰς θέλγοντες ἀεὶ τελετῶν ἀπάγουσιν—said here of evil, chthonic daemons.

ll. 18-19 ὁ δὲ ξένος εἰς τύπον τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν δημιουργῶν νοείσθω.

This is a record of the identification of the characters, which seems to have been an essential part of an Iamblichean introduction to a Commentary. The Stranger is the Father of the Demiurges, while Socrates and Theodorus are identified respectively with Zeus and Hermes, Hermes being here seen as the ἀγγελικὴ νόησις of the Father. This νόησις is 'geometric', presumably, as creating the basis of the three-dimensional material world. 'Hermes' may thus be seen as the *logos* of the Father descending even to the Sublunar realm, and Theodorus, as a geometrician, belongs to the sphere of Logos.

As to the rest of the *Sophist* no views of Iamblichus are recorded. It is even possible that all of this passage after the initial sentence is elaboration by Proclus, but there still remains the fact that the Sublunar Demiurge must be explained, and I feel, therefore, that at least the substance of all this can be claimed for Iamblichus.

IN PHAEDRUM

Fr. 1

The second, larger passage seems in fact to expound in detail Iamblichus' view of the subject of the dialogue, 'τὸ παντοδαπὸν καλόν'. Hermeias promises at the end of the first passage to expound it more fully later, and that is what he does. We cannot know how far it is given in Iamblichus' own words, but that is not essential for our purpose. We do at any rate have Iamblichus' scheme for the *Phaedrus*. It is as follows:

(1) *Visible Beauty*, as exemplified by Lysias' love for Phaedrus. This may be taken to cover that portion of the dialogue from the beginning to 230E.

(2) *Beauty in Discourse*, which covers the whole passage 230E-244E, concerning Lysias' Speech and Socrates' comments on it.

(3) *Beauty of the Soul.*

(4) *Beauty of the Cosmic Gods.*

(5) *Beauty of the Intellect.*

(6) *The Beautiful Itself.*

These latter four stages will be contained in the section 244E-257C, comprising the account of the nature of the Soul, and the Myth, in which the soul ascends, in company with the cosmic gods, to view the Forms, and the Beautiful Itself. The discussion of Style and the Dialectic from 257C onwards will be the downward progress, this time employing the art of *diaeresis*.

Such a scheme sees in the *Phaedrus* a graded ascent such as described by Diotima in the *Symposium*, and further a corresponding descent.

ll. 3-4. ἵνα ὡς ἐν ζῴω πάντα τῷ ἑνὶ συντάττηται.

This comparison of the λόγος with a ζῷον (repeated in l. 7) is a reference to the statement of Socrates at *Phaedr.* 264C that a speech should be put together like a living being (cf. n. 1 to *Comm. in Tim.* Fr. 23), and may well be the text that stimulated Iamblichus to insist on the overall consistency of each of Plato's dialogue, a doctrine which led to such strange results for Neo-

platonic exegesis. Cf. on this A. Bielmeier, *Die neuplatonische Phaidrosinterpretation*, pp. 22-3.

Fr. 2

The question here discussed arises from an *aporia*, mentioned at 113, 15—τί οὖν, εἴποι τις ἄν, μόνη ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος; and I am taking it that Iamblichus chose a lemma of about the same extent for his general remarks on the subject. Whether this is a real problem, or merely an excuse for further elaboration, is uncertain; I suspect the latter.

Plato, of course, was contrasting soul only with body, but the later commentators had the problem that *nous* was now a separate hypostasis, and this situation was projected back into Plato's own thought. Further, the irrational soul, the ἀλογία, (which is what ἡ μερικὴ φύσις here refers to), was considered a separate entity. Both these had to be discussed in this connexion. Hermeias explains away the omission of *nous* by declaring that it is ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀθάνατον εἶναι (113, 16-17). It exists on a plane where the predication of immortality is no longer meaningful. Well and good; but what of ἡ μερικὴ φύσις? Hermeias himself considers that if it can be called 'self-moved' at all, it can be so-called only εἰδωλικῶς, (113, 28), and so not properly. Even as *nous* is superior to this term, so the irrational soul is below it.

Before saying this, however, he mentions the view of Porphyry and Iamblichus that the irrational soul cannot be said to be self-moved at all. Probably, here, we may envisage Iamblichus quoting, and agreeing with, Porphyry. Their point is the reasonable one that the irrational soul is merely an ὄργανον of the rational soul, and so cannot be regarded as being the source of its own movement.

The reference to ἡ ἐνάτη κίνησις is of interest, and may be a clue to further Iamblichean elements in this section of the commentary. At p. 107, 6ff. Hermeias sets out to explain how the movements of the soul may be said to be 'paradigmatic' of the movements of the body, which are eight in number. He then enumerates the 'psychic' equivalents of each of the bodily motions. Finally (l. 23ff.) he makes mention of a ninth motion in the body, which also has its counterpart in the soul:

ἡ δὲ ἐνάτη κίνησις ἥτις ἐστὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων περὶ τοῖς σώμασιν,

οἷαι θερμότητες ἢ ψύξεις ἢ ἐμψυχίαι, ἔχει τὴν παραδειγματικὴν αἰτίαν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καθὸ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῖς σώμασιν ἐνδίδωσι ζωήν.

The action, then, of the immaterial qualities upon bodies has its paradigmatic counterpart in the action of the soul in giving life in bodies. This kind of laborious listing of qualities, epithets and equivalences is certainly a characteristic of Iamblichus, as one may observe from the *De Mysteriis*, and from some fragments of the *Timaeus Commentary*.[1] Even though this passage on the motions may well have been worked over by Syrianus and/or Hermeias, I feel that one might be justified in claiming it, in essence, for Iamblichus. However, I will leave its formal annexation to some bolder spirit.

While we are on the subject of the immortality of the soul, it may not be out of place to mention what evidence we have for Iamblichus' position on the subject, since he probably mentioned it here. In the *B* Commentary on the *Phaedo* (*In Phaed.* p. 124, 13ff.) there is a comprehensive doxography of views on the question of what types of soul should be allowed immortality. Iamblichus' position, as stated, is in apparent conflict with the evidence presented here:

οἱ δὲ μέχρι τῆς ἀλογίας (ἀπαθανατίζουσιν), ὡς τῶν μὲν παλαιῶν Ξενοκράτης καὶ Σπεύσιππος, τῶν δὲ νεωτέρων Ἰάμβλιχος καὶ Πλούταρχος.

However, all that Iamblichus is denying to ἡ μερικὴ φύσις is self-motion, not immortality. We know from *Comm. In Tim.*, Fr. 81 that he granted immortality to the ὄχημα, though his further plans for it remain uncertain. It cannot have accompanied the pure soul out of the cosmos. He may have discussed all this in connexion with the precise meaning of ψυχὴ πᾶσα in the lemma, but we have no trace of such a discussion. It is plain to Hermeias that ψυχὴ πᾶσα means πᾶσα λογικὴ ψυχή (p. 102, 19), and he quotes only Posidonius and Harpocration as representing two extreme alternative views, the one restricting the meaning to the All-Soul, or Soul of the World, the other extending it to include all souls of whatever grade, 'even those of ants and flies'.

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[1] e.g. Fr. 49, a listing of eight virtues of sphericity.

Fr. 3

There was much debate among the commentators, it seems, as to the identity of Zeus and the other eleven gods, as mentioned in this passage. Hermeias begins (135, 27) with an anonymous doxography of (presumably) Middle Platonic opinions:

(1) '*Some*' take them to be the twelve spheres of the cosmos, the sphere of the fixed stars, the seven planetary spheres, and the spheres of the four elements (below the Moon). Zeus would then be the sphere of the fixed stars, and Hestia would be the earth.

(2) *Others* take them as the souls of all these spheres. (135, 30).

(3) *Others* again, as the intellects presiding over the souls (135, 30-136, 1).

The fatal flaw with all these is that these gods are said to preside over the whole cosmos, whereas each of these spheres, or their souls or intellects, can only be concerned with its own area. Further, as regards the latter two explanations, how can the soul or intellect of the earth be said to be motionless?

(4) There are others yet, who take Zeus to be the Sun, commanding the whole universe. Hestia is the Zodiacal sign in which the sun resides, while the other eleven gods are the other eleven signs, who are assisting him in his work of creation. The 'host' will then be the gods ruling over the decans (δεχαδάρχαι θεοί) and the daemons who preside over fate (μοιρηγέται δαίμονες).

This still sounds like a Middle Platonist interpretation, perhaps Numenian. Hermeias considers this to be getting warmer, but still erroneously confining itself to the universe.

Iamblichus seems to be the first to raise the exegesis to a supracosmic level, equating Zeus with the Demiurge of the *Timaeus*, ὁ ἐξηρημένος δημιουργός, as Hermeias refers to him just below (136, 21). Hermeias accepts this in essence, but with an elaboration or two, no doubt derived from Syrianus.

The second passage, from Proclus, makes a point not made by Hermeias, namely that the *ouranos* of the lemma must be of the intelligible order, that being the proper realm for the Demiurge to operate in.

Fr. 4

The problem here consists in the question whether 'happiness' or 'good fortune' (εὐδαιμονία) can properly be predicated of the

gods. Iamblichus obviously thinks that it cannot, except in a 'causal' sense. Here his theory of the virtues may be brought into play, allowing a virtue to be present in different forms at different levels of existence. 'Happiness' is not really a virtue, but the theory may be applied to it. Syrianus also subscribes to the theory of different levels—indeed he tends to elaborate it further—but his explanation (which I assume Hermeias to be relaying) is somewhat different. The εὐδαιμονία of the gods consists properly in their close and constant attendance on their own leaders.

Fr. 5

The question here is what we are to understand by the ὑπουράνιος ἁψίς. Iamblichus declares it to be the διακόσμησις situated immediately below the Demiurge (or the Heaven—the reference of αὐτῷ is not clear to me), and thus presumably the 'primary order of creation', or sphere of the cosmic gods, the νέοι θεοί, who will themselves, in the *Timaeus*, supervise the creation of everything below them.

Hermeias (144, 17ff.) declares it to refer to τὰς προσεχῶς ἐξημμένας Οὐρανοῦ τάξεις τῶν θεῶν, ἤ τινας ἄλλας μεταξὺ Οὐρανοῦ καὶ Κρόνου, a view (presumably) of Syrianus' which seems to confuse the situation unnecessarily.

Iamblichus' apparent reference to the Chaldaean ὑπεζωκώς in this connexion is interesting. The ὑπεζωκώς is in Chaldaean theology (as interpreted by the Neoplatonists) the lowest member of the order of intellectual gods. According to Damascius (*Dub. et Sol.* II 131, 27ff.), who seems here to be reporting Proclus,[1] the ὑπεζωκώς is that which holds the lowest order of supercelestial gods, the ἀμείλικτοι, apart from each other and from what is above them; the *ameiliktoi*, themselves, it seems, seal off all the higher orders from Matter (132, 2-3). The Oracle is quoted as follows (Fr. 6 Des Places):

ὡς γὰρ ὑπεζωκώς τις ὑμὴν νοερὸς διακρίνει.

For the Chaldaeans, the matter was probably simpler (cf. Lewy, *Ch. Or.* p. 92). The ὑπεζωκώς seems to have been for them the Soul of the World, acting as an immaterial membrane enclosing matter and separating it from the noetic world.

[1] Proclus mentions this entity also *In Remp.* II 225, 1ff. as 'the single cause of otherness and division', and equates it with Platonic ἑτερότης.

Iamblichus is taking the ὑπεζωκώς as the primary creation of the Demiurge, which could indeed be identified with the soul of the world, though he makes no such identification.

Proclus is probably quoting here primarily Iamblichus' *Platonic Theology*, as he is elsewhere in *Th. Plat.* (p. 140, 15ff.), but he makes a subsidiary reference to the *Phaedrus Commentary*, which, indeed, brings us welcome evidence that there *was* a Phaedrus Commentary. The reference to 'some places' in which Iamblichus has identified 'the great heaven' with the Demiurge is probably to *In Tim.* Fr. 34 where Iamblichus' broad view of the extent of the Demiurge is quoted.

Fr. 6

First, the textual problem. Modern editors are unanimous, I think, in reading ψυχῆς κυβερνήτῃ μόνῳ θεατῇ νῷ at 247C 7-8. The dative θεατῇ requires something to govern it, such as the χρῆται supplied by B and W. This is not satisfactory, however, as it clashes grammatically with ἔχει in the same sentence. A participle χρωμένῃ would be grammatical, but there is no ms. support for it. It certainly seems as if not only Hermeias but also Iamblichus read θεατῇ. It also seems as if neither of them read νῷ. Further on in his commentary, (152, 2 and 8) Hermeias twice quotes the phrase ψυχῆς—θεατῇ and in neither case does he add νῷ, though it would have been suitable to do so had it been there. Further, Iamblichus' argument, which Hermeias adopts, that the κυβερνήτης is the One, *not* the Intellect, of the soul, would surely have been impossible to propound had νῷ been part of their text. At the very least they would have had to explain it away.

It is possible, indeed, that νῷ is an explanatory gloss, even as BW's χρῆται seems to be. There is no suggestion in Hermeias' commentary as to how the string of datives was construed, but it does not seem to worry him. As regards Plato's meaning, not much is at issue; he surely *is* referring to the mind, for him the highest part of the soul.

For Iamblichus, however, this was not so. A special faculty of the soul was required, to be the receptacle of mystical inspiration from the gods, and to answer in the microcosm of the individual to the realm of the One in the macrocosm. In postulating a 'One' of the soul he was only schematising in a scholastic manner, the

mystical faculty of the soul which was recognised by Plotinus (e.g. *Enn.* III 8, 9) and many of his predecessors.

Even the summit of the noetic world Iamblichus in his *Parmenides Commentary* at least (fr. 2A), did not consider to be attainable by the faculties of the mind proper. This ἀκρότης or κορυφή, which in its various aspects was ἕν, ὄν and νοητόν was beyond normal knowledge, and could only be striven towards in a supra-rational way. See further Comm. *ad In Parm.* Fr. 2A.

Cf. also *In Tim.* Fr. 87, where there may indeed be a reference to the *Phaedrus Commentary*. There the point is that the 'charioteer' of the Soul does not always remain 'above'; here the 'helmsman' is postulated as a higher aspect of the Soul than the 'charioteer'. It is not quite clear here whether the One of the Soul constantly remains Above, or simply that, when it is operating, it is in communion with the One. For the sake of Iamblichus' consistency, I hope the latter.

The notion of a mystical faculty of the soul seems also to be implied in *De Myst.* III *20:148-9*, where the faculty wherein ἡ θεουργὸς ἐνέργεια resides is the subject of discussion.

Fr. 6A

This may perhaps find a place as a dubious fragment. It is conceivable that Iamblichus made this lemma the occasion for a disquisition on Fate, of which this would be the initial statement. It is possible, however, that, Iamblichus' definition of Fate being well known, Hermeias simply put it in here for good measure. On the other hand, why the apparently random reference to Iamblichus?

Iamblichus defines Fate in his *Letter to Sopater on Fate* (*ap.* Stob. I 81 Wachs.) as follows:

> τῆς δ' εἱμαρμένης ἡ οὐσία σύμπασά ἐστιν ἐν τῇ φύσει· φύσιν δὲ λέγω τὴν ἀχώριστον αἰτίαν τοῦ κόσμου καὶ ἀχωρίστως περιέχουσαν τὰς ὅλας αἰτίας τῆς γενέσεως, ὅσα χωριστῶς αἱ κρείττονες οὐσίαι καὶ διακοσμήσεις συνειλήφασιν ἐν ἑαυταῖς.

He expands on this further in the same passage. His main surviving discussion of Fate, Providence and Freewill is contained in the fragments of his *Letter to Macedonius on Fate,* also preserved in Stobaeus (I 80, II 173-6 Wachs.), a statement of Platonic

doctrine consonant with Plotinus' exposition in *Enn.* III 1 and 2-3. Iamblichus' reported formulation here seems to be taken directly from *Timaeus* 41 e 2: καὶ ἐμβιβάσας ὡς εἰς ὄχημα τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν ἔδειξεν. It is worth noting that Proclus, *In Tim.* III 272, 16, in his discussion of Fate (*ad. Tim.* 41 E), condemns Porphyry for defining Fate as τὴν φύσιν ἁπλῶς instead of φύσιν . . . ἔνθεον καὶ πεπληρωμένην ἐλλάμψεων θείων, νοερῶν, ψυχικῶν (ll. 26-8). Since Iamblichus is not mentioned, and since this latter formulation agrees well with what we find in the *Letter to Macedonius*, we may suspect Proclus of developing Iamblichus' views in this passage.

Fr. 7

Here we have Iamblichus' exegesis of the Fable of the Men who Became Cicadas. He sees in it an allegory of the individual soul, first in its pure state before the development of the cosmos, then in its state when first experiencing *genesis*. The soul that still retains a memory of its life in the intelligible realm will recoil from the works of Matter, and continuous abstention from them will lead to its 'death', in reality to its triumphant re-ascent into the Intelligible.

l. 9 ἡ ἔκφανσις ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ γενομένη . . .

ἔκφανσις seems to be a distinctively Neoplatonic noun, first used by Plotinus in *Enn.* III 5, 9, where Poros of the *Symposium* Myth is referred to as follows: ὁμοῦ δὲ οἱ λόγοι ὁ Πόρος, ἡ εὐπορία καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος τῶν καλῶν, ἐν ἐκφάνσει ἤδη.

The word is common in Proclus. It means the manifestation of an entity or hypostasis which has also a hidden aspect—one cannot say 'which was formerly hidden', since there is not temporal sequence involved. That is the point of Iamblichus' contrast μὴ χρόνῳ . . . ἀλλὰ πρὶν εἰς τὸ ἔμφανες ταύτην τὴν πρόοδον γενέσθαι τῶν σφαιρῶν.

l. 13 καὶ ἅτε δὴ νεοτελεῖς οὖσαι.

Iamblichus refers again to this class of soul in the *De Anima* (*ap.* Stob. I 380, 23ff. Wachs.) in his discussion of the Descent of Souls: οἵ τε γὰρ νεοτελεῖς καὶ πολυθεάμονες τῶν ὄντων, οἵ τε συνοπαδοὶ καὶ συγγενεῖς τῶν θεῶν, οἵ τε παντελεῖς καὶ ὁλόκληρα τὰ εἴδη τῆς

ψυχῆς περιέχοντες, πάντες ἀπαθεῖς καὶ ἀκήρατοι ἐμφύονται πρώτως εἰς τὰ σώματα.

The passage is replete with reminiscences of the *Phaedrus* Myth. Iamblichus is most concerned to maintain, in this part of the *De Anima*, the distinction between the *types* of soul which descend into bodies, and the reasons for which they do this. He certainly felt, in distinction to most of his predecessors, that there are different classes of person going about on the earth, some having come down voluntarily for the salvation of the race, others (also voluntarily) to exercise their moral virtue (διὰ γυμνασίαν καὶ ἐπανόρθωσιν τῶν οἰκείων ἠθῶν)—perhaps to earn a higher perch on the celestial ladder; and others, perhaps the majority, involuntarily, by way of punishment and judgement.

IN PHILEBUM

Fr. 1

I give the whole passage here, but tentatively. To me, the passage beginning with the qualification οὐχ ἁπλῶς δὲ οὕτως· has the mark of a typical amplification by Syrianus of an Iamblichean formulation, such as may be observed at various points in Proclus' *Commentary on the Timaeus* (e.g. *In Tim.* I 441, 15ff., III 174, 13ff.).[1]

All I would confidently claim for Iamblichus is the basic formulation περὶ τοῦ τελικοῦ αἰτίου πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσιν, described further as τὸ διὰ πάντων διῆκον ἀγαθόν. However, I give the rest, in cautionary brackets, for the perusal of the reader.

The basic Middle Platonic verdict on the subject-matter of the *Philebus* was the obvious one, that it was on Pleasure. Thrasyllus in his edition labelled it ἠθικός, περὶ ἡδονῆς. Damascius gives this as the first suggestion for the σκοπός, though without mentioning names (sect. 1).

Of Neoplatonists, one Peisitheus, a pupil of Theodorus of Asine (and probably, before him, Porphyry (cf. sect. 10)) concluded that it concerned Intelligence. This is an oversimplification, as was the Middle Platonic view, and it is transcended by the proposal of Iamblichus, who is followed by Syrianus and the Athenian School.

Damascius (ὁ ἡμέτερος καθηγεμών, sect. 6, 1) wishes to qualify this by suggesting that the subject is οὐχ ἁπλῶς τὸ διὰ πάντων ἧκον ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ διὰ πάντων ζῴων θείων τε καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἐσχάτων, since it must concern at least beings which can partake in pleasure or intelligence.

It looks as if an original proposal of Iamblichus experienced successive modifications or clarifications, first by Syrianus and Proclus, then by Damascius. The Good Itself, τὸ ἐξῃρημένον ἀγαθόν, is to be excluded. It does seem from the report of the *Anon. Proleg.* quoted in n. 1 above that Iamblichus made no limitations, which is strange, since the *Parmenides* might seem on his own arrangement

[1] Westerink inclines also to this view (see his note *ad loc.*), quoting the *Anon. Proleg.* c. 26, where Iamblichus' view of the σκοπός is given as follows: ἔσχατον δὲ δεῖ (sc. πράττειν) τὸν Φίληβον, ἐπειδὴ ἐν αὐτῷ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διαλέγεται, ὃ πάντων ἐπέκεινά ἐστιν.

a better place for a discussion of the Good Itself. But in Iamblichus' arrangement, after all, the *Timaeus* and the *Parmenides* are really *summaries* of all previous Platonic doctrine, not continuations of it, so that the *Philebus*, being at the summit of the basic course of ten dialogues, quite properly concerns the ultimate ground of all Being.

Six phases of the Good are actually enumerated in *Phileb.* 66A-C, which supports Iamblichus' analysis. The fact that the Supreme Good is not enumerated is simply, as is explained in sect. 252, because it is ἄρρητον. It can only be defined by means of the things in which it appears. This explanation is not attributed to Iamblichus, but it would suit his position well, and may be a reflection of the one he gave.

Fr. 2

This seems to be a record of a correction of Porphyry by Iamblichus, probably polemical, which would form part of Iamblichus' discussion of the σκοπός. Damascius takes a dispassionate view of their respective interpretations, and reconciles their differences. Iamblichus took Pleasure as essentially involving intellect, while he restricted Intellect to the simple activity of cognition, whereas Porphyry had taken the opposite line, understanding Intellect as the summit of human activity, and limiting Pleasure to its purely irrational aspect. As Damascius points out, Iamblichus' view is in accord with that of Plato himself.

Fr. 3

This could of course come from some other discussion by Iamblichus of the symbolic significance of Prometheus and Epimetheus, but, assuming that he commented on the *Philebus*, it is quite reasonable to suppose that he made these remarks specifically on this passage.

As Westerink points out (*Comm. ad loc.*), this interpretation is based upon the etymology Prometheus = πρόνοια, Epimetheus = ἐπιστροφὴ εἰς τὸ νοητόν. Julian, in his *Lecture to the Uneducated Cynics* (*Or.* VI 182CD), makes this connexion explicit, probably here giving an Iamblichean doctrine:

ὁ γάρ τοι Προμηθεύς, ἡ πάντα ἐπιτροπεύουσα τὰ θνητὰ πρόνοια,

πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον ὥσπερ ὄργανον ὑποβάλλουσα τῇ φύσει, ἅπασι μετέδωκεν ἀσωμάτου λόγου.

Julian has just referred to the *Philebus* passage of our lemma, which might contribute to our feeling that he was familiar with an exegesis of the passage in which Prometheus was allegorically explained, and such an exegesis one might, knowing Julian's loyalties and enthusiasms, assume to be that of Iamblichus.

Prometheus thus allegorised clearly comes into some relationship with the sublunar demiurge discerned by Iamblichus as the subject of Plato's *Sophist* (see *Comm. In Soph.* Fr. 1). They do not seem to be identical, as the 'Sophist' is engaged in ensnaring the souls which come down to his realm, 'θέλγων τὰς ψυχάς τοῖς φυσικοῖς λόγοις, ὡς δυσαποσπάστως ἔχειν ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως', and is thus cast rather in the role of a villain, while Prometheus, especially as described by Julian, is certainly beneficent. They may, however, be aspects of the same being, whom Iamblichus regarded in various lights according to the context. Proclus, in the *Commentary on the Republic* (*In Remp.* II 19, 28ff., and 53, 2ff. Kroll), names Prometheus as the supervisor of human existence, while in the *Commentary on the Timaeus* (III 346, 12ff. Diehl), he identifies Prometheus with the Circle of the Same within us, which a man may free from being bound by Epimetheus, here, as in the *Republic Commentary* (*loc. cit.*), regarded as the force of irrational nature, *not* as the stimulator of *epistrophe.*

Fr. 4

In the case of this passage, as in that of all the rest of those which I shall include as fragments of the *Philebus Commentary*, I must admit to grave misgivings. They are not closely connected with any passage of the *Philebus*, although they could all arise out of a passage in the normal course of a general discussion on the *theoria*, such as we see in the commentaries of Proclus or Olympiodorus. I admit that Damascius may well be quoting from some other work of Iamblichus', or simply referring to Iamblichus' doctrine in general. However, if we accept that Iamblichus wrote a commentary on the dialogue at all, then it seems to me probable that he brought these doctrines of his into the discussion. The form of the notes on the *Philebus* does not make the connexions of thought clear. I am in favour of giving these passages the benefit of the doubt,

particularly as, if they are not included in this collection, it will not be easy to find a home for them, and they are important principles of Iamblichus' philosophy.

The present passage reveals an interesting scholastic dogma. For Iamblichus the Forms proper come into being only in the Intellective (noeric) Realm, not in the Intelligible or Noetic. There they can only exist 'paradigmatically'. To put it more accurately, each of the three elements of the Noetic Triad makes its own contribution to the Forms. The Father (or paternal mind, or Being) may be credited with the *monads* of the Forms, that is to say, this hypostasis is the cause of their being, and holds within itself what one might call 'the forms of the Forms', their unitary prefigurations on a higher level. Zoë, the principle of Life, endows them with life, and Nous proper bestows upon them a formal definiteness, making them Forms (εἰδοποιΐα must be distinct from οὐσία εἰδητική). If these distinctions seem to the reader somewhat redundant, then the reader is not yet a true scholastic Neoplatonist.

I have been unwilling to translate ὑφίστασθαι by any term, though Westerink's 'are constituted' is good enough. Any phrase such as 'come into being' or 'come into existence' seems best avoided.

For Iamblichus' views on the Noetic Triad, see Intro. pp. 36-7.

Fr. 5

This is admittedly a very general principle of both Porphyry's and Iamblichus' philosophy, and I have chosen the lemma *exempli gratia*. For Porphyry we can quote *Sent.* 10:

οὐχ ὁμοίως μὲν νοοῦμεν ἐν πᾶσιν, ἀλλ' οἰκείως τῇ ἑκάστου οὐσίᾳ. ἐν νῷ μὲν γὰρ νοερῶς· ἐν ψυχῇ δὲ λογικῶς· ἐν δὲ τοῖς φυτοῖς σπερματικῶς· ἐν δὲ σώμασιν εἰδωλικῶς· ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐπέκεινα, ἀνεννοήτως τε καὶ ὑπερουσίως.

This is an application of the principle, rather than the basic principle as we have it here, since it refers to the modes of intellection proper to various states of being, whereas the principle refers to modes of existence.

Iamblichus, in the *De Anima* (*ap.* Stob. I 365, 7ff.), attributes this principle originally to Numenius, whom he regards as being

followed more or less faithfully by Plotinus, Amelius and Porphyry. The subject there being discussed is the nature of the soul, and the principle is being employed to assert the soul's essential homogeneity with the hypostases superior to it, a position which Iamblichus opposes (365, 22ff.). He sounds here as if he did not think very highly of the principle either:

εἰσὶ δή τινες, οἳ πᾶσαν τὴν τοιαύτην οὐσίαν ὁμοιομερῆ καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μίαν ἀποφαίνονται, ὡς καὶ ἐν ὁτῳοῦν αὐτῆς μέρει εἶναι τὰ ὅλα· οἵτινες καὶ ἐν τῇ μεριστῇ ψυχῇ τὸν νοητὸν κόσμον καὶ θεοὺς καὶ δαίμονας καὶ τἀγαθὸν καὶ πάντα τὰ πρεσβύτερα γένη αὐτῆς ἐνιδρύουσι καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ὡσαύτως πάντα εἶναι ἀποφαίνονται, οἰκείως μέντοι κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ἐν ἑκάστοις.

It is not in fact inconsistent with Iamblichus' own doctrine of the soul that the soul should contain the hypostases superior to it ψυχικῶς, while preserving its own separate, inferior, existence. We may, however, be able to catch Iamblichus in an inconsistency here, caused by the exigencies of Neoplatonic ideological infighting.

As for the present passage, it arises naturally out of a general discussion of the passage 29A 6-30A 8, or of any subdivision thereof, such as the one which I have selected. Damascius seems here to be following Proclus, whom he quotes just after Porphyry and Iamblichus (130, 4), and from whom he perhaps borrowed the reference to the latter two. Probably following Proclus, Damascius discerns four arguments (ἐπιχειρήματα) produced by Socrates in the passage 28D 5-30C 11, to prove that the universe is governed by Intelligence, the second of which is the argument κατὰ ἀναλογίαν, namely that the bodily elements in us come from the universe, so that so also *a fortiori* should the soul, it being superior to the body. To this the *aporia* is raised as to how in that case the parts are to be distinguished from the whole, a question particularly directed at the independence of the individual soul. It is to this *aporia* that Porphyry and Iamblichus are producing their solution.

As we see from the *De Anima*, their views on the relation of the individual soul to the higher beings in the universe differed, but they could agree at least on the wording of this formula.

Fr. 6

Once again, we cannot be certain that this reflection was contained in Iamblichus' *Commentary*, but its relevance to the text makes it seem probable. It plainly arises from the passage 61A1-B7, where Socrates is reminding Protarchus that the Good (which is to be equated with the Cause) will be found in the mixed life rather than in either of the unmixed ones. I have chosen what seemed to me the most useful section of this passage as a tentative lemma.

Iamblichus makes this the occasion for the remark that the individual on his own, being analogous to the unmixed life, cannot attain to participation in the divine save through communal religious activity, to wit, theurgy. He thus makes this passage into an advertisement for organised religion.[1]

We may note a remark in a similar spirit in Proclus, *In Parm.* (664, 30-2) 'ἡ μερικὴ βούλησις οὐδὲν ἄνευ τῶν ὅλων περαίνειν δύναται', in a context (symbolic exegesis of the characters) which I suspect to be much influenced by Iamblichus.

Fr. 7

As Westerink points out in his note *ad loc.*, Damascius' last sentence solves the problem. The Egg is the equivalent of the πατρικὸς νοῦς, the first element of the noetic triad, and it is therefore in that hypostasis, and not in Intellect proper, the third element of this triad, that Iamblichus declared that the three monads stand revealed.

Typically, Syrianus (sect. 244) has a more elaborate plan, assigning Truth to Being (the Paternal Intellect), Beauty to Life, and Proportion to Intellect, thus developing Iamblichus in a way we often observe him doing in the *Timaeus* Commentary (see refs. in *Comm. ad* Fr. 1 above).

These three monads, as the Neoplatonists termed them, were the subject of much attention in later Neoplatonism. They are discussed in detail, for instance, by Proclus in the *Platonic Theo-*

[1] Westerink *ad loc.* refers suitably to Damascius, *Dub. et Sol.* ch. 38, (I 19, 11-14 Ruelle): ὅτι δὲ ταῦτα καὶ Ἰαμβλίχῳ δύναται συνᾴδειν, ἐκεῖνο ποιοῦμαι τεκμήριον ὅτι τὴν πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ἀναγωγὴν ἑκάστῳ οὐκ ἐφικτὴν εἶναί φησιν, εἰ μὴ συντάξειεν ἑαυτὸ τοῖς πᾶσιν, καὶ μετὰ πάντων ἀναδράμοι πρὸς τὴν κοινὴν πάντων ἀρχήν. Damascius is speaking of the return to the Supreme Principle. He may be referring to the same passage of Iamblichus as that referred to here.

logy, Book II ch. xi-xiii,[1] pp. 139-143, in the course of which discussion Iamblichus is quoted twice, though from his *Platonic Theology*, it seems, rather than from a Commentary on the *Philebus*. Nevertheless, they seem worth recording here.

(1) p. 140, 15ff.:

ταῦτα δή μοι δοκεῖ τὰς τρεῖς τοῦ ὄντος αἰτίας καὶ ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος κατιδὼν ἐν τρισὶ τούτοις ἀφορίζειν τὸ νοητόν, συμμετρίᾳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ κάλλει, καὶ διὰ τούτων τοὺς νοητοὺς θεοὺς ἐκφαίνειν ἐν τῇ Πλατωνικῇ Θεολογίᾳ.

(2) p. 143, 45ff.:

Τριάδος δ' οὖν οὔσης ἐν ἑκάστῳ μικτῷ, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον συμμετρία μάλιστα συνέχει, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἀλήθεια, τὸ δὲ τρίτον κάλλος· ὃ δὴ καὶ τὸν θεῖον Ἰάμβλιχον λέγειν ἀνέπεισεν ὡς ἄρα τὸ νοητὸν πᾶν ἐν τρισὶ τούτοις ὁ Πλάτων ἀφορίζει.

These references make it clear to us that Iamblichus regarded these three monads as key agents in the ordering of the noetic world and its gods. They primarily shed their influence upon the πατρικὸς νοῦς, but through it upon the whole νοητὸν πλάτος. For further details on this matter we must turn to Proclus' exposition, which doubtless owes much to Iamblichus. Since it is not clear how much, however, it is not proper to go into it further here.

[1] Proclus mentions, in *In Remp.* I 295, 24ff., that he wrote a special essay on these three monads, but it has not survived.

IN TIMAEUM

BOOK I

Fr. 1

To Iamblichus must go the credit for proposing a definite order of study for the Platonic dialogues, and for establishing the principle that all elements of the dialogue, including the introductory portions, must be referred to the general σκοπός of the dialogue, which must then be defined.[1]

For instance, Proclus says, in the introduction to his commentary on the *Alcibiades* (11, 11):

καί μοι δοκεῖ καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὁ θεῖος Ἰαμβλιχος τὴν πρώτην αὐτῷ (sc. the *Alcibiades*) διδόναι τάξιν ἐν τοῖς δέκα διαλόγοις ἐν οἷς οἴεται τὴν ὅλην τοῦ Πλάτωνος περιέχεσθαι φιλοσοφίαν, ὥσπερ ἐν σπέρματι τούτῳ τῆς συμπάσης ἐκείνων διεξόδου προειλημμένης.

The ten were, as we learn from the *Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy* (Ch. 26): Alcibiades I, Gorgias, Phaedo, Cratylus, Theaetetus[2] . . . Phaedrus, Symposium, and Philebus, arranged according to their σκοποί, to form a complete course in all branches of philosophy, from a knowledge of oneself to a knowledge of τἀγαθόν.

These ten formed the first cycle of dialogues in Iamblichus' (and his successors') scheme of instruction. They were then summed up in the two dialogues comprising the second cycle, the *Timaeus* and the *Parmenides*.

λέγομεν δὲ ὃ ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος ἐποίησεν· αὐτὸς τοίνυν πάντας εἰς ιβ' διήρει διαλόγους, καὶ τούτων τοὺς μὲν φυσικοὺς ἔλεγεν, τοὺς δὲ θεολογικούς· πάλιν δὲ τοὺς δώδεκα συνήρει εἰς δύο, εἴς τε τὸν Τίμαιον

[1] The definition of a basic subject for each dialogue was already the custom in the School of Gaius, as we may gather from the Anonymous Theaetetus-Commentary. (See Intro. p. 56 n.2). The seeing of images and symbols in the introductory portions, however, does seem to be an innovation of Iamblichus.

[2] Here we must add . . . . *Sophist*, *Statesman* . . . .with Westerink. See Westerink's ed. of *Prolegomena*, pp. XXXVII-XXXVIII. We can gather from Fr. 66 that the *Sophist* was 'theological.'

καὶ τὸν Παρμενίδην, ὧν τὸν μὲν Τίμαιον ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς φυσικοῖς τὸν δὲ Παρμενίδην τοῖς θεολογικοῖς.

The account in the *Prolegomena* does not make the true situation absolutely clear, but this is how it must have been.

We have a good account of Iamblichus' version of the σκοπός of the *Sophist* in the scholia to that dialogue (See *In Soph.* Fr. 1, with my Comm.).

Fr. 2

The whole passage concerns the interpretation of the invasion of the Atlantids (*Tim.* 24E), and will be discussed again as Fr. 23. Here, however, we must note that it was Iamblichus' stated aim in the preface to interpret the dialogue symbolically,[1] and as embodying πᾶσαν τὴν τῶν ἐγκοσμίων καὶ ὑπερκοσμίων πραγματείαν, to quote Fr. 1.

It seems also to have been Iamblichus' view that the dialogue was φυσικός and that in all ones individual exegeses one should bear that in mind, this being a point of dispute with Porphyry. (see Fr. 3).

There is some difficulty, it seems to me, as to the precise reference of ἐν προοιμίοις. I have taken it as referring to the Preface to Book I, but one must recognise that, even taking into account sophistical habits of vagueness, it may mean that Iamblichus was generally accustomed, in his prefaces, either to other commentaries, or to other books of this commentary, to give ἀφορμαί for such interpretations. The lack of a definite article might make the latter interpretation more likely; 'ἐν τοῖς προοιμίοις' would more clearly give the meaning 'in the Preface' (cf. Procl. *In Tim.* I 26, 9: 'ἐν τοῖς προοιμίοις', referring to the first part of the *Timaeus*). On the other hand, Proclus repeatedly refers to this same first part (up to 27C) as προοίμια, without the article (e.g. I 68, 30 'ἐκ προοιμίων' I 223, 6 'ἐκ προοιμίων'), so that I feel justified in assuming that Proclus is here referring to Iamblichus' Preface.

Fr. 3

Proclus sums up thus (19, 22):

λέγει δὴ οὖν ὁ λόγος τὸν ἀπολειπόμενον ὡς ἀσύμμετρον τοῖς φυσικοῖς

[1] At any rate, ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον.

λόγοις ἀπεῖναι, βούλεσθαι δ' ἂν παρεῖναι τούτοις, εἰ περὶ τὰ νοητὰ διατρίψειν ἔμελλον.

I feel that this is Proclus' summary rather than Iamblichus' own, although it expresses Iamblichus' interpretation. There is no reason, on the other hand, not to attribute all the preceding passage to Iamblichus.[1] The infinitives ἀπολείπεσθαι . . . εἶναι make this clear.

Iamblichus' exegesis here is put forward as a contradiction or 'heightening' of that of Porphyry, who is just previously reported as considering that the absence of the fourth member through illness (ἀσθένεια τοῦ σώματος) is mentioned to show that only illness could keep one away from such an important gathering, and also showing how friends will make apologies for friends, ὅταν τι δοκῶσι παρὰ τὸ κοινῇ δόξαν <οὐκ> ὀρθῶς ποιεῖν. (accepting Radermacher's addition of <οὐκ>).

This is an 'ethical' comment rather than a 'physical' one, which explains Proclus's epithet ὑψηλολογούμενος in regard to Iamblichus, and his following comparison (p. 19, 24ff. D): καὶ σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ πρὸ τῆς φυσιολογίας ὁ μὲν ἐξηγεῖται πολιτικώτερον, ὁ Πορφύριος, εἰς τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀναφέρων καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα καθήκοντα, ὁ δὲ (sc. Iamblichus) φυσικώτερον· δεῖν γὰρ τῷ προκειμένῳ σκοπῷ πάντα σύμφωνα εἶναι· φυσικὸς δὲ ὁ διάλογος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἠθικός. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οἱ φιλόσοφοι διατάττονται περὶ τούτων·

I must confess that δεῖν disturbs me. Why the infinitive, instead of δεῖ? Admittedly P reads δεῖ, but it is in the minority. Also the whole statement is odd. Even with δεῖ, it is more appropriate to someone defending his own views, than to a commentator on those views. For a commentator, a phrase is left out, e.g. '(And this is the better way of taking this section) for . . .'

We may take it, I think, that this is in fact a quotation from Iamblichus' own defence of his exegesis of the dialogue. It seems a good, indeed an extreme, example of γὰρ meaning 'for, (he says),' —here transposed into 'for (he says that) . . .'.

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[1] This interpretation of 'weakness' turns up again remarkably in Hermeias' *Comm. In Phaedr. ad* 234E 'ὑπὸ τῆς ἐμῆς οὐδενείας' (p. 41, 22f. *Couvr.*): τὸ 'τῆς οὐδενείας' οὐκ ἀσθένειαν ἀλλὰ δυνάμεως ὑπερβολὴν σημαίνει. τὸ γὰρ δύναμιν ἔχον περὶ τὰ νοητὰ ἐνεργεῖν ἀδυναμίαν ἔχει τοῦ προσέχειν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς. This is very probably Iamblichean, but I refrain from including it as a fragment. That would belong to a later stage of investigation.

Fr. 4

Here again we find Iamblichus interpreting on a different plane to Porphyry, who continues to give an *ethical* interpretation, to the effect that friends should help each other both in word and deed. Iamblichus uses the passage to introduce a theory of ὁμοιότης between physical and noetic things. Both as a Platonist and as a theurgist, Iamblichus maintained the doctrine that all things are in all things, but in the appropriate form (οἰκείως),[1] and that noetic and divine things leave σύμβολα here, which it is the business of the theurgist to recognise.

ἀλλὰ παρασπᾶται . . . πρὸς αὐτά. Iamblichus uses παρασπάομαι on a number of occasions to express this notion of a lower level of being 'drawing off' some power or influence from a higher (*In Tim.* fr. 14, *De Myst.* III 27: 164, *VP* 1, 12). The three members present are in this case to be seen as drawing off from the Absent Guest, whom Iamblichus has postulated as 'higher' than they, (cf. Fr. 3), and a monad, some principle of unification, even as physical science draws off certain principles of order from metaphysics. Ἀναπλήρωσις is thus a description of the attempt of the lower orders to imitate completely the higher (cf. the way in which Time is described as imitating Eternity, fr. 64).

Fr. 5

Of course οἱ μέν and οἱ δέ in Proclus may refer to anyone from the very earliest philosophers or commentators to his own contemporaries. In this case, however, it seems easy enough to identify the parties under discussion, though less easy to decide why he has used this allusive method of referring to Porphyry and Iamblichus at this point.

We have first heard (p. 19, 24ff. D, v. fr. 3) how Porphyry treats this part of the dialogue πολιτικώτερον, while Iamblichus takes it φυσικώτερον. On fr. 4 also, (p. 24, 12ff. D) Porphyry ἠθικὸν ἐν τούτοις ἀναγράφει . . . while Iamblichus gives the more 'physical' explanation. Note also Iamblichus' view (p. 19, 27ff.) that the

[1] The principle is most clearly stated in Procl. E. T. prop. 103. See Dodds' note, p. 254 of his edition. Iamblichus himself, in the *De Anima* (ap. Stob. I 365 Wachs.), attributes it first to Numenius. As a principle of theurgy, it pervades the *De Mysteriis*. See also *In Phileb.* Fr. 5 and Comm.

dialogue is φυσικός, and that all parts of it should be in harmony with the overall theme. The comparison with Pythagorean practice is also significant. Iamblichus dealt with these matters in *VP* 66, and 103-5, though not in just such words.

I venture to translate τὴν τοῦ ὄμματος διακάθαρσιν as 'the purging of (the mind's) vision', by comparing the phrases in *VP* 31: 'ὀμματοποιὰ τῆς ψυχῆς . . . καὶ καθαρτικὰ τῆς . . . τοῦ νοῦ τυφλώσεως.' The phrase is, no doubt, a reminiscence of Plato, *Rep.* VII, 533 D 2, 'καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἐν βορβόρῳ βαρβαρικῷ τινι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα κατορωρυγμένον ἠρέμα ἕλκει καὶ ἀνάγει ἄνω, κ.τ.λ.

Fr. 6

Proclus in fact inclines, as he goes on to say (55, 16ff.) towards the latter alternative, that a summary is being summarised.

It was the general belief of ancient commentators that the summary at the beginning of the *Timaeus* was a summary of the actual *Republic* as we have it, but a second telling of the *Republic* was postulated, with the present audience plus the Absent Guest. The question is as to the form that this second telling took. Was it a complete telling, or itself a summary? Rather surprisingly, for men who often take a great interest in details, neither Proclus nor Iamblichus feel the point worth arguing, although as Proclus subsequently points out, an ascending summariness of description would accord well with the principles on which reality is constructed, and thus a summarised version on the previous day also is to be favoured.

Fr. 7

This comes at the end of a fairly comprehensive doxography, which I will begin by summarising (75, 30ff.).

(1) 'Some' (*Crantor*—ὁ πρῶτος τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐξηγητής) consider the Atlantis Story to be ἱστορία ψιλή, and Crantor tells a story of its confirmation at Plato's request by the priests of Egypt.

(2) 'Others' say it is by no means just myth and invention, but contains a representation (ἔνδειξις) of τὰ ἀεὶ ὄντα κατὰ τὸν κόσμον ἢ γιγνόμενα.

(3) 'Others' do not deny that these things happened in this way, but consider that they are to be taken as εἰκόνες τῶν ἐν τῷ παντὶ

προουσῶν ἐναντιώσεων and they quote Heraclitus: 'πόλεμος πατὴρ πάντων.'

Of these:

(a) 'some' refer the reference εἰς τοὺς ἀπλανεῖς καὶ πλάνητας.

(b) 'others' make the Atlantids the planets, and refer the fight to the 'contrary revolution'. (ἀντιπεριφορά), the other side (the Athenians) prevailing διὰ τὴν μίαν τοῦ κόσμου στροφήν.

(*Amelius* is given as a strong supporter of this latter interpretation, (which is only a refinement of 3(a)), pointing to the fact of the seven-fold division of the island of Atlantis in the *Critias*.)

(4) 'Others' (*Origen*) refer it εἰς δαιμόνων τινῶν ἐναντίωσιν, one group good, the other evil, one superior πλήθει, the other δυνάμει, one group winning, the other being beaten.

(5) 'Others' (*Numenius*) refer it to a conflict of 'nobler souls', who are nurselings of Athena, (τῆς 'Αθηνᾶς τροφίμων) with certain producers of Generation (γενεσιουργῶν), who also belong to the God who oversees Generation (προσήκουσι τῷ τῆς γενέσεως ἐφόρῳ θεῷ), that is, Poseidon, cf. Porph. *De Antro* 32-35, where Numenius is referred to.

(6) 'Others' (*Porphyry*), combining Numenius and Origen ('ὡς οἴονται') make the battle one between souls and daemons, τῶν μὲν δαιμόνων καταγωγῶν ὄντων, τῶν δὲ ψυχῶν ἀναγομένων. 'These divide daemons into three types, θεῖοι, 'relative' (κατὰ σχέσιν), and evil. It is these last with whom the war is waged, as the souls are in the process of entering bodies.

Against all these, then, Iamblichus and Syrianus take their stand, making the conflict much more general than any of those criticised. As to whether Iamblichus or Syrianus is here being directly quoted, I would declare, on the whole, for Syrianus. However, various elements must be distinguished. First, the doxography may very well originally be Porphyry's, though in its present form (with the addition of Amelius and Porphyry himself), it may be adjudged to Iamblichus. The passage ἀλλ' οὗτοί γε . . . τῶν δυνάμεων we may regard as a summary by Proclus; but the passage from ἐπεὶ γὰρ πάντα . . . I allot to Syrianus, who will however be using Iamblichus' terminology, and we may therefore take the language as Iamblichean. (cf. frr. 63 and 68 notes.) If two authorities are quoted by Proclus as agreeing, we must imagine, I think, some such original phrase (based on Proclus' own usage)

as ὡς ὁ Πορφύριός φησι κἀγὼ πείθομαι (for Iamblichus), or ὡς ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχός φησι κἀγὼ πείθομαι (for Syrianus). In each case the words of the person agreed with will be substantially those used, though I stop short of regarding them as a direct quotation.

As far as philosophy is concerned, Iamblichus here takes the line of generalising the conflict of which previous commentators have given partial versions. He sees the ἐναντίωσις as going all through the cosmos and beyond it, as far as τὸ ἕν and the Dyad after it. If this is to accord with what we learn of Iamblichus' metaphysics elsewhere, this must refer to the second One and the Dyad of Limit and the Unlimited immediately after it. Since Iamblichus is alone in postulating two Ones, Syrianus would make this One the primal one.[1]

For Iamblichus, again, τὰ γένη τοῦ ὄντος will have a special meaning. They should be the γένη of the noetic world, dependent on τὸ ὄν, itself the product of the Second One and the Dyad, which sits at the summit of the noetic world. All classes of things depending on it partake of the Platonic categories of ταὐτόν, θάτερον, κίνησις and στάσις, and all things in the cosmos partake of these classes.

We see here, as often elsewhere, Iamblichus trumping Porphyry by moving the reference of the Platonic text to a more exalted level. Porphyry is concerned with intra-cosmic struggles; Iamblichus ascends to the threshold of the Unspeakable One, to analyse the roots of ἐναντίωσις.

Fr. 8


It seems as if Iamblichus has simply been caught in inaccuracy. It would be interesting to know who, if anyone, he was following in this. It is also reported that others, among them Theon ὁ Πλατωνικός (of Smyrna), make Critias and Glaucon the sons of Callaeschrus.

However, Proclus was wrong, and caused himself difficulty,

[1] But cf. Syr. *In Metaph.* 112, 14: Ἔλεγον μὲν οἱ ἄνδρες μετὰ τὴν μίαν τῶν πάντων ἀρχήν, ἣν τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ὑπερούσιον ἓν ἠξίουν καλεῖν, δύο εἶναι τῶν ὅλων αἰτίας, μονάδα καὶ τὴν ἀπειροδύναμον δυάδα, καὶ ταύτας τὰς ἀρχὰς καθ' ἑκάστην τῶν ὄντων τάξιν οἰκείως ἀπετίθεντο· κ.τ.λ. 'οἱ ἄνδρες' are those who believe in the ideas, in Ar. *Metaph.* M 1079 a 15ff., but the philosophy is that of Syrianus. We have here a One and then a Monad coupled with a Dyad. The monad and dyad would be Iamblichus' pair πέρας - ἄπειρον, which follows on the Second One. (See *Intro.*, p. 29 f.)

when the identified Critias here with the member of the Thirty, of whom in fact this must be the grandfather (see Burnet, *Gk. Phil.* I 338 and Taylor, *Comm. on Tim.* p. 23). Proclus leaves out two generations, a Critias (this man's grandfather), and a Dropides.

The genealogy, as given by Proclus, is as follows:



It requires a further 'Dropides-Critias' after the first pair, if we assume the grandfather of the Critias of 'The Thirty' to be our subject. Could Iamblichus have made *the* Glaucon son of Dropides? Surely this would confuse his family tree intolerably. He may have postulated *a* Glaucon after Dropides, making the first Critias a grandson of Dropides, in which case he may have read 'Δρωπίδου τοῦ ἐπιπάππου in 20E 1, 'Dropides, my grandfather's grandfather'. The reading of all the Proclus MSS (except the *recensio vulgata*) 'πάππου' could only stand if it were being used loosely,[1] in which case the Platonic MSS reading προπάππου is a 'correction'.

Fr. 9

What has preceded this is some literary criticism from Longinus (of whom Proclus repeats Plotinus's comment that he was φιλόλογος καὶ οὐ φιλόσοφος.) Longinus is impressed by Plato's use of ἀρχαῖον (of the ἔργον), παλαιός (of the λόγος), and οὐ νέος (of the ἀνήρ),

[1] i.e. 'old man Dropides'.

all to express the same concept, ('old') and takes it as evidence of Plato's concern for ὀνομάτων ὥρα καὶ ποικιλία.[1] Origen denies that Plato is aiming at a contrived effect, quoting Aristoxenus to the effect that the characteristics of philosophers extend to the sounds they utter. Plato is thus spontaneously expressing his nature, while striving for accuracy in his representation of reality.

It is to these literary comments that Iamblichus is reacting with the phrase ἡ πολυπραγμοσύνη τῆς λέξεως.

The final phrase (from ταῦτα γὰρ . . .) is a good example of a 'continuative' γάρ. It is plainly a report of Iamblichus' opinion, although Proclus agrees with it, and thus dispenses with an indirect speech construction.

This we shall find to be the commonest form of quotation, Iamblichus' explanation being thus subtly assimilated to Proclus'.

If we assume this, then it is fairly plain that Iamblichus made reference to Longinus and Origen (no doubt using Porphyry) and that the previous section will also be to some extent Iamblichean. To include it as a quotation would, however, be unsafe, as Proclus might be freer in his borrowing there. That Iamblichus mentioned those he was criticising is, however, inevitable. This situation will recur regularly.

l.4. καὶ τὸ ἓν ὅπως ποικίλλεται. In Fr. 27 (I 218, 8ff.), we find Iamblichus speaking of τὴν εἰδητικὴν πᾶσαν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ποικιλίαν. He likes the notion (cf. also τὴν ποικιλίαν τῶν δυνάμεων in Fr. 7).

ll. 4-5. οἱ αὐτοὶ λόγοι πόσην ἐξαλλαγὴν ἐπιφαίνουσιν. The idea of the same λόγοι manifesting themselves ψυχικῶς, φυσικῶς and ὑλικῶς in the various levels of reality is proper to all those who believed that all things were in all, but οἰκείως. (cf. Fr. 4 Comm.). Since this seems to be an essential part of Iamblichus' argument here, it may be taken as useful evidence of his having formulated this principle.

l.7. μετὰ τῆς ὁμοιότητος παμπόλλην τὴν ἑτερότητα δεικνύντες· The conflict between ὁμοιότης and ἑτερότης in the material world comes to the fore in Fr. 46, where it is made a distinction between entities above and below the Moon.

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[1] On the debate on ποικιλία cf. *Anon. Proleg.* ch. 14.

Fr. 10

This passage begins as a refutation of Origen, but goes on to become quite an extensive exposition of Iamblichus' metaphysics. Proclus seems simply to have gone on copying.

The text after ἐνδείκνυσθαι is joined to what precedes it by οὖν, which would tend to disqualify it, but for the unequivocal φησί. The οὖν may well, then, be Iamblichean. Similarly the final section, beginning διὰ τί δὲ . . . seems impossible to separate from the first διὰ τί passage, so that it seems safe to say that everything but the final editorial phrase is Iamblichean. Had Proclus introduced the second διὰ τί as his own question, some phrase such as φαίη τις ἄν would be demanded.

Origen had confined himself simply to speculating as to why Solon is described as ἐλευθεριώτατος, and he gives three naturalistic suggestions, which Iamblichus brushes aside and rises above. It looks as if Iamblichus is here directly criticising Origen, and therefore quoting him, but it may be that Porphyry reported and adopted Origen's exegesis, and is thus an invisible link.

Iamblichus' own explanation is a good application of his principle, enunciated in Fr. 5, that truths of philosophy should first be expressed εἰκονικῶς. Here Solon and Critias are pressed into service as images of the various factors in the process of intracosmic creation.

Solon here takes a demiurgic role—τὸ ἀπόλυτον τοῦ νοῦ seems to me to signify his position as νοῦς ἀπόλυτος or χωριστός. Within the Demiurge, he represents the 'pure' or 'separated' moment of the Demiurgic Intellect, as opposed to Critias, who represents the ἀχώριστος aspect, the Demiurgic Intellect *in* the cosmos. Solon is the πρωτουργὸς αἰτία of the material world, while Critias is its προσεχὴς καὶ δευτερουργὸς αἰτία. The Demiurgic Intellect creates by μίμησις of the realm of ideas, which he projects onto the cosmos. He projects them, however, through the medium of the encosmic Demiurge. It may be that this secondary Demiurge is to be identified with the ὑπὸ σελήνην δημιουργός whom Iamblichus considered to be the subject of the *Sophist* (see *In Soph.* Fr. 1), although 'Critias' is not here confined to the sublunar region. This secondary Demiurge must correspond to the νέοι θεοὶ of *Tim.* 41A ff.

Finally, Matter resists, with disorderly motion, the efforts of the λόγοι to bring it to order. The λόγοι here are simply the second

Demiurge expressed differently, the proximate cause of creation as opposed to the hypercosmic primal cause.

As I have said above, both as a view of Iamblichus' cosmogony, and of his principles of exegesis, this is a most valuable passage. We can see here the origins of Proclus' own elaborate symbolism of the *dialogi personae*, as practised both here and in the *Parmenides Commentary*, particularly Book I.

Fr. 11

This piece of patriotic vaunting has the air of being asserted by Iamblichus as a counterweight to the praising of the Egyptians, who are here described as partaking particularly in most ancient records, by reason of the purity of the air above them, which enables them clearly to examine the heavens, and because they have never been destroyed by flood or ecpyrosis, as have other nations (Tim. 22CD).

There is no record here that Iamblichus drew the 'high' interpretation from this passage, which is, in Proclus' words, τοιαῦτά ἐστι τὰ θεῖα πάντα αἴτια, προκλητικὰ τῶν τελειοτέρων δυνάμεων, καὶ διὰ τῆς προκλήσεως ταύτης ἀποπληρούμενα θειοτέρων καὶ ὁλικωτέρων νοήσεων ἀπ' αὐτῶν.

Solon's drawing out of the Egyptian priest is thus a symbol of the manner in which τὰ θεῖα αἴτια coax νοήσεις out of the powers above them and are thus fulfilled. One would have expected Iamblichus to have propounded such an explanation, and we are faced with the awkward problem as to whether perhaps, when Proclus found himself in complete agreement with Iamblichus' interpretation, as he must frequently have done, he simply appropriated it without acknowledgement. Word-analysis may tell us something, but cannot carry us to complete certainty, as along with Iamblichus' views, Proclus obviously appropriated his terminology, which he put to his own use.

All we have here, then, explicitly, is this patriotic note. With this we may, I think, compare a passage in the *De Mysteriis* (VI. 7; 249) where Iamblichus, in discussing the Egyptian habit of threatening the gods (which he is defending by saying that the threats are really only directed to περίγειοι δαίμονες), cannot refrain from contrasting with this the behaviour of the Chaldaeans, his *persona* (the Egyptian priest Abammon) wearing thin in the process:

Διόπερ παρὰ Χαλδαίοις, παρ' οἷς διακέκριται καθαρὸς ὁ πρὸς μόνους τοὺς θεοὺς λόγος, οὐδαμοῦ ἀπειλὴ λέγεται· Αἰγύπτιοι δὲ συμμιγνύοντες ἅμα μετὰ τῶν θείων συνθημάτων καὶ τοὺς δαιμονίους λόγους, χρῶνται ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ ταῖς ἀπειλαῖς.

A remark, surely, hardly in keeping with the patriotism of a senior Egyptian priest.

Again, in a mention of sacred languages, (VII, 4; 256), the Assyrians are mentioned before the Egyptians:

Διότι γὰρ τῶν ἱερῶν ἐθνῶν, ὥσπερ Ἀσσυρίων τε καὶ Αἰγυπτίων, οἱ θεοὶ τὴν ὅλην διάλεκτον ἱεροπρεπῆ κατέδειξαν . . .

Hipparchus of Nicaea (fl. c. 161-126 B.C.), the great astronomer, had a profound respect for Babylonian astronomy, and seems to have learned a great deal from it. It seems likely that his information on things Chaldaean was acquired through the medium of a Hellenised Babylonian astronomer of his own day, Kidenas, whose name (Ki-din-nu) has turned up on cuneiform astronomical tablets from Babylon.[1] The period of 270,000 is, of course, nonsense,[2] but may have been a boast which Kidenas, rather than Hipparchus, first made.

This fragment of Hipparchus seems to be recorded nowhere else, and no complete collection of his fragments has yet been made, so that one cannot be certain from what work of his this comes. It does not figure in his surviving *Commentary on Eudoxus and Aratus*.

That Iamblichus takes this information directly from Hipparchus I very much doubt, but I am unable to discover an intermediary. I also doubt that Iamblichus is original in his claim that the Chaldaeans calculated back over whole Great Years, but, again, I can find no other authority for the statement.

l. 8. τῶν ἑπτὰ κοσμοκρατόρων. As a title of the *planets*, κοσμο-

[1] See RE article 'Hipparchos' v. 8:2 col. 1675, and Franz Cumont, *Astrology and Religion Among the Greeks and Romans* Ch. II pp. 34 ff. (Dover Ed.).

[2] Unless it means merely that they calculated lunar and solar eclipses back that far, which would be perfectly practicable. The Scholiast, we may note, is prepared to believe this testimony if the 'years' are understood to be the time taken to traverse 10 or 20 minutes of a degree of the Zodiac, but otherwise "Who would believe you?" I would say to Iamblichus". Cicero, (De Div. I 36) quotes a figure of 470,000 years, so that the figure given here *may* be a mistake.

κράτωρ does not seem to be attested earlier than *Vettius Valens* (2nd Cent. A.D.), 171, 6. We find it used in the *De Mysteriis* (II 3:71) to describe certain archons: τὰ δὲ τῶν ἀρχόντων (φάσματα), εἰ μέν σοι δοκοῦσιν οὗτοι εἶναι οἱ κοσμοκράτορες οἱ τὰ ὑπὸ σελήνην στοιχεῖα διοικοῦντες, ἔσται ποικίλα μὲν, ἐν τάξει δὲ διακεκοσμημένα, (cf. Intro. p. 51). These must here be identified with the planets, who are thus credited with administering the elements (whether material or daemonic) of the physical world.

Fr. 12

In this passage we find Iamblichus reacting, as elsewhere, to a symbolical, 'ethical', interpretation by Porphyry. Proclus reports Porphyry as follows (36C):

"The philosopher Porphyry transfers the description from the phenomena to souls, and says, forsooth, that in these sometimes the spirited part (τὸ θυμοειδές) becomes overheated, and this ecpyrosis is the destruction of the 'men' within us (τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπων):

'and his eyes were like gleaming fire'

says Homer of the enraged Agamemnon (*Il.* A 104).

But when the desiring part (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) is flooded over by the creative wetness (ὑπὸ τῆς γενεσιουργοῦ ὑγρότητος) and is unnerved and submerged in the streams of matter, then this is another death of intelligent souls, 'to become wet', as Heraclitus says.

And if this is asserted correctly, as many as have their spirited part slackened, and symmetrical to a concern for secondary things (σύμμετρον εἰς τὴν τῶν δευτέρων ἐπιμέλειαν), remain unvexed by the passions of the spirit; for this is the meaning of the 'hollow places, near to water'. And those who have their desiring part keyed up (συντονώτερον) and roused up from matter, are unvexed by those of desire; for this is the meaning of the 'high places'. For the spirited part is somehow by nature quick of movement and energetic, while the desiring part is slack and weak; and it is the work of a man skilled in music (μουσικός) to slacken the tension of the spirit, while tightening up the flatness (τὸ ἐκμελές) of Desire."

Porphyry is being 'ethical' again, using here the same argument (with Heraclitus quotation) as he employed in *De Antro Nympharum* (10, p. 63, 5ff. Nauck). But he is also giving a symbolical inter-

pretation, and to disagree with him, as elsewhere, Iamblichus is prepared to be literal.

The problem here arises as to whether Proclus is quoting Porphyry directly or through Iamblichus, who must have quoted him in some form. I feel that Proclus normally used the original text of Porphyry, and does here, but that would not prevent him from using Iamblichus' account of Porphyry in certain instances without checking. Where criticism is mingled with quotation, then I feel that we have Iamblichus' report of Porphyry.

Fr. 13

I feel that the quotation cannot safely be continued beyond 120, 21. Proclus goes on from this point to expand on and defend Iamblichus' adherence to the 'rains' theory as the cause of the Nile's flow, beginning 'εἰ δέ τις αἰτιᾶται ταύτην τὴν ἀπόδοσιν . . .'. In this passage he appears to be answering the negative criticisms made by Aelius Aristides in his 'Egyptian Oration'. Aristides advanced no theory of his own, but poured much scorn on all varieties of the 'rains' theory. It is possible that Iamblichus in fact countered Aristides, but the manner in which Proclus goes on suggests that this is his own contribution to the debate.

Likewise, Iamblichus necessarily mentioned in some form Porphyry's theory (of the porousness of the land of Egypt, which makes water well up out of the earth in summer (In Tim. I 119, 16ff. Sodano fr. XIV)). But we cannot be sure, as usual, that Proclus has not gone directly to Porphyry. It is Porphyry's interpretation of the phrases κάτωθεν ἐπανιέναι and σῴζει λυόμενος (22D 6) that draws Iamblichus' criticism.

πρωτίστην μὲν αἰτίαν . . . Iamblichus is careful to put before the material cause the truest 'physical' cause, the Will of the Gods who have been assigned to watch over Egypt, and the defining plan (ὅρος) of Creation given to them; only then will he discuss the lower, more immediate cause.

ἐν τοῖς ἀντοίκοις. ἄντοικοι are those who live on the *opposite* side of the equator to us, but on the *same* meridian, contra LSJ. cf. Cleomedes, *de motu circulari* I, 2, 12.

τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ὄμβρων αὔξησιν. The 'rains' theory goes back

at least to Eudoxus[1] (Aetius. IV, 1, 7, p. 386 1ff. Diels), and Eratosthenes considered the matter to have been settled by the fact that travellers had actually been there, as Proclus reports, (121, 8ff.); Ἐρατοσθένης δὲ οὐκέτι φησὶν οὐδὲ ζητεῖν χρῆναι περὶ τῆς αὐξήσεως τοῦ Νείλου, σαφῶς καὶ ἀφικομένων τινῶν εἰς τὰς τοῦ Νείλου πηγὰς καὶ τοὺς ὄμβρους τοὺς γιγνομένους ἑωρακότων, ὥστε κρατύνεσθαι τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους ἀπόδοσιν.

Iamblichus may well have quoted Eratosthenes to support his view, but we cannot be sure that this is his quotation. It is good to see Iamblichus adopting what has turned out to be the correct theory.

Fr. 14

We find a similar theory of participation in the divine in Sallustius, *De Diis*, XVIII, pp. 32-4 Nock.

'. . . τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι πάντα τὸν κόσμον τῆς τῶν θεῶν προνοίας ἀπολαύειν ὁμοίως, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν αἰωνίως, τὰ δὲ κατὰ χρόνον, καὶ τὰ μὲν πρώτως, τὰ δὲ δευτέρως μετέχειν ἐκείνης . . . καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὡς ἔοικεν οἱ τὰς ἑορτὰς καταστησάμενοι καὶ ἀποφράδας ἐποίησαν ἐν αἷς τὰ μὲν ἤργει τῶν ἱερῶν, τὰ δὲ ἐκλείετο, τῶν δὲ καὶ τὸν κόσμον ἀφῄρουν, πρὸς τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀφοσιούμενοι φύσεως·

The example of temples being closed serves the same purpose as that of the birthdays of the gods laid down by οἱ ἱεροὶ θεσμοί, though the two examples are in a sense opposites.

Nock recognises this as Iamblichean (pp. LXXXIX, XCIX), but only quotes *De Myst.* III 12, on the subject of variations in oracular power, where the same type of argument is used. The whole is an application of the principle: ἡ μὲν πρόνοια τῶν θεῶν διατείνει πανταχοῦ, ἐπιτηδειότητος δὲ μόνον πρὸς ὑποδοχὴν δεῖται (Sall. ch. XV), which, if not Iamblichus' own words, must certainly be Iamblichean.[2]

Applied to human recipients, this becomes a doctrine of grace. It is brought up in prop. 140 of Pr. E.T. (see Dodds' note ad loc.):

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[1] Fr. 288, Lasserre: Εὔδοξος τοὺς ἱερεῖς φησι λέγειν τὰ ὄμβρια τῶν ὑδάτων κατὰ τὴν ἀντιπερίστασιν τῶν ὡρῶν· ὅταν γὰρ ἡμῖν ᾖ θέρος, τοῖς ὑπὸ τὸν θερινὸν τροπικὸν οἰκοῦσι, τότε τοῖς ὑπὸ τὸν χειμερινὸν τροπικὸν ἀντοίκοις χειμών ἐστιν, ἐξ ὧν τὸ πλημμυροῦν ὕδωρ καταρρήγνυται.

[2] The phrase ἐπιτήδειος πρὸς ὑποδοχήν is frequent in *De Myst.*, e.g. II 2, I, 11, V 23.

'οὔτε τὸ μετέχειν αὐτῶν (the gods) ἐπιτήδειον κωλύεται τῆς μεθέξεως, ἀλλ' ἅμα τέ τι πρὸς τὴν μετουσίαν ἕτοιμον γίνεται κἀκεῖναι πάρεισιν, οὔτε τότε παραγενόμεναι οὔτε πρότερον ἀποῦσαι, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαι. ἐὰν οὖν τι τῶν περὶ γῆν ἐπιτήδειον ᾖ μετέχειν, καὶ τούτῳ πάρεισι·' and more especially in Prop. 142: πᾶσι μὲν οἱ θεοὶ πάρεισιν ὡσαύτως· οὐ πάντα δὲ ὡσαύτως τοῖς θεοῖς πάρεστιν . . .'.

γενέθλια θεῶν. Festugière has an interesting note on this notion, (note *ad loc.*, I p. 195 n. 4 of his trans.). He can find no ancient parallels for this use of γενέθλια, but calls to our attention some beliefs connected with Christian saints, e.g. St. Thecla at Seleucia in Isauria. It must have been the case with many pagan deities also, for instance Asclepius, that they were thought to have taken up residence in a certain area at a certain point in time, this being then their κλῆρος, and their 'birthday' in the area could thus be celebrated. What precisely the ἱεροὶ θεσμοί were escapes me; perhaps various sets of priestly records, prescribing the correct times and methods for festivals and sacrifices, cf. the ἱερὰ γράμματα of *Tim.* 23E (Fr. 14a).

Fr. 14A

This has very doubtful status as a fragment. It seems reasonable to conclude that if Iamblichus *might* say something in a certain place, he *does* not in fact say it. On the other hand, I can find no other instance where Proclus refers to Iamblichus in just this way,[1] though we must compare fr. 34.

The reference follows the report of Porphyry that daemons measure time by chiliads, which no doubt formed part of Porphyry's commentary on the passage.

τῶν κοσμικῶν θείων εἰδῶν. I see no reason for suspecting θείων with Kroll. Iamblichus is quite capable of adding two adjectives to a noun without separating them, cf. fr. 68 'ἡ μέση διπλῆ φύσις' of Time. These κοσμικὰ θεία εἴδη will be those ἐγκόσμιοι θεοί who are φρουρητικοί. The division of Sallustius, *De Diis* c. VI, p. 12 Nock: τῶν δὲ ἐγκοσμίων (θεῶν) οἱ μὲν εἶναι ποιοῦσι τὸν κόσμον, οἱ δὲ αὐτῶν ψυχοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ ἐκ διαφόρων ὄντα ἁρμόζουσιν, οἱ δὲ ἡρμοσμένον φρουροῦσι is no doubt Iamblichean.

[1] We may compare, e.g. III, 179, 29f. 'Πλάτων μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα ἂν φαίη περὶ τούτων καὶ εἶπεν ἐν Κρατύλῳ σαφῶς.

'Forms' as such are not active or personal principles, and yet φρουρά should mean some active surveillance. I am inclined to take εἴδη, then, in this case, as a variation of γένη.

If this is a record of Iamblichus' interpretation of the passage, he is employing the exegetical principle of 'analogy', a basic element in his explanation of the prefactory portions of the dialogues. The long survival of the sacred writings are thus *analogous* to the unfailing providence of the cosmic gods and daemons.

Fr. 15

The exegesis being rejected is that of Porphyry. Porphyry, we learn, postulates Hephaestus as the 'practical mind' (τεχνικὸς νοῦς) [1] and the sphere of the Moon as Earth—this, he says, is called the aetherial earth by the Egyptians. Therefore he says that the souls, created by God, partaking in the 'practical mind', are sown in the body of the Moon, inasmuch as the practical ones among the souls have their administration there, possessing bodies which are effluxes of the etherial bodies. And the 9000 years he assimilates to the souls in this fashion; the ten thousand year circuit of the soul, as he says, is that which ascends and descends through the five planets, so that each may have two thousand-year periods; not, however, in succession. The time, however, is successive by overlapping; for it overlaps itself; wherefore there come to be nine lives in all, which he symbolises by the nine thousand years, and they make ninth-day sacrifices to the dead, and to those that are born, similarly, some give names on the ninth day, employing as symbols the periods of generation and degeneration. And so he did not on this occasion adopt the ten year period, but the number of *nine* thousand, in order that they might be about the earth when drawing near to the ten thousand year cycle.

Iamblichus roundly condemns such speculations. If Athens is stated to have been adopted by Athena 1000 years before Sais,

[1] We find the τεχνικὸς νοῦς occurring in the *Theol. Ar.* p. 79, 5 De Falco (58 Ast), at the beginning of the discussion of the Decad. There it seems to be doing the work of the Demiurge, or possibly the sublunary Demiurge: πολλάκις ἔφθημεν εἰπόντες τὸν τεχνικὸν νοῦν πρὸς τὰς ἀριθμοῦ ἐμφερείας καὶ ἀφομοιώσεις ὡς πρὸς παράδειγμά τι παντελὲς ἀπεργάσασθαι τὴν τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ πάντων κατασκευήν τε καὶ σύστασιν. He is not there identified with Hephaestus, however, who is made an attribute of the number nine, (77, 23 De Falco.), as he is by Proclus here.

it is because it participates more fully by that proportion (9 to 8) in Athena. It was an *aporia* (146, 26) as to why the number 9 should relate to Athena, when it is well known to be proper to Hephaestus, while 1000, as a cube, is χθόνιος. The solution is that this number is proper ταῖς χθονίαις τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς λήξεσιν. It is also explained earlier (146, 11ff.) how 9000 is superior to 8000:

συμβαίνουσι δὲ καὶ ταῖς ζωαῖς οἱ ἀριθμοὶ κατὰ τὸν εἰκότα λόγον. ὁ μέν γε ὀκτακισχιλία κύβος ἐστὶν ἐπὶ κύβον, ὁ δὲ ἕτερος ἐπίπεδον τετραγωνικὸν ἐπὶ κύβον οὐκοῦν ὃ μὲν ἐβάθυνε τὸ ἐπίπεδον καὶ τοῦτο διὰ τῆς ἀορίστου δυάδος, ὅ δὲ αὐτὸ φυλάττων ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἐπίπεδον ἐν ὁμοιότητι καὶ τελειότητι τῇ ἀπὸ τριάδος οὐδὲ τὸν κύβον ἀφῆκεν ἀπερίληπτον, ἀλλὰ περιέσχε καὶ τοῦτον διὰ τῆς χιλιάδος.[1] ἔστι δὲ ζωῆς ἀμείνονος σύμβολον τὸ μένον ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὰ δεύτερα κοσμοῦν, ἀτελέστερον δὲ τὸ κατιὸν εἰς ἐκεῖνα καὶ ὁμοιούμενον αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀοριστίας τινὸς ἀναπιμπλάμενον.

Nine thousand, then, is the symbol of a higher form of life, which contains itself within itself while administering the lower orders, while eight thousand rather pours itself out limitlessly into the lower levels of Being, and becomes assimilated to them.

We may compare this with Iamblichus' definitions of the numbers in the Soul in fr. 53 (*ad* Tim. 35B), Pr. II 215, 12ff.: 'τὴν δὲ ἐννεάδα τελειώσεως ἀληθινῆς καὶ ὁμοιότητος ποιητικήν, τελείαν ἐκ τελείων οὖσαν καὶ τῆς ταὐτοῦ φύσεως μετέχουσαν, τὴν δὲ ὀγδοάδα τῆς ἐπὶ πᾶν προόδου καὶ διὰ πάντων χωρήσεως αἰτίαν . . .'

Here again, Nine is a symbol of Sameness and completeness, Eight of (unlimited) procession. It certainly seems as if this explanation of the relative augustness of the numbers nine thousand and eight thousand is Iamblichean in inspiration, even if Proclus claims it for his own.

ll. 4-5 τὴν μνήμην τῶν ἐν Φαίδρῳ περιόδων. Iamblichus is referring to the fact that Porphyry has connected this passage with the 'ordinance of Adrasteia' in the *Phaedrus* (248C ff.), by which a succession of nine lives are laid down for the soul who once slips from the best state, each stage taking place within a thousand-year period. It is this connexion which Iamblichus declares to be ἄτοπος.

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[1] Festugière's necessary emendation for ἐννεάδος of MSS. See his note *ad loc.* Nine is not a cube; a thousand (10^3) is.

Fr. 16

Since this is a blow-by-blow criticism of Porphyry's exegesis, we should first consider that (Pr. I. 152 12ff.):

"The philosopher Porphyry lays down as follows: the *priests* are analogous to the archangels in heaven turned towards the gods, of whom they are the messengers, and the *warlike class* are analogous to the daemons that descend into bodies, and the *shepherds*, again to those (daemons?) who are appointed over the herds of animals, whom they declare in secret teachings (δι' ἀπορρήτων), to be souls who have failed of human intelligence, and have a disposition towards animals; since there is one who has charge of the herd of men and certain particular (μερικοί) ones, some overseeing races, others cities, and others yet individuals; and the *hunters* are analogous to those who hunt down souls and enclose them in bodies; for there are some who take pleasure in hunting after living things, such as they make out Artemis to be and with her a further multitude of hunting daemons; and the *farmers* are those given charge over the crops. And this whole polity of sublunary daemons, divided into many classes, is called by Plato demiurgic through the fact that he was looking to a finished product already existing or coming to be."

It is amusing to find Porphyry propounding such an exegesis, and Iamblichus condemning him roundly for βαρβαρικὴ ἀλαζονεία.[1] Note also the polemical point that Plato nowhere makes any mention of archangels, an argument which, one might imagine, it ill befits any Neoplatonist to bring against any other. Certainly the name nowhere occurs in Plato, but one could easily *find* archangels in some other form, if necessary. Iamblichus certainly does not object to archangels as such, as can readily be observed from the *De Mysteriis*.

Five classes of divine power (in the cosmos) are here distinguished. Proclus notes (153, 23ff.) that both Porphyry and Iamblichus make a five-fold division, ignoring τὸ δημιουργικόν as a separate category, whereas Syrianus accepts it, and makes a division into three pairs. Porphyry and Iamblichus presumably *wanted* a five-fold division, as six classes seem to be distinguished by Plato, and

[1] Note Julian's using of the same phrase in *Ep.* 89a fin. (Bidez-Cumont), to the high-priest Theodorus, referring to the Christians: ἀλαζονείᾳ βαρβαρικῇ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἀπόνοιαν ἐπαρθέντες.

they must have chosen the five-fold division because it corresponded to an existing division of the cosmic powers.

Hans Lewy, (*Chald. Or.* Excursus XI, p. 497 ff.), convincingly identifies the immediate source of Porphyry's demonology here (and in the *De Abst.* II 36-43) as the Neoplatonist Origen and his work περὶ δαιμόνων, and Cumont (*Oriental Religions*, p. 152, and note 39, pp. 267-8) points out its Persian origin, suggesting a book of 'Ostanes' mentioned by Minucius Felix (26, sect. 11) as a possible intermediary. Iamblichus seems to recognise this in his condemnation—βαρβαρικῆς ἀλαζονείας μεστός. He directs this particularly against the notion that certain daemons shut souls up in bodies ὥσπερ ἐν ζωγρείῳ. The view of the body as a prison is Orphic and Pythagorean, so Iamblichus can have no objection to that; it must be the idea of certain daemons deputed to capture and imprison them that annoys him.[1]

Iamblichus first objects to Porphyry's introduction of archangels, a move which, as I have said above, is legitimate, but precarious, as from one Neoplatonist to another. We see now that Iamblichus has certainly no objection to such beings in themselves. However, he wishes to identify priests with 'all the secondary οὐσίαι and δυνάμεις, such as honour and serve the αἰτίαι prior to them.' These entities sound very much like choirs of angels round the throne of God in Jewish and Christian tradition. We may perhaps identify them with ὀπαδοί who accompany the gods in their celestial ride in *Phaedrus* 246Eff.

Secondly, the warlike class he identifies with οἱ τὸ μὲν ἄθεον πᾶν ἀνατρέπουσι, τὸ δὲ θεῖον κρατύνουσιν. He objects to Porphyry's identification of this class with 'the souls which incline towards bodies'. Now we find in *De Myst.* I, 20:*64* the statement: τοιγαροῦν οἱ θεοὶ τῶν ῥεπουσῶν εἰς τὴν γένεσιν δυνάμεών εἰσιν ἀπηλλαγμενοι· δαίμονες δὲ τούτων οὐ πάντῃ καθαρεύουσιν. Daemons, then, are not entirely free of such influences, but to identify the warlike class with *souls*, and not even with pure souls, is to place them too far down the scale. In many other cases, as we have seen,

[1] This relates to a distinction which he makes in the *De Anima* (ap. Stob. I 379, 7ff.): . . . οἱ μὲν ἑκούσιοι τρόποι νοοῦνται τῆς καθόδου, ἢ ἑλομένης αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν διοίκησιν τῶν περὶ γῆν, ἢ πειθαρχούσης τοῖς κρείττοσιν, οἱ δὲ ἀκούσιοι βιαζομένης ἐπί τι χεῖρον ἕλκεσθαι. Porphyry, after all, in *Sent.* 29, does not accept the image of the ζωγρεῖον: τὸ ἀσώματον ἂν ἐν σώματι κατασχεθῇ, οὐ συγκλεισθῆναι δεῖ, ὡς ἐν ζωγρείῳ θηρία· συγκλεῖσαι γὰρ αὐτὸ οὐδὲν οὕτω δύναται καὶ περιλαβεῖν σῶμα. There seems to be a contradiction here.

Porphyry's fault is to make identifications at too low a level. For Iamblichus, τὸ μαχιμὸν γένος should operate ἀχράντως, even if it does busy itself with the sublunary world. It seems here to be doing the work of Athena, combating ungodly influences. One might identify them with heroes or the 'higher' archons.

Iamblichus goes on to say that one should not ἀντιδιαιρεῖν these souls from gods or daemons. τὸ μαχιμὸν γένος ranks above hunters, shepherds, and farmers, all of whom Porphyry has identified with kinds of daemon, so that these souls would be senior to them, 'ἐν τῷ μέσῳ γένει'. The concept of τὸ μέσον γένος, or τὰ μέσα γένη, is a rather broad one in Iamblichus, as elsewhere. It normally refers to all beings between men and gods, but it seems often to refer to genera between any class and any other, e.g. between gods and souls. Here the gods and daemons are being placed by Porphyry ἐν τοῖς δημιουργικοῖς τοῖς ἐσχάτοις, which must refer to the sublunar realm.

Again, the shepherds are to be identified with those beings who have ἐπιστασία over Life which inclines towards Body and αἱ ἀλόγιστοι δυνάμεις. This hardly differs, except in terminology, from Porphyry's identification, but Iamblichus really objects to Porphyry's downgrading of these daemons as ψυχαὶ ἀποτυχοῦσαι τοῦ ἀνθρωπικοῦ νοῦ, that is 'failed human beings', filled with malice towards the human race. Iamblichus denies that these administering daemons ever were human souls. He might well have identified them with his ἔνυλοι ἄρχοντες (see Intro. p. 51).

Iamblichus is taking a 'conservative', more Plotinian, position against Porphyry here. Porphyry's demonology (based probably on that of Origen) appears much more Gnostic and pessimistic than is proper for a follower of Plotinus, but it is possible that after Plotinus' death Porphyry reverted in some respects to his pre-Plotinian views.[1] Iamblichus, both here and in the *De Mysteriis*, protests against any downgrading of gods or divine daemons, or any suggestion that they may be malicious.

Iamblichus' objection to Porphyry's identification of the hunters I have already discussed above. He makes then δυνάμεις καθολικαί, ordering the secondary powers by means of their search (θήρα)

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[1] We may note that Porphyry here assumes (152, 18ff.), first, a chief daemon (the *Agathodaemon* or Summus Daemon?)—ἀνθρώπων ἀγέλης τις κηδεμών—and then μερικοί τινες daemons overseeing various areas of the earth.

for Being.' Who are these? To be 'universal' is the mark of a god rather than a daemon, who should have a λῆξις μερικὴ. I would equate these with the νέοι θεοί, who create the lower orders by looking to the noetic model.

The 'farmers' and 'warriors' must then be daemonic servants of the νέοι θεοί, the former executing their will in detail, the latter warding off the forces of chaos, performing an 'heroic' or 'archontic' role. Closer identification seems fruitless. It is by no means clear that Iamblichus has in mind here the elaborate scheme which he lays down in the *De Mysteriis*. The main point to note, I feel, is his opposition to Porphyry's somewhat Gnostic or Chaldaean system of evil as well as good daemons, and his defence, similar to that in the *De Mysteriis*, of the transcendence of the Gods.

Fr. 17

What follows this (157, 7ff.) is, I feel, amplification by Proclus. It does not seem to me safe to carry the quotation further. Once again, Porphyry has just been quoted. Iamblichus is not stated here to be explicitly opposing him, but his more 'inspired' exegesis is necessarily a correction of Porphyry.

"Porphyry", says Proclus, "calls the body the 'shield', and understands by 'the spear' the spirit (θυμός); these are characteristic of things that have fallen into generation and are material, and are not implements of the undescended realm of salvation (τῆς ἀτρέπτου σωτηρίας) but of the life that is involved in generation, corrupting the purity of the mind and destroying the life according to reason."

For Iamblichus, τὸ θεῖον cannot be affected by the world of matter, though it must act upon it. It has δυνάμεις that are defensive and offensive, the offensive δυνάμεις penetrating all things and influencing all things, but ἀναφῶς. The adverb ἀναφῶς seems from LSJ to be an Iamblichean coinage, and is certainly characteristic of him, cf. *De Myst.* 202, where the gods τὴν ὕλην ἀναφῶς ἀποκόπτουσιν, preventing any ἀναθυμίασις ἀπὸ σωμάτων from reaching them. This insistence on the freedom of the gods, as opposed to the intermediate classes of being, from any contact by us, is a recurring theme for Iamblichus. He takes the present passage as giving a symbolic expression of this truth.

Fr. 18

ἡ τελέα φρόνησις is here defined as being θεωρητική, not τεχνική. For Hephaestus as patron of practical wisdom, cf. Julian, *Contra Gal.* 235B 'τὰ δὲ εἰς τέχνας Ἥφαιστος ἀποκληροῖ καὶ διανέμει'.

A problem arises as to whether Porphyry is or is not saying that this φρόνησις is τεχνική, and therefore whether Iamblichus is expressly criticising him at this point. The phraseology cannot really count either way. I feel, however, that Proclus would not quote in this way a double reference, Porphyry and Iamblichus each contributing one half of a statement and Iamblichus supporting Porphyry. Certainly Iamblichus often stood with Porphyry—for instance, against Middle Platonic commentators, but then Proclus links them in one phrase, e.g. Πορφύριος δὲ καὶ Ἰάμβλιχος (fr. 28). It seems to me more likely, particularly in view of the form of the next quotation, that Iamblichus is here reported as criticising Porphyry, and supporting his criticism with an explanation.

But *could* Porphyry have regarded this φρόνησις as τεχνική? Athena was, after all, traditionally connected with practical crafts as well as with higher knowledge. At I 159, 25 (quoted in the next fragment), Porphyry makes Athena, through Asclepius, the originator of the art of medicine, and in the Περὶ ἀγαλμάτων p. 14 Bidez (quoted, Fr. 19), he describes Athena as φρονήσεως σύμβολον, without further qualification. In the same work (p. 12, 5ff.), Hephaestus is merely the personification of the force of fire.

Fr. 19

'οἷς' must refer to the two propositions of Porphyry (1) that Asclepius is the Intellect of the Moon and (2) that Apollo is the Intellect of the Sun.[1]

εἰκότως is awkward. Proclus, after all, agrees with Iamblichus' assessment of Porphyry—unless perhaps we may translate 'with *apparent* plausibility'; but this is strained.

For Asclepius as connected with the Sun, cf. Julian, *Contra Gal.* 200A 'ὁ γάρ τοι Ζεὺς ἐν μὲν τοῖς νοητοῖς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ τὸν Ἀσκληπιὸν ἐγέννησεν, εἰς δὲ τὴν γῆν διὰ τῆς Ἡλίου γονίμου ζωῆς ἐξέφηνεν.

[1] Cf. His Περὶ ἀγαλμάτων, p. 14 *ap.* Bidez, *Vie de Porphyre*: ὅπερ δὲ Ἀπόλλων ἐν ἡλίῳ τοῦτο Ἀθηνᾶ ἐν σελήνῃ· ἔστι γὰρ τῆς φρονήσεως σύμβολον, Ἀθρηνᾶ τις οὖσα.

Porphyry here takes Athena as presiding over the Moon, and this affects his whole interpretation of this part of the Atlantis story. Iamblichus seems to be equating her with the Soul of the Universe. She plays a demiurgic role, presiding over ἡ νέα δημουργία. Apollo Iamblichus would posit as presiding over the Sun, rather than as proceeding from it as Intellect, which for him is the role of Asclepius.

Fr. 20

It must seem obvious to us that the τόπος here referred to is a physical portion of the earth, to wit, the land of Attica. If, however, all this portion of the dialogue is to have a higher, symbolic, meaning, then τόπος cannot be anything physical, and the Neoplatonists, from Porphyry onwards, were concerned to define what non-physical thing it could denote.

We may note briefly previous opinions, as listed by Proclus, probably following Porphyry.

(1) (p. 162, 11ff.) Panaetius, 'καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν Πλατωνικῶν' (Kroll dislikes this, and conjectures παλαιῶν), take the text literally, ὡς τῆς 'Αττικῆς διὰ τὰς ὥρας τοῦ ἔτους εὖ κεκραμένας ἐπιτηδείως ἐχούσης πρὸς τὴν τῶν φρονίμων ἀνδρῶν ἀπογέννησιν'. This is strictly an exegesis of 'τὴν εὐκρασίαν τῶν ὡρῶν', but a literal interpretation of τόπος is obviously implied. This is the sole mention of Panaetius in Proclus' commentary, and is disquieting. Is Proclus really referring to him as a *Platonist*, or can the accompanying phrase mean 'and, apart from him, certain of the Platonists'. I would suggest the latter, but perhaps Kroll is right to emend. And did Panaetius write a *commentary* on the *Timaeus*? We need not suppose a full-dress commentary, but in view of Panaetius' well-known interest in Plato and things Platonic, it is not impossible. More probably, however, Panaetius made this reference in some other work, perhaps geographical, and from there it was inserted into the doxographical tradition.

We get next the opinions of Origen and Longinus, no doubt reported by Porphyry.

(2) Origen (162, 27) understands the εὐκρασία as referring to the κυκλοφορία of the Heavens. "For thence derive the cycles of fruitfulness and barrenness of souls, as the Socrates in the *Republic* says." Origen here makes reference to *Rep.* VIII 546A: οὐ μόνον

φυτοῖς ἐγγείοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἐπιγείοις ζώοις φορὰ καὶ ἀφορία ψυχῆς τε καὶ σωμάτων γίγνονται, ὅταν περιτροπαὶ ἑκάστοις κύκλων περιφορὰς ξυνάπτωσι, κτλ. with the subsequent description of the Nuptial Number. Presumably then Origen maintained that Athena chose, not the correct physical place, but the correct time according to her knowledge of the Number.

(3) Longinus (162, 15), criticising Panaetius and 'the others', claims that Plato cannot be referring simply to the climate of Attica, as it is subject both to droughts and storms, and not in a constant state of εὐκρασία. He prefers to think of it as ἰδιότης τις τοῦ καταστήματος ἀκατονόμαστος (a sort of indefinable peculiarity of the climate—or physical situation?—or position of the heavens?), which contributes to the growth of φρόνησις, in the same way as certain waters inspire prophecy, and certain places bring on disease and ill-health.

I place Origen before Longinus, since he was Longinus' teacher, but he falls outside the main stream of commentary on the *Timaeus*. Hans Lewy (*Ch. Or.* Exc. XI, p. 505) conjectures persuasively that it is not from a *Timaeus-Commentary*, but from his work περὶ δαιμόνων, that these references to the *Timaeus* are taken. Longinus, then, represents the highest refinement of the 'literal' interpretation; Origen is already employing a symbolic interpretation, to be taken up further by Porphyry and Iamblichus.

(4) Porphyry (162, 33ff., Fr. XXI (Sodano)) takes issue with Longinus. How does the postulate of a single ἰδιότης explain differences in aptitude of the inhabitants, and differences in levels of aptitude? Porphyry's own theory is based on a system of divine influences, which is worth repeating, as it prefigures later theories of the Athenian school, as well as being a development of Chaldaean astrological teachings:

The gods divide the whole of Space in the order of creation (κατὰ τὴν δημουργικὴν τάξιν). Each part of Space receives souls suitable to it, that dominated by Ares αἱ θυμοειδέστεραι, that dominated by Apollo αἱ μαντικαί, that dominated by Asclepius αἱ ἰατρικαί, and that dominated by Athena αἱ φρόνιμοι. (We may note that these are not *planetary* influences, since of these gods only Ares represents a planet; they are the encosmic gods, as represented in the *Phaedrus* Myth.). Each part (μερίς) of Space has a kind of ποιότης, or rather δύναμις, from the ruling god, and a suitability (εὐαρμοστία) to the type of life prevalent in it. Plato

calls this suitability εὐκρασία, because there are many powers within each part of space, physical, psychic, daemonic and angelic, and the (transcendent) henad of the ruling god unites and mixes together all of these ἀμιγῶς—without including itself in the mixture. For this reason the Father has set the Hours to watch over these μερίδες, as Homer says (E 750), and they see to it that the right souls are put into the places in Space.

So it was such a τόπος that the Goddess picked out as suitable εἰς ὑποδοχὴν ψυχῶν ἐμφρόνων. Certainly, as Origen says, the κυκλοφορία τοῦ οὐρανοῦ does cause φοραί and ἀφορίαι, but even despite these cycles a predominance of φρόνιμοι ψυχαί are produced in the λῆξις of Athena.[1]

Proclus on this occasion agrees with Porphyry, against Iamblichus, and amplifies Porphyry's opinions in the passage 163, 21-164, 22. It seems here that we have, sketched by Porphyry, at least an ancestor of the theory of σειραί which we find in Proclus, a god presiding as a 'monad' over an elaborate chain of angels, daemons, souls, living things and even inanimate objects, which receive the influence of this god as a dominant factor in their existence. All those beings in Athena's μερίς or λῆξις are 'Athenaic'.

It is against such a background of speculation that we must view Iamblichus' contribution. Proclus does not state explicitly that Iamblichus is criticising Porphyry. Strictly, the four previous commentators are discussing εὐκρασία; he is explaining τόπος, but the issue is the same. It sounds very much as if Iamblichus is once again 'taking a more exalted view', this time unsupported by Proclus. We must assume that he took Porphyry's τόπος, which is within the Universe, as a σωματοειδὴς διάστασις. He wishes to understand the τόπος as an immaterial, intelligible influence, coming down from the noetic Athena, at the right hand of the Demiurge, in which she places οἱ ὄντως ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες. This seems to reject the applicability here of the scheme of encosmic λήξεις.

Fr. 21

Again, Porphyry is being criticised. "Porphyry", says Proclus

[1] We may compare Porphyry's treatment of the matter of differences in lives in his Περὶ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν (*ap.* Stob. *Anth.* II 163ff. Wachs., esp. 169ff.), where he is interpreting the myth of *Republic* X in such a way as to safeguard freewill. There he appeals to the wisdom of the Egyptians, and the doctrine of horoscopes.

(p. 165, 16ff.), "assuming Athena to be in the Moon, says that souls descend from there possessing both high spirits and gentleness, and for this reason being both lovers of wisdom and of war, leaders in the mysteries at Eleusis, inasmuch as the descent of those who lead the mysteries in Eleusis is from Musaeus the moon-man, and also since Hermes is in the region of the Moon according to them, and the clan of the Kerykes."

First of all, how does Porphyry's exegesis 'not correctly preserve the analogy'? Iamblichus must be proceeding on the basis of a theology similar to that which we find later in Proclus (165, 30ff.). Athena presides over ἡ νέα δημιουργία. She must rank far higher than the Moon. If this criticism of Porphyry be taken in conjunction with Proclus' immediately following 'elucidation' of Porphyry and Iamblichus, we may, I think, conclude that an important aspect of Proclus's theology, his postulation of successive emanations of the same god at different levels of being, may be attributed, in some form, at least, to Iamblichus. (See further Fr. 74 and Commentary *ad loc.*).

At any rate, Proclus goes on to 'clarify' the views of both Porphyry and Iamblichus (165, 30ff.) by reference to the Chaldaean Oracles.[1] Whether Iamblichus himself used the Chaldaean Oracles in his Commentary is not clear, but I would conclude, on the evidence we have, that he was not greatly influenced by the Oracles at the time at which he wrote this commentary, though by the end of his life he certainly was. Proclus, however, by employing his theory of successive emanations (fully explained by him in the Preface to Book V of his Commentary), gives us a clue as to what Iamblichus means by Porphyry's not preserving the analogy (166, 25ff.). We learn that Athena, herself at the right hand of her father the Demiurge of the Cosmos, is his ἀκλίνης and ἄτρεπτος will, in her secondary emanation κατὰ τὴν ἄχραντον ἑπτάδα, she is Kore, and only in her third emanation, ἐν τοῖς ἀπολύτοις θεοῖς, does she become the Moon, and even then only the Intelligible Moon. To be more exact, she 'unifies the seleniac order with intellectual and demiurgic light and renders it transcendent from what is generated from it'. In a word, things are not so simple as Porphyry supposes.

[1] εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνδρῶν τούτων σαφῆ γενέσθαι διάνοιαν καὶ πρὸ τούτων τὴν Πλατωνικὴν ἐκφανῆναι παράδοσιν συμφωνοτάτην οὖσαν τοῖς θεολόγοις, ἄνωθεν οὑτωσὶ ῥητέον· He is not contradicting, merely clarifying.

Proclus' whole exposition can be regarded as an illustration and development of Iamblichus' definition. Athena has a twofold role, signified by her two epithets:

(1) she organises the Universe for her Father (166, 16), repelling disruptive forces (γιγάντια καὶ γενεσιουργὰ φαντάσματα, 168, 25), and reconciling ἐναντιώσεις ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις (168, 14), and is thus φιλοπόλεμος.

(2) she remains in her Father as his νόησις δημουργικὴ and σοφιά χωριστὴ καὶ ἄυλος (166, 12-13 and 168, 10), providing ὀλύμπια καὶ ἀναγωγὰ τῶν ψυχῶν ἀγαθά, and so is φιλόσοφος.

Proclus' exegesis involves his theory of successive emanations, and draws also on quotations from Homer, Orpheus and the Oracles. We cannot safely attribute this to Iamblichus, but the form of his criticism of Porphyry does, I think, allow us to assume that Iamblichus had developed *some* theory of successive emanations, which allowed the Moon to be an inferior member of the σειρά of Athena, a σειρά of which Porphyry had grasped the wrong end.

Fr. 22

This is a remarkable way for Proclus to refer to Iamblichus in this commentary. Only in fr. 5 (οἱ μέν . . . οἱ δέ) is there another ambiguous reference. But there can be no reasonable doubt that he *is* who is referred to, and it only remains to attempt to divine what Iamblichus' objection to the exegesis here stated may have been. Probably he would object that Porphyry is attributing to souls μεγάλα καὶ θαυμαστὰ ἔργα that are properly to be attributed to Athena. Porphyry's whole demonology was objectionable to Iamblichus (cf. Fr. 16).

Since no other account is given of Iamblichus' view of the passage, we may, I think, reasonably assume that Proclus agreed with him here entirely, and that in fact the passage p. 171, 1-17 is nothing else but Iamblichus. Certainly it accords with his views. I give it in full:

ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἔργων ἔστι μὲν καὶ ἀριθμός, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἑνὰς μία περιληπτική, καθ' ἣν τὸ πᾶν εἶδος ἐπιδείκνυται τῆς πολιτείας, τὸ μέγιστον καὶ ἀρετῇ διαφέρον ἔργον ἐπαγγέλλεται ἀναδιδάξειν. οὐχ ἓν τῶν πολλῶν ὄν, ἀλλ' ἓν πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν. ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη μέθοδος τῶν λόγων

οἰκείως ἔχει πρός τε τὸ πᾶν, ἐν ᾧ τὰ ὅλα μίαν ἀποτελεῖ καὶ συνεχῆ ζωήν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν θεὸν τὴν καὶ τὰς πολλὰς ἐναντιώσεις εἰς ἕνωσιν μίαν συνάγουσαν. πολλῶν οὖν καὶ μεγάλων ὄντων <ἔργων> τῆς πόλεως εἰκότως τὸ ἓν ἔργον ἱστορεῖ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς γεγραμμένον. ἔστι γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ παράδειγμα νοερόν, καθ' ὅσον ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ θεωρεῖται καὶ τὸ ὑπερέχον μεγέθει καὶ ἀρετῇ, τῆς μὲν κατὰ μέγεθος ὑπεροχῆς τῶν ἐγκοσμίων καὶ μερικὰς ἐνεργείας ἔχει πολλὰς καὶ μίαν ἀποτελεῖ ζωὴν καὶ πολιτείαν, καθ' ἣν πάντων κρατεῖ ὑφειμένων ὑπὸ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς στρατηγούμενα.

This is an interpretation which accords with τὰ πράγματα—οἰκείως ἔχει πρός τε τὸ πᾶν, ἐν ᾧ τὰ ὅλα μίαν ἀποτελεῖ καὶ συνεχῆ ζωήν, and with the Goddess (Athena), who gathers together τὰς πόλλας ἐναντιώσεις εἰς ἕνωσιν μίαν. This is what one would expect Iamblichus to do here, to draw attention to the higher meaning contained in 'πάντων γε μὴν ἓν ὑπερέχει μεγέθει καὶ ἀρετῇ', the intellectual paradigm of ἔργον above all individual ἔργα. It is analogous to the higher beings in the cosmos, which, themselves unitary, have many μερικαὶ ἐνέργειαι.

I feel that if Iamblichus' interpretation had been strictly literal, as in the next fragment, or otherwise at variance with that of Proclus, Proclus would have given some indication of this, rather than the cryptic remark which he in fact makes. I suggest that Iamblichus first condemned Porphyry's 'partial' exegesis, and then gave an interpretation which is substantially that above.

Fr. 23

This is perhaps more a *testimonium* than a quotation, but my objection to establishing a category of testimonia has been stated in the Preface. Iamblichus here seems to be acting out of pique. Porphyry has just been reported as referring the passage to the battle of souls against daemons, in accordance with what is the general interpretation of the whole Atlantid War, which Proclus adopts. Iamblichus, quite contrary to his own principle of referring everything in a dialogue to its basic σκοπός (v. Fr. 6), maintains here presumably that when Plato reports that Athens stopped an invasion from outside the Pillars of Heracles, that is precisely and solely what he means. Like Crantor, then, he accepted the historicity of the conflict, though drawing cosmic truths from it by 'analogy', as we can see

from other fragments. Iamblichus' real objection is not to symbolical interpretation but to interpretation μερικώτερον, without regard for overall consistency. He complains of the same thing in fr. 19, with specific reference to Porphyry, (cf. ἀεὶ κατὰ τὸ παρὸν . . . διανέμουσιν).[1]

What, one might wonder, is the ταῦτα which Proclus considers himself to have been taught, in his little apotropaic prayer? Not the art of literal interpretation, certainly. Surely it must be the method of *systematic* symbolic interpretation, as called for by Iamblichus in his preface.

We may note that in fr. 12 we find Iamblichus in fact adopting a *literal* interpretation, as here, as opposed to Porphyry's symbolical one, but the contrast he makes is between a '*physical*' interpretation (his), and an '*ethical*' one (Porphyry's).

Fr. 24

The previous ἀποδόσεις are those of Porphyry on the reasons why children should have good memories. Once again, Iamblichus rises above Porphyry's literalness to a more exalted interpretation. I take τῶν λόγων as a subjective genitive, the ποίησις being that carried out by them. The λόγοι are the agents of Athena, or the δημιουργικὸς νοῦς, in the creation of the world.

'γραφῆς' . . . ἢ . . . 'βαφῆς'. Iamblichus' noting of a variant reading is interesting. βαφῆς is a reading recorded in the mss. F. and *Vatic.* 228 of Plato. There is, of course, the possibility that *Iamblichus* read βαφῆς and that Proclus here is bringing his comment into line with his own text.

Iamblichus takes this passage as an opportunity to expound his theory of emanation, not a development of Plotinus', but couched in distinctive phraseology—ἡ ἀεὶ νέα καὶ ἀκμάζουσα μόνιμος τῶν λόγων ποίησις, ἡ ἀέναος καὶ ἀνέκλειπτος δημιουργία, ἡ ἄφθονος τῶν πρεσβυτέρων αἰτίων εἰς τὰ δεύτερα χορηγία. This last lays stress

[1] It may be that the whole notion of consistency within each dialogue arose from meditation upon Socrates' dogma expressed at *Phaedr.* 264C: ἀλλὰ τόδε γε οἶμαί σε φάναι ἂν δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὥσπερ ζῷον συνεστάναι σῶμά τι ἔχοντα αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ, ὥστε μήτε ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μήτε ἄπουν, ἀλλὰ μέσα τε ἔχειν καὶ ἄκρα, πρέποντα ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ γεγραμμένα. The reference to the λόγος as a ζῷον is made explicitly in an Iamblichean context by Hermeias (*In Phaedr.* 9, 9 and 11, 18 = Iambl. *In Phaedr.* Fr. 1.)

on the benignity of the superior classes of being towards their inferiors.

Fr. 25

This is, of course, not strictly a fragment, but I have thought it best to include it here, as it has an important bearing on the form of Iamblichus' commentary. I have stated already (Intro. p. 54f.) the reasons for agreeing with Sodano that the division into Books is not original with Proclus and goes back at least to Porphyry. The broad divisions of the dialogue, and the chief passages for discussion, were also clearly fixed. Here we are particularly concerned with the attitudes of various commentators to what Proclus here calls the προοίμιον, though the word is also reserved for the introductory passage before the actual commentary on each book.

There are a number of points to note.

Severus (II^{c} A.D.)[1] began his commentary not before 27C, as we must assume from this passage. This seems to be the case also with Theodorus of Asine. We do not hear a comment from him before 27C (Procl. I 213, 3), where he is quoted on the subject of prayer; thereafter he is quoted regularly to the end of the commentary. Calcidius, it must be noted, begins his commentary, with a κεφάλαιον *De genitura mundi*, from 31C. This must be taken into account by anyone who wishes to connect Calcidius' commentary closely with that of Porphyry. His view of the 'προοίμιον' is clear enough:

> 'Denique de principio libri, quo *simplex narratio* continebatur *rerum ante gestarum et historiae veteris recensitio* nihil dixi.'

Of those who accepted the προοίμιον as worth discussing, Crantor 'ὁ πρῶτος τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐξηγητής' (Pr. I 76, 1) would agree with Calcidius that it is ἱστορία ψιλή (simplex narratio). Origen and Numenius are prepared to see in the Atlantid story εἰκόνας τῶν ἐν τῷ παντὶ προουσῶν ἐναντιώσεων (I 76, 19), struggles of souls and daemons, though not denying the historicity of the account. And there is an unnamed group between Crantor and these latter who consider the whole thing μῦθον εἶναι καὶ πλάσμα, γενόμενον μὲν οὐδαμῶς, ἔνδειξιν δὲ φέρον τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων κατὰ τὸν κόσμον ἢ γιγνομένων (I. 76, 10ff.).

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[1] On Severus see Praechter in *RE* IIA, 2007ff.

Amelius is quoted once in Book I on a question of substance, (76, 21ff.), again on the Atlantid story, which is enough to show that he had *something* to say on this section, though steady quotation of him does not begin until Book II.

For Porphyry and Iamblichus, however, one point emerges. Proclus is following their arrangement into books. If he does this for the first book, why should he not do so for all? We may reasonably assume that he does, from the fact that any time that John Philoponus mentions the *place* of a Porphyry passage (e.g. *de Aet. Mundi*. VI 12 p. 154 Rabe—ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῶν εἰς τὸν Τίμαιον ὑπομνημάτων) we find him in the same book as Proclus. The problem posed by Simplicius' references to Iamblichus has been discussed in the Introduction (pp. 60ff.), and will be mentioned at the relevant places. It seems incredible, however, that if Iamblichus ended his first book here (as σύμφωνον . . . τούτοις surely indicates), he should then have begun to churn out books at such a rate that he had reached his eighth by *Tim.* 37D. I do not see that if in fact Iamblichus was now ending, say, his third book, and Porphyry merely his first, that Proclus could have refrained from comment to that effect.

We see again the word μερικώτερον (v. fr. 23), this time directly applied to Porphyry. I think we can see here the original form of Iamblichus' ending of Book I. Previous commentators, he will have noted, had various opinions about this section of the work (this section he will have copied from Porphyry—the remark that Longinus εἰώθει συνάπτειν must refer not to a commentary, but to his custom in lectures, and can thus have been originally made only by Porphyry,[1] his student), but Porphyry was the first to deem it worthy of treatment as an essential part of the dialogue; however, Porphyry expounds it μερικώτερον, whereas it is necessary always to look to an overall scheme of exegesis, as he himself has done. The epithet ἐποπτικώτερον will be Proclus' reflection of this self-praise.

[1] Did Longinus comment on the whole work? Beutler, RE XVIII, 1, 1035, 61ff. s. 'Origenes', thinks so, on the basis of this passage, and even more from *In Tim.* I 322, 24, (ad 28C 29A), where Longinus' views on the relation of the Demiurge to the παραδείγματα τῶν ὅλων are reported. But there is no necessity that this opinion be taken from a full-scale *Commentary on the Timaeus*. I feel that the otherwise total silence about any such Commentary indicates that Longinus' continuous comment was confined to the introductory portions of the dialogue.

BOOK II

Fr. 26

I take the subject of παραδίδωσι to be Iamblichus. To refer it to Plato would be unnatural. The last sentence, then, contains a description by Proclus of Iamblichus' theory of prayer rather than a quotation. The τελειότης is presumably the perfection of the creature that is attainable by means of prayer. Proclus then goes on:

προσήκει δὲ ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὸ συνηθέστερον τοῖς ἀκούουσι καὶ γνωριμώτερον τὸν λόγον μεταγαγόντας τήν τε ἐκείνου σαφῆ ποιῆσαι διάνοιαν καὶ τῷ Πλάτωνι συμφώνους ἀποδοῦναι τοὺς περὶ εὐχῆς λόγους.

Since this is a 'translation' of Iamblichus's views on prayer, and requires extended discussion, I have preferred to relegate it to an appendix.[1] Since the *De Mysteriis* (Book V, 26: *237-240*) states a theory of prayer very similar (though differently phrased) to that expounded by Proclus here, I have considered it possible to reconstruct the discussion on prayer which Iamblichus may have prefixed to Book II of his Commentary. It will be seen to be on a plane more elevated than the ἱστορία which Porphyry indulges in.

l. 5. περὶ τῶν σῴζεσθαι βουλομένων. I prefer the reading of N to the δυναμένων of CP, which Diehl adopts. It is the *will* to be saved that is at issue, and δυναμένων could easily have strayed in from θεοῖς προσομιλεῖν δυναμένων in l. 4.

Fr. 27

Iamblichus is here seen discussing a point of some detail. We find him elsewhere also engaged in textual criticism and emendation, largely unfortunate.[2] Here too he is reading too much into πῄ, but then so did his predecessors. He is here quoted, not after Porphyry, but after οἱ παλαιότεροι τῶν ἐξηγητῶν (i.e. pre-Plotinian), who explained the πῄ as going with γέγονεν and ἀγενές ἐστιν, and took it as meaning that the Cosmos was *in a way* created and *in a way* not, which is as bad as Iamblichus. Proclus sensibly points

[1] Appendix A.

[2] e.g. frr. 28, 43.

out that πῇ goes syntactically with μέλλοντας λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, but then adopts Syrianus's view that this distinguishes the various types of λόγος.

The main thing to be noticed in all this is the weight that commen tators by this time gave to almost every detail of the ,sacred' text.

l.4. τὴν γὰρ ὕλην . . . ἄρρητον ἀφίησι. What can this mean? Matter is discussed by Timaeus from 48E on, we might claim, under the guise of the ὑποδοχή, the τρίτον γένος. Admittedly, the word ὕλη is never mentioned by Timaeus, but the identification with the ὑποδοχή had been made ever since Aristotle's time, so that that is hardly an issue. What Iamblichus must have in mind is something which he maintains firmly elsewhere in his Commentary, and which often leads him into unnatural interpretations,[1] namely that there can be no reference to Matter or material creation *until* 48Eff., and that thus many apparent references in the first part of the dialogue must refer to something purely noetic.

Fr. 28

Sodano attributes the sentence after ἐστί to Proclus. I give it to Iamblichus on two principles, (1) that a sentence connected to what precedes by γὰρ is an explanation of the previous sentence *by the original author*[2] and (2) that when two authors are jointly quoted, it is the words of the second one that are given.

The explanation continues, introduced by καὶ γὰρ, and that I will grant to Proclus, especially in view of the phrase 'ὡς ἔσται δῆλον ἡμῖν μικρὸν ὕστερον.' (219, 27).

The insistence on the *main theme* of the dialogue is consonant with Iamblichus's general method of exegesis, as we have seen.

It is worth noting, perhaps, that the reading generally adopted today is ᾗ γέγονεν from the *cod. Tubing.*, though ἤ is given in *Vindobonensis 21*. Calvisius Taurus (ap. Joh. Philop. *de Aet. Mundi* VI 20, p. 186, 17ff. Rabe) read εἰ γέγονεν, εἰ καὶ ἀγενές ἐστιν. Philoponus himself (ibid. p. 136, 8) read 'εἰ γέγονεν ἤ καὶ ἀγενές ἐστιν.'

Proclus himself recognises three possibilities:

(1) (p. 218, 29ff.) 'Some' read 'ᾗ γέγονεν ἢ καὶ ἀγενές ἐστιν'. (*Albinus* (p. 219, 2) seems to be here in fact the one referred to.)

[1] e.g. Fr. 20.

[2] See *Introduction*, p. 58.

'They say that Timaeus will say about the Universe, to what extent it derived from a cause, even though it is uncreated, in order that we may, by considering it as coming into being, behold its nature.' Albinus, for instance, considers that according to Plato the cosmos, though uncreated, has an ἀρχὴ γενέσεως. It is both ἀεὶ ὤν and γενητός, not as created in Time, but ὡς λόγον ἔχων γενέσεως διὰ τὴν ἐκ πλειόνων καὶ ἀνομοίων σύνθεσιν, for which reason its origin must be referred back to an αἰτία πρεσβυτέρα outside itself. This is Crantor's view of the matter, approved also by Calvisius Taurus (see fr. 32). The school of Gaius, to which Albinus belonged, did not fall into the heresy of Plutarch and Atticus.

(2) 'Others' read ᾗ γέγονε καὶ ᾗ ἀγενές ἐστιν,

— 'that he may be understood to say that he is going to discuss the Universe, *in what way* it has come to be, and *in what way* it is uncreated.' These, says Proclus, make the same mistake as the previous group, 'εἰ μὴ ἄρα οὕτως λέγοιεν γεγονὸς καὶ ἀγένητον τὸ πᾶν κατὰ μὲν τὸ εἶδος γεγονός, κατὰ δὲ τὴν τιθήνην ἀγενητόν.' for even thus Timaeus will go on to say (52A) that the 'nurse' is uncreated, but the cosmos is γενητός, inasmuch as it receives its form from God. This group might be Plutarch and Atticus, who would recognise the eternity of the Nurse, but not of the World itself.

(3) Porphyry and Iamblichus, with whom Proclus agrees. They are here in the position, unfamiliar for them, of eliminating nuances in the text (by textual criticism) which others found there. Their reading makes the question as to whether the Cosmos is created or uncreated quite open; the previous readings all suggest (with ᾗ) that in some way it is created.

It is to be noted that this whole argument presupposes an identity in pronunciation between η and ει and a loss (or omission) of the rough breathing, but this was the case even at the beginning of the present era.

Fr. 29

This is Iamblichus' contribution to the second question [1] proposed by Proclus on this lemma (229, 11ff.): αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὂν ἀεὶ πότερον

[1] The first (227, 13ff.) being the signification of τί at the beginning of the lemma. Is it, as Severus, thought, the designation of a γένος (τὸ τι) common to τὸ ὄν and τὸ γιγνόμενον, or is it a mere request for a definition? Proclus takes the latter alternative.

τὸν νοητὸν πάντα σημαίνει κόσμον ἢ τὸν δημιουργὸν ἢ τὸ παράδειγμα τοῦ παντός;

He thus proposes three alternative identifications for τὸ ὂν ἀεί, all of which have their partisans (ἄλλοι γὰρ ἄλλως ὑπέλαβον, 229, 13 —unfortunately he does elaborate further on the identity of these). At any rate, Iamblichus approves none of these identifications, but takes τὸ ὂν ἀεί as referring particularly to the monad at the head of the noetic realm, which he terms τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν, and identifies with Aeon. (see Intro. p. 33 f.).

I take the passage from τούτοις δὲ . . . as reflecting the fact that Iamblichus quoted the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist* in support of his position. It is reasonable and honest for Proclus to quote evidence against himself but it is less likely that he would spontaneously introduce it. Iamblichus uses the evidence of these dialogues (the Second Hypothesis of the *Parmenides* and the passage 244D ff. of the *Sophist*) to show the existence of a ἓν ὄν distinct from a πλῆθος τῶν ὄντων, which he identifies with the noetic world. This ἓν ὄν he identifies with the ἀεὶ ὄν of the present passage.

Proclus respectfully dissents from this interpretation of τὸ ὄν in this passage,[1] though agreeing that such an order of reality exists. It is indeed an unreasonable interpretation, as Proclus proves, but it gives us useful information on Iamblichus's metaphysics.

Proclus' further comments probably reflect Iamblichus's theories (p. 230, 31ff.):

ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε τὸ ὂν τὸ πρώτως ὂν τὸ ἀκρότατόν ἐστι τοῦ νοητοῦ πλάτους καὶ ἡ μόνας τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων, δῆλον· πανταχοῦ γὰρ τὸ πρώτως ὂν ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ σειρᾷ τὴν ἀκροτάτην ἔχει τάξιν· δεύτερον γὰρ ὄν, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος, οὐκέτι πρώτως ἐστὶν ὅπερ ἐστίν.

Proclus distinguishes τὸ ἓν ὄν from τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν (231, 9ff.). τὸ ἓν ὄν (or τὸ πρώτως ὄν) is ἐπέκεινα τοῦ αἰῶνος; τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν is αἰών, so that they cannot be identical.

In referring further on once again to Iamblichus's theory, (232, 4ff.) Proclus says that it is plain that τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν here includes the whole of reality from τὸ αὐτοόν down to the individual mind, "ἀλλ' οὐχὶ οἷόν ἐστι τὸ ἓν ὄν, δι' ὃ τὰ ὄντα πάντα ὄντα λέγεται, οὗ δὴ

[1] 230, 17 μήποτε οὖν ἄμεινον λέγειν εἶναι μέν τινα τοιαύτην τοῦ ὄντος τάξιν, οἵαν ὁ θεῖος ἐκεῖνος παραδέδωκε καὶ οἵαν ὁ Πλάτων ἐν ἄλλοις ἐθεώρησε, νῦν δὲ ἅπαντα τὸν αἰώνιον κόσμον οὕτως ἐπωνομάσθαι.

μόνον ἐστὶ κρεῖττον τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ τοῦ ὄντος. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἓν <ὂν> καὶ τοῦ αὐθυποστάτου[1] εἶναι κρεῖττόν ἐστι· δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸ παντὸς ἐξῃρῆσθαι πλήθους· τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ ὂν αὐθυπόστατον μέν, διὰ τὸ ἓν δὲ τὴν δύναμιν ἔχει ταύτην· τὸ δὲ μετ᾽ αὐτὸ καὶ αὐθυπόστατον ἅμα καὶ ἀπ᾽ αἰτίας ἄλλης ὑφίσταται ποιητικῆς, οἷόν που καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερόν ἐστι.

τὸ ἓν ὄν and τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν are being distinguished in this passage. τὸ ἕν ὄν,[2] we learn, is not even αὐθυπόστατον; (it is ἄρρητον καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ συνηνωμένον, 231, 24. τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν is αὐθυπόστατον, but derives this power from τὸ ἕν. The principle following on this (not here named) is 'self-substantial', but at the same time depending for subsistence on a creating cause—therefore, 'self-substantial and not self-substantial'; τὰ ἔσχατα, he goes on to say (p. 232, 16), are not self-substantial, but ἀνυπόστατα, without substantial existence.

ll. 2-3. τὸ ἀεὶ ὂν κρεῖττον καὶ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος καὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν. τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν is thus in the position of a ὅλον πρὸ τῶν μερῶν (cf. e.g. Procl. E.T. prop. 67), the 'γένη τοῦ ὄντος, and the Ideas' being the parts, and being in fact synonymous. We see from this passage, as from others, that the theory of a monad presiding over each order goes back to Iamblichus; Proclus' complaint is simply that (a) Plato is not here referring to this monad, (b) the term for the monad of the noetic order is not τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν but τὸ ἓν ὄν.

As for τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν, it is, according to Proclus, a proper term for the whole noetic (and noeric) order 'ἀρχομένην μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοόντος, τελευτῶσαν δὲ εἰς τὸν μερικὸν νοῦν.

At 238, 10ff., (quoted in full at Fr. 35), Proclus identifies the terms αὐτὸ ὄν, ὅπερ ὄν, and ἀεὶ ὄν, showing how they define the same entity in different aspects.

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[1] The expression αὐθυπόστατος, 'self-substantial', though adopted by subsequent philosophers, seems to originate with Iamblichus, cf. *Letter to Macedonius*, ap. Stob. Vol. II, 174, 21ff. Wachs.:

καὶ καθ᾽ ὅσον μὲν λόγον καθαρὸν αὐθυπόστατον καὶ αὐτοκίνητον ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ τε ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ τέλειον ἡ ψυχὴ συνείληφεν ἐν ἑαυτῇ κατὰ τοσοῦτον ἀπόλυτός ἐστι πάντων τῶν ἔξωθεν·

[2] It seems necessary to supply <ὄν> after ἕν in 232, 11 to set up a proper contrast with τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν. Admittedly τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν is said to receive its substantiality from τὸ ἕν, not from τὸ ἓν ὄν (unless we emend this too), but τὸ ἓν ὄν is united with τὸ ἕν—it is a henad, as befits the head of the noetic order.

What is at issue here then is not a difference in metaphysics, but a difference in terminology—and in the interpretation of Plato—out of which Iamblichus does not emerge too well.

Fr. 30

It is plain from this extract that Iamblichus was concerned, as was Proclus on many occasions, to give Aristotelian form to Plato's arguments.

Here, however, the opposition between συλλογισμὸς κατηγορικός and ὑποθετικός seems to be Theophrastean or Stoic rather than Aristotelian.[1] The hypothetical syllogism would presumably have run somewhat as follows:

> Εἰ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αἰτίου γίγνεσθαί τι, γίγνεται ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπ' αἰτίου τινός·
> ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀδύνατον·
> γίγνεται ἄρα ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπ' αἰτίου τινός.

For Proclus, a categorical syllogism is κάλλιον, more beautiful, we must presume, in its exactness. I have simply rendered it 'better', as I feel that it represents rather Proclus's prejudice in favour of an Aristotelian syllogism than any objective increase in accuracy. When left to himself, Proclus, in elucidating the logic of Plato's statements, prefors to use categorical syllogisms.[2]

In this, it seems, he follows an old-established principle of exegesis. We may also assume that the use of hypothetical syllogisms in the same connexion goes back well into Middle Platonism. It is worth going into this matter a little further.

The practice of putting Plato's statements into formal (Aristotelian) syllogistic form *may* go back even to Crantor, or to Theophrastus, whom we know to have expressed opinions at least on the problem of creation of the world in the *Timaeus*, but it may have had to wait until the rivalry between the schools had been dimmed by the syncretism of Antiochus of Ascalon. Adrastus (c. 100 A.D.), is the first Peripatetic whom we know to have commented on the *Timaeus*. Similarly, the attribution of hypothetical syllogisms to Plato can hardly precede Posidonius, the first Stoic

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[1] See Bochenski, *Ancient Formal Logic*, chs. 4 & 5, for a summary of the facts. We find the Stoic form of this syllogism in I 296, 23 ff.

[2] e.g. *In Tim.* I 264, 28ff.

to comment on the *Timaeus*, but it too may only follow Antiochus' *anschluss*.

What is plain is that by the time that Albinus wrote the *Didaskalikos* (c. 150 A.D.), both types of syllogism were acceptable. In ch. VI (Hermann *Plat. Dial.* VI p. 158), we find the following:

τῶν δὲ συλλογισμῶν οἱ μὲν κατηγορικοί, οἱ δὲ ὑποθετικοί, οἱ δὲ μικτοὶ ἐκ τούτων. κατηγορικοὶ μέν, ὧν καὶ τὰ λήμματα καὶ τὰ συμπεράσματα ἁπλαῖ προτάσεις ὑπάρχουσιν, ὑποθετικοὶ δὲ οἱ ἐξ ὑποθετικῶν προτάσεων, μικτοὶ δὲ οἱ τὰ δύο συνειληφότες.

This whole exposition implies that it was by now generally accepted that Plato used all of these types of syllogism at will, in various passages.

There then follow examples, first of categorical syllogisms in all three σχήματα, one from the *Alcibiades* I, two from the *Parmenides*; then examples of the three hypothetical σχήματα, the first two from the *Parmenides*, where, we are told, they are especially found, the third from the *Phaedo*; and finally two types of μικτοί, (1) ἐξ ἀκολουθίας κατασκευαστικοί, (2) ἐξ ἀκολουθίας ἀνασκευαστικοί, that is *constructive* consequential arguments (modus ponens) and *destructive* consequential arguments (modus tollens). If we consider Albinus' example of the former, we will find that the hypothetical argument which I have constructed above is actually of this kind:

εἰ τὸ ἓν ὅλον ἐστι καὶ πεπερασμένον, τοῦτο ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσα καὶ τελευτὴν ἔχον καὶ σχήματος μετέχει· τὸ δὲ ἡγούμενον· τὸ ἄρα λῆγον.

Albinus seems to be the only author to describe this as a συλλογισμὸς μικτός; for Proclus it was simply hypothetical, and so presumably for Iamblichus.

Fr. 31

Here Porphyry and Iamblichus are revealed united in an effort to strain the Greek language in order to fit their theories. For Iamblichus, this is in the same spirit as his stand on the question of τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν in fr. 29, bending every possible line of Plato to the service of his own theories. The result is, as Proclus says, ὑποψελλόν. We may, I feel, take the explanatory clause as Iamblichus', even though it be only Iamblichus repeating Porphyry.

l. 4. κατὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ ῥηθέν. In the normal manner of Platonic commentators, Proclus has brought in a parallel passage from another dialogue, *Phaedrus* 237BC. He has quoted it just above (275, 15ff.): δεῖ δὲ καί, ὥσπερ εἴρηκεν ὁ ἐν Φαίδρῳ Σωκράτης, περὶ παντὸς τὸ τί ἐστιν ἐν ἀρχῇ σκοπεῖν.

That he was not the first to quote the parallel seems indicated by his method of qualifying the interpretation of οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν Πλατωνικῶν, This will then have been already part of the Middle Platonic comment on the passage. We can see from the Anon. Theaetetus-Commentary that quotation of parallels was normal practice.

Fr. 32

Did Plato give the Universe a beginning in Time? The argument on this passage goes back certainly at least to Xenocrates. It was he who, in declaring that Plato did not intend to teach that there was ever a 'first moment', laid down that Plato had used this form of exposition διδασκαλίας χάριν (see fr. 33 and commentary). Plutarch (*De An. Proc. in Tim.* 1013a) links Xenocrates and his successor Crantor ('and their followers') as both considering that the soul (of the οὐρανός) has no beginning in Time (πάντες οὗτοι χρόνῳ μὲν οἴονται τὴν ψυχὴν μὴ γεγονέναι μηδ' εἶναι γενητήν. Here Crantor is credited with the opinion that the Cosmos is γενητός in the sense of being produced by a cause outside itself. The language used (παραγόμενον, αὐτόγονον, αὐθυπόστατον) is Neoplatonic, whether of Proclus himself or of a previous Neoplatonic commentator. As usual in these situations, it is reasonable to suppose that Iamblichus made the contrast (no doubt following Porphyry), between his own position and that of Crantor. At any rate, the words αὐτόγονος and αὐθυπόστατος are attested earliest in Iamblichus.[1]

I take Iamblichus' (and his predecessors') point to be that the main sense in which the Cosmos is γενητός is as being σύνθετος. The sense of συνυπάρχειν must be 'be present as a συναίτιον', and I have rendered accordingly. Otherwise the contrast with Crantor's view is muted, and the form of the sentence becomes eccentric. What Iamblichus felt about the 'διδασκαλίας χάριν' argument becomes plain from the next fragment.

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[1] αὐτόγονος, De Myst. X, 6: 292, αὐθυπόστατος, *Ep. ad Maced.* (ap. Stob. II 174, Wachs), quoted above, Comm. ad fr. 29.

Porphyry receives extended attention from John Philoponus on this point.[1] After a verbatim quotation, in which the word σύνθετος does not in fact occur, Philoponus continues:

μεγίστη ἀνάγκη καὶ πάσης μείζων ἀποδείξεως ἡ ἐνάργεια· καὶ σὺ γάρ, ὦ θαυμάσιε, γενητὸν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, καθὸ σύνθετός ἐστιν, ὑποτίθεσθαι Πλάτωνα λέγων καὶ τούτου ἀπόδειξιν παράγειν τὸ ὁρατὸν εἶναι ἁπτόν τε καὶ σῶμα ἔχειν ἀποφαίνομενος, πόθεν, εἰπέ μοι, τὴν ἀνάγκην τοῦ λόγου κατεσκεύασας; κ.τ.λ.

It is clear from this, and from what follows, that Porphyry took σύνθετος as his preferred meaning of γενητός. It seems from *De Aet. Mundi* VI 8 (p. 148, 7ff. Rabe) that Porphyry was actually supplementing the meanings of γενητός enumerated by Calvisius Taurus in his commentary on the passage (καὶ ὁ Πορφύριος δὲ πρὸς τοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ταύρου κατηριθμημένοις καὶ ἕτερα προστίθησιν τοῦ γενητοῦ σημαινόμενα).

Proclus has, for whatever reason, systematically excluded Taurus from any mention in his commentary, but it seems that it is with Taurus that Porphyry (and thus Iamblichus) is dealing.

As quoted by Philoponus (l.c. p. 145, 13-147, 25), Taurus does not mention Xenocrates or Crantor by name (though he does mention Aristotle and Theophrastus), but merely lists a series of possible meanings of γενητός (besides that of 'creation in Time'): γενητός means

(1) τὸ μὴ γενόμενον μέν, ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ ὂν γένει τοῖς γενητοῖς. Something, that is, which is potentially creatable, but is never actually created, as a body at the centre of the earth would be potentially visible, but never actually seen.

(2) τὸ ἐπινοίᾳ σύνθετον, καὶ εἰ μὴ συντεθῇ. Thus the *mese* in music is σύνθετος of the *nete* and the *hypate*; even if it is not in fact constructed of these two, it is seen as the potential blending of them. 'καὶ τῷ κόσμῳ τοίνυν ἐνορᾶται σύνθεσις καὶ κρᾶσις, καθὸ καὶ δυνάμεθα ἀφελόντες αὐτοῦ καὶ χωρίσαντες τὰς ποιότητας ἀναλύσαι αὐτὸν εἰς τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον.

Proclus (or Iamblichus) refers to, and condemns, this interpretation in I 290, 13ff. (fr. 33). In fr. 37, however, we find Porphyry and Iamblichus approving the theory that Plato only describes the Universe as any stage κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ

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[1] *De Aet. Mundi* VI, 25, p. 200, 4ff. Rabe.

ἀτάκτως so that the essence of Matter may be considered separately by itself—ἐπινοίᾳ, that is—and the benefits it receives from Above thus clearly appreciated.

(3) It is called γενητός, καθὸ ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ γίνεσθαί ἐστιν, ὡς ὁ Πρωτεὺς μεταβάλλων εἰς παντοδαπὰς μορφάς. All parts of it are indeed constantly changing, the things below the Moon into each other, the things above it merely their position.

(4) It could be called γενητός,[1] ὅτι καὶ τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ ἀλλαχόθεν ἐστὶν καὶ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, πρὸς ὃν κεκόσμηται—that is, it derives its being from an external cause, as the Moon derives its light from the Sun. This is Crantor's view, though not credited to him here, and this is the meaning that Taurus himself favours (p. 147, 13ff.), although he also accepts meaning (2)—ἐπινοίᾳ σύνθετον—in view of Plato's use of the phrase 'καὶ σῶμα ἔχων' (28B) rather than 'καὶ σῶμά ἐστιν'.

'οἱ περὶ Κράντορα' would seem, then, to be substantially Calvisius Taurus. As (probable) head of the Athenian Academy, his works should have been accessible to Proclus in the library. John Philoponus, much later, certainly seems to be quoting him directly, unless Porphyry has been relaying long verbatim quotations. The question of interest to us here, however, is whether Iamblichus knew him. He mentions him in the *De Anima* (ap. Stob. I 378, 25ff. W),[2] but it is possible that his doxography is derived from Porphyry's work *On the Soul*, of which Stobaeus also preserves extracts. At any rate, he certainly recognises Taurus' existence.

As I have pointed out above, the terms in which the opinion of 'those about Crantor' is expressed by Proclus are Neoplatonic, not even Middle Platonic (so far as we know), so that Taurus is being interpreted, not quoted—if indeed it is Taurus with whom we are involved here. Perhaps Taurus himself is not mentioned

[1] We find here λέγοιτο in the MSS without ἄν, which has been suspected, but the Optative is a proper way to introduce a view which one has either invented oneself, or which one favours, at the end of a doxography.

[2] Not only Taurus indeed, but two schools of Taurians: Οἱ δὲ περὶ Ταῦρον Πλατωνικοὶ πέμπεσθαι τὰς ψυχὰς ὑπὸ θεῶν εἰς γῆν λέγουσιν, οἵ μὲν ἑπομένως τῷ Τιμαίῳ (39E) παραδιδόντες ὅτι εἰς τελείωσιν τοῦ παντός, ὥστε εἶναι καὶ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τοσαῦτα ζῷα, ὅσα εἰσὶν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ· οἱ δὲ εἰς θείας ζωῆς ἐπίδειξιν τὸ τέλος ἀναφέροντες τῆς καθόδου. ταύτην γὰρ εἶναι τὴν βούλησιν τῶν θεῶν, θεοὺς ἐκφαίνεσθαι διὰ τῶν ψυχῶν. προέρχονται γὰρ εἰς τοὐμφανὲς οἱ θεοὶ καὶ ἐπιδείκνυνται διὰ τῶν ψυχῶν καθαρᾶς καὶ ἀχράντου ζωῆς—this latter a remarkable view.

(either by Porphyry or Proclus) for learned reasons, since he is not himself claiming originality here, but only assembling the various accepted meaning of γενητός, and the one which he picks is that of Crantor, to whom credit is thus given.

We may note, at I 290, 17ff. (ad Tim. 28BC), Proclus's discussion of the meanings of γενητός (πάλιν δὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἴπωμεν, ὅπως λέγεται γενητὸν τὸ πᾶν).

He begins by dismissing 'creation in Time' and 'simple derivation from a cause': οὔτε γὰρ κατὰ χρόνον διὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους λόγους (sc. against Atticus p. 283, 27ff.). οὔθ' ὅτι ἀπ' αἰτίας ἁπλῶς· οὐ γὰρ ἀπόχρη τοῦτο λέγειν· The reason he feels this explanation to be inadequate is that other entities, Nous, and indeed all things inferior to the One, are derived from the One as cause, but they are not described as γενητά. This seems to deal with Crantor (Taurus' Meaning (4)).

Proclus then considers Taurus' *third* meaning: πῶς οὖν γενητὸν τὸ πᾶν; φαίη τις ἄν· ὡς ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον ἅμα καὶ γεγενημένον· This is the meaning that he prefers. The cosmos is something that is both continually coming-to-be and in the state of having come-to-be. He couples this with the meaning 'σύνθετος' (291, 2ff.): καὶ ὡς σύνθετος γίνεται· πᾶσα γὰρ σύνθεσις γένεσίς ἐστιν, and links the two meanings as σύνδρομοι. His conclusion, then, is that of Porphyry and Iamblichus, somewhat elaborated.

Fr. 33

The status of this as a quotation from Iamblichus' commentary is obviously problematical. It is, after all, a quotable quote, suitable to many occasions. One thinks of fr. 14a, where, however, Proclus's phrase is 'ὡς φαίη ἂν ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος', whereas here he uses the indicative. But the distinction may only be between a paraphrased reference to Iamblichus in fr. 14a and a direct quotation here.

Nevertheless, I have included it and its context, since it does after all suit its context well. The argument from σαφήνεια διδασκαλική for Plato's describing the cosmos as γενητός goes back to the earliest period of the Academy, specifically to Xenocrates. We have already seen that Porphyry and Iamblichus were not satisfied with the explanations of Xenocrates and Crantor; it seems therefore likely that Iamblichus explicitly condemned the 'clarity of exposition' argument, and that Proclus simply adopted his criticism,

crediting him personally only with one particularly striking phrase.

Iamblichus' views on all this are well set out by Julian (*Or.* 4, 146AB). Plato and Iamblichus, he says, were prepared to use the hypothesis that the world had a temporal beginning (ἄχρις ὑποθέσεως τῷ γεννητῷ προσχρωμένους καὶ οἱονεὶ χρονικήν τινα τὴν ποίησιν ὑποτιθεμένους) 'in order that a clear idea might be given of the magnitude of the works of Helios', but Iamblichus warned against the dangers of such a procedure—ἐπείπερ ἀκίνδυνον οὐδὲ αὐτὸ τὸ μέχρι ψιλῆς ὑποθέσεως χρονικήν τινα περὶ τὸν κόσμον ὑποθέσθαι ποίησιν ὁ κλεινὸς ἥρως ἐνόμισεν Ἰάμβλιχος.

We cannot be certain what work of Iamblichus' Julian has in mind, but it is reasonable to suppose that Iamblichus uttered his *caveat* in his exegesis of this passage, wherever else he may have said the same thing.

Fr. 34

Porphyry had equated the Demiurge with the ὑπερκόσμιος ψυχή, making νοῦς the Paradigm. Proclus represents Plotinus as postulating two Demiurges, (I. 305, 16ff.) τὸν μὲν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τὸν δὲ τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν τοῦ παντός, which, if referring to *Enn.* III 9.1, is a controversial interpretation. At any rate, it is not what Iamblichus says, though what Iamblichus says accords well enough with III. 9.1.

At any rate, Proclus is not satisfied with Iamblichus' exegesis. If, he says, (307, 25ff.) what he means is that all things are in the Demiurge demiurgically, well and good; but if he claims that the Demiurge is πᾶν τὸ μεταξὺ πλάτος between the One and the Cosmos, then Proclus proposes to combat him ἐξ ὧν ἡμᾶς αὐτὸς ἀνεδίδαξε, *from what he himself has taught us.* "Where are οἱ πρὸ τοῦ Διὸς βασιλεῖς, οἱ πατέρες τοῦ Διός?" Iamblichus must have postulated these figures, no doubt the same as Amelius' three kings, taken from Orpheus, Phanes, Uranos, and Cronus, (cf. I, 306, 10ff.),[1] though for Amelius these were the three demiurges,[2] whereas for Iamblichus they must be above Zeus (as Demiurge). That is what Proclus seems to imply. "And how did we say that τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν was αὐτὸ τὸ πρώτιστον ὄν and the Demiurge πᾶς ὁ νοητὸς διάκοσμος,

[1] As well as from Plato, *Ep.* II, of course.

[2] Cf. ad fr. 40, Pr. In Tim. I 398, 16ff.

if he is himself τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν and also τὸ αὐτοζῷον?" τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν we have met before (fr. 29), but its relationship to the three Kings is not here made clear.

But now Proclus goes more deeply into the matter. Iamblichus here, he says, has spoken rather generally (308, 18), but in his essay Περὶ τῆς ἐν Τιμαίῳ τοῦ Διὸς δημηγορίας he discusses ἡ δημιουργικὴ τάξις in more detail:

"μετὰ τὰς νοητὰς τριάδας καὶ τὰς τῶν νοερῶν[1] θεῶν τρεῖς τριάδας ἐν τῇ νοερᾷ ἑβδομάδι τὴν τρίτην ἐν τοῖς πατράσιν ἀπονέμει τῷ δημιουργῷ τάξιν· τρεῖς γὰρ εἶναι θεοὺς τούτους καὶ παρὰ τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις ὑμνημένους, οἳ τοῦ μὲν ἑνὸς νοῦ, φησί, καὶ τὰς μονάδας ὅλας ἐν ἑαυτοῦ περιέχοντος τὸ ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἀγαθοειδὲς καὶ μένον ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ συνηνωμένον τοῖς νοητοῖς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα γνωρίσματα τῆς ὑπεροχῆς παραδεδώκασι, τοῦ δὲ μέσου καὶ τὴν συμπλήρωσιν συνάγοντος τῶν τριῶν τὸ γόνιμον τῶν θεῶν [2] καὶ τὸ συναγωγὸν τῶν τριῶν καὶ τὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἀποπληρωτικὸν καὶ τὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἀποπληρωτικὸν καὶ τὸ τῆς θείας ζωῆς γεννητικὸν καὶ τὸ προϊὸν πάντῃ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθουργὸν κάλλιστα δείγματα λέγουσι, τοῦ δὲ τρίτου καὶ δημιουργοῦντος τὰ ὅλα τὰς μονίμους προόδους καὶ τὰς τῶν αἰτίων ὅλων ποιήσεις καὶ συνοχὰς τάς τε ἀφωρισμένας ὅλας τοῖς εἴδεσιν αἰτίας καὶ τὰς προιούσας πάσας δημιουργίας καὶ τὰ ὅμοια τούτοις τεκμήρια κάλλιστα ἀναδιδάσκουσι.

Here it is the three Fathers in the Intellectual Hebdomad whose properties are being described, the third being the Demiurge.[2] Michael Psellus' summary of Chaldaean Theology throws light on the matter (sect. 6 ap. Kroll. *De Or. Chald.* p. 74):[3] μετὰ δὲ τούτους τοὺς πηγαίους πατέρας δοξάζουσιν ἤγουν τοὺς κοσμαγούς· ὧν πρῶτος μὲν ὁ ἅπαξ λεγόμενος, μεθ' ὃν <ἡ> Ἑκάτη δευτέρα καὶ μέση, τρίτος δὲ ὁ δὶς ἐπέκεινα·[4]

After these come the second triad, οἱ τρεῖς ἀμείλικτοι, and, to complete the hebdomad, ὁ ὑπεζωκώς. Hecate may seem curiously placed as the middle father, but there she undoubtedly is. She fills everything with life and light (νοεροῦ φωτὸς καὶ ζωῆς πάντα πληροῖ).

ὁ δὶς ἐπέκεινα is so called, says Psellus, because he is δυαδικός, νῷ μὲν κατέχων τὰ νοητά, αἰσθήσιν δὲ ἐπάγων τοῖς κόσμοις. (*Or. Ch.* Fr 8

[1] Perhaps τῶν <νοητῶν καὶ> νοερῶν θεῶν.

[2] The description would in fact fit the triad ὄν -ζωή- νοῦς, νοῦς being the demiurgic element, and one may suspect that Iamblichus is here merely describing Chaldaean-influenced personifications of this triad.

[3] p. 198 Des Places.

[4] See also Procl. *Plat. Theol.* V 2-3.

des Places) Iamblichus preserves this notion in the idea of μόνιμοι πρόοδοι 'stationary progressions' (taking μόνιμος in this sense, rather than as meaning 'permanent'). He has been allotted τάξιν ἐν ταῖς πηγαῖς δημιουργικήν.

Psellus' ultimate source is probably none other than Iamblichus' voluminous work on the Chaldaean Theology, transmitted via Proclus' work on the Oracles, which Psellus used. [1]

Fr. 35

This seems to me a good example of a lemma which previous commentators took as a whole, but which Proclus divides up, in this case into three. Iamblichus' definition of τὸ ὅπερ ὄν, 'ὅ δὴ νοήσει . . . περιληπτόν ἐστίν' seems to imply that he is commenting also on οὕτω δὴ γεγενημένος . . . δεδημιούργηται.' The fact that Proclus' next two lemmata (Εἰ μὲν δὴ καλός ἐστιν . . . I 328, 13ff., and παντί δὴ σαφές . . . 330, 7) are short and bare of reference to his predecessors tends to confirm my suspicions.

I translate τὸ ὅπερ ὄν 'the Essence of Being', but this must be regarded simply as jargon translating jargon. We have here an equivalence: παράδειγμα = τὸ ὅπερ ὄν; in fr. 37 Iamblichus is credited with saying that the Demiurge ἐν αὑτῷ τὸ παράδειγμα περιέχει, as he discerns a δημιουργικὸν ἰδίωμα, a demiurgic property, in the Paradigm. Iamblichus seems to be postulating a power-activity relationship between the Paradigm and the Demiurge.

Apropos 27D (τί τὸ ὄν ἀεί . . .) Proclus makes a useful distinction between the uses of αὐτὸ, ὅπερ and ἀεί to qualify τὸ ὄν, which may prove enlightening. (I 238 10ff.).

(1) ἢ τὸ μὲν 'αὐτὸ' τὴν ἁπλότητα δηλοῖ τῶν νοητῶν καὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ὕπαρξιν καὶ τὸ πρώτως εἶναι, ὃ λέγεται κατὰ τὴν ἰδιότητα, καθ' ἣν πρώτως ὄντα ἅ ἐστι καὶ τὰ δεύτερα πληροῖ τῆς ἑαυτῶν μετουσίας.

(2) τὸ δὲ 'ὅπερ ὂν' τὴν καθαρότητα καὶ τὸ ἀμιγὲς καὶ μὴ ἀναπεπλησμένον τῆς ἐναντίας φύσεως.

(3) τὸ δὲ 'ἀεὶ' τὸ αἰώνιον καὶ ἀμετάβλητον καὶ ἀνεξάλλακτον κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν.

He then proceeds to illustrate this with 'αὐτὸ καλόν', ὅπερ καλόν', and 'ἀεὶ καλόν'.

We have seen earlier, (fr. 29), that Iamblichus wished to make τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν the monad at the summit of the noetic world—what Proclus

[1] See further on all this Appendix C.

wants to term τὸ ἓν ὄν. Now we find τὸ ὅπερ ὄν as the Paradigm. Proclus would make all three terms listed above equal to each other, and equal to the Paradigm in its various aspects.

Fr. 36

We may note ὁ μὲν here meaning 'the latter' (Amelius), and ὁ δὲ 'the former' (Iamblichus) cf. Pr. *in Remp.* I 141, 1ff. Kroll:

Ἄμφω μὲν οὖν οἵδε οἱ θεοὶ περὶ πάντα τὸν κόσμον ἐνεργοῦσιν, ὅ τε Ἥφαιστος λέγω καὶ ὁ Ἄρης, ὁ μὲν διακρίνων τὰς ἐναντιώσεις τοῦ παντὸς . . . ὁ δὲ τὴν ὅλην αἰσθητὴν διακόσμησιν τεχνικὴν ἀπεργαζόμενος . . . where ὁ μὲν is Ares, and ὁ δὲ Hephaestus.

In our passage the identification is obvious from the content:[1] Amelius makes the Paradigm ὁ πρῶτος Ζεύς and Phanes the Demiurge, cf. I 306, 13f.: καὶ ὁ μάλιστα παρ' αὐτῷ δημιουργὸς ὁ Φάνης ἐστίν. Iamblichus we have seen in fr. 34 making the Demiurge πᾶς ὁ νοητὸς κόσμος, enclosing within himself τὰ νοητὰ τοῦ κόσμου παραδείγματα. We find an identification of Metis and the Demiurge at I 169, 17f.: ἦν γὰρ ὁ δημιουργὸς

καὶ Μῆτις πρῶτος γενέτωρ καὶ Ἔρως πολυτερπής.

(Orpheus, fr. 71)

and again, in more detail, just prior to this fragment (p. 336, 6ff.)

πάλαι γὰρ ὁ θεολόγος ἔν τε τῷ Φάνητι τὴν δημιουργικὴν αἰτίαν ἀνύμνησεν· ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἦν τε καὶ προῆν, ὥσπερ ἔφη καὶ αὐτός,

'Βρόμιός τε μέγας καὶ Ζεὺς ὁ πανόπτης,'

ἵνα δὴ τῆς διττῆς δημιουργίας ἔχῃ τὰς οἱονεὶ πηγάς· καὶ ἐν τῷ Διὶ τὴν παραδειγματικήν· Μῆτις γὰρ αὖ καὶ οὗτός ἐστιν, ὥς φησι

'καὶ Μῆτις πρῶτος γενέτωρ καὶ Ἔρως πολυτερπής,'

αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ Διόνυσος καὶ Φάνης καὶ Ἠρικεπαῖος συνεχῶς ὀνομάζεται.

Did Iamblichus make this Orphic interpretation? There is no reason to doubt it. We see that Amelius has already introduced the Orphic poems into the exegesis of Plato. It is most natural to assume that Iamblichus identified the Paradigm with Metis, whom Zeus swallowed.

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[1] It is possible that the scribe of P. was confused by this usage. He writes ἰάμβλιχος for ἀμέλιος (see App. Crit.), but he may have simply been careless.

Fr. 37

First, to what precisely does οἱ περὶ Πορφύριον καὶ Ἰάμβλιχον refer? This is not the only time that Iamblichus is referred to in this way [1] and there is mention of οἱ περὶ Πορφύριον in Pr. 311A, III, 234, 18, though they are never elsewhere thus grouped together. I take this simply as representing Iamblichus reporting and agreeing with Porphyry, the οἱ περὶ being merely sophistical embellishment. We know of various pupils of Iamblichus writing commentaries on Aristotle's *Categories*, Maximus (Simp. *In Cat.* 1.15) and Dexippus (whose commentary survives), but not on the *Timaeus*. Syrianus could not be referred to by Proclus in this way.

We happen to have preserved by John Philoponus a fuller account with direct quotations of Porphyry's commentary on this passage (*De Aet. Mund.* VI 14, and XIV 3: See Sodano, *Porph. Comm.* p. 30ff.), which does not agree very closely with what we have here given as the joint opinion of P. and Iamblichus. Only the opinion that the creation is described διδασκαλίας ἕνεκα is given in both sources, though in different words:

Porph. ap. Philop. VI 14 (p. 154 Rabe): ταῦτα δὲ ἀεὶ ἅμα γίνεται πάντα καὶ οὐ χρόνῳ διῃρημένα, ἀλλ' ἥ γε διδασκαλία ἀναγκαίως διαιρεῖ, ἵνα διδάσκῃ ἀκριβῶς τὸ γιγνόμενον.

The rest of Porphyry's commentary is not reflected in our passage. I feel therefore that we are dealing with Iamblichus' account, and consequently claim the phraseology as Iamblichean.

The 'διδασκαλίας ἕνεκα' explanation is set out by Iamblichus in his own terms. It is important to see ἡ σωματοειδὴς σύστασις, first in itself, and then as organised by δημιουργία, so that we may see the essential characteristics of each. This is to adopt Calvisius Taurus' second meaning of γενητός (see fr. 32), though slightly altered. We are in effect to think of the Universe as ἐπινοίᾳ διαιρούμενον.

Plutarch and Atticus, we are told (p. 381, 26ff.), fastened upon this passage as their prime piece of evidence that Plato intends the cosmos to have a beginning in Time, and that ἡ ἀκόσμητος ὕλη

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[1] Cf. fr. 81 (Pr. 311B, III p. 235): ὡς Ἰάμβλιχος οἴεται καὶ ὅσοι τούτῳ συνᾴδειν ἀξιοῦσι, and fr. 85 (Pr. 321A, III p. 266) 'ὡς εἰώθασι λέγειν καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν μέγαν Ἰάμβλιχον.

and the κακεργέτις ψυχή exist prior to it, the last-named causing the disorderly motion. They can appeal also to the evil soul of *Laws* X, 897B.

It is interesting to compare this with a passage which we find preserved by Lydus, *De Mens.* IV p. 175, 10 Wünsch, from Iamblichus' *Commentary on the Chaldaean Oracles* (Book I). Iamblichus is commenting on πατρογενής as an epithet of ὕλη:

"ἀίδιον μέν ἐστιν ἡ ὕλη, ἐπείπερ συνυφίσταται μετὰ τῶν πρωτίστων αἰτίων ἐξ ἀιδίου, μετ' αὐτῶν τε καὶ σὺν αὐτοῖς ἔχει τὸ εἶναι. οὐδέποτε δὲ ἐξίσταται ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς, διότι κατὰ τὴν μόνιμον (Kroll: ὁμώνυμον mss.) καὶ ἑνιαίαν δύναμιν ἐνεστήρικται τοῖς κοινοῖς."

Fr. 38

This is verbally very close to the account Iamblichus gives in the *De Mysteriis* (VIII 3: *265*):

ὕλην δὲ παρήγαγεν ὁ θεὸς ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσιότητος ὑποσχισθείσης ὑλότητος, ἣν παραλαβὼν ὁ δημιουργὸς ζωτικὴν οὖσαν τὰς ἁπλᾶς καὶ ἀπαθεῖς σφαίρας ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἐδημιούργησε, τὸ δὲ ἔσχατον αὐτῆς εἰς τὰ γεννητὰ καὶ φθαρτὰ σώματα διεκόσμησεν.

The Hermes referred to is doubtless he who in VIII, 1: *261*, is mentioned as having set out the doctrines of the Egyptians 'in 20,000 books, as Seleucus records, or 36, 525, according to Manetho'.

Both οὐσιότης and ὑλότης are words found in the Hermetic Corpus. οὐσιότης is also found in Albinus (*Didasc.* X 3) as an epithet of ὁ πρῶτος θεός, "θειότης, οὐσιότης, ἀλήθεια, συμμετρία, ἀγαθόν." It is obvious from Plotinus' reference to ὑλότης in *Enn.* II, 9.10 "δι' ὕλης ἢ ὑλότητος ἢ ὅτι ὀνομάζειν ἐθέλουσι" that it is a term used by the Gnostics whom he is attacking.

One might well conclude that it is in fact the *De Mysteriis* that is being quoted, except for the notorious habit of Iamblichus of quoting either his own work or that of others repeatedly in different places (e.g. the doublets in the *Vit. Pyth.* and the parallel passages in *De Comm. Math. Sc.* and *In Nic.*). It would be eccentric for Proclus to quote from a different work the author whose commentary he has hitherto been regularly quoting.[1] We can thus, I feel,

[1] Without, that is, using some phrase such as 'ἐν ἄλλοις.'

reasonably preserve this for the Commentary, while noting this excellent evidence for the authenticity of the *De Mysteriis*.

l.3. ὑλότης will presumably be a noetic archetype of *Matter*, perhaps connected with ζωή in the noetic world.

Fr. 39

Here the enemy is Amelius, who has characteristically discerned a triad in the passage from βουληθεὶς (30A) to ἀπειργασμένος (30B), "ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ἄλλος μὲν ὁ βουληθείς, ἄλλος δὲ ὁ λογιζόμενος, ἄλλος δὲ ὁ παραλαβών, καὶ ὁ μὲν τῇ βουλήσει ποιεῖ μόνον, ὁ δὲ τῇ νοήσει καὶ τῷ νοεῖν, ὁ δὲ τῇ μεταχειρίσει· τίθησι μὲν γὰρ νοῦν ἐν ψυχῇ, ψυχὴν δὲ ἐν σώματι καὶ οὕτω συντεκταίνεται τὸ πᾶν."

Here then is Amelius's demiurgic triad. Iamblichus rejects it as λίαν περιττῶς διεσκευωρημένη, but constructs one of his own out of λογισμός, referring to the reasoning power of the Demiurge, thus creating a triadic activity of the Demiurge instead of a demiurgic triad. The λογισμὸς προηγούμενος κατ' αἰτίαν will correspond to the Demiurge λογιζόμενος; in either case the activity of the Demiurge in planning or setting up the conditions for creation is distinguished from the actual creation. λογισμός δημιουργικός corresponds to Amelius's Demiurge παραλαβών, both of which are concerned with actual creation. This leaves Iamblichus' third (ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἑστηκὼς ὡσαύτως), and Amelius's first (ὁ βουληθείς), of which Amelius's sounds more active than Iamblichus's. In each case, however, we have an element which remains static, in opposition to two more active principles. Iamblichus has placed his least active principle last, probably to situate his most active one in the middle of the triad, as was the practice in the Chaldaean Oracles, e.g. the position of Hecate, in the middle of her triads (v. Psellus, *Hyp. Ch Dogm.* 6, ap. Kroll, p. 74).

We may note that in the *De Myst.* III, 28: *168-9*, the Demiurge is described as creating τοὺς κόσμους 'ταῖς ἐννοίαις καὶ βουλήσεσι καὶ τοῖς ἀΰλοις εἴδεσι, διὰ τῆς ἀιδίου τε καὶ ὑπερκοσμίου καὶ ἐγκοσμίου ψυχῆς', which gives us a triad, 'Conception-Will-Activity' (implied in the εἴδη which he employs). This does not agree very closely with the division of demiurgic λογισμός given here, but it preserves a triad of activities *within* the Demiurge, as opposed to a triad of Demiurges.

Fr. 40

I take the passage ὅτι μὲν γὰρ . . . ad fin. as Iamblichean, as it contains the explanation of this particular exegesis of τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ὁρατά, an exegesis which certainly requires defence. It is not reasonable to suppose that Iamblichus gave no explanation of his interpretation, nor is it, I think, reasonable to suppose that Proclus passed over Iamblichus's explanation in silence and gave a quite different one of his own. What we have then, I feel, is substantially Iamblichus's explanation, at most rephrased by Proclus, (e.g. εἰ ἐνθυμηθείης, which is more likely to be Proclus himself than a blind copying of Iamblichus). As Festugière rightly discerns, the passage immediately following this (καὶ μήποτε 400, 11 . . .—καὶ τῆς γενέσεως 400, 17) constitutes a break in the argument, which is then resumed, and continues to 401, 10. There would seem thus to be a more and a less Iamblichean element involved. I have decided to include the first half of the argument only, as a compromise designed to give some view of the original Iamblichean ἐπιβολή without giving a false idea of what we can safely claim. I claim the terminology, such as it is, as Iamblichean.

The argument that what is clear or visible or simple in itself is not so to us and *vice versa*, is a commonplace, but as applied to this passage it may be Iamblichus' own contribution. Inevitably, if we press the matter, the physical world had not been created and so cannot have been beheld by the Demiurge. But then, we may ask, what in the intelligible world is ἀνόητον? The beings of the psychic order, perhaps, but one would like to hear Iamblichus' views on that.

Fr. 41

The doctrine that more general concepts have a wider extension than less general ones is what we have to do with here. This is at the root of props. 58, 59 and 70 of Procl. ET. Ζωή here is a more general concept than ψυχή. We know from fr. 65 that Iamblichus accepted Ζωή as a hypostasis, coming between τὸ ὄν and Νοῦς, as the πρόοδος-element of the noetic triad.

Proclus has mentioned an aporia which 'some' raise (p. 411, 2ff.):

ἀλλὰ πῶς, φασί, ζῶον ἔμψυχον ἔννουν ἀφορίζεται τὸ πᾶν; δοκεῖ μὲν γὰρ αὖ τὸ μὲν ζῷον μέρος εἶναί τι, τὸ δ' ἔμψυχον γένος.

This point could only be made by those who considered that Soul extended into plants, while they restricted the term ζῷον to animals. For Iamblichus the opposite was the case; plants do not have soul, but they are living things—they participate in Ζωή, but not in Ψυχή. Proclus feels the necessity to expand Iamblichus's definition of ζῷον to take in τὰ νοητὰ ζῷα, who are *above* Soul, even as plants are *below* it. From Proclus's wording we must conclude that Iamblichus did not make this clear. It seems that his remarks were made with reference to the *aporia* mentioned above, as Proclus first gives his more elaborate *lusis*, and then appends the opinion of Iamblichus, with his own elucidation.

Fr. 42

Proclus has just given his view that the phrase ἐν μέρους εἴδει = ἐν μέρους τάξει = ὡς μέρος, which is obviously all that Plato meant. He thus implicitly suggests that the divine Iamblichus is being περιττός. But Iamblichus has the same metaphysical problem here that surfaced in fr. 41. The perceptible cosmos has not yet been created, and so we are dealing with the intelligible cosmos, where all things are in all things οἰκείως, and Iamblichus is prepared, as elsewhere, to emend the text in order to preserve philosophical accuracy. If we take τὸν φιλόσοφον in l.14 to refer to Plato, as it should, then Iamblichus is actually proposing to read ὡς in the text; otherwise we would assume him to 'understand' it. Proclus refers to no one else, however, as ὁ φιλόσοφος; therefore Iamblichus *is* proposing a reading, and the text here is Iamblichean, not Proclean.

ll. 6-7 ἕκαστον γὰρ ἐκεῖ . . . κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τάξιν. cf. *De Anima* (ap. Stob. I 365, 7ff. Wachs) εἰσι δή τινες, οἵ πᾶσαν τὴν τοιαύτην οὐσίαν (sc. τὴν ἀσώματον) ὁμοιομερῆ καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μίαν ἀποφαίνονται, ὡς ἐν ὁτῳοῦν αὐτῆς μέρει εἶναι τὰ ὅλα. As an argument for confusing the hypostasis of the Soul with those above it, Iamblichus condemns such a view (365, 22ff.), but he would accept it in general, as here, with the qualification 'κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τάξιν'. This makes possible distinction within unity, without spatial separation, such as is only proper to the physical world. The doctrine is stated definitively in Pr. *El. Theol.* props. 176-7, where the ways in which the εἴδη are respectively distinct and unified are worked out at length.

Fr. 43

The previous commentators had all in various ways regarded κατὰ γένη as representing a higher scale of being than καθ' ἕν, Xenarchus, Atticus and Amelius (with whom Theodore of Asine is represented as agreeing) distinguishing the terms variously.

To take them in chronological order, Xenarchus (a Peripatetic of the time of Augustus) maintains (In Tim. I 425, 22ff.):

τὸ μὲν κατὰ γένη τὰς κατὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν ζῴων προϋπαρχούσας νοητὰς αἰτίας δηλοῦν, οἷον οὐράνιον, ἀέριον, ἔνυδρον, χερσαῖον, ὧν καὶ μνησθήσεται μικρὸν ὕστερον (39E 40A), τὸ δὲ καθ' ἓν τὰς ἐν ἑκάστῳ τούτων εἰδοποιοὺς ἀρχὰς τῶν πολλῶν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανίοις ἄλλο μὲν παράδειγμα ἡλίου, ἄλλο δὲ σελήνης, καὶ ἐν τοῖς μεταξὺ παραπλησίως.

Xenarchus seems here to distinguish two varieties of 'cause' or archetype, (1) those of the four elemental types of living being, and (2) the archetypes of the various species. Within the category of species, we see that heavenly bodies, specifically the Sun and Moon, are unique, while others, the terrestrial species particularly, such as Man and Lion, are pluralised. We find Iamblichus making some such distinction in Fr. 46, where he distinguishes between forms which are μοναδικά and those which are πεπληθυσμένα. Such a distinction tended to resolve itself into one between the things above, and the things below, the Moon, but does not do so here.

Xenarchus also mentions τὰ μεταξύ rather mysteriously,[1] probably referring to various classes of daemon, which are, like the terrestrial species, pluralised.

We must, I think, conclude from this testimony that Xenarchus recognised only four elements, disregarding the Aristotelian fifth, and took the οὐράνια ζῷα to be fiery. We would like to know whether he regarded *birds* or *daemons* to be the proper inhabitants of the airy realm. I suspect, from the reference to τὰ μεταξύ, that he would install the latter, thus taking the line later revealed in Apuleius' *De Deo Socratis*.

Atticus (p. 425, 11ff.) regards καθ' ἕν as referring to τὰ ἄτομα εἴδη, by which he is reported to mean τὰ προσεχῆ τῶν ἀτόμων αἴτια, such as ὁ αὐτοάνθρωπος or ὁ αὐτοίππος, while κατὰ γένη refers to τὰ ὁλικώτερα τούτων καὶ περιληπτικώτερα παραδείγματα of which no examples are given. Atticus' first class comprises archetypes of the

[1] Unless this is just a way of saying 'the rest' (of the planets).

infimae species, nothing more particular than 'Man' or 'Horse' being present in the Intelligible World. τὰ ὁλικώτερα are presumably any more general archetypes, such as 'Living Being', but must also comprise mathematical archetypes, and finally, perhaps, those of Xenarchus's four categories of ζῷον.

This brief survey of Middle Platonic (and Aristotelian) opinion we should probably adjudge primarily to Porphyry, though he himself does not appear in the sequence.

Amelius, it seems, (425, 16ff.), considered καθ' ἕν to refer to individuals, κατὰ γένη to more general concepts (κοινότερα). Theodorus, Proclus tells us (425, 19ff.), followed Amelius' view, and contributed an elaboration of his own, with which we need not concern ourselves.

Iamblichus, however, seems to want to take καθ' ἕν as referring to the henads presiding over each of the *genera* manifested in the visible world. Every genus must be presided over by a henad, and it is in this henadic form (ἑνοειδῶς) that the Essential Living Being, or Autozoon, contains all the genera and species of the universe.

As an interpretation of Plato this is perverse, but as an expression of Iamblichus' metaphysics, valuable. I hesitated before including the concluding passage of the lemma (ἔστιν οὖν 426, 25—ὅμοιον 427, 2). It may be more Proclus than Iamblichus, but it continues the exposition of Iamblichus' view, and may thus, I think, be accepted as substantially Iamblichean.

Fr. 44

Atticus put the Demiurge above the αὐτοζῷον or νοητὸν ζῷον, Porphyry gives him a lower rank than τὸ νοητὸν. The αὐτοζῷον is being taken here as identical with the Paradigm, as it was the Paradigm that Porphyry equated with Mind, the Demiurge with ὑπερουράνιος ψυχή.

We may assume that Porphyry criticised Atticus, and Iamblichus criticised Porphyry and Atticus, but I do not feel justified in including them in the fragment. We have seen from fr. 34 that Iamblichus took the whole noetic cosmos as the Demiurge, who thus comprises the Paradigm within himself—this being Iamblichus' interpretation of *Enn.* III 9, 1. Porphyry's identification of the Demiurge with the ὑπερκόσμιος ψυχή we have already seen.

Atticus' problem was as follows (*In Tim.* I 431, 14ff.): Is the Demiurge contained within the νοητὸν ζῷον?

(1) If he is, then he is a *part*; *but*, parts are by definition imperfect (ἀτελής); the Demiurge, then, must be imperfect, and thus 'not beautiful', which is impossible. (2) or, he is not contained in the νοητὸν ζῷον. In that case, the νοητὸν ζῷον will not contain all the νοητά; (but, on Plato's theory, it must.) So *that* is impossible.

So then, says Proclus (or Porphyry) 'ἀπορήσας ἔθετο ῥᾳδίως ὑπὲρ τὸ αὐτοζῷον εἶναι τὸν δημιουργόν—he rather facilely placed the Demiurge *above* the Essential Living Being. Atticus, of course, was operating in a pre-Neoplatonic philosophical framework; for him, the Demiurge was the Good, the Supreme Being (*In Tim.* I, p. 305, 6ff. Ἀττικος . . . αὐτόθεν τὸν δημιουργὸν εἰς ταὐτὸν ἄγει τἀγαθῷ. There was for him no *One* above the Demiurge. The Ideas were contained in the νοητὸν ζῷον, which he thus contemplated as 'below' him.

The position of Atticus in the 'Ideas as Thoughts of God' controversy has been disputed. However, in the course of Porphyry's extended criticism of οἱ περὶ Ἀττικον, *à propos Tim.* 30A, reported by Proclus, I 391, 4-396, 26, (Sodano fr. LI), we find the following (393, 31ff.):

> Τρίτον τοίνυν, ὅτι οὐδὲ ὁ ποιητής, ὃν παραλαμβάνουσιν ἀρχήν, προσήκει τῷ Πλάτωνι· οὔτε γὰρ αἱ ἰδέαι κεχωρισμέναι τοῦ νοῦ καθ' αὑτὰς ὑπεστήκασιν, ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐπεστραμμένος ὁρᾷ τὰ εἴδη πάντα . . . οἱ δὲ ἀδρανεῖς τὰς ἰδέας τύποις κοροπλαθικοῖς ἐοικυίας ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν οὔσας καὶ ἔξω τοῦ νοῦ κειμένας εἰσάγουσιν.

That is to say, Atticus and his followers regarded the Ideas as being *outside* the Intellect, and independently subsisting.

Fr. 45

I take this passage to represent substantially the arguments of Porphyry and Iamblichus in defence of their interpretation, though Proclus has perhaps reworked the phraseology.

The reader will have to excuse the awkwardness involved in translating the πότερον. The English language has been caught at a disadvantage. We might presume that this refinement of the three terms was first expressed by Porphyry, and was not the subject of previous discussion. Earlier commentators would then

have *tacitly* assumed that only two alternatives were envisaged, ἀπείρους strengthening πολλούς. But the phrasing of the text makes it possible that Porphyry is championing a previous opinion.

It is interesting to see Porphyry and Iamblichus worrying about the correctness of their Greek. Extant evidence would show, I think, that a third term *can* be added after πότερον, but it would be introduced by another ἤ, not by καί as here, (see LSJ s.v.); but we cannot argue confidently on this matter with people in control of much more extensive evidence. As Proclus observes, they are right κατὰ τὰ πράγματα—there were champions of both a limited and an unlimited number of worlds in and before Plato's day—but they are surely stretching Plato's Greek here.

Porphyry and Iamblichus do not here seem to be interested in any particular theory about a limited number of worlds, so much as in the desirability of logical completeness. The alternatives *unity* and *plurality* leave out of account the third term in the process which will unite the two—*unified* or *limited plurality*, in other words, not just ἕν—ἄπειρον, but ἕν—πέρας—ἄπειρον. They might draw support from the exposition of the theory of Dialectic in *Philebus* 16Dff., especially 'τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀπείρου ἰδέαν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος μὴ προσφέρειν πρὶν ἄν τις τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ πάντα κατίδῃ τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπείρου τε καὶ τοῦ ἑνός'.

Fr. 46

The ἀπορία raised is precisely why a copy of a unitary paradigm must itself be unitary. An anonymous class of objectors (p. 439, 22ff.) bring forward the analogy of the αὐτοάνθρωπος, the αὐτοΐππος and suchlike entities, which produce a multitude of copies. Why should not the paradigm?

It is to Porphyry's answer to this ἀπορία that Iamblichus is objecting. Porphyry's answer is (a) it is only where Matter is concerned, in the (material) cosmos, that the Forms must disperse into multiplicity, and (b) as regards the singleness of the sun and moon (which are, as is argued, part of the cosmos),

τοῖς μὲν ἀφθάρτοις ὡς τῷ κόσμῳ, κἂν ᾖ μέρη, τὸ μοναδικὸν οἰκεῖον, τοῖς δὲ φθαρτοῖς τὸ πλῆθος,

the sun and moon being ἄφθαρτα and thus not requiring multiplicity to ensure their survival as a species, as perishable things do.

Presumably what Iamblichus objects to in this account is the too sharp division between perishable and imperishable things in the cosmos. If we assume that the material (αἰσθητός) cosmos takes in everything from above μεριστῶς, διῃρημένως and πεπληθυσμένως, then we cannot just say that the sun and moon are μοναδικά because ἄφθαρτα; *that* is the problem. All we can say, preserving the essential divisiveness of the cosmos, which the unicity of the planets seems to go against, is that in some forms the categories ταυτότης and στάσις prevail, and this makes them unique and permanent, while in others ἑτερότης and κίνησις are dominant.

Proclus' παραμυθία may give us a clue to what Iamblichus has in mind. Proclus *wants* him to refer to the two ἀρχαί after the One, πέρας and ἄπειρον, in one or the other of which not only all forms, but even all gods and classes of gods partake. Those which rejoice in Sameness and Rest, then, will go back to πέρας, while those which rejoice in Motion and Otherness to τὸ ἄπειρον. Since Iamblichus accepted these entities, that is quite possibly what he *does* mean, but neither Proclus nor we ourselves can be quite sure.

BOOK III

Fr. 47

This is an answer to an *aporia*. Proclus has just said (4, 16ff.) that not *everything* that is γενητόν is αἰσθητόν according to Plato, but only what is σύνθετον καὶ ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν χρόνον· for the soul, after all, is γενητή. The difficulty is then made about forms-in-matter and qualities. They are in almost the opposite situation, it seems, to the Soul. They have γένεσις (though being ἀσώματα), and are αἰσθητά.

The force of Iamblichus' answer to the *aporia* must be considered to lie in his use of the Aristotelian term συνθεωρεῖται. Forms and qualities are not visible in themselves, but only in so far as they contribute to the creation of bodies. It is not, then, in fact the εἴδη and ποιότητες that one sees, but the composite thing to which their presence contributes.

What follows this fragment is a good example of an explanation by Proclus as opposed to one taken from Iamblichus. The next sentence is introduced by δ' οὖν; had it been γάρ, the explanation—that the Cosmos, having both bodily and bodiless, created and

uncreated, parts, is naturally given the epithets of the more inferior parts of itself, σωματοειδής and γενητός—must have been taken as substantially Iamblichean.

Fr. 48

First of all, the text. It seems necessary to introduce emendations in lines 18-20 in order to secure a proper connexion between the clauses. Festugière is unhappy about the existing text (v. his note *ad* Diehl 37, 4), and advocates inserting καὶ after διότι. I suggest εἰ after διότι, giving a reasonable translation. This does not seem too violent in view of the generally disturbed state of the text, as evidenced by other necessary insertions.

Once again, γάρ in line 12 seems to introduce in substance Iamblichus' own explanation of why he identifies the powers and forms in matter with 'planes' and the material substances created by their presence with 'solids'. Since Proclus approves of this explanation, he gives it in direct speech. The comparison between planes as the ἔσχατος ὅρος of mathematical body, and forms-in-matter as μορφὴ καὶ πέρας of their substrata may seem a trifle strained, the planes being the *lowest* bound of mathematical body, while the forms and powers are the *highest* element in matter. (Kroll's conjecture φυσικῶν (see App. Crit.) seems necessary, to secure an adequate contrast with τοῦ μαθηματικοῦ σώματος.) It might have been more apposite to take the plane as the highest bound of *geometrical* body. But if we fix our attention on the aspect of *bound*, the analogy is tolerable.

l. 14 τῶν λόγων . . . ἐστιν ἑτερότης. The material world is properly the realm of ἑτερότης, as we have seen in fr. 46, where it is the sublunary world particularly which seems to 'rejoice in Motion and Otherness', and also back in fr. 9, where the *logoi* descending (ultimately) from the One, when they reach Matter, exhibit μετὰ τῆς ὁμοιότητος παμπόλλην τὴν ἑτερότητα. However, in spite of the tendency to Otherness, or multiplicity, of the ἔνυλα εἴδη, the κοίνοι σύνδεσμοι of the reason-principles [1] and the forms, and of Life, secure that only one mean is necessary. Ζωή here

[1] The phrase κοινοὶ σύνδεσμοι recurs in *De An.* 385, 10 (I do not find it used by Proclus): . . . συμμέτρως δ'αὖ καὶ πρὸς τὸ στερεὸν σῶμα συμβιβάζειν μέσοις τισὶ κοινοῖς συνδέσμοις αὐτὴν συνάπτοντα.

seems to be synonymous with φύσις, the life-principle of the physical world.

The explanation of the necessity for at least two means in the case of material bodies is more obscure; they are composite (σύνθετα), of form and matter, and the Dyad is what presides over composition and division. The statement, next, that all composites are composed of a multiplicity of οὐσίαι and δυνάμεις and thus require at least two means, is not easy to comprehend or assent to.[1] I can only assume that what is at issue here is not the Aristotelian substance and attributes of solid bodies, but rather the various cosmic influences from Above and Below that join in the formation of physical substances.[2] At any rate, the form, he says, is responsible for one mean, and the substratum for another. This rather mystifying formulation results from Iamblichus' determination to give a purely *physical* account of the necessity for two means, without recourse to mathematics, in consonance with what he regards as the σκοπός of the dialogue.

Proclus himself, though recording Iamblichus' view favourably, does not adopt it. His 'physical' explanation (p. 37, 14ff.) rests on the principle that the four elements have each not *one* quality, as the early physical philosophers believed, or even *two*, as maintained by Ocellus in his Περὶ Φύσεως, but *three*, as Timaeus himself asserts (cf. 55D, and also Tim. Locr. 98C). It is thus the possession of three qualities that is analogous to being a solid (two qualities being analogous to a plane figure), and two means are required to form a proper link between two elements (fire and earth) having three qualities opposite to each other.

This brings us to a larger problem. Is it possible that a man so enamoured of Pythagorean mathematics as was Iamblichus gave no mathematical comment at all on this passage (31C-32B), where laborious mathematical comment was so much a part of the tradition? It seems to me that it is not possible, and that in fact what we have from Proclus is substantially Iamblichus' treatment, with some additions and embellishments. While it would be impro-

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[1] We may compare, however, *De Myst.* I 4:12, where σύνθετα are compared to τὰ κρείττονα γένη: σύνταξις γάρ τις αὐτῶν (sc. τῶν συνθέτων) συνίσταται, ἀνοικειότης τε μεταξὺ παρεμπίπτει καὶ διάστασις, as a result of their having some qualities which are προηγούμενα and some which are ἑπόμενα.

[2] Cf. the personified δυνάμεις who abound in the Corpus Hermeticum, particularly C.H. I and XIII. See Festugière, *Rev. d. H.T.*, Vol. III, pp. 153ff.

per to carve out sections and declare them to be fragments, it is reasonable, I think, to try to recover in outline Iamblichus' whole contribution to exegesis of the passage.

We may derive profit, I think, from comparing the commentaries of Proclus and Calcidius on this passage. It is at this point (32A ὁπόταν γὰρ ἀριθμῶν τριῶν) that Calcidius sees fit to begin his commentary, following in this, as we have seen, at least one Middle Platonic line of exegesis. We do not know where Severus began his commentary, nor where Adrastus, who is certainly a source for Calcidius,[1] began his, but we know that Severus at least had no use for the Atlantis Myth (see discussion *ad* fr. 26). I regard Calcidius as excellent evidence for the standard Middle Platonic attitude to the passages which he comments on, and for the view of at least one group as to where the serious business of the dialogue began.

If we compare Proclus (II 20, 19-42, 2, comprising two κεφάλαια) with Calcidius cc. VIII-XXV, we note—apart from the obvious Neoplatonic theologising—one chief difference. Proclus begins at p. 20, 19 with a reminder of the basic σκοπός of the dialogue. πρῶτον εἰπεῖν χρὴ περὶ τούτων μαθηματικῶς, ἔπειτα, ὅπερ μάλιστα πρόκειται, φυσικῶς· οὐ γὰρ ἀπηρτῆσθαι δεῖ τὸν λόγον τῆς προκειμένης ἡμῖν θεωρίας.

The mathematical treatment must not make us lose sight of the physical nature of the dialogue.

We are then taken through a discussion of the various means, arithmetic, geometric and harmonic (to p. 23, 8.) This is more elaborate than, but parallel to, Calcidius' discussion of means in cc. IX-XII. Calcidius' treatment is agreed to be substantially that of Adrastus (see Waszink's Intro. p. XXXVII); it sounds from p. 20, 25f. (καὶ ὅ γε Νικόμαχος ταύτης ἐστι τῆς δόξης, λέγων ὀρθῶς) as if Proclus is following Nicomachus. But is he following Nicomachus directly? He could have, of course, but he need not have. On the subject of mathematics (as on Pythagoreanism generally) Nicomachus was Iamblichus' favourite author.

It is worth noting the similarities between the exegesis here and the discussion of means in Iamblichus' *Commentary on Nicomachus' Intro. to Arith.* pp. 100-118 Pistelli, bearing in mind the extreme

[1] Borghorst, *De Anatolii Fontibus*, Diss. Inaug. Berlin 1905, esp. pp. 26-38 discusses the matter well. See also Waszink's Introduction (De Calcidii in Commentario Auctoribus).

banality of the subject-matter.[1] Immediately at the outset we find a similarity:

In Nic. p. 100, 15.

προληπτέον δὲ ὅτι κυρίως ἀναλογίαν ἐκαλοῦν οἱ παλαιοὶ τὴν γεωμετρικήν, κοινότερον δὲ ἤδη καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς πάσας μὴν γενικῶς μεσότητας.

Procl. II 20, 21.

Εἴσι μὲν οὖν τινες, οἳ νομίζουσι τὸν Πλάτωνα διὰ τούτων τὴν γεωμετρικὴν μεσότητα ἀφορίζεσθαι, λέγοντες ἄλλα τε πόλλα καὶ ὅτι κυρίως μέν ἐστιν ἀναλογία παρὰ πάσας ἡ γεωμετρική, μεσότητες δὲ αἱ ἄλλαι καλοίντο ἂν δικαιῶς, καὶ ὅ γε Νικόμαχος ταύτης ἐστι τῆς δόξης, λέγων ὀρθῶς.

In Nicomachus himself (II 24, p. 126 Hoche) we find merely:

ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ συνεχὴς γεωμετρικὴ μεσότης κυρίως ἀναλογία μόνη καλουμένη διὰ τὸ ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον θεωρεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς ἐν αὐτῇ ὅρους.

He then goes on to describe it.

Another peculiarity of Proclus as opposed to Calcidius in his demonstration (21, 18ff.) that *all three means* can be found in all three classes, ἀριθμοί, ὄγκοι (which he takes as *solids*), and δυνάμεις (which he takes as *musical scales*, *contra* Calcidius, who has no mention of music here, though he does discuss it *ad 35C*, closely following Adrastus in his exposition). We do, however, find such a suggestion in Nicomachus (II 27, p. 136ff. Hoche), and this is commented on by Iamblichus (*In Nic.* p. 112, 16 Pist.), though only in the case of numbers. Proclus goes on to refer to the fitting of all the means into solids, and then turns in more detail to the fitting of the means into musical scales, at which point he rapidly gets into difficulties through lack of adequate terminology. (See Winnington-Ingram *ap.* Festugière Vol. III, pp. 46-7, notes.)

It is reasonable, I think, to conclude that Iamblichus, after

[1] We cannot ignore that Adrastus has the same to say on this subject (*ap.* Theo. Smyrn. 105, 15ff. Hiller): τούτων δέ φησιν ὁ Ἄδραστος μίαν τὴν γεωμετρικὴν κυρίως λέγεσθαι καὶ ἀναλογίαν καὶ πρώτην· ταύτης μὲν γὰρ αἱ ἄλλαι προσδέονται, αὐτὴ δ' ἐκείνων οὐχί, ὡς ὑποδείκνυσιν ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς. Κοινότερον δέ φησι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας μεσότητας ὑπ' ἐνίων καλεῖσθαι ἀναλογίας. Note the κοινότερον δὲ in common between Adrastus and Iamblichus.

discussing the various types of mean, giving chief place to the geometric, then gave demonstrations of how the various means might be found, as he does in the *Comm. In Nic.* It seems probable, also, that Iamblichus took δυνάμεις in a musical sense, from his use of the word in *In Nic.* p. 108, 27 etc., when discussing the harmonic mean (he quotes *Tim.* 31C-32A on p. 105—with the perhaps significant omission of ὡντινωνοῦν).

It would be equally unrealistic to assume that Porphyry, for his part, had nothing to say on these matters, but to speculate on that is outside the scope of this work. It seems much more probable that Proclus is dependent, either directly, or through Syrianus, on Iamblichus' treatment of this passage, which went beyond Middle Platonist exegesis chiefly in insisting on attention to the overall σκοπός of the dialogue, and the subordination of mathematical to physical interpretation. Calcidius, as representative of the previous level of comment, tends to 'wallow in mathematical speculations', except in cc. XX-XXV, where he discusses the possibility of establishing means between Fire and Earth by postulating three qualities for each of them, a theory with which Proclus ends his chapter (p. 37, 14-42, 2). The theory in its developed form is of mysterious provenance (though it can take its origin from e.g. *Tim.* 56A). Partisans of the view that Calcidius is dependent on Porphyry may take it back no farther than the latter, but I feel that it is a Middle Platonic development.

Fr. 49

How far can all this be regarded as Iamblichean? We may, I think, take as evidence the passage which follows, in which Proclus states his intention of dealing with the question φυσικῶς, "ὥσπερ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐπεχείρισεν" in which he gives 5 arguments taken from the *De Caelo* (1) B4, 287a 11-23, (2) l.c. 287a 32-287b 7 (3) l.c. 286 b 10-18 (4) l.c. 287 a 23-30 (5) A7, 274 a 31-274 b, relayed with various degrees of faithfulness.

We must make allowance for the fact that Proclus had to compile his Aristotelian arguments from an alien work, while he can take his Iamblichean arguments, presumably, from a commentary parallel in form to his own. I feel, therefore, that the passage can safely be allotted to Iamblichus, to the extent that the phraseology may be taken to be his, even if we have it in a somewhat abbreviated form.

Iamblichus, as we see, is made to assemble eight resemblances between the Universe and its model. His exposition is in fact an elaborate encomium of sphericity. We may question, however, why there should be *eight* points. We might expect, from a Pythagorean, ten. It seems to me in fact that, under point (2), Proclus has run together 3 points, (a) unceasing motion (b) homogeneous circularity, (c) circularity round a centre. Those, properly distinguished, would bring Iamblichus' points to the satisfactory number of ten.

This elaborate, scholastic, listing of eight (or ten) points in favour of the sphere is remarkable, and might tempt us to think of an Iamblichean origin for Proclus' listing of the ten gifts which Plato grants to the world (II 5, 17ff.). I have tried to distinguish parts of the noetic world (and of the supra-noetic world) which the sphere is made to resemble; the first five (or seven) points seem to refer to the noetic world, the last three to the realm of the One. I would not, however, wish to make this classification more than tentative.

Fr. 50

The most important aspect of this passage is the doctrine of the ὑπερκόσμιος ψυχή. Plotinus had made a suggestion in this direction in IV 3, 4: εἰ μή τις τὸ μὲν ἓν στήσειεν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ μὴ πίπτον εἰς σῶμα, εἶτ' ἐξ ἐκείνου τὰς πάσας, τήν τε τοῦ ὅλου καὶ τὰς ἄλλας, this being a solution to the problem of how the unity of Soul can be maintained, but as far as we can see Iamblichus was the first to formalise the theory. In fr. 54 we see him laying down the principle πάσης τάξεως ἡ ἀμέθεκτος ἡγεῖται μονὰς πρὸ τῶν μετεχομένων, and in the psychic order this requires μία καὶ ὑπερκόσμιος ψυχή, from which the ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός and αἱ ἄλλαι must derive, which is precisely what Plotinus had suggested. The Hypercosmic Soul is here given the suitable epithets ἐξῃρημένη and ἀμέθεκτος. It also, however, πᾶσιν ἐνεξουσιάζει (this being a use of this word not found before Iamblichus (c.f. *De Myst.* II, 3:71 and III, 17:143)), and in this sense may be regarded as being 'in the middle'.

It is interesting to note Proclus' methods of quotation in this place. Iamblichus' explanation, introduced by γάρ, is given in indirect speech; Proclus does not entirely identify himself with it. Syrianus' explanation of *his* position, immediately following

(105, 28ff.), also introduced by simple γάρ (τῆς γὰρ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆς . . .) rates direct speech (ταῦτα πάντα ὁ παρὼν λόγος ἔφη ἐνδεικνύμενος . . . 106, 7); Proclus fully adopts his master's line.[1]

We must consider now who it is that Porphyry and Iamblichus are here opposing. We are faced with an elaborate anonymous doxography, presumably of pre-Plotinians. The question is, what does Plato mean by τὸ μέσον, into which the Demiurge put the Soul? We have seen the explanations of Porphyry and Iamblichus; here is what they were combating and rising above (II 104, 17ff.):

(1) Some consider 'the middle' the centre of the earth.
(2) *Others* say it is the Moon, ὡς ἰσθμὸν τῶν γενητῶν καὶ θείων.
(3) *Others* say it is the Sun, ὡς ἐν τόπῳ καρδίας ἱδρυμένον.
(4) *Others* refer it to the Sphere of the fixed stars, of whom
  (a) some make it the equatorial circle (ὁ ἰσημερινός) ὡς ὁρίζοντα τὸ πλάτος.
  (b) others the circle of the ecliptic (ὁ διὰ μέσων)

—in each of which places they respectively fix τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ παντός. Following on this doxography is a short justification of each position. I conjecture that Porphyry originally collected this summary of Middle Platonic and Stoic opinions, but whether thus anonymously or with credit given to authors I cannot assert. If the former, then either Iamblichus or Proclus abbreviated it. It is not relevant to the present enquiry to unravel the various writers hidden in this list; suffice it to note here the common (though not universal) feature of Proclus' anonymous doxographies; the opinions cited amount to *five* (cf. Comm. ad Fr. 53, p. 332, Comm. ad Fr. 74, p. 364; at I 75, 30ff. there are in fact 5 Middle Platonist opinions, pp. 268-9).

Fr. 51

Porphyry has just explained the phrase κύκλῳ κύκλον by reminding us that things that are not circular (such as a stone roller) may be moved in a circle, whereas things that are circular may be moved otherwise than in a circle (as, for instance, a hoop), so that the seemingly pleonastic expression is necessary.

I propose, with some hesitation, to take the passage δῆλον δέ . . .

[1] It must be admitted that an explanatory sentence which is plainly that of Porphyry, μέση γάρ ἐστι τῶν τε νοητῶν καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν is given with direct speech, but this is an uncontroversial remark with which Proclus (& Iamblichus) can fully agree.

περιόδων as Iamblichean, rather than as an explanation by Proclus. The first section would be excessively cryptic, and indeed almost pointless, by itself. Iamblichus must have explained himself further, and this is no doubt the explanation.

The basis of difference with Porphyry, and with the natural interpretation, is that Iamblichus sees here a reference to *two* circles, translating 'a circle turned by a circle' rather than 'a circle turning in a circle'. Once again we must deplore Iamblichus' twisting of Plato's Greek, but that is hardly the point. For Iamblichus the exegesis of a text is really only a pretext for doing philosophy.

This interpretation, as Proclus would say, accords both with the doctrine of Plato and with τὰ πράγματα. 'What has been said before' must refer to the previous sentence, particularly 'καὶ ἔτι ἔξωθεν τὸ σῶμα αὐτῇ περιεκάλυψεν.'[1] Ὁ ψυχικὸς κύκλος here must, then, be the Circle of the Hypercosmic, Transcendent Soul, as described in that fragment. The circle of this Soul, then, causes the σωματικὸς κύκλος of the Universe to turn.

'τὰ ῥηθησόμενα' must refer, as suggested in the translation, to the passage on the construction of the Soul in 36c: 'καὶ τῇ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ἐν ταὐτῷ περιαγομένῃ κινήσει πέριξ αὐτὰς ἔλαβε, καὶ τὸν μὲν ἔξω, τὸν δὲ ἐντὸς ἐποιεῖτο τῶν κύκλων.' When we reach frr. 55 and 56, where this passage is discussed, we find that 'the motion that is carried round uniformly in the same place' is to be identified not with any part of the Soul, but with Nous and ἡ νοερὰ ζωή, on the argument that this κίνησις is external to the Soul, and so cannot be a motion of the Soul. The outer circle of the Same, is then, in Fr. 56, identified with ὁ χωριστὸς νοῦς, the transcendent Intellect, and the inner circle, the circle of the Other, with νοῦς ἀχώριστος, Participated Intellect, which drives the Soul from within. These will be discussed more fully *ad loc.*

Iamblichus can quote as further evidence for his interpretation 36DE: ἐπεὶ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν τῷ ξυνιστάντι πᾶσα ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ξύστασις ἐγεγένητο, μετὰ τοῦτο πᾶν τὸ σωματοειδὲς ἐντὸς αὐτῆς ἐτεκταίνετο καὶ μέσον μέσῃ ξυναγαγὼν προσήρμοττεν, . . . where one may regard the material mass as enclosed by the psychic.

ll. 6-7. τὰς διττὰς ἀνακυκλήσεις εἰς ἀναλογίαν ἄξει . . . This

[1] On which Iamblichus has just commented in Fr. 50.

presumably refers to 36C, where the two κύκλοι are related to the circuits of the Same and the Other within the Soul.

Fr. 52

I have included the Theodorus passage only to make clear the reference of ὁ μέν, ἡ δέ and ἡ δέ in the Iamblichus passage. Theodorus is quoted here before Iamblichus, but only because he has formulated in more technical language his predecessor's distinctions.

Here we have set out the three aspects of each hypostasis, which Iamblichus seems to have been the first to distinguish, although here there is not a question of different moments within the same hypostasis, but of different hypostases, each representing one relation, Nous being ἐξῃρημένος or ἀμέθεκτος, ἡ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ζωή being καθ' ἕξιν, a condition of physical bodies, and the Soul being μετεχομένη, both separate and participated.

This is not preceded by any doxography, but only by Proclus' own elaborate formulation. For a doxography we must wait till p. 153, 13ff. For the best account of the early interpretations we may turn to Plutarch, *De Animae Procreatione in Timaeo.* We are faced here with the almost irresistible conclusion that Plato himself declined to make any authoritative statement on what Timaeus meant by the elements which go into the making of the Soul. Only thus can the remarkable divergence of views even among his immediate successors be explained. Xenocrates is the first, of whom we have evidence, who essayed an interpretation of this passage. He offers a mathematical explanation, identifying the Undivided Essence with the number One, and that divided about bodies with the Indefinite Dyad; from the union of these two are derived the system of integer numbers (Plut. *De An. Procr.* 1012 E): οἱ μὲν γὰρ (the Xenocrateans) οὐδὲν ἢ γένεσιν ἀριθμοῦ δηλοῦσθαι νομίζουσι τῇ μίξει τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ μεριστῆς οὐσίας· ἀμέριστον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἕν, μεριστὸν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος, ἐκ δὲ τούτων γίγνεσθαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦ ἑνὸς ὁρίζοντος τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τῇ ἀπειρίᾳ πέρας ἐντιθέντος, ἣν καὶ δυάδα καλοῦσιν ἀόριστον.

This we may term the *arithmetical* explanation.

We may note, however, that Xenocrates' predecessor, Speusippus, defined the Soul as ἰδέα τοῦ πάντῃ διαστατοῦ (Iambl. *De An.* p. 364, 5).

That this had some connexion with this passage seems indicated

by Plut. *De An. Proc.* 1023B (where the definition is attributed to οἱ περὶ Ποσειδώνιον): . . . δεξάμενοι τὴν τῶν περάτων οὐσίαν περὶ τὰ σώματα μεριστὴν καὶ ταῦτα τῷ νοητῷ μίξαντες ἀπεφήναντο τὴν ψυχὴν ἰδέαν εἶναι τοῦ πάντῃ διαστατοῦ κατ' ἀριθμὸν συνεστῶσαν ἁρμονίαν περιέχοντα.

This we may term the *geometrical* explanation.

Against the mathematical exegesis of his predecessors, Crantor of Soli, pupil of Xenocrates, revolted. To him we may credit the first formulation of the *physical* explanation, that the Soul was a mixture ἐκ τε τῆς νοητῆς καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ δοξαστῆς φύσεως (Plut. *op. cit.* 1012D). Plutarch goes on to explain further (1012F ff.): οἱ δὲ περὶ Κράντορα μάλιστα τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἔργον εἶναι τὸ κρίνειν τά τε νοητὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ τάς τε τούτων ἐν αὑτοῖς καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα γιγνομένας διαφορὰς καὶ ὁμοιότητας, ἐκ πάντων φασίν, ἵνα πάντα γιγνώσκῃ, συγκεκρᾶσθαι τὴν ψυχήν· ταῦτα δ' εἶναι τέτταρα, τὴν νοητήν φύσιν ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν καὶ τὴν περὶ τὰ σώματα παθητικὴν καί μεταβλητήν, ἔτι δὲ τὴν ταὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου διὰ τὸ κἀκείνων ἑκατέραν μετέχειν ἑτερότητος καὶ ταὐτότητος.

Crantor, then, seeing the Soul as median between the noetic and sensible worlds, requires that it be made up of four elements, ἡ νοητὴ φύσις and ἡ περὶ τὰ σώματα παθητικὴ καὶ μεταβλητή in order that it may have a likeness to each of these realms, and again of Sameness and Otherness, since both these categories are present in both realms, and the Soul must be able to discern them.[1]

It is with the view of Crantor that Iamblichus will feel most sympathy. It is likely that the passage of the *De Anima* (365, 27ff.), where he expresses an opinion opposed to that which makes the Soul contain in itself all the higher beings, expresses his own opinion. His first definition there is 'τὸ μέσον τῶν μεριστῶν καὶ ἀμερίστων <τῶν τε σωματικῶν καὶ ἀ>σωμάτων γενῶν.' The Soul is able to comprehend everything above and below itself, but does not *contain* these things, as Numenius and those who follow him would have it do.

In fact, in Procl. II 153, 15ff. Aristander and Numenius are credited with the view of Xenocrates: ἀριθμὸν αὐτὴν (s.c. τὴν

[1] He may have taken his position from Aristotle, *De An.* A, 404b 16: τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ; γιγνώσκεσθαι γὰρ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, τὰ δὲ πράγματα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἶναι, taking στοιχεῖα and ἀρχαί to be in effect the categories of the *Sophist*, ὄν, ταὐτόν, θάτερον, στάσις, and κίνησις.

ψυχὴν) εἰπόντες ἐκ μονάδος ποιοῦσιν, ὡς ἀμερίστου, καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου δυάδος, ὡς μεριστῆς, which puts them in the arithmetical category, while Severus is credited with another form of the geometrical explanation:

οἵ δὲ (Severus, l. 25) ὡς γεωμετρικὴν ὑπόστασιν οὖσαν ἐκ σημείου καὶ διαστάσεως, τοῦ μὲν ἀμεροῦς, τῆς δὲ μεριστῆς.

Iamblichus himself gives this as follows (*De An.* 364, 3ff.): ἔστι δὴ γένος ἕν τι αὐτῆς τὸ σχῆμα, πέρας ὂν διαστάσεως, καὶ αὐτὴ <ἡ> διάστασις. ἐν αὐτοῖς μὲν οὖν Σεβῆρος ὁ Πλατωνικὸς αὐτὴν ἀφωρίσατο.

I distrust the word σχῆμα in this passage. Either it is being used in a special sense, to mean 'geometrical point', or we should emend, perhaps, to στίγμα. The latter I do not find used in this sense either (though στιγμή is common enough), but its very unfamiliarity might invite corruption. At any rate, Severus identified the Indivisible Substance with the point, the Divided with spatial extension, which puts him in the *geometrical* camp.

Fr. 53


This is an extremely important passage, being the earliest definite reference [1] to the triad μόνη—πρόοδος—ἐπιστροφή as a process going on *within* any given hypostasis. This further articulation of the Plotinian theory has been traditionally granted to Proclus (e.g. by Zeller, III². ii. 713ff.), but the present passage, like the *Anon. Taur.* passage, and Marius Victorinus, *Hymn III* (e.g. ll. 71-4 'Status, Progressio, Regressus, O beata trinitas' p. 638 Hadot) shows that the triad is not original with him, but goes back, probably, to Porphyry. Iamblichus, however, is our earliest certain authority.

We are here presented with a scheme based on the seven numbers of the Soul, as follows: (see p. 332)

Two triadic processes are here revealed, the first for the noetic world, the second for the world of becoming, with the Tetrad acting as the mediating influence, gathering all of the noetic world into itself, and showing forth all the 'secondary creation'. The

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[1] Apart from the allusion in *Anon. In Parm.* XIV, the authorship of which, despite Hadot RÉG 74 pp. 410ff., must be regarded as uncertain. See Dodds, *Proclus* pp. 220-1.



tetrad might thus be taken as the Soul proper, mediating between the two worlds, but all the numbers, and the powers connected with them, are to be regarded as contained in the Soul, which, like the Tetrad, is πάντων περιεκτική and πάντων ἐκφαντική, of those things above it and below it, respectively.

It is interesting here to note the previous exegeses of the passage, as set out by Proclus. First, the anonymous Middle Platonists, exhibiting substantially five literal, astronomical, interpretations, with a miscellaneous group (II 212, 12ff.).

(1) οἱ μέν wish to relate these seven ὅροι to the seven planetary spheres.

(2) οἱ δέ, to the distances of these from the centre of the earth, taking it as the monad.

(3) οἱ δέ, εἰς τὰς κινήσεις, presumably the various movements of the spheres.

(4) οἱ δέ, εἰς τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἀστέρων—the various sizes of the planets.

(5) οἱ δέ, εἰς τὰ τάχη τῶν κύκλων—their respective speeds of revolution.

and others have other similar theories. (ἄλλας τοιούτας ἀποδόσεις, 212, 21).

Proclus condemns all these. First, they disagree with the latest astronomical theories (τὰς τῶν νεωτέρων ἀστρονόμων τηρήσεις). Secondly, Plato does not define the size or distances or time or motion of the stars, but only says one is larger than another. Thirdly, we are dealing with the formation of the Soul (ψυχογονία), not that of the Cosmos (κοσμογονία).

We now are given the opinions of 'the commentators who deal in more serious arguments' (πραγματειωδεστέρων λόγων ἀντεχόμενοι).

These are Amelius, Porphyry, Iamblichus (see the present fragment), Theodorus, and finally (218, 20ff.) Syrianus. We must examine the theories of Amelius and Porphyry.

Amelius (213, 9ff.) tries to father his theory on Plotinus, appealing to ἄγραφοι συνουσίαι.[1] This, it seems, he did to add authority to a theory which had already been refuted by his successors, including, no doubt, Iamblichus.

"ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ πάντων ἐστὶ συνεκτικὴ τῶν ἐγκοσμίων, οἷον θεῶν δαιμόνων, ἀνθρώπων, ἀλόγων, κατὰ μὲν τὴν μονάδα φησὶν αὐτὴν πὰν τὸ ἐγκόσμιον τῶν θεῶν γένος συνέχειν (καὶ τοῦτο μὴ θαυμάσωμεν, εἰ θεῶν ἡ ψυχὴ συνεκτικὴ λέγοιτο· τοῦτο γοῦν ἤδη τις[2] αὐτῷ τῶν μετ' αὐτὸν ἐπήνεγκε·πολλαχῶς γὰρ ὁ θεός, οὐχὶ τὸ ὑπερούσιον μόνον οὐδὲ ὁ νοῦς μόνος, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ θεῖαι ψυχαὶ καὶ τὰ θεῖα σώματα· τούτων οὖν ἔστω καὶ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴ συνεκτικὴ κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτῆς μοναδικὸν τὸν ἀριθμὸν περιλαμβάνουσα τὸν θεῖον)· κατὰ δὲ τὴν δυάδα καὶ τριάδα τὸ δαιμόνιον γένος (ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἱ δαίμονες καὶ τῶν θεῶν ἐξήρτηνται καὶ ἡμῶν προνοοῦσι, κατὰ μὲν τὴν δυάδα τὴν πρόνοιαν αὐτῶν ἀνεγείρει, κατὰ δὲ τὴν τριάδα τὴν πρὸς θεοὺς αὐτῶν ἐπιστροφὴν τελειοῖ· διττὴ γάρ, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, ἡ σχέσις αὐτῶν, διότι μεταξὺ θεῶν τέ εἰσι καὶ ἡμῶν)· κατὰ δὲ τὴν τετράδα καὶ ἐννεάδα τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης πάσης προνοεῖ ζωῆς (διττὴ γὰρ καὶ αὕτη, τῷ τε ἀμείνονι καὶ τῷ χείρονι διαιρουμένη, καὶ τῇ μὲν ἐννεάδι κοσμεῖ τὴν ἀμείνω, τῇ δὲ τετράδι τάττει τὴν καταδεεστέραν)· κατὰ δὲ τὴν ὀκτάδα καὶ εἰκοσιεπτάδα πρόεισιν ἐπὶ πᾶν καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἐσχάτων καὶ τελειοῖ τὰ μὲν ἥμερα τῷ περίττω, τὰ δὲ ἄγρια τῷ ἀρτίῳ (προσφόροις γὰρ δυνάμεσιν ἕκαστα κοσμεῖ, ταῖς μὲν ἀρτίαις τὰ ὑφειμένα πανταχοῦ, ταῖς δὲ περιτταῖς τὰ σεμνότερα καὶ κυριώτερα καὶ θείοις πλέον προσήκοντα).

This, then, was one of the identifications which Iamblichus had to consider. It is based on Plotinus' view that the soul penetrated to all levels of being, a view which Iamblichus and the Athenian School rejected. Amelius here abandons his favourite arrangement of triads for a monad and three pairs. His efforts to explain the pairs are strenuous but unconvincing. The double role of daemons

[1] Ἀμέλιος μὲν γὰρ ἣν εἰς Πλωτῖνον ἀναπέμπει θεωρίαν ὡς ἐν ἀγράφοις συνουσίαις παραδεδομένην ὑπὸ τῶν μετ' αὐτὸν ἱκανῶς ἐληλεγμένην μὴ προσποιησάμενος, τρόπον ἕτερον ἐξηγεῖσθαι πειρᾶται τοὺς ἐκκειμένους λόγους.

[2] Probably Iamblichus. See his criticisms in *De An.* ap. Stob. I 365ff. Wachs., discussed in Comm. to Fr. 88.

we can accept, but the 'better' and 'worse' types of men pose a difficulty. Does this refer to men and women, following the *Timaeus* (42A), or to some class of 'saved' individuals, as opposed to the mass of humanity? Probably the former, since the *Timaeus* gives warrant for it; but later commentators, e.g. Theodorus and Proclus, preferred to explain away the apparent distinction made between men and women. Then the division into wild and tame animals, though ingenious, is a fairly desperate measure. That Plotinus went to these lengths, except perhaps in after-dinner conversation, we take leave to doubt. Amelius, of course, had every right to appeal to ἄγραφοι συνουσίαι, as being the Master's senior pupil, and he had a vast collection of papers and reminiscences, but appealing to such a source remains a suspect procedure.

Porphyry next (214, 4ff.), following on Amelius, provides the other side of the dialectic process. The difference between the interpretations of the two pupils of Plotinus is characteristic. Porphyry declines to make any identifications of the individual numbers (Proclus is astonished that he can so completely ignore Amelius' scheme), and declares the numbers in the soul to represent the diatonic scale, the perfect πλῆθος ἡρμοσμένον. He does state in conclusion that the harmony in the soul may perfectly well reflect distinctions in the external world: "κωλύει δὲ οὐδὲν καὶ τούτων ἀληθῶν ὄντων ὅμως εἶναι καὶ εἰκόνας τοὺς ἁρμονικοὺς λόγους θείων τινῶν πραγμάτων οὕτως, ὡς τὸ σῶμα σφαιρικὸν μέν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦ σφαιρικοῦ μίμημα εἶναι λέγεται νοῦ· καὶ συμβαίνει ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις." (cf. Fr. 49).

Iamblichus, then, in his interpretation, takes something from both his predecessors. From Amelius, the idea that the numbers much each have a reference, from Porphyry, that they should refer to some internal quality of the soul. The result is a more sophisticated identification (a pair of triads, united by the tetrad), which we have seen above.

ll. 17-18 καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐννεὰς ἔχει πρὸς τὴν μονάδα συγγένειαν, ἓν νέον οὖσα. The καὶ γάρ makes it uncertain whether the passage following it is still Iamblichean or an elaboration by Proclus, but the etymology ἓν νέον still seems worth commenting on, since Iamblichus may well have employed it here.

The 'etymology' seems to be a Neopythagorean formulation, not found before Proclus and Hermeias, but perhaps taken by

them ultimately from Nicomachus of Gerasa (though it does not occur in the *Theol. Ar.*) [1] It is mainly applied to the Muses, as being a progression from the monad, Apollo.

In Procl. *In Remp.* II 4, 20ff. we find the following:

αἱ δὲ Μοῦσαι πλῆθος οὖσα τοῦ Μουσηγέτου, προελθὸν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου μονάδος εἰς τὸν ὅλον ἀριθμὸν καὶ ἓν νέον ἐφιέμενον εἶναι . . .

The etymology is alluded to also *ibid.* 35, 9, and 80, 26, where the Muses are again being referred to. In Hermeias *In Phaedr.* p. 90, 27 the reference is again to the Muses, as well as to the general properties of the number nine.

Fr. 54

For Proclus to indulge in jocularity—to the extent of quoting Aristophanes—at the expense of the divine Iamblichus, there must be grave provocation. Similar language, e.g. in Fr. 6 'ὁ δέ γε θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος ὑψηλολογούμενος ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ῥήσει' though not necessarily playful, also seems to go with disagreement on Proclus's part with some excessive subtlety by Iamblichus. There is nothing here, however, with which Proclus should not agree philosophically, though he might object to the propriety of applying it to this passage.

The main principle here enunciated is as follows (cf. Fr. 50); πάσης τάξεως ἡ ἀμέθεκτος ἡγεῖται μονὰς πρὸ τῶν μετεχομένων. cf. Pr. E.T. prop. 21 (πᾶσα τάξις ἀπὸ μονάδος ἀρχομένη πρόεισιν εἰς πλῆθος τῇ μονάδι σύστοιχον. . .) prop. 67, πᾶσα ὁλότης ἢ πρὸ τῶν μερῶν ἐστιν ἢ ἐκ τῶν μερῶν ἢ ἐν τῷ μέρει) prop. 101 (πάντων τῶν νοῦ μετεχόντων ἡγεῖται ὁ ἀμέθεκτος νοῦς). This is a basic principle of Proclean metaphysics, and here we see it enunciated by Iamblichus, whom, failing earlier evidence, we must presume to have originated it in its full form, though (as Dodds points out, *Pr. E.T.* p. 236) the antithesis between a ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν and a ὅλον πρὸ τῶν μερῶν originates in *Theaet.* 204A-205C. Every order, then, including,

[1] Unless perhaps the statement 'εἴπερ ἐννεὰς μὲν κέκληται οἱονεὶ ἑνὰς ἡ πάντα ἐντὸς αὐτῆς κατὰ παρωνυμίαν τοῦ ἕν.' (76, 14f. De Falco), may be thought to imply such an etymology. But here there seems rather to be a pun on ἐν and ἕν.

obviously, the Soul, is headed, and presided over, by an unparticipated monad. In the Soul-order, this monad is ἡ ὅλη ψυχή or ἡ ὑπερουράνιος ψυχή, which is itself ἀμέθεκτος by the order below it, to wit, φύσις. Thus, at least three Souls are now called for, rather than two—ἡ ἀμέθεκτος ψυχή (the Whole Soul), ἡ μεθεκτὴ ψυχή (the Soul of the Universe), and ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ μέθεξιν (ἡ μερικὴ ψυχή), the Soul divided among bodies, in Nature, which participates it.

Such a series is reflected also in the noetic world, and is a consequence of the scholastic elaboration of Plotinus' system (see Intro. p. 33).

Fr. 55

The passage from καὶ γὰρ οὐδαμοῦ φαίνεται . . . (l. 6) I am unhappy about. It seems necessary that Iamblichus, having disagreed with all previous interpreters, should offer some explanation of his position. And this is what we have. I would prefer, of course, οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ φαίνεται. On the other hand, Proclus approves thoroughly of Iamblichus's interpretation, and any explanation he would give can hardly have been other than that of Iamblichus. I feel, therefore, that the passage is essentially Iamblichean, the καὶ γάρ notwithstanding. The καὶ γάρ will then be original to Iamblichus, and introduces his additional reason for his interpretation, rather than Proclus's additional reason for agreeing with him. We see in Fr. 57, l. 11 a καὶ γάρ which is manifestly part of Iamblichus' argument.

In this fragment and the next (56), we see the three aspects of Nous distinguished in their relationship to the Soul. Here the 'Motion of the Same' is to be equated with the νοῦς ἀμέθεκτος or χωριστός. The Soul reaches towards it, but it in itself is not related to the Soul, only through the νοῦς μεθεκτός or ἀχώριστος, which is to be identified with the 'Motion of the Other'.

ll. 11-12. κίνησις ἀκίνητος. This formulation no doubt takes its start from Ar. *Metaph.* 1012b31: τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον αὐτό.

Fr. 56

Here νοῦς χωριστός (or ἀμέθεκτος) and νοῦς ἀχώριστος (μεθεκτός) are distinguished, and equated respectively with the Motions of

the Same and of the Other. The Unparticipated Intellect surrounds the two Souls, being unmixed with the soul-life and soul-powers, but the participated one is in the Souls and gives order to their life and powers. These two Souls seem to be ἡ ὅλη ψυχή and ἡ μερικὴ ψυχή (αἱ μερικαὶ ψυχαί taken as a whole). However, there is a difficulty here, since we find Iamblichus in Fr. 54 distinguishing (as he must do, according to his own theory), between ἡ ὅλη ψυχή (or ὑπερκόσμιος ψυχή) which serves as the Monad for the τάξις of souls, from which two souls proceed, ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός and ἡ μερικὴ ψυχή. In Fr. 54, ἡ ὅλη ψυχή seems to correspond to the circle of the Same, the two others to the circle of the Other, viewed as a Dyad. The difficulty is only apparent. When referred to the noetic realm, the two circles represent the unparticipated and participated Nous respectively, while on the psychic level they represent the Soul-Monad and the dyad of Souls proceeding from it, and the noetic 'Circle of the Other', the νοῦς μεθεκτός, penetrates and guides the whole psychic realm, inasmuch as it is νοερά, receptive of Nous.

Fr. 57

This extract contains much that is worthy of note. First, we have the name of a κεφάλαιον which seems definitely part of the text of Iamblichus' Commentary, in contrast to the essay περὶ τῆς ἐν Τιμαίῳ τοῦ Διὸς δημηγορίας (see *ad* Fr. 34), which I have adjudged a separate work. Festugière, in his translation, seems to take this also as a separate work, but the term κεφάλαιον seems to belie this. As for the elaborate title, we may compare some of the titles of chapters in Proclus' *Commentary on the Republic*. If we accept this as the title of a chapter, it might tell us something about the structure of the Commentary, showing it as less closely tied to the text than Proclus's. It could have taken 'subjects' rather than passages as bases for κεφάλαια, more like Calcidius than Proclus, while being obviously more detailed than Calcidius. The refutations must be assumed to concern only Amelius's opinions about the significance of the word ψυχή—the title is not ambiguous in the context.

The second remarkable thing is that Proclus speaks as if he has not gone into the matter of Numenius's relation to Amelius himself, but is relying only on Iamblichus' criticism. This raises the question of what Proclus had access to. It is probable that there is no simple answer. The works of such men as Numenius and Amelius may well

have been in the library, but rather than go through the labour of unrolling them again and again, Proclus would surely be content to accept Porphyry's or Iamblichus' version of what they said. Surely the testimony of the divinely-inspired Iamblichus, for instance, would be sufficient evidence of the substance of what Amelius said or believed. Yet this would not preclude unrolling Amelius in some other connection, for a first-hand account. And yet οὐ γὰρ ἔχω λέγειν must seem to us a curiously offhand expression for a distinguished lecturer or commentator to make.

Thirdly, it is to be observed that, although Iamblichus' reply is to *Amelius's* theory of the γράμματα and χαρακτῆρες and ἀριθμοί of the word ψυχή; what we have in fact is Theodorus of Asine's account of the γράμματα, χαρακτῆρες and ἀριθμοί of not only ψυχή, but ἕν as well, with which Iamblichus is not concerned. It seems as if Theodorus's commentary was to hand and Amelius's was not—although the report of Theodorus's theories gives rise to the suspicion that what is being quoted is not his Commentary, but an essay Περὶ ὀνομάτων which he is known to have written. He may, however, have lifted a section from that essay, or a summary of it, and used it for his commentary. Proclus speaks as if Iamblichus *might* have commented on Theodorus but chose to strike at Amelius instead, using the general term οἱ ἀμφὶ Ἀμέλιον. We have the testimony of Eunapius that Theodorus came to study under Iamblichus; he is also said to have been a pupil of Porphyry,[1] though not of Amelius. Yet, like Amelius, he was an enthusiast for Numenius (τῶν Νουμηνείων λόγων ἐμφορηθείς II 274, 11), and indeed it looks as if the mathematical calculations that Iamblichus is attacking go back to Numenius. Either, then, Proclus' chronology is a little vague (though he generally ranks Theodorus after Iamblichus in a doxology), or else it was beneath Iamblichus' dignity to attack the opinions of a pupil. It is fairly certain, though, that Theodorus' commentary appeared after Iamblichus', though possibly only a few years after it.

The arithmological process which Iamblichus is here criticising is known as Gematria. I quote a description from Dantzig, *Number, the Language of Science*, p. 39. "One of the most absurd yet widely spread forms which numerology took was the so-called *Gematria*. Every letter in the Hebrew or Greek alphabet had the double

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[1] Damascius, *Vita Isidori*, sect. 166 p. 230 Zintzen.

meaning of a sound and of a number. The sum of the numbers represented by the letters of the word was the *number of the word*, and from the standpoint of Gematria two words were equivalent if they added up to the same number."

It must be noted that this fragment concerns only the particular arithmological speculations of Amelius.[1] We learn nothing of Iamblichus' interpretation of the astronomy of the passage. Proclus begins his own chapter (p. 263, 26) with an astronomical discussion (τρόπος γὰρ οὗτος διδασκαλίας ἐμμελής), and one may be excused, I think, for assuming that Iamblichus also began with such a survey, before passing on, as does Proclus (265, 29), to 'higher' mathematical and psychological discussions.

This next passage, which relates the numbers one, two and seven, as being the λόγοι of τὸ ἀπλανές, τὸ πλανώμενον, and τὰ ἕπτα πλανώμενα, to the Soul of the Universe, which contains them all, is divided into two parts, of which the second (268, 15) begins: 'ἔτι δ' ἂν ῥηθείη τελεώτερον, . . .'. The discussion then becomes more Chaldaean and Pythagorean. Tempting though it is to make an effort to find Iamblicheanisms, I feel that such analysis should be left until a full collection of Iamblichus' fragments can be made, and until Proclus's methods of composition can receive proper analysis.

Fr. 58

I have preferred not to translate λόγος; in the first context (as in the *Timaeus* lemma) it might be translated 'discourse', but in the Iamblichean context, the meaning of 'reason-principle' certainly seems to enter. It is better in such cases to leave translation (or comprehension) to the reader.

There is here a clear case of a 'continuative' γάρ. This is Iamblichus' explanation, or the substance of it. Proclus then continues himself (καὶ δοκοῦσι μὲν αἱ ἐξηγήσεις . . . etc.), by saying that all these explanations seem to get hold of Plato's meaning, but that Porphyry's accords best with the present context and with what is said elsewhere.

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[1] It is not irrelevant, perhaps, to recall Porphyry's testimony (*V. Plot.* 7) that Amelius wished to change his name to Amerius ('partless', instead of 'careless'). How serious this was is not clear. No one else ever refers to him as Amerius—but it shows a concern for the power of names.

For Iamblichus, ἡ ὅλη ψυχή was the monad presiding over the dyad of Souls proceeding from it (see Fr. 54), the ὑπερκόσμιος ψυχή, ἀφ' ἧς καὶ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι. It is this theory that Proclus is combating when he says a little further on (306, 12ff.):

ἢ διὰ τί μὴ τρεῖς γεγόνασι κύκλοι, καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν στοιχείων (of the Soul) τριῶν ὄντων εἷς, ἀλλὰ δύο μόνον, ἢ ὡς τῆς οὐσίας μιᾶς ἐν ἀμφοῖν;

Proclus, as we have seen before (*ad* Fr. 55), did not like this third, or rather, *first*, Soul above the other two. Porphyry's view of the Charioteer did not, therefore, make the Charioteer a third soul.

As an interpretation of Plato, it is surely Atticus' view that is correct. The προσεκτικὴ δύναμις of the Soul is, however, a post-Platonic formulation, perhaps Stoic, perhaps Atticus's own.

ll. 5-6. αὕτη γὰρ ἑαυτὴν πᾶσαν κινεῖ.

It seems that here we can discern a variation between the transmitted reading of the Proclus mss. and that of the ms. to which Iamblichus had access. Iamblichus' interpretation implies that he was reading 'ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ ὑφ' αὑτοῦ' at *Tim.* 37B (see lemma), as against the ὑπ' αὐτοῦ of Proclus. In this Iamblichus agrees with the mss. of Plato and of Stobaeus. Further, Proclus admits, in an interesting passage, that it is the reading ἐν τοῖς ἀκριβεστέροις (II 308, 25ff.):

'εἰ δέ, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἀκριβεστέροις εὕρομεν τοῖς κεκολασμένοις, μὴ γράφοιτο 'ἐν τῷ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ κινουμένῳ', ἵν' ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον ἔχῃ τὴν ἀναφοράν, ἀλλὰ 'τῷ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κινουμένῳ', πᾶσαν ἂν δηλοίη τοῦτο τὴν ψυχήν, ἀπὸ τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ σημαῖνον αὐτήν· τὸ γὰρ ὁριστὸν τῷ ὁρισμῷ ταὐτὸν πώς ἐστι.'

Proclus himself, as we have seen, favoured Porphyry's interpretation, and wishes ὑπ' αὐτοῦ to refer to the *logos* (*qua* Charioteer), who moves himself and the two circles of the Soul. Honesty compels him to admit, however, that this is not the reading of the best manuscripts.

Fr. 59

This is a slightly confusing passage. It is necessary that the passage beginning δηλοῖ δὲ (l. 8) . . . be attributed to Porphyry and

Iamblichus jointly. A phrase of this kind might seem to be adversative to the (Porphyrean) previous phrase, introduced by δηλοῖ μέν. However, the qualification 'ὡς ὅ τε Πορφύριος ἐξηγήσατο καὶ ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος ἐπέκρινε' must go with both. The passage beginning οἰκεῖον γὰρ . . . is intimately connected with what precedes, and Iamblichus must be regarded as subscribing to the thoughts therein contained, and may be credited with at least transmitting the phraseology. From ἀμέριστον μὲν οὖν, however, their ways must part, for it is to this part of Porphyry's exegesis that Iamblichus takes exception. 'ἀκούει' must refer to Porphyry. It cannot, as Festugière thinks, refer to Plato. A man cannot ἀκούειν *his own work* 'in a certain sense'. I feel, then, that Porphyry's name has dropped out. Since it must be admitted that μεριστὸν δὲ has dropped out, I suggest that ἀμέριστον also was missed out, and reinserted in such a way as to displace Πορφύριος at the beginning of the sentence. At any rate, that seems to put us where we want to be as regards the sense.

Once more Iamblichus is correcting Porphyry for postulating a physical world where no such world has yet been created. We must be dealing with the noetic foreshadowing of sense-perception rather than with sense-perception itself. It is interesting to recall here Plotinus's discussion in *Enn.* VI 7, 1-11 as to how τὸ αἰσθητικόν might have a place in Nous.

We get some insight here into Iamblichus' psychology, if, that is, we can claim the passage beginning ὅταν τοίνυν . . . (l. 16) as Iamblichean. One would have preferred γάρ to τοίνυν, but, on the other hand, some explanation of Iamblichus' objection seems required. If this is Iamblichus, then, we find him adopting the 'charioteer and horses' image (*Phaedr.* 246 Aff.) as Porphyry does, to explain the workings of the Soul. The charioteer is for Iamblichus ἡ ὅλη ψυχή, the Hypercosmic Soul. He rouses the Circuit of the Other, which stirs up the λόγοι of the things of sense, and reports on them to the Soul in general, so that all of it, even the Circuit of the Same, does have knowledge of τὰ αἰσθητά. The Circuit of the Other, ὁ δοξαστικὸς κύκλος, is in its best state when illumined by the more divine part of the Soul, and then it beholds the things of sense, transient and fluid though they are, μονίμως, πίστως and ἀραρότως.

This is all referring strictly to the Hypercosmic Soul. The human soul, on Iamblichus' doctrine, has no residual *divine* part, as Plo-

tinus believed, although it could rise above the material world by theurgy and purifications, by giving rein to its well-behaved horse, the Circuit of the Same within it. The gods, on the other hand, do have a second horse (see *Phaedr.* 247AB), however well-behaved it may be, and this must be regarded as their Circuit of the Other, their *equivalent* of the ἄλογος ψυχή. (The gods do indeed have ὀχήματα, albeit εὐήνια). With this element in their souls, the gods view the λόγοι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, even as the Hypercosmic Soul itself does.

Fr. 60

Proclus has just previously declared that νοῦς here *is* ὁ καθ' ἕξιν (p. 312, 30f.), so that he is in disagreement with Iamblichus. Proclus goes on to give his threefold division of νοῦς: 'πρῶτος μὲν ὁ θεῖος, οἷος δὴ καὶ ὁ δημιουργός, δεύτερος δὲ ὁ μετεχόμενος ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐσιώδης καὶ αὐτοτέλης, τρίτος δὲ ὁ καθ' ἕξιν, δι' ὃν ἡ ψυχὴ νοερά ἐστιν. That this reflects an Iamblichean division is made probable by the phraseology of a parallel division in Procl. *In Alc.* 65, 16ff. p. 29 Westerink:

'καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς ἄλλος μὲν ὁ ἀμέθεκτος, ἐξῃρημένος ἀφ' ὅλων τῶν μερικῶν γενῶν, ἄλλος δὲ ὁ μεθεκτός, οὗ καὶ αἱ ψυχαὶ τῶν θεῶν μετέχουσι κρείττονος ὄντος, ἄλλος δὲ ἀπὸ τούτου ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐγγιγνόμενος, ὃς δὴ καὶ ἔστιν αὐτῶν τῶν ψυχῶν τελειότης. Cf. also *In Tim.* III 101, 24ff.

In each case it is the second type of νοῦς that Iamblichus wants to understand here, the νοῦς μεθεκτός, presiding over the Soul directly, participated by it, but not a product or ἕξις of it. Proclus freely recognises the existence of this type of νοῦς, but does not accept that that is what is referred to here. Once more, Iamblichus is too ready to insert his own distinctions into the text, and Proclus recoils respectfully.

We may note here two principles of Iamblichus' metaphysics (both given as γάρ clauses with the infinitive), (1) There can be no direct progression from the Transcendent to the Participating, but the participated mode is required as a mean; (2) That which is in itself must precede that which is in another. For the former, see Proclus *ET.* prop. 23 and Dodd's note.

Fr. 61

The 'philosopher' is, of course, Plato, but who is 'the most theological of the commentators?' Diehl assumes Iamblichus in the apparatus *ad loc.*, but in the Index takes it to refer to Syrianus (v. sub *Syrianus*, III 379)—persuaded, it seems, by Freudenthal,[1] who assumes this to refer to Syrianus, through comparing Procl. *In Parm.* 1061 Cousin, where Syrianus is described by Proclus as 'τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ θεολογικώτερον εἶδος τῆς ἐξηγήσεως ἀνενεγκών'. Proclus is not recorded as describing any other commentator as θεολογικώτατος, but on the other hand it must be recognised as unlikely that he would refer to, and criticise, Syrianus in this offhand, anonymous way. Indeed, he refers to ὁ ἡμέτερος καθηγεμών just below (p. 15, 16), and this, together with the fact that Syrianus is there credited with a different interpretation of 'μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἑνί' seems to me to leave Iamblichus as the only serious contender for the title here.

We must consider, however, whether Iamblichus *could* consistently place Aion in The Good (i.e. The One). If he did, then Aion must be identical with τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν, which he placed at the summit of the noetic realm, as we have seen (Fr. 29). Aion, then, serves as a unity which comprehends all the contents of the noetic world, and will thus partake particularly of The One.

Proclus's objection to this (14, 19ff.) is that The One does not even remain in itself, let alone allow anything else to 'remain' in it. To have one element 'remaining' in another implies duality, and this is intolerable in the case of The One. If, however, one postulates a second 'active' One, this difficulty may be overcome, although even then it is more a case of emanation on the part of the second One than of any ascension on the part of Aion.

Syrianus's opinion, as we learn from 15, 13ff., was that the Monad of Being, τὸ ἓν ὄν, must be considered to be above Aion, and is therefore the 'One' in which Aion remains.

Fr. 62

This is obviously, from internal evidence, and from the context, a contribution to the argument against Time equalling Motion, and so belongs to the discussion of the lemma quoted in Fr. 61,

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[1] *Hermes* 16, p. 217, note 1).

under which Proclus has ranked his main discussion of the Theory of Eternity and Time.

Iamblichus's theory of Time will be discussed more fully in connection with Fr. 63. Iamblichus is thinking here of Time in itself, ὁ ἀμεθεκτός, ἐξῃρημένος χρόνος, which indeed does not need to be in relation to Rest, or to have anything opposed to it, as does Motion.

The arguments are:

(1) One may conceive of many motions occurring at the same *time*, but it makes no sense to talk of different parts of time occurring at the same time.

(2) Motion must occur in relation to something at rest, but Time proceeds without relation to something at rest.

(3) Any motion must have its opposite either a contrary motion or a lack of motion, but Time has nothing opposed to it.

Therefore: Time is not identical with, but prior to, Motion.

In this connection I must defend here my attribution of this, and Frr. 63 and 68, to Book III of Iamblichus' Commentary, in face of the ὀγδόῳ of the MSS.[1]

Only Simplicius makes any mention of books or chapters in respect of Iamblichus' Commentary, so that we have nowhere else to turn for evidence. My arguments are as follows:

(1) Simplicius attributes a comment by Iamblichus on Space (my Fr. 90), which properly concerns Tim. 52A, or thereabouts, to Book V of Iamblichus' Commentary (which would probably correspond to Book VI of Proclus's Commentary, if it continued that far). Admittedly there is a bothersome variant in One Ms., (ιε' for ε') (see Comm. *ad* Fr. 90), but I take that to be a rationalisation by someone who observed the anomaly to which I am drawing attention, and tried to rectify it in the wrong direction. The variant ιε' shows that the numerals were in the MSS at a certain stage instead of the ordinal words. My claim is that Iamblichus cannot have commented on 37D in Book Eight if he commented on 52A in Book Five.

(2) We know from Philoponus that Porphyry's Book II corresponded at least approximately (and probably exactly) with Proclus's Book II. It seems implied by Proclus (I 204, 24ff. Fr. 25

[1] See also discussion in Introduction, pp. 60-2

above) that he is following Porphyry and Iamblichus in ending his first book at 27B. Can Iamblichus have rushed to eight books by 37D?

Fr. 63

Our first considerable piece of Iamblichus' prose unbeautified by Proclus does not, I think, cause us to yearn for that which has perished. Nevertheless, it is most valuable for style and technical vocabulary. We may note here that characteristic of Iamblichus' style which Proclus, in the introductory note to the mss. of the *De Mysteriis*, is reported to have characterised as τὸ κομματικὸν καὶ ἀφοριστικόν, which seems on the whole a polite way of describing Iamblichus' practice, equally evident in the present work, of piling up a string of parallel epithets or short clauses to define his meaning with more precision. In the first sentence of this passage we have a good example of this: τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν τῇ προιούσῃ διακοσμήσει καὶ συνταττομένῃ πρὸς τὰ δημιουργούμενα καὶ ἀχωρίστῳ τῶν ἀποτελουμένων ὑφ' ἑαυτῆς ὑπαρχούσῃ ταύτῃ συντάττομεν. as we have in the first sentence of Fr. 64: ὅτι τὸ ἓν καὶ ἄπειρον τοῦ αἰῶνος καὶ ἤδη ὂν καὶ ὁμοῦ πᾶν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν μένον καὶ ἀμέτρητον ὂν μέτρον τῶν νοητῶν ἐν ἀνελίξει κυκλικῇ καὶ ἐν συνεχείᾳ καὶ τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἐπιδείκνυσι καὶ τῷ ἀρχὰς καὶ μέσα καὶ τέλη διακρίνειν καὶ μηδ' ὁτιοῦν ἀπολείπειν τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ περιεχομένων,

The Time which Iamblichus is here discussing is, as Simplicius explains, ὁ ἐξῃρημένος χρόνος. 'κατ' ἐνέργειαν', in its activity, it may be regarded as united with the διακόσμησις going forth from the Demiurge, and it will be ἀχώριστος from its manifestations. In itself, however, as the χρονικὴ μονάς (in Proclus's words), it must be above, and separate (χωριστός) from the Cosmos, brought into being along with the Heaven, but not dependent on it. It cannot, then, be regarded in itself as a measure of motion, nor yet of the activity of the Soul. It can only be a τάξις in the sense that it presides over organisation, a μέτρον in the sense that it is the monad uniting all the particular temporal manifestations. κατὰ δύναμιν, however, it will be μεθεκτός, and κατ' ἐνέργειαν it will be καθ' ἕξιν. It is this last, Time *in* its parts, with which the physical philosophers have concerned themselves.

On the question of the more general dependence of Proclus on

Iamblichus, already touched upon in Fr. 48, the passage of Proclus, III 31, 15ff., is, I feel, of considerable importance. After referring to Iamblichus, and quoting him accurately, if not fully, Proclus goes on to a further discussion of the same subject, not joined to the proceeding by any tell-tale γὰρ, but by a δέ (31, 4). Normally we could have no clue, other than a general suspicion (expressed by Sambursky, *op. cit.*, *infra*, p. 17), that Proclus was dependent on Iamblichus. In this case, however, we can see how in fact he does use him, with elaborations from his own pen. I would venture to postulate that this is essentially what Proclus's commentary in large part is—expanded Iamblichus, together with refinements and corrections of Iamblichus by Syrianus.

The passage 31, 15-27 must be quoted in full, and compared with the text of Fr. 63, in order to see exactly what is happening (I space Iamblichean portions):

Οὕτω καὶ ὁ χρόνος καίπερ αἰώνιος ὢν κατὰ φύσιν ὅμως εἴρηται κινητὸς ὡς πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν αἰῶνα, διὰ δὲ τὴν τάξιν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν τῇ προόδῳ συνέχειαν τό τε πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον παρ' αὐτῷ πόλλου δεῖ τοιοῦτον εἶναι, οἷαν αὐτό τινες ὑπειλήφασιν· οὔτε γὰρ κατὰ κινήσεων μεταβάσεις μόνον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, οὔτε κατὰ σωματικῶν γενέσεων διεξόδους ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς φύσεως, οὔτε κατ' ἄλλο τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν αὐτὸ θεωρητέον ἀφωρισμένως, (τῶν γὰρ μετ' αὐτὸν τάξεων ἴδια ταῦτα καθέστηκεν), ἀλλὰ κατ' αἰτίων προήγησιν καὶ συμπλοκὴν τῷ συνέχει τῶν ἀπογεννήσεων καὶ πρωτουργὸν ἐνέργειαν καὶ δύναμιν ἐνεργητικὴν τῶν ποικίλων καὶ παντοδαπῶν κινήσεων.

Proclus then veers away from a close attention to Iamblichus's commentary, but returns about a page later (33, 1ff.), in his summing-up, to what seems to be a direct quotation of Iamblichus (Fr. 64). It seems reasonable to extrapolate from this to many similar places in Proclus' commentary, where he gives Iamblichus his due with a short direct quotation, and then continues with an exposition based on Iamblichus but adapted and expanded. However, the passage above shows the precariousness of trying to recover from the text precisely what is Iamblichean.

The whole question of Iamblichus' theory of Time is well discussed by S. Sambursky and S. Pines, *The Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism*, The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Jerusalem, 1971. The most noticeable feature here is the exaltation of

absolute Time, in line with the exaltation of Aion in the noetic world, which in its turn is probably a consequence of the Zoroastrian deification of Aion. For pre-Neoplatonic commentators, the passage 'ὁ δ' αὖ διὰ τέλους τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον γεγονώς τε καὶ ὢν καὶ ἐσόμενος' (38C)—see Frr. 67-8—seems to have been the basis for a definition of Time as ἡ τοῦ ὅλου κίνησις (Ar. *Phys.* Δ 218 a 33), Theophrastus, φυσ. δόξ. Fr. 15 Xenocrates is reported (Aetius, *Plac.* 1.22, *Doxog. Graec.* 492) as giving the definition μέτρον τῶν γενητῶν καὶ κίνησις ἀίδιος, while Speusippus (Plut. *Quaest. Plat.* 1007B) defined it as τὸ ἐν κινήσει ποσόν.

Iamblichus' reference in ll. 44ff. to μέτρον as a definition seems to answer the pseudo-Platonic definition (Def. 411B 3) 'χρόνος ἡλίου κίνησις, μέτρον φορᾶς'. He will accept the definition μέτρον, but only inasmuch as Time is τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ἓν ὁμοῦ πάντων τούτων (sc. the heavenly bodies and motions).[1]

Fr. 64

This passage, which seems to be quoted verbatim, concerns the way in which Time is an image of Eternity. The first sentence, with its long line of parallel phrases, is characteristic of what we have observed of Iamblichus' style. It has seemed to me necessary to emend the διακρίνοντι (l. 7) and ἀπολείποντι (l. 8) of the Mss. to διακρίνειν and ἀπολείπειν in order to create articular infinitives out of apparently meaningless participial constructions. The possibility of articular participles, in an oblique case, to express the action of the verb, without a supporting noun, is a phenomenon which one cannot accept without proof, such as I have not discovered. A participle in the dative in such a case as this would surely have to mean '*to one discerning* beginnings, middles and ends' etc., which is not the meaning required. I suggest that the diacritical marks for -ειν and -οντι were confused at some stage of the tradition by a scribe, who, like most scribes, was not attending to the overall sense of the sentence.

ll. 7-8. *καὶ ὥσπερ οὐ κινητὸς ἁπλῶς . . . ἂν ῥηθείη δικαίως.* Unparticipated Time, as we have seen, is not κινητός, so that the moving image of Eternity is more properly speaking τὸ σύνολον τοῦτο, Time and all that which is moved by and in Time.

[1] Iamblichus also discussed Time in his Comm. on the *Categories* (*ap.* Simpl. *In Cat.* 353, 19ff.), basing himself there on Pseudo-Archytas.

ll. 10 ὅλως ὅμως. This sounds suspicious, and Kroll would delete ὅλως, but with Iamblichus one never knows. ὅλως can, after all, reasonably modify περιεκτική, and thus adds to the sense —it encompasses all motions *as their totality*—while ὅμως introduces the following clause. There is a contrast between being an ἀληθινὴ οὐσία, and *nevertheless* being an εἰκών (albeit the first Being in the scale of Reality to be such) since the noetic world cannot be said to be the *image* of its prior.

ll. 19-20. 26. μετέχει γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέσα τῶν πρώτων. This turns up an interesting metaphysical dispute. Amelius, following Numenius, considered that there was participation also in the noetic world, which must involve lower grades of noetic being participating in their priors (for μέθεξις is a *vertical* relationship), Proclus himself, in the *Elements of Theology*, recognises participation in the noetic world (props. 135, 138, 163). Being, and all that is below it, participate in the divine henads. But Proclus is being historically accurate here, as is Iamblichus himself on other occasions, e.g. on the subject of archangels or epicycles in Plato. For Plato, τὰ νοητά were τὰ πρώτιστα (l. 28), and he recognised no μέθεξις among them (for to participate something is taken as equivalent to being its image). Numenius, at any rate, must have postulated μέθεξις in the highest grade of Being. For him, this must refer to the Second Nous in its relation to the First.

For Amelius, however, the question is more complicated. Things become clearer only when one takes in evidence a passage from Syrianus (*In Metaph.* p. 109, 12ff. Kroll CAG.) which is in fact parallel to the passage before us. Syrianus (*ad Met.* M 1079a 3ff.) is discussing the question 'τίνα τὰ μετέχοντα τῶν ἰδεῶν' (108, 34). Do both τὰ γενητά and τὰ ἀίδια participate, and of τὰ ἀίδια perhaps only some, τὰ σωματοειδῆ, i.e. τὰ οὐράνια? And also, how do the participants participate the Ideas? (109, 3.)

Syrianus' solution is one which we see him often producing in his *Commentary on the Timaeus*. He trumps the views of his predecessors, which he is about to list, by combining them, and proposing that both τὰ νοητά and τὰ αἰσθητά participate the same Ideas, but οἰκείως τῇ ἑαυτοῦ τάξει (109, 21). He then continues:

"ἵνα δὲ μὴ ταραττώμεθα πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων αὐτοῦ, ληπτέον τὰ δοκοῦντα περὶ τῶν μετεχόντων τοῖς ἀρίστοις τῶν Πλατωνικῶν. Νουμηνίῳ μὲν οὖν καὶ Κρονίῳ καὶ Ἀμελίῳ καὶ τὰ νοητὰ

καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ πάντα μετέχειν ἀρέσκει τῶν ἰδεῶν, Πορφυρίῳ δὲ μόνα τὰ αἰσθητά, <Ἰαμβλίχῳ δὲ οὔτε μόνα τὰ νοητὰ οὔτε μόνα τὰ αἰσθητά,> [1] ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα καὶ ἄριστα τῶν νοητῶν αὐτὰ εἶναι τὰ μετεχόμενα, τὰ δ' ἐκεῖθεν ἀπογεννώμενα ταῦτ' εἶναι τὰ τῶν εἰδῶν μετέχοντα, τόν τε ψυχικὸν δηλαδὴ διάκοσμον καὶ τὸν αἰσθητόν."

The resemblance between this passage and that of Proclus (especially with Usener's justifiable supplement) will be immediately obvious, and should provide us with a notion of Syrianus' overall influence on Proclus' Commentary. We see now that it is participation in the *Ideas* that is at question. Amelius holds that the noetic world, the νόες and the noetic gods, presumably, participate such Ideas as Being, Sameness and Difference (ὁμοιότης, ἰσότης and ταυτότης are actually listed by Syrianus at 109, 17), these Ideas being in the Paradigm, and so prior to the noetic entities proper.

This theory Porphyry rejected, as he would *identify* the Ideas and τὰ νοητά. But Porphyry, it seems, omitted to consider τὰ μέσα γένη, to wit ὁ ψυχικὸς διάκοσμος, Soul and the psychic entities. Here Iamblichus introduces his refinement. They too, and first among them Time, participate in the Ideas, Time's 'Idea' being Eternity.

Proclus has substituted for *Ideas* τὰ ὄντως ὄντα. Now to say that τὰ νοητά participate τὰ ὄντως ὄντα, seems, to me at least, considerably more obscure than to say that they participate ἰδέαι, but we must realise that by Proclus' time the Ideas were firmly established in τὸ ὄν *as opposed to* Nous, so that τὰ ὄντως ὄντα would thus be a perfectly reasonable synonym for 'Ideas'.

Fr. 65

Here we have an unequivocal employment by Iamblichus of the triad Ὄν-Ζωή-Νοῦς, with ζωή established as a hypostasis between τὸ ὄν and νοῦς. Time is thus in the position of mediating to the physical world the powers of all three hypostases of the noetic world. Aion does not appear here, but presumably, as being the summit of the noetic world, it contains κατ' αἰτίαν the three hypostases into which it is divided, and thus its image, Time, inherits their images as well. τὸ ὄν, which is of widest extension,

[1] This is Usener's supplement, which seems necessary to complete the sense. Doubtless, the scribe fell victim to homoeoteleuton as between αἰσθητά and αἰσθητά.

provides Being to the physical world. Ζωή, the second in rank and extension, provides the principle of life and growth, 'τὸ νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι καὶ πρεσβύτερον', and Nous, being of narrowest extension, provides—τὸ γίγνεσθαι ποτέ, etc. One would have expected it to provide *intelligence*, but Iamblichus is limited by the text on which he is commenting.

Proclus does not think much of this effort at the higher criticism —τούτων δὲ λίαν ἐμφρόνως εἰρημένων (45, 12). He prefers, reasonably, a two-fold division, associating 'πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον' with 'γενέσθαι ποτέ' and 'εἰσαῦθις ἔσεσθαι' with 'γεγονέναι νῦν'.

It is worth, perhaps, puzzling awhile as to what Iamblichus may have meant by his third identification here, that of the influence of Nous with 'coming to be at some time or having now come to be or destined to be on another occasion'. It seems incredible that he should be simply throwing in the towel here. Perhaps we should see Nous here, in creating intelligent beings, as a principle of individuation, being responsible for a series of separate and distinct conscious beings, whereas Life and Being produce continuous and undifferentiated quantities of what they produce. This involves regarding the non-intelligent living things as less than individuals, so that they cannot really come to be as individuals, which is not entirely convincing. However, nothing better occurs to me.

Fr. 66

Since Proclus has inserted himself into this discussion with κἀγὼ πείθομαι, we cannot safely assign anything verbally to Iamblichus. However, on the question of content, Iamblichus has disagreed with the majority, including, presumably (*ex silentio*), Porphyry, in declaring that the more suitable treatise in which to discuss types of Being and Non-being would be a theological one. He must then prove this. And how else than by adducing the *Sophist* and the *Parmenides*? The reference to Pythagorean practice might also lead us to think of Iamblichus, though Proclus is quite able to refer to Pythagoreans on his own. However, our argument will run: either Iamblichus' argument must differ from that of Proclus, or be the same, or he gave no argument at all. But if the first, then Proclus would need to contradict or amplify it (as he does on other occasions); if the third, then Iamblichus is

being unusually bald and laconic, and, moreover, Proclus' explanation would naturally begin καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ Σοφιστῇ, rather than with the simple γάρ; therefore, I would maintain, the second.

The *Parmenides* was, for all Neoplatonists, including Iamblichus (see Fr. 1), the theological dialogue *par excellence.*[1] *Parm.* 155E-157B, with its discussion of τὸ ἐξαίφνης and of the continuity or discontinuity of κίνησις, is probably what is here referred to. On the other hand, Middle Platonic commentators, writing before the time when the Parmenides was 'discovered' to be theological, could point to the same passage as being part of a *logical* dialogue.

As for the *Sophist*, 237B-241D, where τὸ μὴ ὄν and the problem surrounding it are discussed, is no doubt the passage which Iamblichus has in mind. Again, for earlier Platonists, the *Sophist* was a 'logical' dialogue; for Iamblichus, it ranks as theological. For evidence of his Commentary on, and view of, the *Sophist*, see *In Sophistam* Fr. 1.

l. 13 ὧν δὴ καὶ τὸ σκέμμα οἰκεῖον ὁ Τίμαιος εἶναι ἀποφαίνεται. Proclus is speaking very loosely here. Timaeus cannot be referring to the *Sophist* or the *Parmenides*. It is Plato who so refers. Does this imply that Proclus (or Iamblichus) considered these dialogues to be later (or earlier) than the *Timaeus?* Not necessarily, I think. I do not know of any other evidence as to the views of the Neoplatonists on the relative order of these dialogues.

Fr. 67

As we saw, Ch. 6 of Book III (or VIII) seems to deal with *Tim.* 37D. Now Ch. 10 is concerned with 38BC. If a κεφάλαιον of Iamblichus means to Simplicius what a κεφάλαιον of Proclus means to Philoponus, then Iamblichus' Commentary seems hardly inferior in its detail to that of Proclus. (And there is the awful possibility, raised in the Introduction, that we really are in the 8th Book, and that Fr. 90 is from the 15th Book. He did, after all, write at least 28 books on the Chaldaean Oracles.) There are four κεφάλαια in

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[1] Whether the Neoplatonists were right in this assumption is a vexed question. Cf. Dodds 'The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic One' CQ 1928 pp. 129ff.

Proclus's commentary between that on 37D and that on 38BC, as compared with three in Iamblichus'. On our calculations, Iamblichus must be near the end of his Third Book, whereas Proclus is on the 7th chapter of his Fourth.

This fragment is a straight exposition of the lemma, and not of much philosophical importance. It sounds as though it comes from the beginning of Iamblichus' comment on the passage, or of a section thereof.

It is interesting to observe the order of Proclus's comment in comparison with this (III, 49-52). First, (49, 27-50, 23), he is concerned to prove, from this passage, by a series of hypothetical syllogisms, that the Heaven must be ἀγένητος καὶ ἄφθαρτος. This Iamblichus may well have done also. Then he turns to the subject which we find Iamblichus discussing here: δευτέρα δέ, ἵνα καὶ ὁμοιότατον ᾖ τῷ παραδείγματι· τὸ γὰρ 'αὐτὸς αὐτῷ' ὁ οὐρανὸς λέγει τῷ παραδείγματι.

We may observe from this a difference in the mss. readings available to Proclus and Iamblichus, Iamblichus commenting on ὁμοιότατος αὐτὸς α ὑ τ ῷ and Proclus on αὐτὸς α ὐ τ ῷ (sc. to Eternity, its paradigm). The accepted reading today (OCT) is αὑτῷ without αὐτός, which Plato's own MSS omit. It is plain from Iamblichus' gloss 'πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὁμοιότατος' that αὑτῷ is what he read, although E and the first hand of F give αὐτῷ. The reading of the corrector of F, and of the Aldine ed., should be accepted, with Diels. Calcidius, although he paraphrases somewhat, reflects the reading αὐτῷ: 'similis ut *aevitatis exemplo similis esset* uterque mundus.'

Proclus' further development of this subject does not reflect what we have of Iamblichus, although it is in no way contrary to it in spirit.[1] It continues to 51, 21, where, beginning with a reference to Iamblichus (quoted in the text), he goes on to the (rhetorical) question 'πῶς χρόνος οὐρανοῦ χάριν ὑπέστη'. This would of course be most unsuitable, the container to exist for the sake of the

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[1] There is even a question in my mind as to whether perhaps for φησίν (sc. ὁ Πλάτων) in 50,26 we should not read φησὶν <ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος>, as the sentence following sounds much more like Iamblichus than Plato: πῶς οὖν διὰ χρόνον 'ὁμοιότερος ὁ οὐρανὸς τῷ αὐτοζῴῳ γίγνεται; ὅτι, φ η σ ί ν, ὥσπερ τὰ νοητὰ σύμπασαν δύναμιν τοῦ αἰῶνος ἑνωτικὴν οὖσαν καὶ συνεκτικὴν ἤδη καὶ ἀθρόως καὶ ἑνιαίως ὑποδέχεται, οὕτω καὶ ὁ κόσμος τὴν σύμπασαν τοῦ χρόνου χορείαν μεριστῶς καὶ διῃρημένως ὑπομέμνηκε, . . .' The run of parallel phrases in the first clause sounds most Iamblichean. Be that as it may, there is nothing to conflict with Iamblichus here.

contained. In fact, for the purpose of imaging Eternity, each exists for the sake of the other (51, 30ff.). Proclus seems to be answering an *aporia* based on the lemma, which appears to make Time created for the sake of the Heaven, in order that it may be made as like as possible to its Paradigm. Since he takes Iamblichus out of context in order to introduce this *aporia* and its solution, it is probable that Iamblichus' own comment did not include this point.

Throughout all this discussion, in Proclus as in Iamblichus, a proper distinction is preserved between the different kinds of Time. What we have seen Iamblichus discussing is primarily ὁ μεθεκτὸς χρόνος, ἐνέργεια of the primal, unparticipated Time, although the existence of the primal Time is always implied, and stressed by Simplicius. It was obviously difficult for anyone believing in completely transcendent Time to work this into a commentary on the Timaeus, where Time is plainly conceived as simply the motion of the planets, primarily the Sun and Moon. This is why Iamblichus has to discuss ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν χρόνος, to the apparent exclusion of ὁ κατ' οὐσίαν, or Time in itself.

ll. 9-10. διὰ τὴν ὁμοιομερῆ φύσιν. There is considerable difference in the MSS here. E reads διὰ τὴν ἀμερῆ, F κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιομερῆ, with διὰ written above κατὰ, and the Aldine Ed. (a) κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιομερῆ, Diels actually prefers ἀμερῆ, but it is Aion, not Time, which is ἀμερής and Time's means of imitating this partlessness is by its being ὁμοιομερής. As a characteristic of the Soul this is a commonplace, e.g. Procl. *In Tim.* II. 225, 31ff.: 'ὅτι μὲν ὁμοούσιός ἐστιν ἡ ὅλη ψυχὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν καὶ ὁμοιομερὴς καὶ οἷον ὁμόχρους, νοερὰ πᾶσα καὶ λόγος οὖσα νοερός, δηλοῖ δήπουθεν ὁ Πλάτων ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ κράματος τά τε ὅλα ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ τὰ μέρη ποιῶν', and Time, being at the head of the psychic realm, has the same relation to Aion as Soul has to Nous.

Fr. 68

As can be seen, Proclus quotes Iamblichus perfectly faithfully—in spite of the κἀγὼ πείθομαι—which must add greatly to our confidence about his general fidelity. We note at the same time that he may leave things out. He does not, however, alter Iamblichus' language. This, together with the evidence of Fr. 63, should serve to sustain us.

This is presumably also from Chapter Ten. It further develops the way in which Time is an image of Eternity, by a series of comparisons, four in number. The passage seems in fact to start with a direct quotation from the Timaeus. Iamblichus *may* have omitted ὄν after ἐστιν, and written γέγονεν, ὥστε for γεγονώς τε (or this *may* have been the reading of his text), but I fear that the MSS of Simplicius may simply be garbled, as they were in Fr. 63. I leave the text, since it makes sense, but the reader should beware. In the third comparison I feel the need to emend (II 8-9) τὸ ὂν ὡσαύτως τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ of the Aldine ed. (accepted by Diels), to the more Platonic τὸ ὂν ὡσαύτως ἐν ταὐτῷ, to secure a proper balance with the second half of the comparison. The MSS show some uncertainty, see App. Crit.

Proclus does, as we see, quote Iamblichus, but does not subsequently follow the same line of discussion (see previous note).

l. 10. συνυφίσταται πρός . . ., συντάττεται πρός . . . Time's double position is expressed by the statement that, *horizontally* speaking, it is coexistent with the Cosmos, while it has a special *vertical* relationship with Aion, being its image in the psychic world. The πρός instead of a Dative is noticeable. One might translate 'in relation to' rather than 'with', to express the Greek more exactly.

Fr. 69

Here again Iamblichus seems to be 'rising above' previous commentators, with a 'higher' interpretation of 'περιφοράς'. That this passage *is* in fact Iamblichean seems assured by Proclus's immediately following qualification (p. 60, 4): 'τάχα δ' ἂν εἴη κάλλιον λέγειν . . .'

The περιφοραί are the orbits of the planets. What the earlier commentators (three varieties of whom seem to be mentioned here) were concerned with, was the question of what exactly these orbits were:

(1) οἱ ἐπίκυκλοι. We get an elaborate explanation of these by Adrastus, *ap.* Theo Smyrn. *Expos.* pp. 158-166. Iamblichus points out in Fr. 70 (III, 65, 7ff.) that epicycles are un-Platonic, whatever about their intrinsic validity. They are in fact a product of Alexandrian ingenuity, specifically that of Hipparchus, devised

to overcome the difficulties arising from the theories of Eudoxus of Cnidos.

(2) αἱ ἀνελίττουσαι σφαῖραι were the theory of *Eudoxus*, amplified by his pupil Callippus, which involved the planets having a varying number of contrary orbits, the combination of which explained the irregularities observed in their paths.[1]

(3) αἱ ὅλαι σφαῖραι may be the continuous spheres in which certain of the early physicists believed the planets to circulate, or this too may refer to Eudoxus' theory.

Iamblichus rejects these physical explanations, taking the περιφοραὶ to be the νοεραὶ ψυχαί of the planets. Proclus rephrases this proposal (60, 4) by suggesting that it is into the δυνάμεις τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς that the bodies of the planets are put. For Iamblichus, the seven νοεραὶ ψυχαί of the planets must be in fact ἡ ὅλη ψυχή, which maintains its unity in spite of its seven-fold division.

ll. 10-11. ἃς ἡ θατέρου περίοδος περιάγει... This, while not quite a verbatim quotation, seems to reflect a reading ἦγεν at *Tim.* 38 C.

Fr. 70

First, the extent of the quotation, about which there might seem some question. One should not, I feel, be deterred by the phrase (65, 28) ὡς εἴπομεν πρότερον, which refers back to 65, 1ff. There is no reason why Proclus should not insert a cross-reference to himself into his transcription of someone else's work, since this is not formally a quotation, cf. Fr. 10 (I, 93, 30) where he has added ὡς εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον (referring to 91, 17ff.) to a clearly Iamblichean passage. More disturbing is the fact that epicycles seem accepted here as a fact, even if a subsidiary one, whereas Iamblichus roundly condemns them at the beginning, at least as regards their relevance to the elucidation of Plato's meaning. It is not difficult, however, for Proclus, who does not reject the applicability of epicycles, to so alter the text of Iamblichus, by the addition of 'μόνον', 'καὶ διὰ ταῦτα μὲν γάρ', and 'καί', as to make it acceptable to himself, at the cost of blunting somewhat the force of the sentence.

Iamblichus, I would suggest, rejects the first two opinions, that of the μαθηματικοί and that of the ἀστρολογικοί, and gives a

[1] Cf. Arist. Metaph. Α 1073b 17ff. (Eudoxus *Test.* 6 Lasserre), Simpl. *In De Caelo* p. 422 Heiberg (Fr. 122 Lasserre), and ibid. p. 492 (fr. 124 Lasserre).

third which finds support, it seems to him, in the text of Plato. A more convincing place for the Iamblichean material to end is 66, 8, where Proclus continues in a way characteristic for the addition of ones own opinion to a previous one—'εἴποις δ' ἂν καὶ διότι . . .'

l. 5. τὰς τῶν ἐπικύκλων παρεισκυκλήσεις. Iamblichus realises perfectly well that a writer like Adrastus or Theon of Smyrna choses to ignore, that it is anachronistic to bring epicycles into the interpretation of Plato. He also condemns ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς ζωῆς ἐπιβολή, which was the suggestion of Porphyry (followed by Theodorus). The problem concerns the interpretation of 'τὴν δὲ ἐναντίαν εἰληχότα αὐτῷ δύναμιν' about which there was much uncertainty in antiquity, and in modern times (see Taylor's note *ad loc.*).

Calcidius (cc. 109-112) lists three (Middle Platonic) 'physical' interpretations of ἡ ἐναντία δύναμις (probably here following *Adrastus*):

(1) Mercury and Venus travel in the opposite direction to the Sun, from West to East.

(2) Mercury and Venus appear alternately as morning and evening stars, either catching up with the sun, or being caught up with by him.

(3) Venus appears now 'above', and now 'below' the sun, making an excursion of 50° in either sense. She is furthest east of the Sun when she appears as an evening star, furthest west when she appears as a morning star. Calcidius gives a geometrical proof of this, with diagram, very much in the manner of Adrastus, as observed *apud* Theo. This view is in effect a refinement of the second theory.

Porphyry rises above these physical explanations. For him, as for all the Neoplatonists after him, the inequality in speeds of the planets, and the ἐναντιότης of Mercury and Venus to the Sun, must be above all due to differences in their *Souls*, that is, in their true selves.

His explanation is most interesting, as it involves a distinction between οὐσία, ζωή and νοῦς, obviously influenced by the *Chaldaean Oracles*. It runs as follows (p. 64, 11ff.):

"The cause, according to them (Porphyry and Theodorus), of the equality or inequality in speed (of the three planets) arises from the Intellects (νόες) being related to the Essence either immediately or through a number of intermediaries (ἢ αὐτόθεν

ἢ διὰ πλειόνων) and from their turning to the same goal, even though through different intermediaries, or again to various different goals. The Sun, being Essence, journeys to Intellect through Life; Venus, though being Intellect, yet proceeds through Life to Intellect; Mercury is Life, but proceeds through Essence to Intellect. This Intellect, however, to which they all three turn, is in one case 'essential' (οὐσιώδης) in another, 'intellectual' (νοερός), in another, 'vital' (ζωτικός); wherefore, although moving with unequal speeds, and seeming to trail behind and precede each other in turn, they end up in the same position.

And as for Saturn and Jupiter and Mars, they might be in different sections (τμήματα), and for this reason not be of equal speed; but even if they were to be in the same intermediaries, they are not of equal speed. As for example if Saturn were in himself Essence, and proceeded to Essence, while Jupiter did so through the medium of Intellect alone, and Mars through the medium of Intellect and Life, one of them will be immediately in Essence, another through one mean, another through two, and in this way they will not be of equal speed; for of the planets the first triad is related to Essence, the second to Intellect, and the Moon to Life, comprehending as it does all generation in itself, and extending itself to the furthest recesses of the earth."

This may seem to the layman the purest nonsense, but I relay it in full because of its extreme importance for Porphyry's philosophy and for the relationship between Porphyry and Iamblichus. What should this elaborate scheme immediately remind us of? Nothing else but the arrangement of the noetic world in the *Chaldaean Oracles*. Three οὐσίαι or βασιλεῖς οὐσιώδεις, three (demiurgic) νόες, and the ὑπεζωκώς, which can be identified with Hecate, the Soul of the Universe, or the Moon.[1] We have seen Amelius being affected by this in his doctrine of three Demiurges, and Iamblichus himself in his essay 'On the Speech of Zeus in the *Timaeus*' (cf. Comm. *ad* Fr. 34 and App. C), but here we find Iamblichus condemning the whole construction as artificial and un-Platonic. This conservatism is no doubt partly a byproduct of polemic, but we find Iamblichus on a number of occasions taking a conservative line against Porphyry's excesses (as he does, also, against Amelius in Fr. 71). Theodorus seems to have carried these triadic elaborations

[1] See Lewy, *The Chaldaean Oracles*, Exc. VII for a useful diagram.

and other fancies to their furthest extent, while the Athenian School—certainly Syrianus and perhaps Plutarch of Athens—retreated from such positions and on the whole sided with Iamblichus, while elaborating on him.

At any rate, Iamblichus is not here prepared to accept a 'Chaldaean' solution to the problem of the different speeds of the heavenly bodies, and of the ἐναντία δύναμις of Venus and Mercury. We only have his account of the first four heavenly bodies relayed to us here—unless, as is possible, Proclus continues to semi-quote him, after interposing his own views (66, 8-22) at 66, 23ff. In that case we might conclude that Iamblichus viewed the three other planets as follows (67, 22ff.): ἄλλη τριάς ἐστι Κρόνου μὲν καὶ Ἄρεος ἄκρων ὄντων καὶ ἐναντίων ἀλλήλοις, καθ' ὅσον ὁ μὲν συνοχῆς, ὁ δὲ διαιρέσεως αἴτιος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ψύξεως, ὁ δὲ θερμότητος, τοῦ δὲ Διὸς ἐν μέσῳ τεταγμένου καὶ εἰς εὐκρασίαν ἄγοντος αὐτῶν τὰς δημιουργικὰς ποιήσεις.

This is a suitably simpler arrangement than Porphyry's, relying as it does on the traditional astrological values of the planets in question.

Having rejected ἡ τῆς ζωῆς ἐπιβολή, however, Iamblichus has still to explain the ἐναντία δύναμις of Venus and Mercury. His explanation is still psychological rather than physical, and is as Proclus says, 'simpler', though he does not generate a very convincing ἐναντιότης. The power of the Sun, he says, is incomparable with those of the other two. They are his helpers, and help each other, and it is only their great inferiority in power that makes them ἐνάντιαι.

The description given by Julian (*Or.* 4, 150 BC) of the work of Aphrodite in assisting Helios agrees well with the present passage, which may encourage us to assume an Iamblichean origin for both:

ἔστι δὴ οὖν αὕτη σύγκρασις τῶν οὐρανίων θεῶν, καὶ τῆς ἁρμονίας αὐτῶν ἔτι φιλία καὶ ἕνωσις. Ἡλίου γὰρ ἐγγὺς οὖσα καὶ συμπεριθέουσα καὶ πλησιάζουσα πληροῖ μὲν τὸν οὐρανὸν εὐκρασίας, ἐνδίδωσι δὲ τὸ γόνιμον τῇ γῇ, προμηθουμένη καὶ αὐτὴ τῆς ἀειγενεσίας τῶν ζῴων, ἧς ὁ μὲν βασιλεὺς Ἥλιος ἔχει τὴν πρωτουργὸν αἰτίαν, Ἀφροδίτη δὲ αὐτῷ συναίτιος, ἡ θέλγουσα μὲν τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν σὺν εὐφροσύνῃ, καταπέμπουσα δὲ εἰς γῆν ἐξ αἰθέρος αὐγὰς ἡδίστας καὶ ἀκηράτους αὐτοῦ τοῦ χρυσίου στιλπνοτέρας.

Fr. 71

Once again, as in Fr. 70, Iamblichus is in the position of checking the excesses of his predecessors, in this case Amelius, by an appeal to the facts, to 'What Plato Said.' He is thus in the position of the conservative, condemning irresponsible innovators. It is plain from the word προστιθείς, that Iamblichus' main criticism is contained in the previous passage, which is a statement, and criticism, of the views of Numenius and Amelius. The passage takes the form of exposition of the view of, first, Amelius, and then Numenius, to each of which is appended a criticism. I have raised the suspicion at other such passages (cf. Comm. Fr. 50) that Proclus is taking the opinion plus criticism straight from Iamblichus without checking his sources further; in this passage it is virtually certain that that is what he has done. Nonetheless, I will leave it to some bolder spirit to include everything from 103, 18 in the Fragment. Had Proclus been more honest, he would have written, e.g. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τούτους οὕτως ἀντείρηκε, προστιθείς but he preferred to cover his tracks. I cannot therefore quite incorporate the passage, but give a full account of it below.

Numenius, to take them in chronological order (103, 28ff.) identified τὸ ὅ ἐστι ζῷον with his First God, which intelligises (νοεῖ) by using as an instrument the Second (ἐν προσχρήσει τοῦ δευτέρου) which he identifies with Plato's νοῦς, and which in turn creates the world, using as an instrument the Third, which he identifies with ὁ διανοούμενος (from Plato's διενοήθη). Proclus has already (*In Tim.* I, 303, 27ff. ad 28C), told us about Numenius' three gods, ὁ πατήρ, ὁ ποιητής and τὸ ποίημα or, as Numenius called them, πάππος, ἔγγονος and ἀπόγονος. Numenius thus postulated *two* Demiurges, the higher operating ἐν προσχρήσει of the lower.[1] This possibility is also entertained by Plotinus in that most ambiguous and interesting fragment, *Enn.* III, 9.1, which seems also to give a starting point not only for Amelius' triad (see below), but for Porphyry's view of the Demiurge, as also for those of Iamblichus and Proclus (see Comm. Fr. 34).

Amelius (103, 18ff.) derives from this passage of the *Timaeus* particularly his triad of demiurgic intellects, ὁ ὤν, which he identifies with τὸ ὅ ἐστι ζῷον; ὁ ἔχων, which he derives from the ἐνούσας

[1] For a good discussion of Numenius, see Dodds, *Entretiens Fondation Hardt*, Vol. V.

(ἰδέας) ("for the second does not exist, so much as that they exist in him"—οὐ γάρ ἔστιν ὁ δεύτερος, ἀλλ' εἴσεισιν ἐν αὐτῷ); and ὁ ὁρῶν, from 'καθορᾶν'.

Iamblichus' criticism of Amelius (103, 23-28) is that Plato said that the Ideas were *in* τὸ ὅ ἐστι ζῷον, it is not the case that the ὅ ἐστι ζῷον is different from ὅ ἐν ᾧ ἔνεισιν αἱ ἰδέαι.

Of Numenius his criticism is as follows (103, 32-104, 8):

Ταῦτα δὲ ὅτι μὲν ἔχει τινὰς καθ' ἑαυτὰ διαφοράς, πρόδηλον, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ διῄρηται νῦν ὑπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, ὥστε ἕτερον μὲν εἶναι τὸν νοοῦντα νοῦν, ἕτερον δὲ τὸν διανοούμενον· οὐ γὰρ ἀντιδιαιρεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ὁ Πλάτων τοῖς ἐνεργοῦσιν· ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν ἐνεργούντων αἱ ἐνέργειαι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν θείων οὐσιῶν σύνδρομοι πρὸς τὰς οὐσίας. τὸ δὲ 'διενοήθη' καὶ τὸ 'καθορᾷ' τοῦ δημιουργικοῦ νοῦ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ὡς ἐνεργήματα παραλαμβάνεται. πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ταῦτα ἀντιδιαιρεῖσθαι πρὸς αὐτόν, ἃ σύνδρομά ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν αὐτοῦ.

"It is obvious that these assertions reflect certain real distinctions, but they do not correspond to any distinction which Plato makes here, to the effect that the intelligising Intellect should be distinct from the planning one. For Plato does not set up activities as being distinct from their source; for activities proceed from their sources, or rather, in the case of divine entities, are coincident with their essences. The notions represented by 'he planned' and 'he beholds' are to be taken in the present instance as activities of the demiurgic Intellect. It is most improper, then, to set them up in contrast to him (the Intellect), when they are coincident with his substance."

It was Iamblichus' own view (Fr. 34) that the Demiurge comprised the whole intelligible world, so that he naturally vigorously opposes these divisions. His *additional* refutation consists in asserting that Numenius and Amelius cannot base their constructions of the noetic world on Plato's statements on the One or the Universe in the *Sophist*, *Philebus* and *Parmenides*, as these dialogues give no warrant for constructing a continuous account of τὰ θεῖα, but discuss each entity separately, τοῖς οἰκείοις ἀφορισμοῖς. An interesting remark for a Neoplatonist to make.

This mention of these three dialogues is interesting. That the *Parmenides* concerns the One is generally agreed, but it is good to see here Iamblichus' view that the *Philebus* concerns the Universe (cf. *In Phileb.* Fr. 1). As for the *Sophist*, we can gather from *In Soph.* Fr. 1 that it concerns the sublunar realm.

Fr. 72

We have already seen, in Fr. 69, that Iamblichus considers 'ἔθηκεν εἰς τὰς περιφοράς' (38C) to refer to the placing of the planets in their souls. We learn here, from Proclus, that the 'ensouling' also joins them to 'the whole soul of the Circuit of the Same', not to be confused with The Whole Soul proper, which here seems to be referred to as ἡ κοσμικὴ ψυχή, but we remember that Proclus was not happy with Iamblichus' theory of the Whole Soul (Fr. 54).

Iamblichus' identification of ἡ τοῦ κρατίστου φρόνησις with the Paradigm is, we must believe, a distortion of Plato, who merely meant the outermost sphere of the Heaven, the Circuit of the Same, although the phrase is peculiar, putting the Mind of the Universe in its outer edge in a Pythagorean manner, even as the Heart of the Universe lies in the Sun. But, again, we are not concerned here with what Plato really meant.

Proclus agrees with Iamblichus that this passage describes the establishing of the stars (and *planets*, although Plato is speaking only of stars), in the actual noetic Paradigm. ἡ ψύχωσις τῶν ἄστρων thus involves four stages: (1) inclusion in their individual souls, (and so with the Circuit of the Other of the Whole Soul, cf. Fr. 69), (2) union with the Circuit of the Same, (3) assumption into the Cosmic Soul (the Whole Soul), and (4) establishment in the noetic Paradigm. If we transform the last three verbs into nouns we get σύναψις, ἀναγωγή and ἐνίδρυσις, all theurgical terms, applicable equally well to the 'individual' soul. See Lewy, *Chald. Or.* ch. III 'Theurgical Elevation', and *De Mysteriis*, passim.

(Cf. also Appendix A, *Iamblichus' Theory of Prayer*, where these terms occur).

Fr. 73

All we can safely claim here is that Iamblichus took the 'pole stretched through all' as the οὐρανός, although he doubtless quoted the *Cratylus* to reinforce his point. The passage of the *Cratylus* referred to is 405 CD: '. . . καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὴν 'ὁμοῦ πόλησιν' καὶ περὶ τὸν οὐρανόν, οὓς δὴ 'πόλους' καλοῦσιν, καὶ [τὴν] περὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ ᾠδῇ ἁρμονίαν, ἣ δὴ συμφωνία καλεῖται, ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα, ὥς φασιν οἱ κομψοὶ περὶ μουσικὴν καὶ ἀστρονομίαν, ἁρμονίᾳ τινὶ πολεῖ ἅμα πάντα·

If we take the Heaven as the 'pole that is stretched through

all', then says Proclus, (139, 7ff.) we cannot regard the earth as 'winding' around it τοπικῶς, ἀλλὰ δι' ὄρεξιν τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμοιότητος συννεύουσα εἰς τὸ μέσον, in an effort to imitate the sphericity of the Heaven by gathering itself round its own centre. Proclus introduces this as his own contribution to this far-fetched interpretation (λέγοιτ' ἂν οὖν κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐπιβολήν), so that we cannot know whether Iamblichus gave any further explanation of his interpretation then the reference to the *Cratylus*. If he did, then surely it must have been on the lines given here by Proclus, and indeed this optative may be only Proclus' way of appropriating and paraphrasing Iamblichus.[1]

This passage, and specifically the word ἰλλομένην/εἰλλομένην, is one of the most vexed in the *Timaeus*. See Taylor, and Cornford, *ad loc.* However, it is not our business to decide what Plato meant, only to observe that Proclus thought it meant σφιγγομένην καὶ συνεχομένην (p. 137, 6), and that there is no indication that Iamblichus thought otherwise. The possibility of the interpretation εἰλουμένην καὶ στρεφομένην (p. 138, 7-8) was still recognised (as that of Heraclides of Pontus and of Aristotle), but rejected. The reading ἰλλομένην δὲ τὴν which, as Taylor claims, settles the matter in favour of the motion theory, is not recorded by Proclus, and had probably dropped out of the tradition early in the Alexandrian era.

Once again, Iamblichus is devising a psychological interpretation to replace a physical one (we do not learn what Porphyry's view was, but we assume that it was physical, unless Proclus simply failed to check), though the Greek will hardly stand it. If we substitute for 'τὸν . . . τεταμένον' 'τὸν οὐρανόν' we get ἰλλομένην περὶ τὸν οὐρανόν, whereas what Iamblichus apparently wants to say is that it packs itself around (its axis) δι' ὄρεξιν of the sphericity of the outer heaven, τὸ ἀπλανές. But at all costs a 'higher' meaning must be extracted.

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[1] It is not unlikely also that the passage immediately preceding our fragment (138, 30ff.: καὶ μέντοι καὶ τὸ 'τεταμένον' ἐνδείκνυται Τιτήνιον εἶναι τὴν μίαν ταύτην δύναμιν τὴν φρουρητικὴν τῆς ἀνακυκλήσεως τῶν ὅλων) may be taken from Iamblichus, cf. Procl. *In Crat.* p. 56, 13ff. Pasquali: καὶ ταχ' ἂν ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τούτοις τοῦ τῶν Τιτάνων ὀνόματος διττὰς ἐξηγήσεις ἡμῖν ἀρχοειδεῖς παραδίδωσιν, ἃς 'Ιάμβλιχός τε καὶ 'Αμέλιος ἀναγέγραφεν· Τιτᾶνας γὰρ ὁ μὲν παρα τὸ διατείνειν ἐπὶ πάντα τὰς ἑαυτῶν δυνάμεις, ὁ δὲ παρὰ τό 'τι ἄτομον' κεκλησθαί φησιν. . .'

BOOK IV

Fr. 74

This fragment represents a compromise. One might stop at 168, 7 . . . ἀληθείας, or one might go on to include the whole account of Orphic theology which follows, together with the interpretations given with it. It would be most helpful if one could include all of this, because it contains much of what is regarded as Proclus' theology of the traditional gods, and how their various manifestations may be reconciled by postulating the appearance of versions of the same god at different levels of reality. But the links in the text make it unsafe to do this. Even the passage 168, 7-15, which I have included, *could* have been begun 'Πυθαγόρειος γὰρ ὢν ὁ Τίμαιος'. I have included it, in fact, only because (a) as usual, if Iamblichus is going to refute and condemn his predecessors, he must base his position on *some* explanation, and since Proclus adopts his position, that explanation is presumably consonant with that of Proclus, and (b) because this account of Pythagoras' Orphic initiation is taken from the Ἱερὸς Λόγος, which is quoted verbatim in Iambl. *Vit. Pyth.* 146, p. 82 Deubner: '<λόγος> ὅδε περὶ θεῶν Πυθαγόρα τῶ Μνησάρχω, τὸν ἐξέμαθον ὀργιασθεὶς ἐν Λιβήθροις τοῖς Θρακίοις, Ἀγλαοφάμω τελεστᾶ μεταδόντος, ὡς ἄρα Ὀρφεὺς ὁ Καλλιόπας κατὰ τὸ Πάγγαιον ὄρος ὑπὸ τᾶς ματρὸς πινυσθεὶς ἔφα, . . .

By itself this proves nothing. Proclus was quite capable of quoting either Iamblichus, or the original Ἱερὸς Λόγος. Indeed the difference between the Λεβήθροις of the Proclus MSS and the Λιβήθροις of the Iamblichus MSS would seem to indicate the latter possibility. On the other hand, in the circumstances, it is not unreasonable to assume that Iamblichus used the evidence of the Ἱερὸς Λόγος to bolster his argument here. It is also likely that he went on to expound the Orphic theology—he was, after, all an authority on the subject—but at that point I prefer to draw the line.

40E 5 must seem to us a rather perverse place to begin a new book, as opposed to 40D 6 (περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων δαιμόνων). I would suggest that in fact in Porphyry's arrangement the first lemma of Book IV (V) took in the passage 'περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων δαιμόνων . . . ἐχέτω καὶ λεγέσθω' as part of the Introduction to the Book, and thus it may have been left in an ambiguous position. In Proclus we

find this passage divided into three κεφάλαια, forming a conclusion to his Book IV. This arrangement *may* go back to Theodore of Asine,—as we find him quoted (III 154, 19ff.) on the problem as to why Plato called the γενεσιουργοὶ θεοί here δαίμονες,— and after him Syrianus. However, this problem may have been raised, and answered, in their respective introductions to the next book.

Be that as it may, the subject of Proclus' Book V, and Iamblichus' Book IV, is the sublunary gods. Iamblichus' introduction may have included a discourse on the respective roles of gods, angels, daemons and heroes, similar to that given in the *De Mysteriis*. The passage III 165, 3-166, 29 may in fact be substantially Iamblichean, but it would be unsafe to claim anything detailed at this stage of our knowledge.

In the present passage, it is worth noting the five-fold division of anonymous 'opinions' which Iamblichus refutes (cf. Comm. ad Fr. 50). Taken together, they cover the efforts of previous thinkers to rationalise the traditional gods. Some of the terms used are curious, for instance φυλακικαὶ δυνάμεις (if this is indeed the reading), and 'souls'. Plotinus believed that souls might *share* in the government of the universe, while others believed that they could only observe this, and this may be what is referred to here. The 'guardian powers' would have to be conscious beings of some sort, no doubt daemonic or angelic.

Iamblichus, then, is not a rationaliser in this sense, but neither does he leave the traditional gods in their traditional forms. We will see in the succeeding fragments what in fact he does do. His reported opinions here must be related to his treatise Περὶ Θεῶν, which undoubtedly influenced Julian and Sallustius, and of which he is probably repeating or paraphrasing relevant parts in his commentary.

Fr. 75

With the identifications of the encosmic gods, we seem to enter on a section closely dependent on Syrianus. In each case we have a doxography, culminating in Iamblichus, Theodorus, and Syrianus, the only authorities to be mentioned by name. Porphyry, Amelius, and all other previous commentators have been demoted to οἳ μέν and οἳ δέ. In the present instance, we have a list of *eight* anonymous identifications for Gē and Uranos, (173, 7ff.), then

Iamblichus, then Theodorus (173, 24ff.), then Syrianus, introduced by the following passage:

> ταῦτα δὲ εἰδώς (sc. all the previous identifications), ἡγοῦμαι δεῖν ὥσπερ ἀσφαλοῦς πείσματος ἔχεσθαι τῆς τοῦ καθηγεμόνος ἡμῶν παραδόσεως· διὰ γὰρ ταύτης τὰ μὲν πλημμελῆ τῶν δοξασμάτων φευξόμεθα, ταῖς δὲ καθαρωτάταις ἐννοίαις 'Ιαμβλίχου συνεψόμεθα'.

It sounds as if Syrianus is claiming to expound the theories of Iamblichus in their pristine purity, as against the excesses of Theodorus, to which we have just been exposed. Yet the ensuing exposition bears no close relation to the identifications of Iamblichus just given.

Iamblichus' definitions here are redolent of his style, a string of epithets joined by καί. The sum of the epithets is somewhat bewildering. Obviously, Γῆ can refer to nothing material. If we refer it to the encosmic gods, it must in them refer to whatever is analogous to 'Earth', that is, the stable and permanent element in them. We are, after all, discussing the sublunary gods, as Proclus points out (174, 18), so that all these mythological names must somehow be referred to them. Iamblichus' term ἐγκόσμιοι θεοί *may* be a broader category than that of Proclus, but since Proclus does not contradict him in this, we may presume that he *felt* that they were referring to the same class of gods, the νέοι θεοί. Proclus does claim here, after all, to be following the καθαρώταται ἔννοιαι of Iamblichus.

Earth and Heaven, then, are to be regarded as the two extreme ἀκρότητες of the encosmic, genesiurgic gods, to wit, their most stable and their most active elements. Proclus, on the contrary, seems essentially to identify 'Heaven' and 'Earth' with the forces of πέρας and ἀπειρία, respectively, at work in the sublunary realm. (see esp. 175, 30ff.) 'Heaven' seems to be in fact the *logos* of the Demiurge at work in the world.

Fr. 76

We seem with each succeeding definition to be sinking deeper and deeper into a morass of jargon. However, 'Ocean' and 'Tethys' are to be identified as the two means between the ἀκρότητες 'Earth' and 'Heaven', still as applied to the encosmic gods.

One might have expected 'Ocean' to be analogous to Water in this scheme, but where then would Tethys fit in? The element

ὠκ- in ὠκεανος, however, makes it suitable to preside over Fire and Air, leaving Tethys to be the power behind Water and Earth.

Proclus begins his discussion of Okeanos and Tethys (176, 10) by reminding us that there can be no question of any union of previously distinct elements to produce these two new entities, as some erroneously postulate, but that they arise κατὰ μίαν ἕνωσιν καὶ συμπλοκὴν τῶν δυνάμεων ἀδιαίρετον, which the theologians call γάμος. Iamblichus must surely have also held that there was no genealogy here, but merely a listing of the characteristics of the encosmic gods.

'Ocean' then, he defines as the intermediate κινητικὴ αἰτία in which a number of entities which he lists participate. The use of the word μέσος is a problem here, as elsewhere. If Ocean is a μέση αἰτία it is not primary, but must have a πρώτη or πρωτίστη αἰτία prior to it. One might presume this first cause to be the Demiurge himself, or *Phanes*, from III 101, 9ff.

"διὸ δὴ καὶ 'Ορφεὺς Φάνητά τε τὸν θεὸν τοῦτον προσηγόρευσεν ὡς ἐκφαίνοντα τὰς νοητὰς ἑνάδας καὶ ζῴων αὐτῷ μορφὰς ἀνέθηκεν ὡς ἐν αὐτῷ τῆς πρώτης αἰτίας τῶν νοητῶν ζῴων ἐκφανείσης καὶ ἰδέας πολυειδεὶς ὡς τῶν νοητῶν ἰδεῶν πρώτως περιληπτικῷ . . ."

The μέση αἰτία then, produces, or is participated by, μέσαι ψυχαί and ζωαί and νοήσεις. Presumably these come between ὅλαι ψυχαί etc., and μερικαὶ ψυχαί, general (divine) and individual souls.

Fr. 77

Phorcys, Kronos, and Rhea are here stated by Iamblichus to divide the sublunar realm in three, 'those before them having divided it in two'. It has not previously been made clear, it seems to me, that that is what Uranos and Ge, or Oceanos and Tethys, were doing. However, both the previous pairs did set up a dichotomy, the former pair representing extremes (ἀκρότητες) in the Universe, the latter representing μεσότητες.

The division here seems to cut across rather than supplement the previous identifications. There are three spheres here envisaged between Heaven and Earth.[1] Kronos, seen as a monad, presides over the aether, Rhea, as dyad, developing the δυνάμεις

[1] This seems to be a Chaldaean division, cf. Psellus, *Ecthesis* 1149c, p. 189 *Des Places*, where we have τρεῖς ὑλαῖοι κόσμοι, presided over by a triad of πατήρ, δύναμις and νοῦς.

latent in Kronos, presides over the air, and Phorcys, as triad, presides over the watery element, bringing the procession (of δυνάμεις) to completion. From him, as we learn, οἱ ἑξῆς βασιλεῖς produce the visible order. We must presume that this refers to Zeus, Hera and their brethren, who are dealt with in the next fragment.

This is a considerable elaboration on the Orphic system, which involved only a sequence Kronos-Rhea-Zeus, but something had to be done with the text that was given. There is a progression in four stages. Uranos and Gē are responsible for δυνάμεις κρείττονες and ὅλαι ζωαί; Okeanos and Tethys preside over μέσαι ψυχαὶ καὶ ζωαὶ καὶ νοήσεις; Kronos, Rhea and Phorcys are subordinate to these, and constitute a triad bringing certain δυνάμεις, presumably μέσαι δυνάμεις, to completion; finally Zeus, Hera, (Poseidon and Hades), constituting a tetrad, the number proper to material creation, bring to completion the realm of γένεσις (comprising μερικαὶ ζωαί, φύσεις and δυνάμεις).

I cannot claim to follow with any confidence Iamblichus' plan in all this. We cannot safely credit him with the doctrine of manifestations of the same god at different levels (see fr. 74), which seems to be a development initiated by Syrianus. It is probable, however, that his scheme of exegesis was more coherent than Proclus' references to it here would lead us to believe.

Fr. 78

This, as Proclus says (189, 22) is the third πρόοδος of θεοὶ γενεσιουργοί, and their fourth τάξις. After Iamblichus' placing of Kronos, Rhea, and Phorcys over the three sublunary spheres (see last fragment), aether, air and water, there might not seem further room or employment for their offspring, but Zeus was traditionally demiurgic, and must be fitted in this capacity. Iamblichus seems here to give him a general supervisory role over the whole of generation, τελεσιουργὸς πασῆς τῆς γενέσεως. Proclus later (190, 19ff.), qualifies this Zeus as the lowest of the Zeuses, but as I have said above (fr. 77), I can find so far no clear evidence that Iamblichus had yet formulated the theory of the same god reappearing at different levels.

Hera, as we see, has also a general responsibility for generated things, being for them the cause of συνοχή, πλήρωσις and ζωή, coherence, fulfilment, and life. She seems to do for earthly things,

in Iamblichus' scheme, what Oceanus does for αἱ μέσαι ψυχαί and the other intermediate essences (fr. 76).

The 'brothers' are not further specified, but left as assistants in the γενεσιουργὸς δημιουργία. Poseidon and Hades are being primarily referred to, I presume, and Proclus must have them in mind when he characterises this τάξις as a tetrad (189, 24), the tetrad being proper to the creation of the 'realm' of generation.

With this the 'procession' of encosmic gods comes to an end. The whole passage seems on Proclus' evidence to have been given its earliest full exegesis by Iamblichus. Porphyry fades out of the picture, though οἱ μέν and οἱ δέ occasionally appear. We may suspect that this exegesis of Iamblichus' closely follows, or is followed by, his Περὶ Θεῶν, which had primary influence on Julian's (and Sallustius') beliefs about the gods.

Fr. 79

The subject of discussion in this passage is the nature of the gods who organise creation (γένεσιν κατευθύνοντες, 196, 11), that is, the gods beneath the moon (197, 23). For how much of this Iamblichus can be held responsible is not certain. All that he is certainly quoted on here is the duplicative characteristic of the sublunary gods which goes with their decrease in power.

Proclus has identified those gods who περιπολοῦσι φανερῶς, with the οὐράνιοι θεοί, the planetary gods, and those who φαίνονται καθ' ὅσον ἂν ἐθέλωσι with the sublunary gods, though this latter identification, he feels (II 195, 1), requires some explanation. Their ὀχήματα are invisible to us, but they may take on visible bodies in response to a summons, or for some purpose of their own. They are not to be regarded as having an οὐσία τῇ ὕλῃ συμμεμιγμένη as the Stoics assert (cf. SVF II 307), nor even δυνάμεις and ἐνέργεια mixed with Matter, their essence being unmixed, according to Numenius' formula. They are in fact πάντῃ ἀμιγεῖς πρὸς τὴν ὕλην (196, 25), administering the material world without drawing from it any contamination, a formulation of which the Iamblichus of the *De Mysteriis* would thoroughly approve.

It seems reasonable to suppose that Iamblichus first made such a division as this between heavenly and sublunary gods, and that he characterised the sublunary gods in the way here laid out. It is probable also that he used the Stoics and Numenius as butts

for his criticism. Since, however, his formulation was not remarkable, Proclus felt no need to credit him with it.

Who, we must inquire, are the twenty-one ἡγεμόνες, and the other three classes here described?

One might begin more confidently with a consideration of the δεκαδάρχαι, or decan-rulers. These are deities of Chaldaean origin, perhaps brought into Greek calculations by Hipparchus, although the word is not attested by LSJ until Hermeias. They presided over decans, divisions of the Zodiac, each decan being a third of a sign, i.e. ten degrees. There were thus 36 of them, to cover the 360 degrees.

Certain views of Iamblichus' on the place of *decadarchs* are given by Damascius, *Dub. et Sol.* 358, (Vol. II p. 216 Ruelle), in answer to a problem concerning the ἀπόλυτοι θεοί (p. 213, 11f.): 'εἰ μόνοι ἀπόλυτοί εἰσιν, ἢ καὶ ἐγκόσμιοί τινες οἱ δεκαδάρχαι καὶ ζῳδιοκράτορες καὶ ὡρονόμοι καὶ κραταιοί'; In other words, are these deities only ἀπόλυτοι, or are they *in the cosmos* as well? Iamblichus thinks that they are also encosmic: "οὔτε ὁ μέγας 'Ιάμβλιχος οὕτως ἔχειν συγχωρεῖ, οὔτε ὁ ἀληθὴς λόγος. τὰ γὰρ ζῴδια τοῦ κόσμου μοῖραί τινές εἰσιν· ἐγκόσμιοι ἄρα οἱ ζῳδιοκράτορες, ὥστε καὶ οἱ δεκαδάρχαι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, οἵ τε κατεκληρούχησαν τὸ πᾶν. εἰσὶ μὴν τούτοις ὁμώνυμοι καὶ ἀπόλυτοι θεοί, ἀπολύτως τῶν αὐτῶν προεστῶτες, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν κοσμοκρατόρων ἕκαστος διττός, ὁ μὲν ἐγκόσμιος, ὁ δὲ ὑπερκόσμιος.

We see here vestiges of a theory which we could not confidently claim for Iamblichus in fr. 74, that of manifestations of the same god at different levels. The cosmocrators (the planetary gods) can be also above the cosmos, and so can the ὁμώνυμοι of the rulers of the zodiacal signs and of the decans. The decadarchs proper, if we may so term them, will rule above the moon; above the cosmos, their archetypes rule ἀπολύτως; below the moon, it seems, they suffer a mysterious doubling, and emerge as 72—perhaps still decadarchs, perhaps something else. I have as yet discovered no clues.

The twenty-one ἡγεμόνες are even more mysterious. I can find no analogy for this number. All that occurs to me is the following: 21 is $7 = 3$, and each of these numbers has a possible reference. If we imagine an influence from each of the seven planets extending into each of the three elements (στοιχεῖα) fire, air and water, which extend in consecutive layers between the moon and the earth, then one might conceive of the ἡγεμόνες here as the 'leaders' of each planetary influence in each sublunary element. These, however,

must be themselves *above the moon*: it is the 42 ἡγεμονίαι of genesiurgic gods descending from these who are properly sublunary.

These are all 'Chaldaean' refinements, which require further, separate, research into the Oracles. Their mention, here, however, seems to show that Iamblichus' Timaeus Commentary was not so free of Chaldaean influence as the surviving fragments would suggest. From Dam. *Dub. et Sol.* II 232, 13ff. Ruelle we learn that this doubling process is a Chaldaean doctrine: ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐκεῖνο ὁ Πλάτων ἐνδείκνυται, ὅτι ἡ οὐρανία ἐξὰς ἐν τῷ ὑπὸ σελήνην κόσμῳ διπλασιάζεται, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ Χαλδαῖοι τὰ ὑπουράνια γένη τῶν οὐρανίων διπλασίῳ παραδιδόασιν. Along with their doubling, as Iamblichus bears witness, goes a lessening of power.

Fr. 80

It is first necessary to defend the inclusion of the passage αὐτὴ δὲ . . . ζωῆς, which contains a description of four kinds of death, suitable to four types of being. I think we must conclude from the fact that Iamblichus considered that 'not even the first mode of death' was attributable to encosmic gods and 'essential' (κατ' οὐσίαν) daemons, that he has previously made some mention of various τρόποι θανάτων. Since Proclus mentions four such just previously, and relates Iamblichus's declaration to them, it is unreasonable to deny any connection between the two. On the other hand, all that we can safely claim is that Iamblichus recognised these four modes of death, and applied them to the beings mentioned. The language must be regarded as that of Proclus pending evidence to the contrary.

A close parallel to the language of the second part of the passage can be found in *De Myst.* I. 10 (33-34), where Iamblichus is replying to a distinction which Porphyry has made between members of τὰ κρείττονα γένη which are ἐμπαθῆ and those which are ἀπαθῆ:

"Ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲ ταύτην δέχομαι τὴν διαίρεσιν. οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν γὰρ τῶν κρειττόνων γενῶν ἐστιν ἐμπαθὲς οὐδ' ἀπαθὲς οὕτως ὡς ἀντιδιαιρούμενον πρὸς τὸ παθητὸν οὐδ' ὡς πεφυκὸς μὲν δέχεσθαι τὰ πάθη, δι' ἀρετὴν δ' αὐτῶν ἤ τινα ἄλλην σπουδαίαν κατάστασιν ἀπολελυμένον. ἀλλ' ὅτι παντελῶς ἐξῄρηται τῆς ἐναντιώσεως τοῦ πάσχειν ἢ μὴ πάσχειν, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲ πέφυκεν ὅλως πάσχειν, καὶ ὅτι κατ' οὐσίαν ἔχει τὴν ἄτρεπτον στερεότητα κατὰ τοῦτο ἐν ὅλοις αὐτοῖς τίθεμαι τὸ ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἄτρεπτον".

Iamblichus is not here discussing death, but only subjection to πάθη. Nevertheless, on similar subjects we find him using similar language (cf. *In Tim.* fr. 39, where the closeness with the *De Mysteriis* does not mean that we have not a quotation from the Commentary).

This fourfold distinction of kinds of death is of great interest, bearing in mind the doctrine of the ὄχημα, and of the χιτῶνες which the soul puts on and sheds again in its descent and reascent through the planetary spheres. For a good survey of the development of theories of the ὄχημα, see Dodds, *El. of Theol.* App. II p. 313ff.

Fr. 81

The question under discussion here is as to the identity of the 'immortal' and 'mortal' elements. Proclus begins his chapter with a three-part doxography, of which Iamblichus is the third.

(1) Some ("οἱ Ἀττικοὶ καὶ Ἀλβῖνοι καὶ τοιοῦτοί τινες", 234, 9ff.), permit only the λογικὴ ψυχή to be immortal and grant destruction to ἡ ἄλογος ζωὴ σύμπασα and τὸ πνευματικὸν ὄχημα τῆς ψυχῆς, granting them an existence only in connection with the εἰς γένεσιν ῥοπὴ τῆς ψυχῆς, its life in the body, and preserving only the *mind* (νοῦς) as immortal.

Can we assume from this passage that Atticus and Albinus in the 2nd Century A.D. recognised the existence, if only the *mortal* existence, of a πνευματικὸν ὄχημα? The evidence is that such entities were recognised in certain quarters at this time. Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* II 20. 112-113) tells us that the Basilidian Gnostics believed in a προσηρτημένον πνεῦμα or προσφυὴς ψυχή which was the organ of passion. Again, Galen (*De Placitis Hipp. et Plat.* p. 643 Muller) recognises, and seems to approve, the possibility of an αὐγοειδές τε καὶ αἰθερῶδες σῶμα (incorporating Aristotle's view of the nutritive soul in *De Gen. An.* 736b 27ff.), which might serve as a πρῶτον ὄχημα for the soul, itself immaterial, διὰ οὗ μέσου τὴν πρὸς τἆλλα σώματα κοινωνίαν λαμβάνει. This ὄχημα it would naturally divest itself if on separation from the body. The author of the pseudo-Plutarchean *De Vita et Poesi Homeri* (prob. 2nd cent. A.D., *vide* Diels *Dox. Gr.* 99) states, as the view of 'Plato and Aristotle', that the soul at death takes with it τὸ πνευματικόν, which acts as its ὄχημα (c. 128), though how permanent such an ὄχημα is unclear. Alexander of Aphrodisias (Simp. *In Phys.* 964,

19ff. Diels), at the end of the 2nd Cent., knew of the doctrine of the ὄχημα, and, like Atticus and Albinus, opposed it. Iamblichus himself, in his *de Anima*, (ap. Stob. I 378 Wachs) gives it as the opinion of 'Eratosthenes and Ptolemy the Platonist and others' (probably neither the astronomer nor the mathematician, but two Platonists of the 2nd Cent. A.D.; it is not of great importance in the present context [1]) that the soul ἀεὶ εἶναι ἐν σώματι, and ἀπὸ σωμάτων αὐτὴν λεπτοτέρων εἰς τὰ ὀστρεώδη πάλιν [εἰσοικίζουσι] σώματα.

It seems to me that there is ample evidence that Atticus and Albinus knew of the ὄχημα.[2]

What was the view of Atticus, at least, we learn from a later passage of the *De Anima* (ap. Stob. I 379, 25ff. Wachs): Ἀττικῷ <δὲ> καὶ <ἄλλοις τισὶ> Πλατωνικοῖς οὐ συνδοκεῖ (sc. the notion that pure souls join with bodies purely, souls of an opposite nature in an opposite fashion), καθ'ἕνα δὲ τρόπον συντεύξεως τὰς ὅλας ψυχὰς τοῖς σώμασι συνάγουσιν, ὡσαύτως ἀεὶ μὲν καὶ ἐπὶ πάσης ἐνσωματώσεως τῶν ψυχῶν προϋποτιθέντες τὴν ἄλογον καὶ πλημμελῆ καὶ ἔνυλον ψυχήν, ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ κατακοσμουμένῃ τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς λογικῆς ἐπεισάγοντες.

For Atticus, then, the ἄλογος ψυχή of the individual was a bodily phenomenon, necessary as a prerequisite for the descent of a soul, but not surviving its departure from the body.[3]

(2) The second school of thought is represented by οἱ περὶ Πορφύριον (234, 18ff.). They are described (a trifle sarcastically), as μετριώτεροι καὶ πρᾳότεροι than the first group. They decline to impose so-called destruction upon the ὄχημα and the ἄλογος ψυχή but say that they are resolved into their elements and in some way dissolved (ἀναλύεσθαι) into the celestial spheres, from which

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[1] If this were *the* Eratosthenes (see F. Solmsen, 'Eratosthenes as Platonist and Poet', TAPA 73 (1942) 210ff.), then the whole doctrine goes back to Hellenistic times, and may have received amplification by Posidonius. Cf. Reinhardt, *Kosmos u. Sympathie* p. 380, note 2.

[2] We may note that Origen (*Contra Celsum* II, 60), writing c. 246-8 A.D. accepts an αὐγοειδὲς σῶμα: τὰ μὲν οὖν γινόμενα περὶ ψυχῆς τεθνηκότων φαντάσματα ἀπό τινος ὑποκειμένου γίνεται, τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπεστηκυῖαν ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ αὐγοειδεῖ σώματι ψυχήν.

[3] An analogous notion is found in the Hermetic tradition, cf. Hermes *ap.* Stob. I 290, 13ff. Wachs: ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τὸ πνεῦμα οὐκ εἶχεν ἐν τῇ νηδύι τὴν ζωτικὴν κίνησιν, τὴν δὲ βλαστικήν, καὶ ταύτην ἥρμοσεν ἁρμονίᾳ ὑποδοχὴν οὖσαν τῆς διανοητικῆς ζωῆς, where a ψυχὴ βλαστική seems to be presupposed as a ὑποδοχή for rational life, and thus for the rational soul.

they were originally combined, and that these are mixtures (φυράματα—the components of the ὄχημα are now being referred to) given off by the celestial spheres, and that the soul collects them during its descent, so that they both exist and don't exist (ὥστε καὶ εἶναι ταῦτα καὶ μὴ εἶναι), but that they cease to exist as one composite thing and do not preserve their identity (ἰδιότητα).

This belief, which (as Proclus—or Iamblichus) points out, finds support in the Chaldaean Oracles (p. 47 Kroll), is also expressed by Porphyry in *De Antro Nymph.* 11 etc. It is also in fact that of Plotinus, *Enn.* IV 3, 15 and 24.

I believe that Iamblichus himself presented these two views, before stating his own, which is that the ὄχημα and ἄλογος ψυχή survive intact, not dissolving into nothing or into the spheres, but taking their origins from the gods themselves and not the universe.[1] Iamblichus was quite well aware of the views of Atticus and Albinus, as we can see from the *De Anima*, and his assertion that the ὄχημα does not owe its existence to τὰ θεῖα σώματα seems to be a direct criticism of Porphyry's view. As usual, however, I refrain from including the doxography in the fragment proper.

Iamblichus, then, is forced to take τὸ θνητόν as being so called merely because it is concerned with mortal affairs. Proclus agrees that the ὄχημα is not destroyed, but is in some difficulty to explain the use of the word θνητόν (235, 9-236, 30). To us it must seem obvious that it refers to the material element of man, the body, but for ancient commentators, particularly the Neoplatonists, the matter was complicated by the identification of the 'younger gods' with the planetary gods. When, therefore, the Demiurge says 'ἀπεργάζεσθε ζῷα καὶ γεννᾶτε τροφήν τε διδόντες αὐξάνετε καὶ φθίνοντα πάλιν δέχεσθε·', this, especially the last injunction, was taken to refer to the astrological influences of the planets on human life, and the final return of the various passions (the χιτῶνες) to the planets which generated them (see Proclus' next chapter, 238, 29-242, 7)

The other difficulty—and it is one that has cropped up before—is that, for Neoplatonist commentators, Matter has not yet been created in Timaeus' scheme (it is not to be dealt with properly until 47E, with the introduction of τὰ δι' ἀναγκῆς γιγνόμενα, as we

[1] This is the doctrine also of the *Oracles*, as set out by Psellus (*Exeg.* 1124a6, pp. 162-3 Des Places, and Fr. 158 Des Places).

can see from Calcidius' treatment), and so whatever apparent references there may have been previously to Body or Matter must have some metaphorical significance. This has been a cause of difficulty to Iamblichus on a number of occasions.

At any rate, Syrianus is now brought on by Proclus to solve the problem with one of his characteristic 'portmanteau' solutions (236, 31ff.). The ὄχημα is up to a point immortal and up to a point mortal:

τὰς μὲν ἀκρότητας τῆς ἀλόγου ζωῆς τὸ πνεῦμα περιέχειν καὶ εἶναι ταύτας μετὰ τοῦ ὀχήματος ἀιδίους ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ παρηγμένας, ταύτας δὲ ἐκτεινομένας καὶ μεριζομένας ποιεῖν τὴν ζωὴν ταύτην, ἣν προσυφαίνουσιν οἱ νέοι θεοί, θνητὴν μὲν οὖσαν διότι τὸν μέρισμον ταῦτον ἀποτίθεσθαί ποτε τὴν ψυχὴν ἀναγκαῖον, ὅταν ἀποκαταστῇ τυχοῦσα καθάρσεως, πολυχρονιωτέραν δὲ τῆς τοῦ σώματος τούτου ζωῆς.

There are then, for Syrianus (and for Proclus), two aspects of the ὄχημα or πνεῦμα. The first is immortal, created by the Demiurge himself, and comprises the ἀκρότητες of the irrational life—the ὄχημα in itself, one might say. ἀκρότης has a special meaning for Proclus and Syrianus, to wit, the highest point of an hypostasis or level of Being, which is united to the level above it (cf. *El. of Theol.* propp. 146-8), so that the ὄχημα proper merely deals with the prefiguration κατ' αἰτίαν of the irrational part of the soul in the rational part, and it is this ἀκρότης which, it seems, survives the ascent and purification of the soul and is thus immortal. But the ἀκρότητες are also extended and divided (κατ' ἐνέργειαν, one might say) into the actual irrational life of the soul, and in this capacity are formed by the 'young gods' and are mortal, being dispersed during the soul's ascent and purification, although they *do* survive the body for some length of time, sufficient, at any rate, to be tormented in Hades, for instance.

To these subtleties Iamblichus, it seems, did not attain. For him the ὄχημα is simply immortal. We get more information on his view of it from the *De Mysteriis*. We hear, in II 11 and 14, of the αὐγοειδὲς πνεῦμα in connexion with divination. It is this which is illuminated by the ἐπίπνοια of the gods, particularly in the process known as φωτὸς ἀγωγή, or φωταγωγία: αὕτη (s.c. φωτὸς ἀγωγή) δή που τὸ περικείμενον τῇ ψυχῇ αἰθερῶδες καὶ αὐγοειδὲς ὄχημα ἐπιλάμπει θείῳ φωτί, ἐξ οὗ δὴ φαντασίαι θεῖαι καταλαμβάνουσι τὴν ἐν ἡμῖν φανταστικὴν δύναμιν, κινούμεναι ὑπὸ τῆς βουλήσεως τῶν

θεῶν. This ὄχημα, then, provides a medium through which divine images may be impressed upon the φαντασία on the imaging faculty of the soul.

We also find, in *De Myst.* VIII 6: 269, a theory of two souls, one issuing from τὸ πρῶτον νοητόν, the other introduced into us from the circuit of the heavenly bodies:

Δύο γὰρ ἔχει ψυχάς, ὡς ταῦτα φησι τὰ γράμματα (sc. the Hermetic writings) ὁ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ ἡ μέν ἐστιν ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου νοητοῦ, μετέχουσα καὶ τῆς τοῦ δημιουργοῦ δυνάμεως, ἡ δὲ ἐνδιδομένη ἐκ τῆς τῶν οὐρανίων περιφορᾶς, εἰς ἣν ἐπεισέρπει ἡ θεοπτικὴ ψυχή. τούτων δὴ οὕτως ἐχόντων ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν κόσμων εἰς ἡμᾶς καθήκουσα ψυχῆς ταῖς περιόδοις συνακολουθεῖ τῶν κόσμων, ἡ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ νοητῶς παροῦσα τῆς γενεσιουργοῦ κυκλήσεως ὑπερέχει, καὶ κατ' αὐτὴν ἥ τε λύσις γίγνεται τῆς εἱμαρμενῆς καὶ ἡ πρὸς τοὺς νοητοὺς θεοὺς ἄνοδος . . ."

We are not, however, told that the second soul, ἐνδιδομένη ἐκ τῆς τῶν οὐρανίων περιφορᾶς, is mortal, merely that it is subject to Fate, in contrast to the higher soul, by means of which we can escape from this world through theurgy.

Iamblichus gives his view also in the *De Anima* (ap. Stob. I 384) as follows (Festugière, in his translation, makes this a section on *The Fate of the Irrational Faculties of the Soul,* which seems reasonable):

'τοὺς δὲ περὶ Πλωτῖνον τῆς στάσεως προισταμένους ἐκείνης τῆς χωριζούσης αὐτὰς (sc. τὰς ἀλόγους δυνάμεις) ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου, ἢ καὶ ἀφιείσης εἰς τὴν γένεσιν, ἢ καὶ ἀφαιρούσης ἀπὸ τῆς διανοίας· ἀφ' ἧς πάλιν διττῆς δόξης γίγνεται διάκρισις· ἤτοι γὰρ λύεται ἑκάστη δύναμις ἄλογος εἰς τὴν ὅλην ζωὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀφ' ἧς ἀπεμερίσθη, ᾗ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα μένει ἀμετάβλητος, ὥσπερ ἡγεῖται Πορφύριος· ἢ καὶ χωρισθεῖσα ἀπὸ τῆς διανοίας ἡ ὅλη ἄλογος ζωὴ μένει καὶ αὐτὴ διασῳζομένη ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, ὥσπερ οἱ παλαιότατοι τῶν ἱερέων ἀποφαίνονται.'

'The most ancient of the priests' are simply one of the two devices by which Iamblichus introduces his own views in the *De Anima*, as any reader of that work will recognise. This does not, of course, mean that Iamblichus is not here referring to existing doctrines, such as those quoted just above, from *De Myst.* VIII, 6.

The view here attributed to Porphyry is peculiarly phrased, but accords well enough with the evidence of the *Timaeus Commen-*

tary (I believe that Heeren's emendation of mss. ἢ καὶ to ἡ καὶ must be adopted, *contra* Festugière). Porphyry assumes the dissolution of the individual faculties from each other, but imagines the psychic stuff from which they sprang to subsist permanently in the Universe (presumably in the spheres of the relevant planetary gods). This is Hermetic doctrine, as given in the *Poemandres*, for instance.

The theory of two human souls, as opposed to a rational and an irrational part of the same soul, is referred back to Numenius by Porphyry, in an essay Περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων (ap. Stob. I 350, 25 Wachs.—unless indeed this is part of his treatise *On the Soul*):

ἄλλοι δέ, ὧν καὶ Νουμήνιος, οὐ τρία μέρη ψυχῆς μιᾶς ἢ δύο γε, τὸ λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον, ἀλλὰ δύο ψυχὰς ἔχειν ἡμᾶς οἴονται, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλα, τὴν μὲν λογικήν, τὴν δὲ ἄλογον· οἱ μὲν ἄμφω ἀθανάτους, οἱ δὲ τὴν λογικὴν ἀθάνατον, τὴν δὲ ἄλογον οὐ κατὰ τὰς ἐνεργείας μόνον ἀφίστασθαι τῆς ποιᾶς κινήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ' οὐσίαν διαλύεσθαι. (Numenius, *Test.* 36 Leemans.)

From other evidence [1] it is clear that Numenius belongs to the class of those who make both souls immortal. Probably Porphyry has Atticus and Albinus in mind as representing the second group.

The real difficulty in Numenius' and Iamblichus' position, it seems to me, is not the postulation of a second soul (they share this view with many, as we have seen), but the immortalisation of it. In the purity of the noetic world, it must inevitably have been an embarrassment. The physical world being eternal, it could stay on eternally in the atmosphere as a daemon of some grade, but this is not made clear in the surviving evidence.

I will end this discussion by quoting the passage from Olympiodorus noted above (*In Phaed.* p. 124, 13ff. Norvin), as it puts Iamblichus well in context:

'ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς ἄχρι τῆς ἐμψύχου ἕξεως ἀπαθανατίζουσιν, ὡς Νουμήνιος· οἱ δὲ μέχρι τῆς φύσεως, ὡς Πλωτῖνος ἔνι ὅπου.[2] οἱ δὲ μέχρι τῆς ἀλογίας, ὡς τῶν μὲν παλαιῶν Ξενοκράτης καὶ Σπεύσιπ-

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[1] Olympiodorus *In Phaed.* p. 124 Norvin (Test. 38 Leemans), and Joh. Philop. *In De Anima* p. 9, 37 Hayduck CAG XV (Test. 39 Leemans).

[2] e.g. *Enn.* IV 7, 14.

πος, τῶν δὲ νεωτέρων Ἰάμβλιχος καὶ Πλούταρχος.[1] οἱ δὲ μέχρι μόνης τῆς λογικῆς, ὡς Πρόκλος καὶ Πορφύριος· οἱ δὲ μέχρι μόνου τοῦ νοῦ, φθείρουσι γὰρ τὴν δόξαν, ὡς πολλοὶ τῶν Περιπατητικῶν· οἱ δὲ μέχρι τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς· φθείρουσι γὰρ τὰς μερικὰς εἰς τὴν ὅλην.'

We see here that Olympiodorus distinguishes Numenius' position from that of Iamblichus, inasmuch as ἡ ἔμψυχος ἕξις, which must be the 'embodied' aspect of the Soul, or the 'ensouled' aspect of the Body, may be distinguished from ἡ ἀλογία.

Fr. 82

This passage is immediately preceded by a rather curiously personal reference to *Atticus*, who maintained that there were *two* mixing bowls (this being the point of ὁ κράτηρ ἐστιν εἷς μέν. . . at the beginning of the Iamblichus quotation). As it is both remarkable and short, I quote it in full. If Proclus is being honest, it means that he personally consulted Atticus' commentaries, not only on the *Timaeus*, but on the *Phaedrus*:

'καὶ ἔγωγε καὶ τὸν φιλοπονώτατον Ἀττικὸν ἐθαύμασα διττόν που τὸν κρατῆρα λέγοντα εὑρών, καὶ ταῦτα εἰωθότα σφόδρα παρέπεσθαι ταῖς ῥήσεσι· μέμνηται δὲ ὅμως ἐκεῖνος τοῦ διττοῦ κρατῆρος καὶ τὸν Φαῖδρον ἐξηγούμενος.'

Atticus, to solve his difficulties about the nature of Demiurge's activities at this point, resorts to the expedient of two mixing-bowls, despite the plain indication of the text 'ἐπὶ τὸν πρότερον κρατῆρα.'

This passage, indeed, as Proclus points out in the beginning of his chapter, is a stumbling block to those who wish to make our souls ἰσάξιοι and ὁμοούσιοι with the divine souls (245, 19f.) as does Plotinus, while being a supporting text for those who want to make a difference.

Iamblichus himself postulates only one mixing-bowl, as warranted by the text, but preserves the difference between divine and human souls by a doctrine of different λήξεις, within which

[1] Iamblichus' partner here, Plutarchus, is probably *Plutarch of Athens*, as Norvin assumes in the Index. However, the scholion on the passage gives us instead of Plutarchus a mysterious Paterius, whom one would dismiss out of hand, were it not for the fact that he is quoted at three other places in the Commentary (85, 1; 104, 21, and 113, 5 and 12), as well as by Proclus, *In Remp.* II 42, 9; 134, 9; 380, 25 (schol.).

the demiurgic λόγοι, coming forth from the 'mixing-bowl' (which on Iamblichus' description sounds very like Hera, or even the Chaldaean Hecate—at any rate, a female, life-producing principle assisting the Demiurge) give to each type of soul (divine, daemonic, human) its proper μέτρα τῆς συνοχῆς. From an excursus by Proclus subsequent to this (252, 9 καὶ εἴ τι δεῖ τῇ ἐμῇ μαντείᾳ προσέχειν.—256, 21), we might gather that what is at issue is different proportions of οὐσία, ταυτότης and ἑτερότης for divine, daemonic, and individual human souls respectively (254, 4f.). As I do not see anything else which the μέτρα τῆς συνοχῆς could refer to, I assume that this is what was in the mind of Iamblichus also. We may recall here his formula in Fr. 46 about certain cosmic entities 'rejoicing more' in ταυτότης, and others in ἑτερότης. The same components are in all souls, but in different proportions, so that different elements are dominant.

Fr. 82A

Although this reference to Iamblichus comes under the lemma 41D, I feel that Proclus is really harking back to a doctrine of Iamblichus that has been bothering him since 35A, which Iamblichus took to refer to the Hypercosmic Soul, rather than to the Soul of the Universe (Fr. 52) 'καὶ πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἰς καιρὸν ἐκείνης ἐμέμνητο' would thus refer to the former passage rather than to this, while Iamblichus is exhorted to look to this passage ('τὸν πρότερον κρατῆρα, ἐν ᾧ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴν κεραννὺς ἔμισγε' as further evidence of his wrong-headedness. This, therefore, has rather doubtful status as a fragment. It is more of a *testimonium* to an on-going argument in Proclus's mind against Iamblichus' position, and I accordingly number it as an appendix to fr. 82.

Fr. 83

This is a comment in particular on 'τὰ τῶν πρόσθεν ὑπόλοιπα'. Proclus (257, 5ff.) would identify these with ὑπόλοιπα τῶν μέσων γενῶν rather than τοῦ ἐκεῖ κράματος, the previous mixing of the cosmic souls, of which, he says, the mixture was all used up on that occasion (cf. 36B). What, then, does he make of πρόσθεν? Within τὰ μέσα γένη, he argues, there are some that are ἀκρότατα καὶ νοερά, some that are μέσα, and some that are ἔσχατα. It is these

ἔσχατα that are here being mixed, and they are ὑπόλοιπα of the highest degrees of μέσα γένη.

This, however, is not given as Iamblichus' view. He, it seems, stressed the transcendent superiority of those γένη which go to make up divine souls. Presumably γένη refers here to the categories ὄν, ταὐτόν and θάτερον rather than any class of angels or daemons, and Iamblichus wishes the divine souls to be made of components of a different degree of purity from those of individual souls. This would accord well with his general psychological theory.

Proclus accepts this, but also wishes to stress the ὁμοιότης subsisting between all classes of soul.

Fr. 84

This passage presents a number of difficulties. First of all, what are we to understand by οἱ περὶ τὸν μέγαν Ἰάμβλιχον? Taken along with the reference in fr. 81 to an 'Iamblichean group' of interpreters (or philosophers), one is constrained to believe that it is something more than a mere literary circumlocution for Iamblichus himself. At any rate, I persist in taking the phraseology as Iamblichean. The unknown disciple of Iamblichus, if such there be, must be presumed to be here echoing the master.

As to the identity of such a disciple, we must be at a loss. Theodorus is out; he was more of a rival than a disciple, and he had a different opinion, in this case, of the origin and nature of the 'vehicle' (266, 15ff.); and one could not refer to Syrianus in this way. Rather than search for shadowy commentators in the last half of the 4th century, I would take the reference (as may be the case with many οἱ μέν, οἱ δέ and ἔνιοι) to refer to factions in the school in Proclus' own time. It is most probable, for instance, that there were stronger partisans of Iamblichus around than Proclus himself. Damascius, in the next generation, certainly was,[1] and so perhaps was his master Isidorus—ὅσοι τούτῳ συνᾴδειν ἀξίουσι' in fr. 81, while not conclusive either way, sounds best as a reference to contemporary partisans, under Proclus' nose. 'οἱ περί' is admittedly much more like a reference to a group of immediate disciples, and we must perhaps think of the school of Pergamum under Aedesius and his successors, who would have had much use for a doctrine of ὀχήματα in connexion with theurgy.

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[1] Cf. Simpl. *In Phys.* 795, 13ff. Diels.

As for the doctrine, we are enquiring into the origin and nature of the ὄχημα. The views of (a) Theodorus, who declared the ὄχημα to be ἡ τοῦ παντὸς φύσις (p. 265, 15), presumably in the sense that it is derived from it, and (b) τινές who make the ὄχημα the ἄστρον mentioned in the previous clause of the text, have been rejected, as is in general the view that the ὄχημα is a pre-existing thing, not created specially for the soul (p. 267, 8ff.). Iamblichus here seems to derive the ὄχημα from the aether, the πεμπτὸν σῶμα, thus recognising the Aristotelian side of its origin, as πνεῦμα. He thus credits the aether with a γονίμη δύναμις, which does not involve taking anything away from the heavenly bodies.

But what are we to understand by οὔτε συμπεφορημένως ὑφισταμένων'? We may, I think, compare III 236, 22, where the unreasoning soul is the subject of discussion: οὐ γάρ ἐστι ζωῶν συμφόρησις ἡ ἄλογος, ἀλλὰ μία ζωὴ πολυειδής. That is, the ἄλογος ψυχή is not just a collection of ζωαί or characteristics gathered in the descent of the soul through the Universe, but a single articulated entity. So this phrase means, I think, 'not put together as a result of contributions (χιτῶνες) gathered from each of the planetary gods'. Again, αἱ ζωαὶ αἱ θεῖαι I take to mean the life-principles—the unreasoning generative principles, neither οὐσίαι nor νόες—of the encosmic gods. These are, in theological terms, the aetherial source of the individual πνεύματα/ὀχήματα.

Fr. 85

Proclus mentions three views of what γένεσις πρώτη refers to. First, this opinion of Iamblichus. Then, ἄλλος τις, who makes it ἡ μία κάθοδος τῶν ψυχῶν. This man ἁπλῶς διορίζεται μίαν γέ τινα κάθοδον εἶναι ψυχῆς ἑκάστης. I will leave this man's identity uninvestigated. It is possible that Proclus could not name him either, as the whole account here may come straight from Syrianus, whose opinion is quoted next (278, 9ff.). Syrianus criticises primarily 'ἄλλος τις' pointing out that the soul does not simply have *one* descent, but one descent καθ' ἑκάστην τοῦ θείου γενητοῦ περιόδον—in every Great Year or ἀποκατάστασις. Iamblichus is criticised only to the extent that ἡ πρώτη γένεσις, being the first κάθοδος, is later than the σπορὰ τῶν ὀχημάτων. Proclus must be assumed to agree with Syrianus, as he makes no further comment.

Since Iamblichus took the πρώτη γένεσις to refer to the σπορά, he must then assume all ὀχήματα to be of equal value, as the point

of this first birth is ἵνα μή τις ἐλάττοῖτο ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. Differences in the quality of life must then depend on how good ones relation is with ones ὄχημα.

l. 7. ἐπήγαγε γὰρ ὡς τούτῳ συνεχὲς . . . I believe the subject of ἐπήγαγε to be in fact *Plato*, and that the phrase is thus Iamblichus' own. If the subject were Iamblichus, it would be more in keeping with the preceding ἀποκαλεῖ for Proclus to have written ἐπάγει.

Fr. 86

Proclus himself gives a more literal interpretation of the πυκνοὶ γόμφοι (321, 12ff.):

τοὺς μὲν οὖν πυκνοὺς καὶ ἀοράτους γόμφους λεγόμεν τὰς τῶν σμικρῶν καὶ ἀοράτων στοιχείων παρενθέσεις τοῖς μεγαλομερεστέροις, τὴν δὲ σύντηξιν οἰκείαν εἶναι τοῖς Ἡφαιστείοις ἔργοις, τοῦ πυρὸς ἐργαζομένου διὰ τῆς ἀραιώσεως ἐν τῇ συντήξει τὴν πάντων δι' ἀλλήλων χώρησιν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν συγχωνευομένων γίνεται μετάλλων εἰσδυομένων ἐν τῷ τήκεσθαι τῶν σμικρομερῶν εἰς τὰ μεγαλομερέστερα καὶ οὕτω τῆς συγκράσεως γινομένης.

"The 'numerous invisible pegs', then, we assert to be the insertion of the small invisible elements in between those with larger particles, and the 'welding together' to be proper to the works of Hephaestus, the fire bringing about through rarefaction in the welding the penetration of all the elements by each other, as happens in the case of metals melted together, the elements with small particles in the melting process entering into those with larger particles and the blending taking place as a result of this."

Proclus thus takes the 'physical' interpretation, connecting this with the passage 54D ff. Iamblichus maintains his 'higher' interpretation—the γόμφοι represent the unifying property of the λόγοι operating in Nature. No doubt he also interprets the basic triangles of 54D in this way. The welding together is not the direct work of the Demiurge, of course, but of the young gods. Nevertheless, it is demiurgic.

Calcidius (c. CCIII p. 222, 10ff. Wasz.) no doubt represents the Middle Platonic comment on γόμφοι, represented here (perhaps with the addition of Porphyry) by οἱ μέν:

"Invisibles porro coniunctiones gomphos appellat, vel min<im>-o

rum corpusculorum concervationem, ut Diodorus, vel eorundem similium inter se conglobationem formabilem, ut Anaxagoras, vel supra dictorum multiformam implicationem, ut Democritus et Leucippus, vel interdum concretionem interdum discretionem, ut Empedocles, concretionem quidem amicitiam, discretionem porro et separationem inimicitiam vocans, vel, ut Stoici, corporum diversorum usque quaque concretionem. Quorum omnium quendam nodum concatenationemque dicit esse in minutis solidisque corpusculis, quae gomphos cognominat".

In fact, a bald doxographic exegesis, without any trace of the 'higher' interpretation.

Fr. 87

This is a most important passage for Iamblichus' psychology· Here he is taking issue with Plotinus (we assume *not* with Theodorus) on the question whether there is any part of the individual human soul which was ἀπαθές. The argument is pursued more fully by Iamblichus in the *De Anima* (Stob. I 365-6 Wachs.). There he identifies Numenius, Plotinus, Amelius and Porphyry as defenders of the view that makes the Soul in no essential respect different from the intellect, and thus preserving in itself an element which ἀεὶ νοεῖ and which is ἀπαθές. We may suspect, by analogous situations, that Theodorus here is following Amelius. Iamblichus does state that the philosophers mentioned held to this doctrine with different degrees of consistency and firmness, only Numenius being unequivocal in this opinion, but he regards them as a solid bloc against which to argue. For his own doctrine, see Introduction, pp. 43 ff. where the *De Anima* passage is quoted.

Iamblichus' view is that Soul is a separate and inferior hypostasis to Nous, and to τὰ κρείττονα γένη generally. On the level of the individual Soul, Iamblichus' argument is one from experience. Is there in fact any part of us that remains unaffected by the passions? Iamblichus claims there is not; like Hume, he would regard the will and intellect as in fact the servant of the passions. Bringing the *Phaedrus* Myth into the discussion (as was traditional), Iamblichus reminds us that the Charioteer of the individual soul, while sometimes, admittedly, μετέωρος φέρεται, etc., at other times δύνει, καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ χωλείας καὶ πτερόρρυήσεως <ἀναπίμπλησι ξυνωρίδα>. The fact that *at any time* he should so descend proves

that no part of the soul remains always ἀπαθές and ἀεὶ νοεῖ. We must then retreat from the Plotinian view that the soul can range unaided, by its own power, up and down the scale of Being, even to the One itself. Iamblichus, and the Athenian School after him, put a greater distance than that between us and the One, and in the process increased the persuasiveness of the argument for the necessity of ritual acts, *karma*, theurgy.

Fr. 88

This admission of necessary ignorance is contrary to the spirit of Plotinus, and fully consonant with a theory of theurgy, as it is with the Christian concept of 'mysteries of faith'.

This passage is rounded off by the phrase 'περὶ ὧν μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος, εἴρηται' indicating that all before it is part of one train of thought. Iamblichus must have given a reason for his statement that the methods of creation of the gods are unknowable to us, and this only comes with the sentence beginning 'αἴτιον δέ . . ', —Providence and the power of generation are the peculiar province of the Gods, and have an ἄγνωστος ὑπεροχή to any thought-processes of ours. Proclus approves of this formulation, and so it comes to us in direct speech.

Fr. 89

This is strictly a *testimonium* rather than a fragment. We are not told by Simplicius *what* Iamblichus had to say on the subject of vision, simply that he said something. It sounds as if Iamblichus may have been giving a purely physical exegesis at this point, in which case it may not have been greatly different from Calcidius' chapters *De Visu*, (cc. CCXXXVI-CCXLVII). I presume that we are still in Iamblichus' Fourth Book. The lemma which I have chosen (45C) seems to approximate most closely to the subject-matter, but it is, of course, a mere guess.

Simplicius is commenting on Ar. *De An.* 418b 14, ὅτι οὔτε πῦρ οὐθ' ὅλως σῶμα (sc. ἐστὶ τὸ φῶς), in the course of Aristotle's discussion of the nature of light. It is interesting that Simplicius should refer to Iamblichus' *Commentary* at this point, rather than that of Proclus. Was that part of Proclus' *Commentary* which is lost to us also unavailable to Simplicius? Perhaps, on the other hand,

Iamblichus himself, in commenting on the *De Anima*, referred to his own *Commentary on the Timaeus*, and this led Simplicius to do so as well.

BOOK V

Fr. 90

In this fragment, it seems to me, as in Fr. 89, we have evidence for Iamblichus' Commentary which goes beyond what we have of Proclus. I have chosen the passage 52AB (τρίτον δ' αὖ γένος . . . οὐδὲν εἶναι as the lemma, because it is the first place where Space is given a mention in the dialogue.[1] Iamblichus makes this point when he says that Timaeus makes the first mention here of the existence of Space (τὸν τόπον πρώτως παράγει) along with the account of the first creation of bodies. This is a rather Proclean lemma—I cannot be sure that Iamblichus is not commenting on a longer passage—but I feel that this at least is the core of it.

We are at this point in the second chapter of Iamblichus' Fifth Book.[2] We cannot be sure whether a προοίμιον counted as a κεφάλαιον. Whether it did or not, Iamblichus' Book V cannot begin much before 51E 'τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων', and indeed there is where I would suggest that it did begin. As for Proclus, John Philoponus produces [3] a quotation from the 5th Book of his Commentary, which Diehl (III 357) seems to wish to refer to 48E, but which seems to me to refer clearly to 50C: τὰ δὲ εἰσίοντα καὶ ἐξίοντα τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ μιμήματα . . .' cf. Procl. (III 357, 10ff.) . . . μήποτε δὲ ἄμεινον λέγειν, ὅτι καὶ τὰ εἴδη τὰ ἔνυλα καὶ οὐ μόνον αἱ ποιότητες εἰσίοντα κέκληται καὶ ἐξίοντα.

This gives Proclus a 5th Book, and Iamblichus a 4th, extending from 40E-51E. This is a long stretch, certainly, but I do not see any other explanation of the phenomena.

Iamblichus is concerned in this passage to emphasise the essential nature of τόπος. We are to see it as αἰτίας συγγενής, in connexion

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[1] 24C ἐκλεξαμένη τὸν τόπον . . . . cannot be allowed to count. Iamblichus has already explained that away as denoting οὐδεμίαν σωματοειδῆ σύστασιν (see Fr. 20).

[2] Or 15th, if the reading of E be accepted, but I feel that this is either a slip arising from EN ΤΩΙΕ ΒΙΒΛΙΩΙ being wrongly divided, or an attempt to rationalise resulting from the of Frr. 62 and 63. See Comm. ad loc.

[3] *De Aet. Mundi* 11, 11 p. 364 Rabe.

with the causal principle on which it is dependent. It is not to be given a purely physical explanation, any more than Time was, but always in relation to the Demiurge's plan of creation (ὁμοφυὴς πρὸς τὴν δημιουργίαν). Iamblichus' definition here—space is a δύναμις σωματοειδὴς ἡ ἀνέχουσα τὰ σώματα . . . καὶ περιέχουσα πανταχόθεν—is remarkably similar to his definition of the noetic τόπος of 24C in which Athena operates: ἡ διὰ τῆς γῆς διήκουσα ἀσώματος αἰτία ἡ ἀνέχουσα τῇ ζωῇ τὰ σώματα καὶ περιέχουσα πᾶσαν διάστασιν.

Physical Space seems thus for Iamblichus to be an analogue of the noetic influence exerted by Athena in her assistance of the Demiurge.

ll. 13-15 ὅσοι . . . ἐφέλκονται. It would be good to know who, apart from Aristotle, is here being attacked. Simplicius does not provide us with any clear lead. The expressions πέρατα ἐπιφανειῶν and χωρήματα διάκενα are distinctive, particularly the latter, and for the latter I can find no parallel. Perhaps it is Iamblichus' own phrase. At any rate, we may note his frequent stance of defender of Plato against corrupters of the pure doctrine. In this case the enemy seems to be Aristotelians, but may well include Middle Platonists who have adopted an Aristotelian line on this matter. Porphyry's views are not recorded.

IN PARMENIDEM

Fr. 1

We have here testimony to a comment by Iamblichus in his *Parmenides Commentary* on approximately the passage of the *Parmenides* (130CD) which I have chosen as a lemma. I have chosen this passage simply because Proclus in his *Commentary* (pp. 815-833 Cousin) took it as the basis for his discussion of the question 'τίνων ἐστὶ καὶ τίνων οὐκ ἔστι τὰ εἴδη'; in which he agrees with Iamblichus' conclusions as outlined by Syrianus, and with Plotinus, except in the matter of forms of individuals. It is reasonable to suspect that we have in Proclus the substance of Iamblichus' own exposition, but it would be unsafe to extract any particular passages.

Iamblichus is here reported as rejecting ideas of τεχνητά and of τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. Proclus covers the former in 827, 26-829, 21, making much use of Plotinus, *Enn.* V 9, particularly *sects.* 10, 11 and 14; the latter he discusses at 824, 12-825, 35 in which he is answering Plotinus in *Enn.* V 7, the remarkable essay 'On Whether there are Forms of Individuals'.

There were also, however, the problems of the existence of a Form of Matter, and of forms of evil things (κακά) both of which Proclus also deals with (822, 29-823, 15 and 829, 22-831, 29 respectively), and neither of which he accepts. Amelius was noted for his acceptance of Forms of 'evil things' or 'anti-Forms', and Proclus is probably referring to him at 833, 13ff.: ἐὰν γὰρ οὕτω λέγωμεν, οὔτε τῶν κακῶν ἰδεάς εἰσοίσομεν, ὥς τινες τῶν Πλατωνικῶν, but I doubt that Iamblichus did.

This exposition of Proclus' is a key passage for the Neoplatonic Theory of Ideas, and it may well be that he is simply following tradition in having a comprehensive discussion of the Theory at this point in the dialogue.

I should say a word here about the probable nature of the introductory portion of Iamblichus' commentary. It seems to me inevitable that there is much in Book I of Proclus' Commentary as regards the aim and nature of the dialogue and the 'analogical' interpretation of the characters that Proclus owes to Iamblichus,

but he has covered his tracks here so well that no certain attributions are possible. A comparative reading of the introductory portions of the *Timaeus* and *Parmenides* Commentary, noting Iamblichus' known contributions to the former, is extremely instructive. It may be possible at a later stage of scholarship to work out with confidence the skeleton of Iamblichus' Introduction to this dialogue. For the moment, I can only exhort the reader to examine the text.

Fr. 2

This account of the σκοποί of the hypotheses is identified with Iamblichus simply by the note of the scholiast *ad loc.*, but it is confirmed in some details by Damascius' account. The passage which I have given as Fr. 12 quotes Iamblichus as stating the subject of the Third Hypothesis as τὰ ἀεὶ θεοῖς ἑπόμενα, which agrees with τὰ κρείττονα ἡμῶν γένη of this passage, since they are further particularised as angels, daemons and heroes, and these are the beings which Iamblichus has in mind in Frr. 12 and 13 (Cf. Comm. *ad* Fr. 13). Again, at *Dub. et Sol.* II 292, 7ff., on the subject of the Sixth Hypothesis, we have the following statement:

ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲν ἀπεμφαῖνον λέγομεν τοῖς παλαιοῖς δηλοῖ μὲν καὶ Ἰάμβλιχος, ἤδη τινας ὑποθέσεις τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἀπονείμας καὶ ἀτόμοις, δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ ἱερὸς Πλούταρχος, αὐτὴν ταύτην τὴν ἕκτην ὑπόθεσιν περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὑποθέμενος.

That Plutarch of Athens held this to be the subject of the Sixth Hypothesis is confirmed by Proclus, *In Parm.* VI, 1058, 21ff. As for Iamblichus, this description would cover his analysis of the Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Hypotheses, as given by Proclus. See also Fr. 14 and Comm.

Iamblichus' doctrine of the subject matter of the hypotheses must be seen in the context of the development of Neoplatonic theory on this subject. The question is very ably surveyed in the Introduction to the Saffrey-Westerink edition of Proclus' *Platonic Theology* (Vol. I pp. LXXV-LXXXIX). Plotinus is the first, as far as we can tell with certainty, to take the *Parmenides* as a metaphysical treatise, revealing the structure of the universe. In *Enn.* V 1.8.23-27 he identified the subject of the First Hypothesis, the One, that of the Second, Intellect, and that of the Third, Soul.

He also in *Enn.* IV 2, 2.52-55, seems to be taking as the subject of the Fourth the Forms in Matter, and of the Fifth, Matter alone.

It is with Amelius that the formal identification of the subject-matters of all the hypotheses appears to start. He distinguished eight, and set them out as follows (Pr. *In Parm.* 1052, 21-1053, 35): *I*, The One; *II*, Intellect; *III*, Rational Souls; *IV*, Irrational Souls; *V*, Matter as disposed towards the reception of Forms; *VI*, Matter brought to order and in receipt of Forms; *VII*, Pure Matter; *VIII* Form united to Matter.

Porphyry, next, established a division into nine hypotheses, which was accepted by Iamblichus and then by the Athenian School. He distinguished them as follows (*ibid.* 1053, 36-1055, 25):

I ὁ θεὸς ὁ πρώτιστος
II τὸ νοητὸν πλάτος
III ψυχή
IV σῶμα κεκοσμημένον
V σῶμα ἀκόσμητον
VI ὕλη κεκοσμημένη
VII ὕλη ἀκόσμητος
VIII τὰ ἔνυλα εἴδη ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ
IX τὰ ἔνυλα εἴδη ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν

It will be seen that more or less the same order emerges. Porphyry does not distinguish types of soul, and has thus to produce 'body' as an entity between soul and matter. Porphyry does make quite a point of distinguishing σῶμα from ὕλη, as can be seen from Fr. XLVII of his *Timaeus Commentary* (p. 30-1 Sodano). But one seems to detect a certain desperation in the identifications after Hyp. IV or V. Iamblichus differs fairly widely from both Amelius and Porphyry, though taking more suggestions from the former than from the latter. Mainly, his hierarchy of being is more elaborate than Porphyry's.

Proclus' account of his interpretation of Hyp. I would seem to indicate a belief by Iamblichus in henads. It seems inevitable that Iamblichus recognised a class of gods in the realm of the One, since that is the whole point of his innovation from his predecessors, particularly Porphyry. Whether he himself termed them henads is not so important, but there seems no reason to doubt it.[1]

The account of Hyp. II is marred by a lacuna, but it must have

[1] On this see Appendix B.

concerned Intellect, and there is mention of some noetic entities, perhaps gods.

In Hyp. III Iamblichus breaks loose from what must already have been the traditional view), that it concerns Soul of at least some variety. He perversely puts in here τὰ κρείττονα γένη, presumably to establish a more elaborately structured universe such as we see laid out in the *De Mysteriis*, where the angels, daemons and heroes are intermediate between Intellect (and the gods) and Soul. Both Proclus and, later, Damascius, criticise him for this, and nobody else followed his suggestion.

From this on, the Hypotheses are interpreted smoothly enough, until VIII and IX, where he really seems to run out of entities. However, his view quoted in Fr. 14 below, asserting that σύνθετα can be ἀρχαί, and mentioning the four elements and the heaven as examples, shows what was in his mind. Proclus condemns him for this, however, (1055, 23-25) as introducing ἀποτελέσματα instead of ἀρχαί in these two hypotheses.

Proclus has a general explanation of why these early interpreters went off the rails (1055, 25-1051, 5). They did not see that only the first five hypotheses are intended to lead to true conclusions, whereas the last four lead to absurdities (ἄτοπά τινα). They do not introduce further realities, but simply demonstrate that nothing exists if the One does not exist. The Athenian School, then, from Plutarch of Athens onwards, took only the first five Hypotheses as describing levels of reality, and made their task that much the simpler.

Fr. 2A

Whether this splendidly Iamblichean flow of epithets actually comes from his *Parmenides Commentary* must remain doubtful. I include it here provisionally for the following reason:

Damascius, in protesting mildly against the violence of this formulation (151, 22ff.)—after all, even the ἄνθος τοῦ νοῦ cannot comprehend the νοητόν in this passage—finally contrasts Iamblichus' position here on the knowability of the summit of the noetic world with his position in his *Chaldaean Theology* (154, 7ff.):

Χωρὶς δὲ τούτων καὶ οἱ θεοὶ γιγνώσκεσθαι τὸ νοητὸν ἀποφαίνονται σαφῶς, οὐ μόνον λέγοντες νοεῖσθαι καὶ νοεῖν· ἤδη μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλως ἐξηγοῦνται οἱ φιλόσοφοι, τὸ νοητὸν προκεῖσθαι τῷ νῷ λέγοντες,

οὐχ ὡς γνωστόν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐφετόν, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου πληροῦσθαι τὸν νοῦν λέγοντες οὐ γνώσεως ἀλλ' οὐσίας καὶ τῆς ὅλης καὶ νοητῆς τελειότητος. οὕτω γὰρ πολλαχοῦ καὶ ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτὸν ἀξιοῦσιν· οὐκ ἀεὶ δὲ οὕτως, ἀλλ' ἐν ἄλλοις καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ καὶ περὶ αὐτὸ καταλείπουσιν, ὡς ἐν τοῖς Χαλδαικοῖς ὁμολογουμένως ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος.

Iamblichus' position here, then, is contrasted with his position in the *Chaldaean Theology*, in particular his exegesis of the well-known passage (Fr. 1 Des Places, which Damascius now quotes), in which the ἄνθος τοῦ νοῦ is introduced, for the very purpose for which Iamblichus is now denying its efficacy:[1]

Ἔστιν γάρ τι νοητόν, ὃ χρή σε νοεῖν νόου ἄνθει·|ἢν γὰρ ἐπεγκλίνῃς σὸν νοῦν κἀκεῖνο νοήσῃς|ὥς τι νοῶν, οὐ κεῖνο νοήσεις· ἔστι γὰρ ἀλκῆς |ἀμφιφαοῦς δύναμις νοεραῖς στράπτουσα τομαῖσιν.|οὐ δὴ χρὴ σφοδρότητι νοεῖν τὸ νοητὸν ἐκεῖνο,|ἀλλὰ νοῦ ταναοῦ ταναῇ φλογὶ πάντα μετρούσῃ| πλὴν τὸ νοητὸν ἐκεῖνο· χρεὼ δὴ τοῦτο νοῆσαι|οὐκ ἀτενῶς, ἀλλ' ἁγνὸν ἀπόστροφον ὄμμα φέροντα|σῆς ψυχῆς, τεῖναι κενεὸν νόον ἐς τὸ νοητόν,| ὄφρα μάθῃς τὸ νοητόν, ἔπει νόου ἔξω ὑπάρχει.

I have quoted the passage in full (in Lewy's corrected version, *Chald. Or.* p. 165-6), since Iamblichus' doctrine in the present fragment is based on it, though it appears to contradict it.

The contradiction, however, is more apparent than real, and I suggest, depends rather on the text which Iamblichus is commenting upon in each instance (cf. Fr. 2B and Comm.). It was his position, after all, that the summit of the noetic world was really more in the realm of the One than in its own realm, and that thus no form of purely intellectual activity could properly comprehend it. As Damascius represents him as saying, the Monad of the Intelligible Realm is for the intellect an object of striving (ἐφετόν) rather than an object of knowledge. Not that this striving can be *definite* (ἐπέρεισις ὡρισμένη); it must rather be attained by indirection—ἀλλ' ἁγνὸν ἀπόστροφον ὄμμα φέροντα | σῆς ψυχῆς, as the Oracle says.

However, since Damascius can present an apparent discrepancy between this passage and Iamblichus' exegesis of the Oracles, this passage must have occurred somewhere else. But where? Damascius does quote elsewhere a Περὶ θεῶν by Iamblichus (I 132, 13). Iam-

[1] We probably have the substance of Iamblichus' comment on this passage reflected in Proclus, *Ecl. Chald.* 194 Pitra, p. 209 Des Places.

blichus in that passage is quoted on a general philosophical point, the distinction between εἶναι and ὑπάρχειν, so he seems to have discussed a general scheme of theology in that work, and this passage might very well be from this source also. There is also a *Platonic Theology* attributed to Iamblichus by Proclus (*Theol. Plat.* III p. 140, 20 Portus), but not mentioned by Damascius. These, then, are distinct possibilities, but one must ask oneself, if indeed Iamblichus wrote a *Commentary on the Parmenides*, what did he have to say on this or that passage, and such speculation leads us, I think, in this case to one particular passage.

The end of the discussion of the First Hypothesis (*Parm.* 142a 1-8) seems a good place for Iamblichus to introduce his exposition of the monad of the noetic realm, the lowest element in the realm of the One, τὸ ἓν ὄν, which is itself, we must remember, neither ἕν nor ὄν in a noetic sense, but transcends both.

In this passage, as we see from my suggested lemma, we have a fine litany of ways in which the One cannot be known, which may well have prompted Iamblichus to his own, more comprehensive litany. Only δόξα, it must be admitted, is common to both, but the same ground is covered, except that no mention is made of αἴσθησις or αἰσθάνεσθαι, which for a Neoplatonist it would have been abhorrent to apply to the One, even negatively, *pace* the divine Plato.

Fr. 2B

Iamblichus' views are here being quoted on a number of points, and it is by no means certain that Damascius is in fact thinking of his *Parmenides Commentary*, as opposed to, say, his *Platonic Theology*. However, it seems to me quite possible that Iamblichus made some such remarks as this in a discussion of theory at the beginning of Hyp. II, and I have therefore chosen the lemma which begins the argument, as being analogous to the lemma quoted in Fr. 2 from the beginning of Hyp. I, which Proclus uses as a basis for his lengthy discussion of the hypotheses in Book VI of his Commentary.

The first doctrine on which Iamblichus is quoted is in some way a continuation of his view quoted in Fr. 2A, and indeed they might have been placed under the same lemma. The same entity is being discussed, although perhaps in two different aspects. The summit of the noetic realm, the νοητόν proper, or ἓν ὄν, is strictly

above Being, and above intellection. It is more in the realm of the One than in its own realm. In the One, it is properly the μικτόν, the product of Limit and Unlimitedness, but it presides over the noetic realm as the One-Being. In Fr. 2A its knowability was being discussed, and the passage at the end of Hyp. I is more suitable to that discussion. Here its ontological status is in question, and the present lemma seems a suitable starting-point for that.

We may note that in this passage Iamblichus speaks of a certain νόησις that is proper to the noetic summit—μιὰ συνειλημμένη ἐκ πασῶν παντελὴς καὶ ἀδιάκριτος καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡνωμένη. This may seem to contradict the statement contained in Fr. 2A, and to agree better with what Damascius quotes from Iamblichus' exegesis of the *Chaldaean Oracles* (see Comm. *ad* 2A), but in fact the terms ἀδιάκριτος and ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡνωμένη make it clear that this intellection can be in no way analytical, but rather intuitive, and is thus really a super-intellection. Further, in 2A the One-Being is being spoken of, if I am right, rather as the lowest element in the realm of the One, whereas here it is being treated as the summit of the noetic realm.

Perhaps the truest expression of Iamblichus' views on the type of intellection possible of the noetic summit is that 'it lies before the mind, not as an object of knowledge but of striving, and from it the mind is filled not with knowledge but with being and with whole and noetic perfection' (*Dub et Sol.* I 154, 9ff., quoted in Comm. *ad* Fr. 2A).

The second doctrine of Iamblichus mentioned in this passage concerns the summit of the Intellectual Realm. It, by contrast with the One-Being, may be spoken of as being Substance, and pure Substance at that. For in the intellectual realm we have the first manifestation of true separateness and distinctness, so that οὐσία here may be distinguished from τὸ ἕν. Damascius has just been speaking of ἑτερότης and οὐσία καθαρά as being manifest first in the Intellectual Realm (147, 16ff.) and this doctrine is now attributed to Iamblichus also.

Fr. 3

Here, it seems to me, we have with fair certainty a reference to Iamblichus' *Commentary*, not a very interesting one perhaps, but definite enough at least. For Damascius, this part of the Second Hypothesis describes the Third Noetic Triad (142d 6-142a 3).

We cannot tell from this what Iamblichus' part in this division may have been. All he is credited with here is a formula to explain how each part of τὸ ἓν ὄν is itself ἓν ὄν, since the sort of engendering that takes place in the noetic world does not result in division or separation. Iamblichus may have gone on to expand on this in a distinctive manner, but as it stands it is hard to see why Damascius dragged the great man in at this point.

Damascius is concerned to show that the third element of the noetic world is also ἓν ὄν, but Iamblichus is more likely to have been affirming rather that neither the Oneness nor the Being which the One-Being transmits to the noetic realm in general should be conceived of as being solely itself to the exclusion of the other, there being no separation as we understand it in the noetic world.

Fr. 4

Here we have the record of an exegesis by Iamblichus of a detail of the Platonic text. In Damascius, it comes as the ninth of a series of ten detailed comments on the *lexis* of the passage 143a 4-144b 8, which largely covers what Damascius took to be Plato's description of the summit (ἀκρότης) of the noetic-noeric realm. Sections 191-229 have been taken up with the *theoria* of this passage, and this is followed by this series of comments on the text. Only in the present passage, section 238, does Damascius quote any authorities, and here we get a pleasing sequence, Porphyry—Iamblichus—Syrianus, though in a somewhat confused form.

Porphyry is being somewhat unsubtle in his interpretation, as often, giving what we would regard as the obvious explanation of the phrase ἕν γέ τι. Iamblichus and Syrianus do not appear to be in conflict. Presumably Syrianus was quoting both Porphyry and Iamblichus, and perhaps Proclus was quoting Syrianus. If so, Proclus changed his policy on quoting once he got past the First Hypothesis. The alternative is that Damascius had independent access to these earlier authorities, and since Damascius shows much other evidence earlier of a knowledge of Iamblichus independent of Proclus, this is not difficult to assume here.

The philosophical content consists merely of the principle, elsewhere employed, that every form has both an unparticipated and a participated moment. This is used here to give a fanciful explanation of the τὶ of ἕν γέ τι.

Fr. 5

The two parts making up this testimony are separated in Damascius' *Commentary*, being embedded respectively in the replies to the eighth and thirteenth *aporiai* on the First Noeric Order (*Parm.* 145 bc-e 6). The eighth is 'What is the proof of the statement 'in another', and how is it to be truly interpreted?' (130, 19-20); the thirteenth I have included in the text, as the second passage is hardly comprehensible without it. The first passage, one might say, is hardly comprehensible as it stands, but the inclusion of the original *aporia* would not help matters much in this case. I put the passages together, as I am maintaining the position that Iamblichus wrote his commentary in a 'Procline' manner, as opposed to an 'Olympiodorean', and that thus all his comments on one passage will be in one place, though perhaps divided into discussion of *theoria* and *lexis*.

There is, perhaps, a trace of such a division here. First, a discussion of how ὁ ὅλος νοῦς can be said to be both in itself and in another; then, the question as to what οὕτως ἔχον of 145b 6 refers to. Is it to the conclusion of the μέση τάξις of the noetic-noeric realm (τὸ ἓν ἄρα ὂν ἕν τέ ἐστί που καὶ πολλά, καὶ ὅλον καὶ μόρια, καὶ πεπερασμένον καὶ ἄπειρον πλήθει (145a 2-3)), or to that of the τρίτη τάξις of that realm (καὶ σχήματος δή τινος, ὡς ἔοικε, τοιοῦτον ὂν μετέχοι ἂν τὸ ἕν, ἤτοι εὐθέος ἢ στρογγύλου ἤ τινος μεικτοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν (145b 3-5)), and if the former, why not the latter, which is, after all, τὸ προσεχὲς συμπέρασμα?

It sounds to me as if Iamblichus, at any rate, is discussing here the Demiurgic Intellect, in which he held that the forms *as forms* resided. This Intellect splits itself up in extending to what is below and must partake of it, but gathers itself together again continually in returning upon itself. We must resolutely divest ourselves of Damascius' more elaborate schematisation if we are to recover Iamblichus' interpretation.

He could, for instance, perfectly well posit and solve the *aporia* presented here in the second passage without holding that 144e 3-145a 3 described the order of συνοχεῖς and 145a 4-b 5 the order of τελετάρχαι. We note Damascius assiduously 'strengthening' Iamblichus' argument in l. 21 by including a reference to these. Plainly Iamblichus made no such reference. His problem is simply that οὕτως ἔχον should naturally refer to the immediately preceding

conclusion, and this it at first sight does not seem to do. Iamblichus' reaction was simply to look more closely, until it seemed to fit *both* previous conclusions equally well.

The whole continuation from ἔτι δέ . . . (l. 27) might be taken as simply Damascius' contribution, were it not for the fact that he ends his account of the ways in which this order is related to its priors by a respectful reference to Iamblichus ('οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσαν ἀντίθεσιν εἰς μίαν συνάγει νόησιν ὁ μέγας Ἰάμβλιχος') which seems to refer not just to the immediately previous point, but to the whole previous exposition. I take it as *substantially* Iamblichean.

Two qualities of the Demiurgic Intellect, τὸ αὐτοπερίγραφον and τὸ τέλειον, are to be derived from the immediately previous conclusion on the σχῆμα of the One. In connexion with τὸ αὐτοπερίγραφον, (a term not found before Damascius) we may, I think, salvage the substance, at least, of Iamblichus' discussion of 145b 3-5, relayed in Damascius' ch. 261, II 127, 3-17. This passage is an exposition of the theological significance of the various basic geometrical figures, all of which unite in the Demiurgic Intellect, and each of which represents some god. 'The Pythagoreans', and in particular *Philolaus*, are heavily relied on. Although Damascius is theoretically capable of having adduced these references himself, it is much more likely that they descended to him, mediately or immediately, from Iamblichus.

Fr. 6

The problem here is how we are to reconcile the statement that the One is 'in itself' and 'in another' with the present statement that 'the Whole is not in the Parts, neither in all nor in any one'. Iamblichus' solution seems to be as follows:

(1) In the noetic realm, all things are in all things. Even in the case of number, of a group of twelve gods, each individual god is just as much a twelve as is the whole group. (This is an interesting interpretation of what an οὐσιώδης ἀριθμός is).

(2) However, in the case of the Demiurge, in one aspect he is ἐν ἄλλῳ, as being distinct from his 'parts', the entities which participate him, whereas he is also present to the parts, as exercising πρόνοια over them—a πρόνοια to which are attached some Iamblichean-sounding epithets, ἀπερίγραφος, ἀμέριστος, ἐξῃρημένη. The last two at least are certainly Iamblichean, if we may judge from

the *Timaeus Commentary* (see *Index verborum*). For ἀπερίγραφος Iamblichus actually seems to use ἀπερίληπτος: *In Nic.* p. 6, 10 Pistelli = *VP* p. 90, 5 Deubner; *De Myst.* I 9 : 30.

How far the exegesis of Iamblichus in fact extends is not entirely clear. All the rest of Damascius' section seems to be a continuous exposition, so I include it, as conveying the substance of what Iamblichus said. There are, however, contributions by Damascius, particularly the final section (καὶ μήποτε . . . ὁ ἅπαξ ἐπέκεινα)—unless Damascius is simply remembering at the last moment to include another point made by Iamblichus.

I fail to see why Ruelle preserves a garbled version of the Parmenides quotation 'πᾶν ἔμπλεον ἐόντος' (l. 8). Since Damascius, or Iamblichus, comments 'καὶ λέγει 'πᾶν' καλῶς', he must surely have quoted it correctly, with πᾶν. Ruelle was, to say the least, excessively cautious, here as elsewhere.

Fr. 6A

The status of this as a fragment is doubtful, but it contains some points of interest, and could refer to a discussion of the Demiurge by Iamblichus at approximately this point in his Commentary, so I am content to give it a provisional home.

We may note first the declared debt of Syrianus to Iamblichus, and the implication here that Damascius has access to a commentary by Syrianus, rather than one by Iamblichus himself. The νῦν does seem to imply that Damascius has before him a text, presumably a Commentary by Syrianus on this part of the *Parmenides*, which he is consulting as he writes. (It is *possible* also that the αὐτός refers, as so often elsewhere, to Proclus, but the existing portion of his Commentary does not make it likely that he made such personal comments, and the αὐτός in this context would then be quite ambiguous).

We hear of Iamblichus' views on the relation of the γένη τοῦ ὄντος to the Demiurge also in Fr. 34 of the *Timaeus Commentary*, where the Demiurge is said to embrace within himself 'τὴν ὄντως οὐσίαν καὶ τῶν γιγνομένων ἀρχὴν καὶ τὰ νοητὰ τοῦ κόσμου παραδείγματα'. Again, in Fr. 29 of that commentary, we learn that τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν, which is for him the monad of the noetic world, is κρεῖττον καὶ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος καὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν.

The metaphysics of the *Timaeus Commentary*, so far as that can

be discerned, is by no means as elaborate as that laid out by Damascius in *Dub. et Sol.*, so that we may conclude that if the Ideas are not in τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν, they must be found in the Demiurge, since Iamblichus seems from *In Tim.* Fr. 34 to be regarding the Demiurge as comprising the whole noetic realm. From *In Phileb.* Fr. 4 we may further learn that in the first element of the noetic triad, τὸ ὄν or ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς, we find only the monads of the forms; the second element, ζωή, gives the forms life, but only in the third, the Demiurgic Intellect, do the forms receive distinct existence as forms.

Fr. 7

In Damascius' (and Proclus') arrangement, we have now reached (145e 7-146a 8) ἡ μέση τῶν νοερῶν τάξις, which is characterised by the thesis that the One must be both in motion and at rest. The point made here by Iamblichus is the first of seven given by Damascius as to why motion and rest are posterior to being in oneself and in another. He may be responsible for more of them, but this is all he is credited with.

The fact that Iamblichus is quoted here does not imply that he was following the same elaborate scheme as the Athenian School, any more than do his comments recorded in Fr. 5. He was simply interested in explaining the logical correctness of the order of Plato's argument. There is another reference to Iamblichus' view in ch. 365, p. 219, 13ff.: ἀλλ' ἔοικεν καὶ τοῦτο ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἥκειν εἰς αὐτούς· τὸ δὲ ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος εἰς τὸν νοητὸν ἀνήνεγκε τόπον, καὶ ὅλως τὰ ὀνόματα μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τόπων ἐλήφθη.

In this case the subject of discussion is the mention of ἕδρα and χώρα in 148E, but the reference to Iamblichus seems to be to his principle enunciated in this connexion.

Fr. 8

It is not, unfortunately, absolutely clear from Damascius' language that Iamblichus actually dealt with this question—namely, why Plato feels that he can slip in ἀεί in the conclusion of his syllogism about Motion and Rest, without it having been proved in the premises. Damascius only says that one should follow the example of Iamblichus, as for instance exemplified in the exegesis

of *Parm.* 145B (II 147, 22f. = Fr. 5), where Iamblichus 'πᾶσαν ἀντίθεσιν εἰς μίαν συνάγει νόησιν'. But on the other hand, it seems equally reasonable that Iamblichus should have followed his own principle here also.

We would not, I think, attach any particular significance to the introduction of ἀεί in this argument. The ἀεί is actually introduced at 146A 3 'τὸ δέ γε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀεὶ ὄν', and then repeated in the next line, 'τὸ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἀεὶ ὄν' and I might have included these in the lemma, but it is really the conclusion which Damascius at least is discussing, and it is there that the use of ἀεί becomes obtrusive. At no stage, certainly, is its insertion separately argued for, and it is thus ἀναπόδεικτον.

I have had silently to correct Ruelle's punctuation at various points, in order to make sense of the argument. What Ruelle thought was being said is not easy to discern. I take the whole argument, which is continuous, as being substantially Iamblichean, and feel that this is what Damascius is in fact revealing to us by his reference. The point, then, which Iamblichus is making will be that the concepts of motion and rest are inextricably involved with one another, and it is this of which Plato is reminding us by his introduction of ἀεί.

l. 5. ἐν παρατάσει. This term requires some comment. I take it here as signifying 'extension in time', or indeed 'co-extension'. In translating this passage we are at a disadvantage in English, since ἀεί means not just 'always' but 'continually', and Iamblichus seems to be making use of both meanings in his exegesis. Therefore, both co-extensively and *in turn*, Motion and Rest involve each other, in two ways:

(1) The beginning of motion involves the cessation of rest, and *vice versa*, (Ruelle leaves this first point in chaos, which Chaignet politely corrects in his translation).

(2) 'Being permanently in motion' involves *remaining* ('resting') in motion, and Rest involves *being extended* ('moving in Time') in immobility.

This latter notion is developed by an explanation which involves an idea of a tension between the two opposites. Motion will not permit Rest to 'drop off to sleep', (to decline into nothingness?), and Rest will not permit Motion to 'become beside itself' (to disintegrate into nothingness?).

This, then, would be a good example of Iamblichus' alleged method of 'uniting antitheses into one comprehensive concept', and I am therefore all the more inclined to believe that this exegesis is essentially his.

Fr. 9

The *aporia* here is whether Plato intends the whole-part relation to be an *additional* distinction to the same-different relation, or simply an elaboration of it.

From Damascius' discussion (180, 3ff.) we learn that this question had exercised οἱ παλαιοί (l. 6), so Iamblichus inherited the question. It may seem to us that Plato is here distinguishing between a 'horizontal' relation and a 'vertical' one, but the question still remained, 'Are not wholes and parts in some way at least the same as and different from each other?'

Iamblichus' solution is to say that there is only one real distinction being made, that between sameness and difference, and the distinction between whole and part is merely supplementary (that must be the meaning of ἐξ ὑποθέσεως here, i.e. 'derived from the basic distinction'). We must take sameness and difference not as absolute categories, but as admitting variations in degree (πῇ). Once that is assumed, then wholes and parts can be seen to be merely aspects of sameness and difference.

I am inclined to see the origin of this whole discussion in an eristic *aporia,* on the lines of 'Is not Plato simply repeating himself here?'

Damascius himself (181, 19ff.) does not agree with Iamblichus that the whole-part distinction is simply ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, in view of Plato's use of the additional specification 'πρὸς ὃ οὕτως ἔχει. He prefers to take whole and part as 'τινὰ φύσιν ἴδιον τῶν πρός τι'.

Fr. 10

It is clear here, at least, that we have a record of a comment by Iamblichus, and it is fairly clear also on what passage it is a comment. Once again it is interesting to observe what apparently insignificant details caught the eye, and exercised the ingenuity, of the Neoplatonic commentator. Plato has mentioned the One's Otherness from the Others (146D 4) prior to mentioning its Sameness with the Others (147B 5ff.), and this is cause for comment

and explanation, since Sameness is generally reckoned prior to Otherness, and thus should properly be dealt with first.

The ἑτερότης of the Demiurgic Intellect does represent its higher aspect, according to which it transcends its productions, whereas its ταὐτότης represents its lower aspect, its immanence in matter, or the Others. We note also that, although Sameness and Otherness towards the Others derive from Sameness and Otherness towards itself, one may also say that Otherness from the Others involves greater self-involvement, and vice versa.

Fr. 11

This discussion comes, in Damascius, under the heading ἀνάπτυξις τῶν συλλογισμῶν, which is an analysis of the four syllogistic arguments contained in the passage 146B 5-147B8. Iamblichus is quoted on the first one, which I accordingly give as the lemma.

The problem is how Parmenides can at this stage of his exposition deny attributes like whole and part to the One, which at this level is to be regarded as the Demiurgic Intellect. This One, says Damascius (186, 21), must be considered to be πλῆρες τῶν προαποδεδειγμένων, filled with the attributes previously demonstrated as belonging to it. Where, then, does that leave 'whole and part'?

Iamblichus is ready with an ingenious scholastic explanation, which, however, does not satisfy Damascius, who has another theory which need not concern us.

Iamblichus is quoted later on in the discussion (187, 17-18 καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀντίθεσις τοῦ ἑνὸς ἦν, καὶ ἦν τὰ δύο ἦν, ὡς ἐνόει ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος), but I am afraid that I can make nothing of it. It seems a general remark, however.

Fr. 12

Damascius seems here excessively polite. One wonders what other ancient exegeses he found *less* persuasive. As has been pointed out in the commentary to Fr. 2, Iamblichus was alone in making this identification, and persuaded none of his successors. He also involved himself in difficulties which required all his ingenuity to escape from (See Fr. 13 and Comm.).

Damascius' reference to the *Symposium* may reflect the fact that Iamblichus quoted that dialogue to support his case. Certainly

the famous passage on the intermediary position of daemons (202E) would seem to demand a special status for beings of this rank between gods and souls. No Neoplatonist would, of course, deny the intermediate status of daemons, but there were grave difficulties, as we can see e.g. from Fr. 13, in the way of placing the daemons, or τὰ κρείττονα γένη generally, in the Third Hypothesis, whereas it seemed eminently suitable to the description of Soul.

Fr. 13

This is a most difficult passage for anyone to explain away who, like Iamblichus, insisted on taking the Third Hypothesis as concerning, not Soul, but τὰ κρείττονα γένη, (angels, daemons and heroes), who are *always* in attendance on the gods. Here, in 155E, there is talk of 'participating at one time and not participating at another'. Damascius is respectful to Iamblichus, as always (he even concedes that the superior classes may experience descent and ascent in some form), but he makes it clear that the evidence militates against Iamblichus' view.

It is not easy to see what sort of κάθοδοι and ἄνοδοι Iamblichus had in mind for the 'superior classes'. We may think, however, of *Timaeus* 41A 'καὶ ὅσοι φαίνονται θεοὶ καθ' ὅσον ἂν ἐθέλωσι', which, on the Neoplatonic interpretation (cf. Procl. *In Tim.* III 194ff.), described the 'gods' below the moon who administer the realm of Generation (τῶν κατευθυνόντων τὴν γένεσιν θεῶν, *ibid.*, 196, 11). These are referred to as *gods*, because Plato has so referred to them, but they are necessarily of an inferior rank, and little different, surely, from the angels, daemons and heroes whom Proclus describes them (*ibid.*, ll. 30-1) as directing. I feel that what is said of them by Proclus (probably following Iamblichus, whom he quotes just subsequently, 197, 12) may equally well be said of their helpers, that in spite of their descent they are ἀμιγεῖς πρὸς τὴν ὕλην (196, 25).

I suggest, then, that this is what Iamblichus had in mind as the κάθοδος proper to the κρείττονα γένη, and that since such a descent did not involve contamination with matter, it therefore involved no real separation from the intelligible realm.

And in this way an experienced scholastic mind disposes of an apparent difficulty such as that posed in this lemma.

Fr. 14

This is a fine scholastic mare's nest. What has given rise to it is this: Plato has devoted *Hypothesis* V (159B 2-160B 4) to demonstrating that, if the Others are totally separate from the One, then nothing can be predicated of them. But he ends, strangely, with a conclusion that refers only to the One: "Thus, if there is a One, the One is both all things and nothing whatsoever, alike with reference to itself and to the Others". (Cornford's trans.).

Modern scholars have also observed the peculiarity of this, and indeed Heindorf emended the end of the sentence to read . . . καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα, <καὶ τὰ ἄλλα>ὡσαύτως, ". . . to the Others, *and the same is true of the Others*" which would be a plausible emendation, were it not for the fact that no other Hypothesis draws conclusions for both the One and the Others. The problem here is that the conclusions should have been drawn for the Others, not for the One. Such a solution, however, was beyond the range of Neoplatonic scholarship, so that a reason had to be concocted as to why the results for the Others receive no mention.

Proclus'[1] explanation, it seems, is that Hyp. V describes a non-composite entity, to wit, Pure Matter, and that thus a combination of conclusions would be suitable, but the discussion of composite entities is not proper to this dialogue, since this dialogue is about principles, and no composite entity can be a principle. This seems like a direct criticism of Iamblichus, whom Proclus has previously criticised in his review of past opinions on the subjects of the Hypotheses in *In Parm.* Book VI (1055, 23ff.): πρόσεστι δὲ καὶ τούτοις ἀποτελέσματα παραλαμβάνειν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀρχὰς ἐν ταῖς τελευταίαις ὑποθέσεσι. Cf. also Comm. *ad* Fr. 2.

Here, on the other hand, Damascius brings on Iamblichus to counter Proclus. The principle quoted is a general one, however, and must be taken from Iamblichus' arguments in defence of his identifications of the subjects of Hyps. VIII and IX, rather than from any comment on this passage. But we might speculate as to what might have been Iamblichus' answer to this *aporia*, if indeed he posed himself the question. Perhaps that of Damascius (286, 29ff.), that Parmenides will state these consequences in the next Hypothesis, and does not want to repeat himself:

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[1] Assuming αὐτός to refer to Proclus, as it normally does in this work.

ἵνα οὖν μὴ διλογῇ, παρῆκεν νῦν ταῦτα· ἀποδώσει δὲ αὐτὰ ἐφεξῆς τὴν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸ ἓν διαίρεσιν ἐνστησάμενος· ὥστε κατὰ μὲν τὴν μέθοδον διπλασιαστέον τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐκεῖ ὄντα καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὀφείλοντα· κατὰ δὲ τὰ πράγματα ἅπαξ ἔδει τεθῆναι ὥσπερ καὶ ἐτέθη ὅπου αὐτὰ ἡ τοῦ συνθέτου μετήγαγεν φύσις εἰς τὴν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἑνὸς διαίρεσιν. καὶ γὰρ φαίνεται ὁ Παρμενίδης τῶν πραγμάτων μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς μεθόδου ἐχόμενος.

The notion that the Parmenides of this dialogue was more concerned with τὰ πράγματα than with the μέθοδος is bizarre, but a possible reflection for a scholastic of Damascius' calibre.

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APPENDIX A

Iamblichus' Theory of Prayer

After his summary of Porphyry's views on prayer, (*In Tim.* I 207, 23-209, 1), Proclus reports Iamblichus' criticism of Porphyry, and then adds:

παραδίδωσι δὲ τήν τε δύναμιν τῆς εὐχῆς καὶ τὴν τελειότητα θαυμαστήν τινα καὶ ὑπερφυῆ καὶ πᾶσαν ὑπεραίρουσαν ἐλπίδα. προσήκει δὲ ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὸ συνηθέστερον τοῖς ἀκούουσι καὶ γνωριμώτερον τὸν λόγον μεταγαγόντας τήν τε ἐκείνου σαφῆ ποιῆσαι διάνοιαν καὶ τῷ Πλάτωνι συμφώνους ἀποδοῦναι τοὺς περὶ εὐχῆς λόγους.

which I translate as:

"And he describes the power of prayer, and the perfection (to be attained), marvellous as it is and remarkable and exceeding all anticipation. But it would be well for me to translate his account into terms more familiar and better known to my hearers, and to make the meaning of the writer clear and to expound (his) theory of prayer so that it is concordant with that of Plato."

It might have been grammatically possible for ἐκείνου to refer back to Porphyry, but only if there had been a part of οὗτος to balance it, referring to Iamblichus. As it is, the ἐκεῖνου is contrasted with τῷ Πλάτωνι in the next phrase, and must refer to Iamblichus.

Proclus declares a double aim: (1) to present the theory of Iamblichus on prayer in terms familiar τοῖς ἀκούουσι, presumably the students in the Academy, and (2) to bring Iamblichus into accordance with Platonic theory.[1] In view of this statement of intention I wish first to examine Iamblichus' doctrine as stated in Book V of the *De Mysteriis* (ch. 26: 237-240), and then to analyse Proclus' 'μεταγωγή', in the hope of finding common features.

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[1] τῷ Πλάτωνι . . . λόγους *could* be taken as 'expound a theory of prayer concordant with that of Plato', but there is no sign of a break in exposition (until 213, 8), and I feel that Proclus would in that case have said, e.g. λόγους περὶ εὐχῆς ἀ. τῷ Π. συμφώνους.

Iamblichus is discussing prayer in connexion with sacrifices. The first relevant passage is as follows:

φημὶ δὴ οὖν ὡς τὸ μὲν πρῶτον τῆς εὐχῆς εἶδός ἐστι συναγωγόν συναφῆς τε τῆς πρὸς τὸ θεῖον καὶ γνωρίσεως ἐξηγούμενον· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ κοινωνίας ὁμονοητικῆς συνδετικόν, δόσεις τε προκαλούμενον τὰς ἐκ θεῶν καταπεμπομένας πρὸ τοῦ λόγου, καὶ πρὸ τοῦ νοῆσαι τὰ ὅλα ἔργα ἐπιτελούσας· τὸ δὲ τελεώτατον αὐτῆς ἡ ἄρρητος ἕνωσις ἐπισφραγίζεται, τὸ πᾶν κῦρος ἐνιδρύουσα τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ τελέως ἐν αὐτοῖς κεῖσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν παρέχουσα.

Iamblichus here distinguishes three classes of prayer, in ascending order of perfection, the first being συναγωγόν, leading to union with the divine and cognition thereof, the second συνδετικόν, linking us with the divine by sympathetic association, calling forth gifts sent by the gods even before we express our requests, the third being ἡ ἄρρητος ἕνωσις, unity beyond expression, establishing all power in the gods, and providing that our souls rest completely in them.

He characterises these three stages just after this (238, 10ff.) as 'τὸ μὲν εἰς ἐπίλαμψιν τεῖνον, τὸ δὲ εἰς κοινὴν ἀπεργασίαν, τὸ δὲ εἰς τὴν τέλεαν ἀποπλήρωσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ πυρός'.

If we turn now to Proclus's account, even allowing for differences in Iamblichus' presentation in his *Timaeus* commentary, the prospect is not initially encouraging. The efficacy of prayer is based on the premise that all things are ἔκγονα θεῶν (this extends, as we see later, to inanimate objects, which also pray after their fashion). All things proceed from the gods, but yet all things remain in them. 'οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἀφέστηκε τὸ θεῖον, ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν ἐξ ἴσου πάρεστι', 'προῆλθε πάντα καὶ οὐ προῆλθεν'. As all things experience πρόοδος, they also experience ἐπιστροφή (I 210, 2ff.), even τὰ ἄψυχα, which have συμπάθεια to various σειραί of gods, and to this ἐπιστροφή much is contributed by prayer (210, 30ff.) which, by means of σύμβολα ἄρρητα, draws down the beneficence of the gods towards the suppliant and unites him with them (ἑνοῦσα and συνάπτουσα) and rouses the will of those who encompass in themselves perfectly all goods to the ungrudging sharing of them, πειθοῦς τε οὖσα τῆς θείας δημιουργὸς καὶ ὅλα τὰ ἡμέτερα τοῖς θεοῖς ἐνιδρύουσα.

The Proclus account begins on a different tack, but it can be seen that the same ideas and phrases are beginning to recur.

We now (211, 7ff.) find a three-fold division of prayer:

(1) ἡγεῖται δὲ τῆς τελείας καὶ ὄντως οὔσης εὐχῆς πρῶτον ἡ γνῶσις τῶν θείων τάξεων πασῶν, αἷς πρόσεισιν ὁ εὐχόμενος· οὐ γὰρ ἂν οἰκείως προσέλθοι μὴ τὰς ἰδιότητας αὐτῶν ἐγνωκώς. διὸ καὶ τὸ λόγιον 'τὴν πυριθαλπῆ ἔννοιαν' πρωτίστην ἔχειν τάξιν ἐν τῇ ἱερᾷ θρησκείᾳ παρεκελεύσατο.

The first type of prayer is γνῶσις τῶν θεῶν τάξεων πασῶν, for which the suppliant, to approach them properly, must know their ἰδιότητες, and for this the Oracle recommends ἡ πυριθαλπὴς ἔννοια. Whether it is Proclus or Iamblichus who quotes the Oracle I leave aside for the moment, merely noting the fire-imagery. The phraseology does not match the *De Mysteriis* very well, but it is plainly enough the same class of prayer. It is concerned with approach (συναγωγός), and productive of γνῶσις/γνώρισις.

(2) δεύτερα δὲ μετὰ ταύτην ἡ οἰκείωσις κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ὁμοίωσιν ἡμῶν τῆς συμπάσης καθαρότητος, ἁγνείας, παιδείας, τάξεως, δι' ἧς τὰ ἡμέτερα προσάγομεν τοῖς θεοῖς, ἕλκοντες τὴν ἀπ' αὐτῶν εὐμένειαν καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν ὑποκατακλίνοντες αὐτοῖς.

Again, the same level of prayer is being described, but the terms are different. Nevertheless οἰκείωσις [1] and κοινωνία express the same idea. The *De Mysteriis* stresses the efficacy of this level of prayer in obtaining δόσεις through κοινωνία, while the Proclus 'translation' lays emphasis on ὁμοίωσις πρὸς τὸ θεῖον in the matter of καθαρότης, ἁγνεία, παιδεία and τάξις. We do, however, draw down their εὐμένεια, which does lead to δόσεις.

Also, a little further on, the *De Mysteriis* passage speaks of prayer, or of διατριβή in prayers, as follows (239):

"... τὰ μὲν ἡμέτερα τῆς διανοίας ἤθη ἠρέμα ἀνέλκει, τὰ δὲ τῶν θεῶν ἡμῖν ἐκδίδωσι, πειθὼ δὲ καὶ κοινωνίαν καὶ φιλίαν ἀδιάλυτον ἐγείρει, τόν τε θεῖον ἔρωτα συναύξει, καὶ τὸ θεῖον τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνάπτει, ἀποκαθαίρει τε πᾶν τὸ ἐναντίον τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ἀπορρίπτει τοῦ αἰθεριώδους καὶ αὐγοειδοῦς πνεύματος περὶ αὐτὴν ὅσον ἐστὶ γενεσιουργόν, ἐλπίδα τε ἀγαθὴν καὶ τὴν περὶ τὸ φῶς πίστιν τελειοῖ, καὶ τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν, ὁμιλητὰς τῶν θεῶν, ἵνα οὕτως εἴπωμεν τοὺς χρωμένους αὐταῖς ἀπεργάζεται."

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[1] Cf. also *De Myst.* 239, 18—ἐπειδὴ δι' ἔργων οἰκειοῦται τοῖς θεοῖς.

I quote this whole passage in order to connect it in turn with further passages of Proclus. What concerns us immediately is the reference to 'drawing' (though in this case we are being 'drawn' up, rather than the gods down) and to purification (ἀποκαθαίρει). παιδεία is not mentioned, nor τάξις, although these terms probably refer to the knowledge of the *right* prayers to address to the *right* deities (τάξις τῶν θείων ἔργων, 212, 19), and so are substantially involved in κοινὴ ἀπεργασία (*De Myst.* 238, 10).

However, we see in this passage an appearance of a triad ἔρως—ἐλπίς—πίστις, which is close to that of the Chaldaean Oracles,[1] with which we may compare Pr. 212, 19ff., where the triad appears in its correct form:

καὶ τὴν τάξιν τῶν θείων ἔργων ἀσάλευτον φυλάττειν ἀρετάς τε ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως καθαρτικὰς καὶ ἀναγωγοὺς προβεβλῆσθαι καὶ πίστιν καὶ ἀλήθειαν καὶ ἔρωτα, ταύτην ἐκείνην τὴν τριάδα, καὶ ἐλπίδα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄτρεπτόν τε ὑποδοχὴν τοῦ θείου φωτὸς καὶ ἔκστασιν ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων.

With these last phrases we may in turn compare *De Myst.* 238, 17ff. 'τὴν δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ὑποδοχὴν τῶν θεῶν ποιεῖ λίαν εὐρυτέραν, ἀνοίγει δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὰ τῶν θεῶν, συνήθειαν δὲ παρέχει πρὸς τὰς τοῦ φῶτος μαρμαρυγάς.'

But we have been deflected from the examination of the second stage of prayer. To summarise, in the *De Mysteriis* it unites us with gods in a working relationship, with a view to benefits from them (κοινωνίας ὁμονοητικῆς συνδετικόν, εἰς κοινὴν ἀπεργασίαν τεῖνον) in Proclus it makes us like the divine in purity, education and a sense of order, but also attracts divine εὐμένεια towards our problems.

(3) The third and highest degree of prayer in the *De Myst.* (238, 3ff.) involves ἡ ἄρρητος ἕνωσις, τὸ πᾶν κῦρος ἐνιδρύουσα τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ τελέως ἐν αὐτοῖς κεῖσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν παρέχουσα. It is leads to τὴν τελείαν ἀποπλήρωσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ πυρός (238, 11).

For Proclus the highest degree is (211, 24) ἡ ἕνωσις, αὐτῷ τῷ ἑνὶ τῶν θεῶν τὸ ἓν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνιδρύουσα καὶ μίαν ἐνέργειαν ἡμῶν τε ποιοῦσα καὶ τῶν θεῶν, καθ' ἣν οὐδὲ ἑαυτῶν ἐσμεν, ἀλλὰ τῶν θεῶν, ἐν τῷ θείῳ φωτὶ μένοντες καὶ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ κύκλῳ περιεχόμενοι.

[1] Psellus, *Hypotyposis*, p. 74, 28 Kroll, p. 199 Des Places.

Here the correspondence is fairly exact, Proclus's main contribution being a development of the idea of ἕνωσις of the One of the Soul with the One in the gods (we may note that the actual phrase ἄρρητος ἕνωσις occurs in Pr. 213, 14). What may we conclude from this survey? The language is by no means identical, but the same scheme seems to be employed in both passages. Much of the variation may be due to Proclus' process of 'translation', which would bode ill for hopes of verbal accuracy in his other Iamblichus references, but it may also be due to the fact that Iamblichus himself phrased and arranged his doctrine differently in different places. In the *De Mysteriis*, after all, he is talking of prayer as a complement to sacrifice. The whole tone of *In Tim.* I 209, 13-212, 28, however, agrees very well with that of *De Myst.* V 26. The doctrine of the three stages of prayer does seem to be an Iamblichean invention.[1] I am inclined then, to take the whole *In Tim.* passage as broadly Iamblichean, but I have not thought fit to include it formally as a fragment.

I will conclude with a further statement of Iamblichus on Prayer, from *De Myst.* I 15:46, which also fits well with the present passage (esp. *In Tim.* I 211, 24ff.). (Porphyry has just been wondering whether it is worth while praying to 'pure intellects'):

ἐγὼ δ' οὐδ' ἄλλοις τισὶν ἡγοῦμαι δεῖν εὔχεσθαι. τὸ γὰρ θεῖον ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ νοερὸν καὶ ἕν, ἢ εἰ νοητὸν αὐτὸ καλεῖν ἐθέλοις, ἐγείρεται τότε ἐναργῶς ἐν ταῖς εὐχαῖς, ἐγειρόμενον δὲ ἐφίεται τοῦ ὁμοίου διαφερόντως καὶ συνάπτεται πρὸς αὐτοτελειότητα . . . οὔτε δὴν οὖν διὰ δυνάμεων οὔτε δι' ὀργάνων εἰσδέχονται εἰς ἑαυτοὺς οἱ θεοὶ τὰς εὐχάς, ἐν ἑαυτοῖς δὲ περιέχουσι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰς ἐνεργείας τῶν λόγων, καὶ μάλιστα ἐκείνων οἵτινες διὰ τῆς ἱερᾶς ἁγιστείας ἐνιδρυμένοι τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ συνηνωμένοι τυγχάνουσιν· ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ τηνικαῦτα αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον πρὸς ἑαυτὸ σύνεστι, καὶ οὐδ' ὡς ἕτερον κοινωνεῖ τῶν ἐν ταῖς εὐχαῖς νοήσεων.

This last sentence in particular expresses very well Iamblichus' view that the highest form of prayer unites τὸ θεῖον in us with τὸ θεῖον itself, and that this highest form of prayer can only be reached by performance of the proper ritual acts (ἁγιστεία).

[1] If, indeed, it is not Chaldaean. But we have no secure evidence on this point.

APPENDIX B

Iamblichus and the Origin of the Doctrine of Henads [1]

E. R. Dodds, in his great edition of Proclus' *Elements of Theology*,[2] devotes some pages of his commentary (pp. 257-260) to a discussion of the origin of the doctrine of divine henads, and their identification with the traditional gods. He traces this doctrine to Syrianus. Later, in the *Addenda and Corrigenda* (p. 346), he correctly retracts one point in his argument, observing that Syrianus cannot be referred to by Proclus at *In Parm.* 1066, 21 *Cousin*, as τινὲς τῶν ἡμῖν αἰδοίων, since he places the gods in the Second Hypothesis of the *Parmenides*, whereas the figure or figures referred to there place them in the First. At this point he gives up, merely noting that the doctrine of henads must be earlier than Syrianus.

It seems to me that by a somewhat closer examination of the existing evidence we can come to a more definite conclusion than this, and in fact attribute the origin of the doctrine with virtual certainty to Iamblichus.

Proclus, in Book VI of his *Commentary on the Parmenides* (1054, 34ff. Cousin), sets out what can be identified with certainty, on the basis of a scholium and correspondences in Damascius, *Dubitationes et Solutiones*, as the view of Iamblichus as to the subject matters of the various Hypotheses.[3] His account of the first one is as follows:

Οἱ δὲ μετὰ τούτους κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον εἰσάγοντες τὰ ὄντα, τὴν μὲν πρώτην λέγοντες εἶναι περὶ θεοῦ καὶ θεῶν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον περὶ τοῦ ἑνός, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ πασῶν τῶν θείων ἑνάδων αὐτὴν ποιεῖσθαι τὸν λόγον.

It might be doubted here whether the amplification mentioning the 'divine henads' is Iamblichean or due to Proclus. Regarded by itself, all this testimony can be taken to affirm with certainty is that Iamblichus took the First Hypothesis to concern not only

[1] This appendix has appeared separately, as an article in *Phronesis* XVII: 2, 1972.

[2] Oxford 2nd Ed. 1963.

[3] See the excellent survey in the Introduction to the Budé edition of Proclus' *Platonic Theology*. (edd. Saffrey and Westerink, Vol. I pp. LXXV-LXXXIX).

God (that is, ὁ πρώτιστος θεός, which Porphyry had made the subject of it—1053, 40 Cousin), but the gods in general. Even if we confine ourselves to this passage alone, however, the question still arises as to what status Iamblichus envisaged for this multiplicity of gods. Would they not inevitably be 'henads', in the sense in which the term was later understood?

But we do not in fact have to confine ourselves to this passage. Later, at *In Parm.* 1066, 16ff., we find the following passage, which seems to me to refer inevitably to Iamblichus:

Ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, εἴπερ μόνον καὶ ἅπαν τὸ θεῖον ὑπὲρ οὐσίαν ἐστίν, ἢ περὶ τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ μόνον εἶναι τὸν παρόντα λόγον, ὃς δὴ μόνος ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ οὐσίαν, ἢ περὶ πάντων θεῶν καὶ τῶν μετ' ἐκεῖνον, ὥσπερ ἀξιοῦσί τινες τῶν ἡμῖν αἰδοίων.

'The present argument' is the First Hypothesis. A phrase such as 'certain of those whom we revere' would have been suitable to Syrianus, as Dodds points out (*loc. cit.*), but for the fact, above mentioned, that Syrianus puts the gods in the Second Hypothesis (*In Parm.* 1061, 33ff.). The phrase must therefore refer to someone else, and only one other philosopher is recorded as explicitly placing the Gods in the First Hypothesis, to wit, Iamblichus.

Proclus continues, presumably now paraphrasing or elaborating on Iamblichus' explanation: (1066, 22ff.):

ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πᾶς θεὸς καθὸ θεὸς ἑνάς ἐστι (τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ πάσης οὐσίας ἐκθεωτικόν, τὸ ἕν), διὰ δὴ τοῦτο συνάπτειν ἀξιοῦσι τῇ περὶ θεοῦ τοῦ πρώτου θεωρίᾳ τὴν περὶ θεῶν ἁπάντων ὑφήγησιν· πάντες γάρ εἰσιν ἑνάδες ὑπερούσιοι, καὶ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ὄντων ὑπερανέχουσαι, καὶ ἀκρότητες τῶν οὐσιῶν.

It was Porphyry, as we have seen, who declared Hyp. I to be about 'the first god', and Iamblichus who chose to add '(all) the gods'. If we consider for a moment how he will have defended his innovation, we must conclude, I think, that it was very much along the lines laid down here by Proclus.

At this point one may suitably introduce a passage of Damascius, *Dub. et Sol.* (ch. 100, I 257, 20ff. Ruelle), where he is contrasting Iamblichus with his predecessors in his treatment of the gods:

Τί δεῖ πολλὰ λέγειν ὅτε καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς οὕτως ὑποτίθενται τοὺς πολλοὺς

οἱ πρὸ Ἰαμβλίχου σχεδόν τι πάντες φιλόσοφοι, ἕνα μὲν εἶναι τὸν ὑπερούσιον θεὸν λέγοντες, τοὺς <δ'> ἄλλους οὐσιώδεις εἶναι, ταῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐλλάμψεσιν ἐκθεουμένους, καὶ εἶναι τὸ τῶν ὑπερουσίων πλῆθος ἑνάδων οὐκ αὐτοτελῶν ὑποστάσεων, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐλλαμπομένων ἀπὸ τοῦ μόνου θεοῦ, καὶ ταῖς οὐσίαις ἐνδιδομένων θεώσεων.

From which we may reasonably conclude that Iamblichus held that the rest of the gods were also 'superessential', that they *were* 'independent hypostases', and that they were *not* simply entities (of a lower order) divinised by the supreme and only God.[1]

It should be plain from this that Iamblichus had worked out at least the substance of the later doctrine of henads. Whether or not he termed these gods 'henads' is less important, but it seems somewhat perverse, in face of these various pieces of evidence, to deny him the term. Iamblichus needed these henads as links between the supreme and ineffable One and his creation. All of his very complicated systematising of the Realm of the One, including his postulating of two Ones (Dam. *Dub. et Sol.* ch. 43, I 86 *Ruelle*), is prompted by the desire to bridge the great gap between a completely transcendent First Principle and everything subsequent to it. He could also defend the introduction of henads on the analogy of the multiplicity of intellects co-existing with Intellect itself, and the souls co-existing with Soul, each multiplicity being inferior to its monad, but not being mere ἐλλάμψεις thereof. And this indeed is the argument developed by Damascius throughout ch. 100.

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[1] Of the predecessors of Iamblichus in this context the most distinguished was Plotinus himself. In *Enn.* II 9, 9, for instance, he makes it clear that the Supreme God produces the multiplicity of gods, as emanations of himself. They are in the noetic world; he is above it:

ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἤδη καὶ τοὺς νοητοὺς ὑμνεῖν θεούς, ἐφ' ἅπασι δὲ ἤδη τὸν μέγαν τῶν ἐκεῖ βασιλέα καὶ ἐν τῷ πλήθει μάλιστα τῶν θεῶν τὸ μέγα αὐτοῦ ἐνδεικνύμενον· οὐ γὰρ τὸ συστεῖλαι εἰς ἕν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δεῖξαι πολὺ τὸ θεῖον, ὅσον ἔδειξεν αὐτός, τοῦτό ἐστι δύναμιν θεοῦ εἰδότων, ὅταν μένων ὃς ἔστι πολλοὺς ποιῇ πάντας εἰς αὐτὸν ἀνηρτημένους καὶ δι' ἐκεῖνον καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου ὄντας.

cf. also *Enn.* V 1, 8ff. which points in the same direction. If the Demiurge is in the noetic world, and is represented in Hyp. II of the *Parmenides*, then *a fortiori* so are the gods in general. Plotinus recognises no gods above the Demiurge—only The One.

Porphyry followed Plotinus in all this, as we see from his placing of 'the gods' in the Second Hypothesis, and only the Supreme God in the First. Iamblichus' break with this doctrine is thus of considerable importance.

The henads, which may be equated with the traditional gods on their highest level, are not then simply 'illuminations' of the One, as they were for Plotinus, but they are not to be regarded as properly distinct from it either. Such distinction would be intolerable, after all, in the henadic realm. Sallustius, in ch. 2 of the *De Diis et Mundo*, is probably being Iamblichean when he says of the Gods:

οὐδὲ τῆς πρώτης αἰτίας ἢ ἀλλήλων χωρίζονται, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ νοῦ αἱ νοήσεις οὐδὲ ψυχῆς αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι οὐδὲ ζῴου αἱ αἰσθήσεις.

I do not think that one should necessarily conclude from this, as Dodds does (*op. cit.* p. 259, n. 1), that Sallustius is here representing the Gods as simply Philonic 'powers' of the First Cause; he is simply, I think, using a vivid comparison, perhaps a somewhat unfortunate one, to express an inexpressible relation.

To return to Proclus, he continues to discuss the placing of the other gods in the First Hypothesis until 1071, 8. The criticism he levels against the doctrine is not of a type which he would have used against Syrianus, whom he never disagrees with as directly as this.[1] He firmly rejects the notion, and the reason he gives first is most useful for the understanding of Iamblichus' reason for postulating henads. (1066, 33ff.):

εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν πρώτιστον ἕν, ὡς δοκεῖ που καὶ αὐτοῖς μάλιστα, πάντων μόνως ἐστὶ καὶ ἀσύντακτον πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα καὶ ἀμέθεκτον, φασίν, αὐτὸ ἁρπᾶσαν πρὸς τῶν ὅλων[2], καὶ ἄγνωστον τοῖς πᾶσιν <καὶ> ἐξῃρημένον, ἑκάστη δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἑνάδων μεθεκτή πῶς ἐστι, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἑνὰς ἀλλὰ καὶ πλήθους οἰκείου μετέχουσα, καὶ οὐσίας ἢ νοητῆς ἢ νοερᾶς ἢ ψυχικῆς ἢ καὶ σωματικῆς (μέχρι γὰρ ταύτης προέισιν ἡ μέθεξις), τί χρὴ τὸ μὴ συναριθμούμενον τοῖς οὖσιν ἕν, μηδὲ συνταττόμενον ὅλως τοῖς πολλοῖς, εἰς μίαν ὑπόθεσιν ἀναφέρειν ταῖς μετεχομέναις μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων, συνεκτικαῖς δὲ τῶν πολλῶν ἑνάσιν;

This may be a powerful argument against Iamblichus' doctrine, but it also tells us why he should have wanted to propound it, and what role his henads were to play. It seems from this evidence

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[1] Proclus had enormous respect for Iamblichus, but he nonetheless is prepared to contradict him on occasion, a thing he does not do to Syrianus; e.g. *In Tim.* I 153, 28; 218, 13; II 105, 28; III 247, 27 et al. In all these cases the contradiction is really made by Syrianus; Proclus simply seconds it. In one passage (I 147, 29ff.), Proclus even backs Porphyry against Iamblichus.

[2] A ref. to *Or. Chald.* Fr. 3 Des Places, presumably by Iamblichus himself.

very much as if Iamblichus saw each henad, or god, as the head of a sequence of manifestations of itself at various levels, from the intelligible down to the bodily, by each of which it is participated. This is nothing less than a σειρά, and indeed the doctrine of henads seems to involve the doctrine of *seirai* for the henads to govern. Proclus does not, of course, object to the doctrine, simply to the idea of associating these participated entities too closely (i.e. in the same Hypothesis) with the imparticipable One.

To conclude, it seems plain that the 'revered' individual who is the object of criticism from *In Parm.* 1066, 16 to 1071, 8 had a doctrine of henads and of their participation by *seirai* of entities right down the scale of being, and it seems equally plain that this individual can only have been Iamblichus. The doubt that has hung over of the question of the origins of the doctrine of divine henads should therefore be dispelled, and Iamblichus should be given the credit which his successors of the Athenian School certainly did not grudge him, though they were frequently less than specific in acknowledging the extent of their debt.

APPENDIX C

The Theology of Iamblichus' Essay Περὶ τῆς ἐν Τιμαίῳ τοῦ Διὸς δημηγορίας

Plainly the metaphysical scheme revealed by Proclus at *In Tim.* I 308, 18ff. is far more elaborate than that being employed by Iamblichus in his *Timaeus Commentary*, and Proclus quotes this scheme, from Iamblichus' treatise [1] 'On the Speech of Zeus in the Timaeus' in order to convict Iamblichus of inconsistency. I find it hard to believe that this could have formed part of Iamblichus' main Commentary, but I feel that it is worth setting out here the scheme therein contained (For the text see Comm. *ad In Tim.* Fr. 34):

(1) 'Triads' of noetic gods are mentioned. I presume these to be *three* triads, as we find next:

(2) τὰς τῶν νοερῶν θεῶν τρεῖς τριάδας. Here, following the scholiast ad loc., (*In Tim.* I 473) I read τῶν <νοητῶν καὶ> νοερῶν θεῶν, as we find *next*:

(3) a noeric hebdomad, in which the Demiurge holds τὴν τρίτην τάξιν ἐν τοῖς πατράσιν.

We seem to have here, especially if the emendation in (2) is accepted, a Chaldaean-influenced schema the complexity of which would have satisfied even Damascius: (three) triads of the noetic realm, followed by three triads of the noetic-noeric realm, followed by two noeric triads. These last should be followed by the ὑπεζωκώς, the seventh member of the noeric hebdomad in Chaldaean-influenced Neoplatonic theology. But who are these Fathers? This seems to be the name for the first noeric triad, the second being

[1] Olympiodorus' reference to this work (*In Alc.* 2, 4f.) is somewhat disturbing: διὸ καὶ ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος ὑπομνηματίζων τὸν διάλογον (sc. *Timaeus*) ἐπέγραψεν 'εἰς τὴν δημηγορίαν τοῦ Διός'. ἐπιγράφω should mean simply 'entitle', which would make the whole mean: ". . . Iamblichus, when writing a commentary on the dialogue, gave it the title . . .". In that case, I submit that this 'commentary' of Iamblichus' is not his main commentary, but simply the essay to which Proclus refers. It is possible, I suppose, that ἐπιγράφω could have the meaning 'write in addition', but I prefer the former alternative.

termed the ἀμείλικτοι. The Fathers are the triad ὄν—ζωή—νοῦς manifested at the noeric level. This passage describes the characteristics of each of them, attributing the doctrine to 'The Pythagoreans', a thing which Iamblichus liked to do.

The Nous-which-is-One, first, or the εἷς νοῦς, contains within himself 'all the monads'. The monads of what? We must assume, surely, the monads of the Forms, and refer to *In Phileb.* Fr. 4, where it is stated that the Father contains within himself not the Forms, but the monads of the Forms. He is also given the epithets ἁπλοῦς, ἀδιαίρετος, ἀγαθοειδής, μένων ἐν ἑαυτῷ, and συνηνωμένος τοῖς νοητοῖς, this last signifying his special connexion with the realms superior to his own. The C scholiast on Proclus (I 473) identifies this principle with Cronos.

The middle element is described as that which 'gathers together the fulness (συμπλήρωσις) of the three'; it is γόνιμος, συναγωγός, τῆς ἐνεργείας ἀποπληρωτικός, τῆς θείας ζωῆς γεννητικός, προίων πάντη, ἀγαθουργός.

It has, in fact, all the marks of a female life-principle. The C Scholiast identifies it with Rhea.

To the third element, the Demiurge proper, identified by the scholiast with Zeus, 'the Pythagoreans' attribute μόνιμοι πρόοδοι, τῶν αἰτίων ὅλων ποίησεις καὶ συνοχαί, ἀφωρισμέναι ὅλαι τοῖς εἴδεσιν αἰτίαι, and αἱ προίουσαι πᾶσαι δημιουργίαι. These are certainly demiurgic attributes. Presumably only in the Demiurge proper are the Forms proper manifested.

The C Scholiast must be in error, in spite of his useful identifications, when he takes the 'hebdomad' as comprising three noetic, three noetic-noeric and one noeric. The hebdomad is clearly stated to be the *noeric* hebdomad. The triad of 'Fathers' (one of whom, we may note, is actually a Mother) is followed by a triad of ἀχραντοὶ or ἀμείλικτοι θεοί, followed in turn by the ὑπεζωκώς. These are not mentioned in the passage, but inevitably implied in the term 'hebdomad'.

It is possible in fact that Proclus is not doing complete justice to Iamblichus' views here, in order to make the sharpest possible contrast with his other view of the Demiurge. The more general 'Chaldaean' view seems to have been that the Demiurge presided over the whole noeric realm, or rather that the whole noeric realm was demiurgic.

Julian, in *Or.* 5 (172D) refers to the Chaldaean Oracles' cele-

bration of ὁ ἑπτάκτις θεός, who, as the intellectual paradigm of the celestial Helios, will be in fact the Demiurge, the Helios of Julian's *Oration Four*. Damascius, *Dub. et Sol.* I 294 refers to ὁ ἑπταχῇ προιὼν ὅλος δημιουργὸς παρὰ τοῖς Χαλδαίοις, and at I 295 to οἱ ἑπτὰ δὶς ἐπέκεινα δημιουργοὶ παρὰ τοῖς θεουργοῖς, making all the noeric entities demiurgic.

We have, then, clear evidence that the *Chaldaean Theology* was already fully elaborated by Iamblichus, as if the fact of having written a work of at least twenty-eight books on the subject were not indication enough. What remains uncertain until all the fragments of Iamblichus' works are assembled and evaluated is the extent to which each of his works exhibits this full elaboration. It seems likely from the surviving fragments that at least the *Timaeus Commentary* does not, though there are conflicting indications from the remains of the other commentaries.

One of the significant differences between the Chaldaean and the simpler Platonic system is the situation of the Demiurge, and together with that, the location of the Forms. If the Demiurge is to be ranked only in the third of the three realms which now spring up between the One and the World Soul, then what is going on in the two higher realms, the noetic and the noetic-noeric? 'Anticipations', 'pre-figurations' and the like, no doubt, but the situation remains confusing for an outsider.

INDICES TO INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY

WORD INDEX TO FRAGMENTS

Note

The task of providing a word index to these 'fragments' is not without problems. One cannot claim that this is an index to an unequivocal text of Iamblichus; it is simply an index to the language of these Iamblichean passages, of which the immediate author is, for instance, Proclus or Damascius. My hope is, however, that such an index will be a contribution to an eventual survey of Iamblichus' philosophical vocabulary. First, however, all the fragments must be collected, and then a comparison can be made with truly Iamblichean works, such as the *De Anima*, the *De Mysteriis*, the *Letters*, and portions of the *Pythagorean Sequence*.

I have included here all words and phrases (or instances of common words) in such parts of the fragments as may reasonably be taken to represent Iamblichus' own language, and which seem to be of any lexical or philosophical interest. (I include *voces Platonicae* except where they are direct quotations). Readers will have to make up their own minds about the likelihood of genuineness of individual entries. Obviously words quoted from *In Tim.* Frr. 62, 63, 67, 68 and 90 (the *verbatim* quotations from Simplicius) deserve special weight.

In giving references, I give abbreviations for each commentary, followed by the number of the fragment in italics, and then by the line-number. When a series of entries occurs from the same commentary (as is particularly the case with *In Tim.*), I omit all abbreviations after the first. In the case of multiple occurrences of a word in one fragment, I have simply written 'etc.' after the first entry, unless there is something remarkable in subsequent entries. In some entries, such as θεός or ψυχή, subdivisions have seemed desirable; in these cases I have given each subheading a paragraph of its own, and I separate the references by a comma instead of a semi-colon.

I. ANCIENT TEXTS QUOTED

[1] This refers to Vol. I of Wachsmuth's' *Anthology*, where the extracts from the *De Anima* are to be found.

[1] Other than *Lemmata*.

II. MODERN AUTHORITIES QUOTED

III. PROPER NAMES

IV. SUBJECTS

(a) *English Words*

(b) *Greek Words*